Kurdish nationalism : continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism

Continuities and Changes in

Kurdish Nationalism

Sina Godamoradpoer

Master Thesis in Political Science

University of Amsterdam

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Kurdish Nationalism

Continuities and Changes in Kurdish Nationalism

Author: Sina Godamoradpoer

Student number: 5881706

Due date: 24

of June 2016

Words: 25,600

Master Thesis in Political Science

University of Amsterdam

-- The picture on the First page is of a mural in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq depicting the proclamation of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad.

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Abstract:

In this research it is attempted to explain the continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism from the 1920s until the present day, this is done by employing the insights generated by the more important approaches to nationalism. These approaches are primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism. The method employed to this end, is the method of process tracing, which entails that evidence will be used from a detailed historical narrative to explain the outcome of interest.

It is contended in this thesis that nationalism has been present in Kurdistan since at least the 1920s, the date that is considered to be the starting point of the politicization of Kurdish nationalism. Yet in those days Kurdish nationalism is not considered to have had a mass presence among ordinary Kurds. It is also observed in this research that there have been two paths that Kurdish nationalism has traversed, leading to two different variants of Kurdish nationalism, which have been named the conservative and the radical form of Kurdish

nationalism. The conservative variant, which is represented by the Kurdistan Regional Government, is the type of nationalism that is less compatible with a modernist account of nationalism, the current orthodox approach to questions relating to nationalism. The other type of Kurdish nationalism, the more radical form, represented by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, is considered to have underwent a transformation in the second half of the 20th century due to processes of modernization in Turkey. Therefore, this variant in turn seems to be less compatible with primordialist or ethno-symbolist accounts of nationalism.

The central thesis in this research is therefore that it is difficult to account for the existence and overall development of Kurdish nationalism through the existing paradigms alone. All three approaches to nationalism can be seen to have their merits, yet all three also

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Table of Contents:

Introduction: --- 7-9

Theoretical Framework:

Introduction: --- 9-12

Primordialism: --- 12-16

Modernism: --- 16-23

Ethno-symbolism: --- 23-27

Conclusion: --- 27-28

Methods:

Introduction: --- 28

Case study design: --- 29-31

Process Tracing: --- 31-34

Data Collection: --- 34-35

Operationalization: --- 35-37

Conclusion: --- 37-38

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The Analysis of the continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism:

Introduction: --- 39-41

Kurdish nationalism in Turkey:

Introduction: --- 41-43

Koçgiri rebellion:

---

43-45

Sheikh Said rebellion: --- 45-47

The republic of Mount Ararat: --- 48-49

The Dersim rebellion: --- 50-52

The PKK and Kurdish nationalism: --- 52-56

Conclusion: --- 56-57

Kurdish nationalism in Iran:

Introduction: --- 58

The Republic of Mahabad: --- 59-61

After the republic of Mahabad: --- 61-63

Conclusion: --- 63-64

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Kurdish nationalism in Iraq:

Introduction: --- 64-65

First signs of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq: --- 65-66

Kurdish nationalism in Iraq as a mass movement: --- 67-72

Conclusion: --- 72-73

Kurdish nationalism in Syria:

Introduction: --- 73-74

The Kurds of Syria: --- 74-79

The ‘Arab Spring’ and the Kurds of Syria: --- 79-81

Conclusion: --- 81-82

Final Conclusion: --- 82-85

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Introduction:

It was on the sixth of March 2016 that exactly one quarter of a century had passed since the Kurds in Iraq took to the streets and spontaneously started an uprising that would set the foundations of what is now the Kurdistan Regional Government or KRG in Iraq (Rudaw 2016). The Kurdistan Regional Government is the as of yet only internationally recognized Kurdish political entity in the historical geographic region called Kurdistan. Since 2013 however a new de-facto autonomous Kurdish region has established itself in northern Syria called Rojava, meaning there where the sun sets in Kurdish, in reference to the western part of a Kurdish homeland. In the dramatic events that have unfolded since the Arab uprisings and the subsequent struggle of the international community with the regime of Bashar al-Assad as well as numerous terrorist groups including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra and others, the Kurdish people have gained international attention for their struggle against these aforementioned actors.

Yet not only have the Kurdish people attracted attention for their struggle against enemies that have gained worldwide notoriety for cruel behavior, in which case Kurdish female fighters are presented in the starkly contrasting picture of heroines fighting these enemies by international media (CNN 2014, BBC 2014, TIME 2015). The Kurds have also risen in influence and are more powerful an actor in the Middle-East than ever before, with this rise in importance there obviously should also be a concomitant rise of the international community’s understanding of this increasingly important actor.

The Kurdish question goes back longer than the present conflicts in the Middle-East however, indeed the Kurds have since long before revolted against the circumstances under which they have lived and still live. In Turkey, for example, from the 1920s onwards there were various uprisings against the Turkish state and a long running guerilla war has been ravaging the country since 1984. Understanding who the Kurds are and more importantly

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what motivates them in their political behavior should provide for a more solid bases for sound policy towards the Kurds and the geo-strategically important Middle-East. Kurdistan, the geographical area that Kurdish nationalists intend on turning into a state, is approximately the size of France and even though there are hardly any reliable figures on the number of Kurds in the Middle East, the Kurds are generally considered one of the four largest peoples of that region. Yet surprisingly little is known about the Kurdish people, and even though most Kurdish political movements are referred to as ‘nationalist’ in international media (despite claims to the contrary by some of the movements concerned) very little is known about Kurdish nationalism too. It is this gap in knowledge that this thesis will try to address, in an attempt to understand Kurdish nationalism, and thereby the collective behavior of the Kurds, it will be attempted to explain the continuities and changes of Kurdish nationalism since the 1920s (the start of the division of the Kurdish people into the different

contemporary states) until the present.

To this end, the following research question will be posed: How can we explain the

continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism from the 1920s until the present. Using this

research question will allow for a better understanding of Kurdish nationalism over the course of its development. For questions concerning the Sykes-Picot agreements, rivalry between the Persian, the Arab and the Turkish states and generally the geopolitical state of affairs in the Middle-East, to name a few, all to some extent relate to the Kurdish nation. Thus to understand their nationalism is to gain insight in their political behavior, at least to some extent, and to gain insight in the political behavior of the Kurdish people is to

understand more of this important region called the Middle-East.

