Shifting social housing market in Amsterdam : unitary or dualist?

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Shifting social housing market in Amsterdam.

Unitary or dualist?

Bachelor thesis 2018

Student: Enya Schots

Student nr: 11054344

Email: enya.schots@student.uva.nl Telephone: 0614819054

Study: Sociale geografie en planologie afstudeerrichting planologie Date: 17th of August 2018

Mentor: Richard Ronald

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Shifting social housing market in Amsterdam.

Unitary or dualist?

What used to be social housing as part of the welfare system in the Netherlands has changed a lot in the past 25 to 30 years. The Netherlands once had a social housing stock of 58% (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2014), these numbers are changing and so are the housing organizations, occupiers, rules and regulations.

According to Kemeny (1995) social housing can be separated into two different approaches, the dualist and the unitary approach. In the Netherlands social housing corporations had a prime role in the beginning of the social housing market. The large amount of social housing used to affect the market prices of housing because of its vast housing stock. This is also known as a unitary approach according to Kemeny (1995). The dualist approach involves a social housing market separated from the market and used only as a safety net. Although the Netherlands still has one of the largest social rented housing stocks in Europe, in the last decades a large part of their housing stock was sold (Elsinga et

al. 2008). Housing corporations also deal with other rules and regulation such as the

changing income boundaries for rented social housing and changes in their role such as renting out houses in the market sector and shrinking public subsidies. The Netherlands seem to be shifting from the unitary to the dualist approach, underlined by scientific analysis (e.g. Elsinga et al. 2008) and headlines in the news.

Up until now there has been much research on the social housing market, the dualist and unitary approach and how these are found in different settings. This has largely been done on a national scale, however. Although social housing is provided everywhere, social housing is more common in urban areas (Elsinga et al. 2008). In 1995 for example,

Amsterdam was at