There are of course a lot of theories on nationalism and nation formation, and to explain the continuities and changes of Kurdish nationalism we must place the development of Kurdish nationalism within this debate. With different thinkers having different ideas on

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nationalism, it would make sense to evaluate what has been previously discovered about this powerful phenomenon and to use these insights to explain the continuities and changes of Kurdish nationalism. In short there are three major approaches, or paradigms, that attempt to explain nationalism: primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism and it is the concern of the next chapter, the theoretical framework, to set out these approaches.

Theoretical Framework:

Introduction:

“It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who gain by the new ones.”

― Niccolò Machiavelli

This quote by Machiavelli could well be applied to the Kurdish case in the twenty first century instead of sixteenth century Italy. And it is easy to see that it is indeed extraordinary difficult to start a new country, perhaps even one with an alternative political-economic system, and it is also clear to see that the initiators would acquire the enmity of all who would profit by the old ways. Yet there is one caveat, it must be wondered whether the initiators of a Kurdish state would find merely lukewarm defenders in those who stand to gain from the new state? For could it be that Kurdish nationalism could compel Kurds to strive for

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nationhood with fervor? To answer this question, we must cast a look on Kurdish nationalism and its state of development, to this end we must first try to understand what nationalism is, how it can be understood and what has been written about it.

What is nationalism? As a term nationalism is often associated with the sense of solidarity one has with one’s nation, nationalism being a sentiment, but it can also entail people striving for sovereignty and self-determination for their national group, nationalism being a political ideology. Apparently first coined by the German philosopher Johann

Gottfried Herder as a term some two hundred years ago, nationalism has become inextricably linked to modern day political legitimacy and an immensely powerful engine for political action. Take for example the second paragraph of the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonization of 14 December 1960: “All peoples have the right to

self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (un.org). Or the second line in the first article and the first chapter of the United Nations’ founding charter, which declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations is: “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” (un.org). This right to self-determination for all peoples refers to the political sovereignty of nations, the nation being at the core of political legitimacy and the having the sole right to determine its own

development as it deems fit. Obviously it has not always been the case that the nation has been at the center of political legitimacy as it is today, with the world being divided into different nation-states and people’s loyalty being primarily to their nation. This is nationalism as a political ideology at work. It is generally agreed upon that the discourse of nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that it did not exist prior to the seventeenth century (Calhoun 1993: 213).

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According to Elie Kedourie the discourse of nationalism, or the way nationalists see the world, consists of three basic propositions, namely: “that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government” (Kedourie 1960: 9 in Calhoun 1993: 213). Thus while political legitimacy prior to the seventeenth century could be drawn from the Church, the tribe or the empire, from the seventeenth century onwards

“nationalism has become the preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-determination” (Ibid.). Furthermore, according to Anthony D. Smith, in today’s world “the nation, the national state and nationalism have come to occupy the commanding heights of political allegiance and political identity” (Smith 2002: 1). And this for the first time in history, since in human history people have lived in all kinds of

communities and have had many different kinds of identities without one identity or form of community becoming pre-eminent globally. Today’s world is different however with the world divided over nations and nation-states. Others would even go so far as to argue that “no single political doctrine has played a more prominent role in shaping the face of the modern world than nationalism” (Özkirimli 2000: 1). Surprisingly however, very little research has been done on nationalism, especially considering the monumental impact it has had and continues to have on human life. For it is only in the last three or four decades that thinking on this important phenomenon has become more substantial (ibid: 2).

The question what nationalism is has much to do with the relation of other forms of identity such as “class, region, gender, race, or religious belief” with the nation (Özkirimli 2000: 58). The degree to which these other forms of identity relate or contribute to the construction of national identities is a source of great controversy (ibid.). Thus while some scholars will consider ‘objective’ criteria, such as language or race as more important for defining nationhood, others will consider ‘subjective’ criteria more important, for example

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self-awareness or solidarity (ibid.). Because there are different opinions on what constitutes the nation there are also different answers to questions as to what the relationship is between nationalism and the nation, what the origins of nations are and how national phenomena can best be understood. Yet to answer the question how we can explain the differences and continuities of Kurdish nationalism we must place Kurdish nationalism in the historic process of the development of theory on nations and nationalism.

Therefore, in this theoretical section it will be set out what so far has been theorized on nations and nationalism and how this can be used for understanding Kurdish nationalism, this will be done by explaining the main theoretical approaches to nationalism, which are: primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism. By setting out the main ideas that have been presented by the scholars that can be placed under these umbrella terms we should be able to gain a fuller picture and make more sense of what is so far known on this elusive subject.

Primordialism:

Primordialism is considered the earliest paradigm of nations and nationalism, like modernism or ethno-symbolism it is not a theory but a paradigm or an approach, therefore there are different explanations for nationalism among scholars that can be considered primordialist. Even though the theories developed by the scholars that are considered primordialist display a “bewildering diversity” (Özkirimli 2000: 64) they do have common denominators, for example: “their belief in the antiquity and naturalness of nations” (ibid.). This grand narrative of primordialism, as Anthony Smith calls it, holds that the nation is a primordial category, one that it is found on primordial attachments. Meaning that nations are natural, ancient but also to a certain extent fixed phenomena (Smith 2002: 2). Thus even within primordialism we

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could further classify according to the weight some scholars would ascribe to, for instance, sociobiological, cultural or psychological factors in contributing to the construction of national identity. It will be refrained from doing so in this section however for the sake of clarity and conciseness, what is important here is to elaborate on how thinkers from this strand explain nations and nationalism, and what critiques can be levelled against this approach.

According to primordialists, since nations are natural, ancient and fixed, national identities are a natural part of all human beings and “a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears” (Gellner 1983: 6). Furthermore, the nation to which one belongs is predetermined and the past is the story of the nation’s perpetual struggle for self-realization (Özkirimli 2000: 66-67). It should come as little surprise then that this is also the view of most nationalists themselves, namely that nations have always existed and that one nation can objectively be told apart from other nations, or that identifying with one’s nation is the natural state of affairs for human beings. Another common denominator of most

primordialists is their belief that since ethnic and national ties are given by nature, if you will, “the strong attachments generated by language, religion, kinship and the like […] are also fixed, or static” (ibid: 75). In other words, these attachments are “transmitted from one generation to the next with their ‘essential’ characteristics unchanged” thus “what we witness today is only a reassertion of the national essence” (ibid.). Thus these strong attachments (ethnic and national ties) are seen from an essentialist point of view in the sense of their characteristics remaining unchanged, and the national essence having been present all along.

Johann Gottfried Herder was one of the first thinkers on nationalism and is often considered a primordialist thinker on nationalism. As a German living in the eighteenth century his was a Romantic form of nationalism grounded in the German Romanticism of his era. Herder’s theory of nationalism “remonstrated against foreign influences in his time” and

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“urged the German people to develop a national culture” a national culture based upon a native foundation (Schmidt 1956: 408). “Looking for the basic historical and natural laws which could serve as a foundation for a philosophy of history” his assertion was that “time, place and national character govern all events that happen among mankind” (Ibid: 408). This is of course a different outlook on nationalism than that of some of the Enlightenment

thinkers before him like Rousseau and Montesquieu, for Herder believed in the uniqueness of national cultures, and “in extolling the virtues of the diversities of cultures, Herder’s aim [was] to repudiate the universalism of the Enlightenment” (Özkirimli 2010: 13). His form of nationalism can be considered cultural nationalism which entails that “the nation was a natural cultural development to Herder” (Schmidt 1956: 408). Therefore, this form of

nationalism can be considered as a primordial explanation of nationalism since we have come to see in this section that primordialism holds nations to be natural and fixed, and language, kinship and territory are considered to be givens.

Another thinker that can be considered a primordialist thinker on nationalism, specifically the cultural version of primordialism, is Clifford Geertz. In the 1994 essay on primordial and civic ties Geertz elaborates on the tension between people’s primordial and civic motives and what it means for states. Geertz claims in that article that people have primordial attachments that stem from ‘the givens or assumed givens of social existence: kin connection mainly but also speaking a particular language, being born into a particular religious community or certain social practices’ (Geertz 1994: 31). He then claims that “these congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves (Ibid.). What is meant with this here is that people are bound to one another not because of practical necessity or common interest but because of natural affinity, in other words: primordial bonds. Thus nations are seen here to be natural constructs based on the givens of social existence and not necessarily based on

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However, primordialism has its critics and critique too, and no longer the orthodoxy in studies on nationalism it would be no more than sensible to evaluate some of the critical points raised against it, and account for its less prominent position in contemporary analysis of national phenomena. In short the critique of primordialism centers around questions raised to primordial explanations concerning: the date of emergence of nations and nationalism, the origins of ethnic and national ties and the nature of these ties (Özkirimli 2000: 75). Or as Anthony Smith notices: primordialism has the strength to “draw attention to long-term significance of popular attachments, kinship and cultural bonds” yet it has as a downside the failure to account for the “social and cultural changes to which such attachments are subject, and which so often transform the character of the communities which coalesce around them” (Smith 2002: 2).

As stated primordialists hold belief in the antiquity of nations and nationalism yet one can easily argue in favor of the historic novelty of both concepts since it has historically been the norm for the states and empires in history to rule over diverse and ethnically

heterogeneous populations. Nation-states as composed out of a single or dominant ethnic group in which ethnic identity matters as much as it does today are novelties. Empires came and went with peoples being molded together or disbanded depending on whether a certain ruler or an empire would stand the test of time, thus states being based on stable nations are indeed novel. Another critique raised against primordialism has to do with the origins of ethnic and national ties, primordialists would like to contend that “ethnic and national attachments are ‘underived’, hence prior to all social interaction” (Özkirimli 2000: 77). Yet this leaves little room for the construction or reinvention of the national identity by nationalist movements.

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nationalists alike is the “historical novelty of both the concept of the nation and the forms of political units now called nation-states” (ibid: 81). Since many of the historical empires and states that have ruled parts of the world were hardly ethnically homogeneous, with empires ruling diverse populations and often rulers having a different ethnicity than the population they ruled. Yet this fact, that rulers and the subject population did not have the same

ethnicity, was not in itself a reason for revolt, nor was a shared ethnicity a ground or cause for solidarity. Thus the idea that ‘the national and the political unit should be congruent’ to go along with Gellner (1983), or that a nation should rule itself, was not dominant among people. This brings us to the contention that nations and nationalism could be modern constructs, an account espoused by the modernists.

Modernism:

As stated before modernism, as an approach, is the current orthodoxy in studies concerning nationalism. Although modernism is quite diverse an approach (for example the main explanatory focus being on socio-cultural, economic, political, or other factors in different theories) all modernist approaches have a few things in common. Namely, modernists consider nationalism as an “explicitly modern ideology and movement”, that is from the eighteenth century onwards (Smith 2002: 4). As “a social structure and cultural system” the nation too is considered to be explicitly new and modern. The same can be said about the international system of nation states. And finally, all three: nationalism, nations and the international order of nation states are seen to spring from “specifically modern conditions; namely, capitalism, bureaucracy, industrialism, urbanization, secularism and the like. This is what makes them qualitatively distinct from any form of community or belief system in pre-modern epochs.” (ibid.).

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In his book ‘Theories of Nationalism’ (1983) Anthony Smith claims in the third chapter, acidly called ‘The Religion of Modernization’, that “contemporary sociological theories of nationalism start from the notion of ‘modernisation’” and that “most of them see the movement as a subspecies of ideologies which erupt from and expand this overall process, …” (Smith 1983: 41). Modernization to Smith is in short “the more or less painful transition from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘modern’ type of society” (ibid: 42). In this

abovenamed chapter Smith quotes from the works of Eisenstadt and Smelser who assert that, as Eisenstadt claims, nationalism “links the community’s tradition with the modernising process.” And does so “by forging roles which unite universal with particularistic orientations to underpin the civil order” (ibid: 43). This occurs of course in a stage in society where the process of modernization and the concomitant rapid changes produce dislocation and conflict. Or as Smelser’s account attests to in the words of Smith, “The experience of rapid change brings inevitable conflicts and violent discontinuities. It is people who are most dislodged from the securing ties of the traditional order who feel particularly drawn to collective movements, and this is because their promise of a new dispensation and ideal harmony is designed to short-circuit the very real problems of the situation. One such promise is nationalism. As an impetus to economic development it is more potent than the protestant ethic” (Smith 1983: 43). This may all sound quite abstract, but an example would be the industrial revolution where people who were dislodged from ‘the securing ties of the

traditional order’ got drawn to collective movements such as the national movement. And in this way the ‘promise’ of national harmony and belonging or the idea of nationalism soothing and ‘short-circuiting’ the ‘inevitable conflicts and violent discontinuities’ that the experience of rapid change brought with it.

Obviously there are other thinkers on nationalism with modernist inclinations too, according to Anthony Smith the most forthright and original exponent of modernism has

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been Ernest Gellner, whose “overall purpose has been to demonstrate the sociological necessity of nations and nationalism in the modern world” (Smith 2002: 4). It is Ernest Gellner who formulated the by now famous maxim that nationalism is “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983: 1). Considering nations as necessary in a given historical epoch, namely that of modernity, to Gellner the reason we live in a world of nations is to be found in the type of society that modernity brings forth: “an industrial growth-orientated kind of society” (Gellner 1964, chapter 7 in Smith 2002: 4). Gellner poignantly notes in the opening sentence of

another article ‘Nationalism’, written in 1981, that there “is almost an inverse relationship between the importance of nationalism in the modern world and the amount of scholarly attention it has received.” (Gellner 1981: 753).

As stated Gellner considers nationalism a consequence of modernizing societies, therefore, in his 1981 article he lists certain traits that he believes have led to the rise of nationalism, traits that relate to modernization. Some of these traits are: ‘political

centralization’, ‘high economic specialization’ and ‘inter-career mobility’. While it would make no sense to discuss all of the traits that Gellner lists, it could prove worthwhile to dwell on the above traits to clarify why to Gellner there is a necessity for nations and nationalism in the modern world.

The first of these traits, political centralization, relates to industrial societies always being centralized, and with centralization is meant that there is a “monopolization of legitimate violence by some political center.” (ibid.). In other social forms of human

societies, there have always been different loci of violent legitimization and the maintenance of order, think for example of feudal or tribal society, where feudal lords or tribes together with a possible center could hold power too. Something which is obviously a far cry from modern society which has only one center of power, only one force with a monopoly of

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The second trait concerning high economic specialization is also a recognizable feature of modern society. For according to Gellner it is not only security that is the

specialization of a few, but the productive activities undertaken in society also entail a very high degree of specialization. The trait inter-career mobility comes down to the point that “while specialization is great, so is inter-specialist cooperation, and hence the need to be able to communicate.” (ibid: 757). This inter-specialist cooperation and the need to be able to communicate obviously have important consequences for the educational system, and according to Gellner: “a large part of our quite essential training consists of acquiring a kind of shared base, which enables us to retrain quickly when changing jobs, and also to

communicate with each other when engaged in our work.” (ibid.). This in turn leads to the potential of nationalism to be able to thrive in modern society since a shared education to certain extent is an economic necessity that at the same time creates a shared base for people. It becomes clear now that to Gellner we live in societies that are “fairly homogeneous

internally in a cultural sense.” (Gellner 1981: 761). This cultural homogeneity that has been induced by these above mentioned traits is the same as the idea that nationalism is a

consequence of societies modernizing. Or the idea that these mentioned traits consequently bring about nationalism. With the above mentioned in mind it becomes clear why to Gellner there is a ‘sociological necessity for nations and nationalism’ in the modern world.

Another influential thinker on nationalism that can be considered modernist, yet who has a different take on the matter, is Benedict Anderson. In his highly acclaimed book

‘Imagined Communities’ Anderson claims that nations are imagined political communities in the sense of being inherently limited as well as well as sovereign (Anderson 2006: 6). Any account of theories of nationalism would we woefully inadequate without an explanation of the claim by Anderson that nations are “imagined communities”.

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What this by now famous statement means comes down to, are the following features: nations are imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion” (Ibid.). Another feature is that even the largest of nations have finite boundaries “beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson 2006: 7), every nation is delineated at a certain point and there are no nationalists who would like their nation to encompass all of humanity. Thus there are boundaries that limit nations. Furthermore, nations are imagined as sovereign since there is not a single authority that can legitimately hold sway over different nations. Enlightenment and Revolution have destroyed the legitimacy “of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” (Ibid.).

With being imagined as a community Anderson points to the observation that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Ibid.).

According to Eric Hobsbawm, also an influential modernist thinker on nationalism, in his seminal work ‘Nations and nationalism since 1780’ most of the important literature on nations and nationalism has “turned to the question: what is a (or the) nation?” (Hobsbawm 1992: 5). Concerning this question, for Hobsbawm the ‘chief characteristic’ of attempting to classify groups of people as a nation is that there is no satisfactory criterion for deciding which human collectivities can be considered nations. In other words, the often made attempts at establishing objective criteria for nationhood a priori have failed (Ibid.). The reason Hobsbawm gives for the failure of objective definitions lies in the simple fact that “since only some members of the large class of entities which fit such definitions can at any time be described as ‘nations’, exceptions can always be found” (Ibid: 5-6). Furthermore,

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according to Hobsbawm, the criteria used for the purpose of objectively determining what a nation is, such as language or ethnicity are themselves ambiguous concepts, ever shifting and not suitable for the intended purpose.

An alternative that Hobsbawm recognizes is to identify nations in a subjective manner, “whether collective (along the lines of Renan’s ‘a nation is a daily plebiscite’) or individual, in the manner of the Austro-Marxists, for whom ‘nationality’ could attach to persons, wherever they lived and whoever they lived with, at any rate if they chose to claim it” (Ibid: 7). Hobsbawm also warns that “defining a nation by its members’ consciousness of belonging to it is tautological and provides only a a posteriori guide to what a nation is” (Ibid: 7-8). Also to take consciousness as the criterion of nationhood is to “subordinate” the many complex ways in which humans define themselves as members of groups to only a single option, namely “the choice of belonging to a ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’” (Ibid: 8). Yet if there are no objective criteria to define nations, then nations and nationalism must be modern constructs as opposed to objectively definable and ancient nations. Since the criteria for nationhood themselves are ambiguous and ever shifting. It must also be noted that Hobsbawm, along with Gellner, considers nationalism to be ‘primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent’ (nationalismproject.org 1999-2007). And since nationalism belongs to a definite modern epoch, they are invented in these modern times by people and nothing natural, thus it is not nations that make states and nationalisms but the other way round (ibid.).

These are the ways in which, some of the more important thinkers on nationalism that have been commonly considered modernist have described and explained nationalism. To recapitulate: Gellner considers nations and nationalism to be a sociological necessity of modern societies and certain features of an industrial growth orientated society have led to cultural homogeneity and the rise of nationalism. Benedict Anderson claims that nations are

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inherently imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them. Therefore, nations are to

Anderson nothing primordial or natural but socially constructed by people, they are an imagined communion in the modern age. Hobsbawm finally, considers nations to be

definable only subjectively, rejecting objective criteria. Hobsbawm claims that criteria such as language or ethnicity are ever shifting and not suitable for defining a nation, thereby opening the door for the construction of national identity as opposed to the ancient, natural and objectively different nature of nations as seen by primordialists and some nationalists.

Of course modernists have had criticism too, let us review some of the criticisms levelled at Gellner and Anderson, two leading modernist scholars who at times have been labeled reductionist. According to Umut Özkirimli many scholars consider Gellner’s theory to suffer from a stark functionalism (Özkirimli 2000: 137). Since nationalism is a necessity for modern industrial society which could not function without it, in Gellner’s theory, “nationalism is unintended by the actors producing modernization” and “the causal

relationship between nationalism and modernisation is not recognized by agents operating in modernising societies” (O’Leary 1996: 85). In this theory it is contended, processes occur as if they were beyond the understanding of human beings and in which consequences seem to precede the causes, furthermore nationalism is considered by Gellner to be an effect of

modernization dictated by economic necessity (ibid.). A critique of Benedict Anderson is that his theory is culturally reductionist. As explained, Anderson considers nations to be imagined communities brought about by print-capitalism, yet if cultural affinities are constructed by print-capitalism it becomes difficult to explain why people are willing to make colossal sacrifices for their nations, or to explain the role wars have in shaping national consciousness (Balakrishnan 1996: 208-211 in Özkirimli 2000: 153).

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leading proponent is Anthony D. Smith, one of Smith’s claims is that “modernist approaches underestimate the significance of local cultures and social context” (Özkirimli 2000: 124). Ethno-symbolists tend to place more weight on the ‘preexisting ethnic ties’ among people than modernists do, and have as such critiqued modernists for underestimating these factors in the creation of nations and nationalism. Let us now turn to the ethno-symbolist approach.

Ethno-symbolism:

The name ethno-symbolism is a reference to the importance attached to the symbolic legacies of pre-modern ethnic identities for modern day nations. Uneasy with both the primordialist and modernist accounts of nationalism, ethno-symbolists have tried to tread the middle ground of these two paradigms (Özkirimli 2000: 168). Ethno-symbolists tend to claim that nations have formed over the course of many centuries, and that any analysis of nationalism should examine the formation of nations and nationalism over this timespan (Armstrong 1982: 4 in Özkirimli 2000: 168). John Armstrong for example views “nationalism as the most recent stage of an extended cycle of ethnic consciousness reaching back to the earliest

collective experiences in Egypt and Mesopotamia” (Smith et al. 1984: 453). Furthermore, ethno-symbolists claim that today’s nations cannot be understood without taking into account their “ethnic forebears”, in other words to understand nations and nationalism one has to take into account “the larger phenomenon of ethnicity which has shaped nations” (Hutchinson 1994: 7 in Özkirimli 2000: 168-169).

It naturally flows from the assumption that nationalism is the most recent stage of ethnic consciousness that modern nations and their ethnic forebears, those being “the collective cultural units” from which nations have sprung, do not differ that much qualitatively, their differences must be sought primarily in the degree to which they are

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different (Özkirimli 2000: 169). In this regard ethno-symbolists differ from modernists who would like to claim that nations and nationalism are inherently imagined, constructed and a sociological necessity of modernity. Hence ethno-symbolists suggest that ethnic identities change more slowly than modernists assume, yet once these identities are formed they can be incredibly persistent and durable over the centuries, often withstanding the tests of time (ibid.). This is of course not to say that ethno-symbolists reject all the arguments of the modernity camp and are really just primordialists in disguise, they do “accord due weight to the transformations wrought by modernity” (ibid.). Ethno-symbolists also reject the

assumption of primordialists that there is a strong continuity between the traditional cultural units and modern nations, it is only meant to point out here, once again, that ethno-symbolism attempts to occupy the middle ground of the primordialist and modernist camps and draw attention to ‘symbolic legacies of pre-modern ethnic identities for modern day nations’.

One of the leading scholars of nationalism that is generally considered

ethno-symbolist is Anthony D. Smith, therefore it is appropriate to evaluate his contributions to our understanding of nationalism. Smith’s central thesis is that “modern nations cannot be

understood without taking pre-existing ethnic components into account” (Smith 1986: 17 in Özkirimli 2000: 174). This of course resonates with the argument above by Hutchinson on taking into account the ‘ethnic forebears’ of nations in the attempt to understand today’s nations. Furthermore, these ‘pre-existing ethnic components’ are needed for the process of ‘nation-building’, without which there could be serious impediments to the ‘construction’ of nationhood (ibid.). Thus some sort of an ethnic basis is necessary for building a nation, it is important to clarify however what Smith’s exact definition is of a nation.

To Smith a nation is “a named human population sharing a historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991: 14). Smith claims that this

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‘working definition’ of nationalism allows us to better appreciate the “complex and abstract nature of national identity” (ibid.). When national identity is seen this way other elements of collective identity come into the equation “class, religious or ethnic” (ibid.) and therefore “national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element, even by particular factions of nationalists, nor can it be easily or swiftly be induced in a population by artificial means” (ibid.). It should also be clear from this definition of Smith that national identity is set “clearly apart from any conception of the state” (ibid.).

Of course when nations are considered to have pre-modern ethnic bases and nations are not merely a sociological necessity of modernity, one has to ask the questions why and how nations emerge, or what the causes and mechanisms are of the process of nation formation from these pre-existing ethnic ties (Özkirimli 2000: 175). Here Smith first

identifies two types of ethnic communities, or ethnie as Smith calls them, which gave birth to modern nations, the ‘aristocratic’ and the ‘demotic’, which both gave rise to different paths of nation formation (Smith 1991: 53). The aristocratic ethnic communities, which were

composed of aristocrats, higher clergy, and sometimes bureaucrats, higher military officials and richer merchants were confined to the upper strata of society and had close links with the upper echelons of neighboring aristocratic ethnic communities, they consequently lacked social depth and their “often marked sense of common ethnicity was bound up with [their]

espirit de corps as a high status stratum and ruling class” (ibid.). Conversely, the demotic

ethnic communities were more popular in the sense of “their culture [being] more diffused to other sections of the population as well” and “a distinctive historical culture helped unite different classes around a common heritage and traditions, especially when the latter were under threat from outside” (ibid.).

As noted above these two different ‘ethnies’ gave rise to different paths of nation formation, the first path, that of the aristocratic ethnie, is called ‘bureaucratic incorporation’

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by Smith (Özkirimli 2000: 178). “The survival of aristocratic ethnic communities depended to a large extent on their capacity to incorporate other strata of the population within their orbit” (ibid.). This has occurred most successfully in the Western European countries of England, France, Spain and Sweden where through the newly emerging bureaucratic state the dominant ethnie was able to “incorporate the middle classes and peripheral regions into the elite culture” (ibid: 178-179). Thus the dominant culture was diffused down the social scale through citizenship rights, conscription, taxation and infrastructural projects along with the movement towards a market economy and the decline of the clerical order (ibid: 179).

The second route of nation formation, that of the demotic ethnie, is different in the sense of the bureaucracy having a more indirect role (ibid.). Instead their ‘distinctive

historical culture’ being based on organized religion, for the process of nation formation there is a primary role for secular intelligentsias transforming “the community of the faithful” into “the community of historic culture” (ibid.). Thus there is a major role for intelligentsias in the nation formation process of demotic ethnies.

Nationalism then, to Smith is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith 1991: 73 in Özkirimli 2000: 181). Smith furthermore distinguishes between ‘Western civic-territorial’ and ‘Eastern

ethnic-genealogical’ nationalisms, where the first process of nation formation, namely that of the aristocratic ethnie, relates to the Western form of nationalism and the second process of nation formation, that of the demotic ethnic community, relates to the Eastern type of nationalism (Özkirimli 2000: 181-182).

Yet ethno-symbolists have their critics too, and it is important to evaluate some of the more important criticisms against symbolism. One strand of critique against ethno-symbolists holds that they have underestimated the differences between modern nations and

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the earlier ethnic communities, and that not “all ethnic groups had a fully developed group consciousness and a deep sense of history” (Symmons-Symonolewicz 1985: 219 in Özkirimli 2000: 184). Another critique is that it is not possible to speak of nations and nationalism in pre-modern eras, since whatever the degree of cohesion and consciousness was between the ethno-religious formations of the past, for example the Armenians and the Greek, they did not make political claims to independence or territory something which only has occurred since the age of nationalism (Eley & Suny 1996: 11 in Özkirimli 2000: 186).

To recapitulate, ethno-symbolists attempt to tread the middle ground of the primordialist and modernist approaches by drawing attention to the importance of pre-modern ethnic identities for pre-modern day nations.

Conclusion:

We have seen now that nationalism as both a sentiment and as a political ideology can be a very powerful engine for political action. We have also come to see that modern day political legitimacy or sovereignty ultimately belongs to the nation. However, it also became clear that it is generally agreed upon that the discourse of nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that it did not exist prior to the seventeenth century (Calhoun 1993: 213). For the first time in history one identity, the national identity, overrides all other forms of political identity in its demand for loyalty, and the world is now divided into nations and nation states.

The study of nationalism, however, remains elusive and understudied, as important as it may be for understanding modern political behavior. Yet even though the study of

nationalism has only become more substantial in the last couple of decades, there are still profound differences in the field on the answers to the more important questions raised. Questions relating to: the date and emergence of today’s nations, the role between nations

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and nationalism and the use of objective or subjective criteria for the definition of nationhood, to name a few.

The answers to these questions are of course answered differently by the different approaches that make up the field, and we saw that that the field consists primarily of the primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches. The primordialists considered nations to be natural and ancient, and therefore nationalism, or having a national identity was considered a natural state of affairs for human beings. Nations were also seen as fixed

phenomena by primordialists, thus not very malleable over time. Modernists, on the other hand, considered nationalism, nations and the international system of nation states to be explicitly modern constructs (Smith 2002: 4). Pointing to modernization as the wellspring of nations and nationalism, modernists hold the belief that it was industrialization, capitalism, secularism and the likes that led to the creation of nationalism, with nationalism engendering nations rather than the other way around. Finally, ethno-symbolists, uncomfortable with both the primordialist as well as the modernist accounts, pointed to the importance of pre-modern ethnic identities for modern nations. Claiming that nations were formed over the course of centuries and that pre-modern cultural units were of importance for any understanding of today’s nations, they denounced the explanation of nations and nationalism as a rigid modern construct.

Thus we have seen that there are profoundly different answers to even the most fundamental questions relating to this powerful phenomenon of nationalism. Yet choices must be made in this research concerning the definitions of nationalism employed and this will be the concern of the methods section.

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Methods:

Introduction:

Having completed the theoretical outlines in the previous section, we have now arrived at the section that deals with the methodological concerns of this thesis. In short this methods section encompasses three main components, which are: explaining the method that will be used for answering the research question, clarifying which data will be used for answering the research question and showing how this data will be operationalized. As for the question what the most useful strategy is for answering the research question the short answer is that since this is a case, the case of Kurdish nationalism from the early 20th century up until the

present day, and since we deal with a historical process, the continuities and changes of Kurdish nationalism in the above mentioned timeframe, it is the method of process tracing that most readily springs to mind for answering the question. After having presented what it means to conduct a case study and what the method of process tracing actually is, and above all how process tracing can fit into a case study, we will continue with explicating which data will be used for the answering of the research question. And after having discussed which data will be used this section we will proceed with setting out the operationalization of the data, so that we will know how the data will be measured, these then are the concerns of the next subsections.

Case study design:

It is according to Pascal Vennesson that “a significant part of what we know about the social and political world comes from case studies” (Vennesson 2008: 223). This research too focusses on the case of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century, since this is a single case, and

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not for instance a comparative research, a case study will be most suitable for answering the research question. Yet what does it mean to conduct a case study? And how will this be executed? First of all, the definition of a case that will be handled in this thesis is that: “a case is a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analysed empirically as a

manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events” (ibid: 226). In other words, a case is an occurrence, or a phenomenon, that is chosen by the researcher as something deviating that challenges the established theories on the subject, yet at the same time it can also contribute to existing theories when put into relation to other cases. Or in the words of Vennesson “In sum, confronted with the case, the challenge is to acknowledge and uncover its specific meaning, while extracting generalizable knowledge actually or potentially related to other cases” (ibid.).

So far the case as such, but how do we conduct a case study? And is it also necessary for the purpose of this research to extract generalizable knowledge related to similar cases? According to Bennett and Elman (2007) case study designs have a considerable advantage in studying the complex phenomena that make up International Relations (IR), and this is the main reason why they have played such a key role in IR research, or in their own words: “the prominence of qualitative methods in IR thus reflects these methods’ advantages in studying complex and relatively unstructured and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of the subfield” (Bennett & Elman 2007: 171). It is not difficult to see that these attributes of a case study design can also be useful for studying the case of Kurdish nationalism. However, one of the pitfalls of conducting a case study is that, as skeptics have argued, case studies can easily become “unconnected, atheoretical, and idiographic” research (ibid.). To cover for these dangers, it is very well possible to use the method of process tracing within this case study in order to conduct a solid research. Thus by using the method of process tracing this case study will be conducted, and we will see in coming subsection that it might not even be

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necessary, as Vennesson claims, to extract generalizable knowledge related to other cases for the purpose of this research. What process tracing is, how we can use it in this case study and why it is chosen as the method of choice for this research will be the concern of the next section.

Process Tracing:

Now what is process tracing? And how does it fit into conducting a case study? According to Bennett and Checkel process tracing comes down to “… the use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case” (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 4). And as such process tracing must have been around for a very long time since “it is nearly impossible to avoid historical explanations and causal inferences from historical cases in any purposive human discourse or activity” and therefore it could very well be the case that “related forms of analysis date back to the Greek historian Thucydides and perhaps even to the origins of human language and society” (ibid.). Yet how does process tracing differ from telling a historical narrative? And how do we use process tracing without stepping in the pitfall of using a general buzzword without explicating how it works in practice and setting out the proper mechanisms we need for process tracing? Or as Checkel (2006) correctly notices: “Proponents of process tracing should be wary of losing sight of the big picture, be aware of the method’s significant data requirements, and recognize epistemological

assumptions inherent in its application” (Checkel 2006: 363).

To Vennesson, even though there are different variants of process tracing, in general process tracing differs from ‘telling a story’ or a pure narrative in three ways: first of all, process tracing is focused, which entails that “it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the phenomenon” (Vennesson 2006: 235). This naturally means that parts of the story are lost

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on the researcher and that not everything can be taken into account. Secondly, “process tracing is structured in the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework identified in the research design” (ibid.). The third

difference between a historical narrative and process tracing is that “… the goal of process tracing is ultimately to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome” (ibid.). Thus the point is to explain a specific outcome, through the explanation of a causal path.

Yet there are of course different variants of process tracing, however, according to Beach and Pedersen (2013): “the state of the art treats process-tracing as a singular method, resulting in murky methodological guidelines” (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 9). According to these authors “there are three different research situations in which process-tracing methods can be used, resulting in three distinct variants of process-tracing” (ibid.). The central claim of Beach and Pedersen is that most of the time process tracing is used in a case-centric way that the authors have termed “the explaining-outcome process-tracing” while “most

methodological works prescribe a theory-centric version of process tracing that involves the deductive testing of whether a generalizable mechanism is present in a single case” (ibid.). So according to Beach and Pedersen certain accounts of process tracing “treat process-tracing as a single method, often defining it as a deductive tool to test whether causal mechanisms are present and function as theorized” (ibid: 10).

Thus to prevent a discrepancy between the objectives for process tracing set out in this methods section and the way process tracing is actually carried out in this research, where we want to account for outcome of a particular puzzle (in this case the continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism) we should take into account the different variants of process tracing that the aforementioned authors recognize. And as such refrain from treating process tracing as a singular method, instead choosing carefully how in this research process tracing

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should be carried out. What then are these different variants of process tracing?

To Beach and Pedersen first of all we can differentiate between theory-centric process tracing on the one hand and case-centric process tracing on the other. With theory-centric process tracing being further dividable between testing process tracing and theory-building process tracing. Within theory-centric process tracing the theory-testing variant of process tracing is all about testing whether ‘a causal mechanism is present and functions as theorized’ (ibid: 12). As such theory-testing process tracing is not about whether we can infer a new theory from this technique, rather it is meant to test a causal mechanism. This is

different in theory-building process tracing where it is the explicit goal to find out what the causal mechanism is between X and Y. Therefore, this variant of process tracing is better suited to build theories than the previous model.

Finally, different from both variants of theory-centric process tracing is case-centric process tracing where the goal is to “explain a particularly puzzling historical outcome” (ibid: 11). According to Beach and Pedersen the most common variant of process tracing in

practice, the aim of case-centric process tracing is not to test or build theories but to “craft a sufficient explanation of the outcome” in other words: “instead of studying mechanisms that cause war (Y), the analysis would focus on explaining a particular outcome such as World War I” (ibid.). Central to this position is the belief by case-centric researchers that “the social world is very complex, multifactored, and extremely context-specific” (ibid: 13). Therefore, the aim is to explain a certain outcome in their specific contexts, or how something came about, “the ambition is not to prove that a theory is correct but instead to prove that it has utility in providing the best possible explanation” (ibid.).

It seems from this analysis that case-centric process tracing will be most suitable for the purpose of this thesis, namely to explain the continuities and changes in Kurdish

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variant of process tracing will be the type that will be used in this research, and the choice to do so will be consciously made, this entails that it will be necessary to clearly keep an eye on the purpose of the methods throughout the thesis and not to get lured into the morass of theory building or theory testing endeavors.

As noted, the theory-centric forms of process tracing have the quality to serve as tools in determining whether there is a presence or an absence of a certain mechanism, whereas ‘explaining-outcome process tracing’ is more useful in making inferences on whether there is a sufficiency of the explanation that is made (ibid: 14). To employ the case-centric variant of process tracing the causal mechanisms that have led to a specific historical outcome need to be combined as a “eclectic conglomerate mechanism” in order for “a minimally sufficient explanation” to be made (ibid: 19). This all connotes in plain English that

explaining-outcome process tracing will resemble historical research in some ways, with the term causal mechanism being used in broad terms, and while it is the intention to set out the causes of a particular historical outcome, it is nevertheless the case that more “generalized theoretical claims” are involved than is generally the case in historical research (ibid.). Furthermore, the theoretical merits research employing this method have can reach beyond the single case under study, thus this form of research can still be considered social science research rather than pure historical scholarship (ibid.).

Data collection:

Since we deal with an in depth historic case, the case of Kurdish nationalism, it is important to take into account what already has been written on Kurdish nationalism, what already has been analyzed. In order to do so it is necessary to primarily use secondary data in this research, that is other works on the topic. Yet since the research question on explaining the

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continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism is a novel question, which has not been answered satisfactorily in previous research, this thesis will not be a repeat of previous works. Therefore, building on other research on this topic it should be possible to come up with new insights. The data collection instrument of this thesis will therefore primarily consist of reviewing secondary literature. Although having multiple methods of data collection, for example conducting surveys and interviews together with documental research, can enrich the data and indeed increase the validity and reliability of the data, it is beyond the practical limits of this research to conduct other forms of research too.

Operationalization:

Before we can explain the continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism we need to

operationalize the concept of Kurdish nationalism. We have defined nationalism conceptually in the theoretical section, that is on an abstract level, by showing how some of the more important thinkers on nationalism have understood the phenomenon. It is important now however to give the operational definition of Kurdish nationalism as meant in this thesis or in other words to operationalize the concept of Kurdish nationalism, or how we will ‘measure’ the concept of Kurdish nationalism (Adcock 2001: 531).

The definition of Kurdish nationalism in this thesis is understood to be: ‘an

ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of the Kurdish nation’. This of course is quite similar to the definition of nationalism given by Anthony Smith (1991) as set out in the theoretical section. The dependent variable in this definition is Kurdish nationalism. The independent variables or causes of nationalism are, as set out in the theoretical section, ambiguous and contested by the scholars dealing with the topic. Some scholars give primordialist explanations for the rise of nationalism while others

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give a modernist or ethno-symbolist account for its occurrence. Nevertheless, careful choices must be made in choosing the right independent variables for explaining the continuities and changes in Kurdish nationalism. The choice for the independent variables will be informed by, and compatible with, all three of the approaches elaborated on in the theory section, namely: ethno-symbolism, primordialism and modernism. This is considered necessary for a critical theory informed analysis and for the eventual answering of the research question.

The independent variables are: ‘ethnicity’, ‘modernity’, ‘ethnic group consciousness’, ‘intelligentsias’ and a ‘common history and shared myths’. The operational definitions then become the following: with ethnicity is meant that people belong to the same social group in the sense of sharing a cultural tradition. The choice for a shared culture is deliberate so that ethnicity in this research will not entail racial homogeneity or identifying with a state, this will allow this research to better grapple with the term ethnicity in a region where

assimilation into dominant cultures by tribes and peoples has been widespread. This definition of ethnicity will also allow to evaluate the importance of ‘ethnic identity’ to be examined for a stateless people, thus ethnicity refers to a group of people sharing a cultural tradition. The variable of ethnicity is, as we have seen, important for many primordialist accounts considering nationalism.

Modernity refers in this research to the process of transition from the traditional type of society to the modern type of society, key in this transition is industrialization.

Industrialization is often a state led process of transiting a traditional society into a growth orientated society marked by a lot of industry and high economic specialization as opposed to a traditional society with little economic specialization and little industry. Also of importance is the centralization of power that comes with modernity, that is a single monopoly of power by the state. This variable is of course inspired by Gellner’s theory, and it seems quite important to account for, or investigate, the impact that modernity has had on Kurdish

37 nationalism.

Ethnic group consciousness relates to the ethnic group’s awareness of a common culture being shared among the members of the social group. Questions to ask are whether the group considered to share a common culture by outsiders, for example neighboring nations or experts, are aware of it themselves, or in other words whether commonly the members of the group consider themselves to share a culture.

The operationalization of intelligentsia is: the intellectual ‘class’, or groups of people with well-established or developed ideas on nationalism and the Kurds, the intellectual elite of the Kurdish people so to say. With the operationalization of a common history and shared myths it is attempted to evaluate the importance of the ‘symbolic legacies of pre-modern ethnic identities’ for today’s nations. Common history therefore is understood to be the historical memory of a people and with shared myths is meant the beliefs and traditional stories held by a group of people. With the variables of ethnic groups consciousness,

intelligentsias and a common history and shared myths the ethno-symbolist considerations on nationalism are also taken into account. Finally, the period over which the data will be

analyzed concerns the 1920s until the present day. Thus the secondary data sources named in the previous section will be critically scrutinized for containing the mentioned variables in the above named operational definitions.

Conclusion:

In the introduction the claim was made that the most useful strategy for answering the research question would probably be the method of process tracing since this case is a historical process. We also saw that the observation has been made by some scholars that a lot that we now know about social and political processes comes from case study research.

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Having defined a case as “a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analysed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events” (Vennesson 2008: 226), we subsequently concluded that a case study design can have many properties that are serviceable for studying the relatively complex phenomena of International Relations. We also came to the realization that to prevent the research from becoming “unconnected, atheoretical, and idiographic” (Bennett & Elman 2007: 171) and to lay the methodological foundation this research required, the method of process tracing would be best suited.

We then saw that the method of process tracing, that is: “… the use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case” (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 4) came in different variants, with the ‘explaining-outcome’ variant of process tracing being considered the most useful version for this research. Since it was the aim of explaining-outcome process tracing to “explain a particularly puzzling historical explaining-outcome” (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 11), the choice was clearly made to choose for this form of process tracing and not to engage with theory-building or theory testing endeavors. It was also decided that the data collection instrument of this thesis would consist of conducting secondary literature research, although acknowledging that multiple data collection instruments within the same research was preferable, it was consciously decided to conduct literature research only, out of practical necessity. Also the concept of Kurdish nationalism was defined as: ‘the ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of the Kurdish nation’. With the indicators to look for when measuring and explaining Kurdish nationalism to be: ‘ethnicity’, ‘modernity’, ‘ethnic group consciousness’, ‘intelligentsias’, and a ‘common history and shared myths’. Having set out the methods it is now time to explain the continuities and changes of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century with this

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The Analysis of the continuities and changes in Kurdish

nationalism:

Introduction:

This research focusses on an important yet also understudied phenomenon in the Middle East, namely Kurdish nationalism. Why is this an important phenomenon one might ask. One answer could be that Kurdish nationalism, just like the German, Polish or Italian nationalisms in 19th century Europe, has the potential to challenge the existing geo-political balance of

power in its home region, the Middle East. What is important to explore however is how we can explain Kurdish nationalism, or even to what extent Kurdish nationalism can be

compared to the 19th century nationalisms of the above mentioned nations. Kurdish

nationalism could be a somewhat different occurrence. What is certain is that the Kurds are struggling politically, as a non-state force and a stateless people, to have a greater say in their own affairs thereby challenging the authority of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria over them. A central ingredient in this struggle has historically been, as we shall come to see in the next sections: nationalism. Furthermore, these are countries located in a strategically important region in the world and a change in the Kurdish question, for example Kurdish autonomy, could have major implications for the region.

The political struggle of the Kurdish people has historically not been led by a single unified Kurdish state, but rather by individuals, tribes or political parties depending on the time and place, as such the struggle of the Kurdish people represents that of a stateless nation against the dominant states and their state-centered nationalisms as well as the nationalisms of the dominant peoples in these states. Or as Benyamin Neuberger puts it in the second chapter of the book ‘The Kurds: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland’ (2014), “In Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Kurds are involved in a conflict with both the territorial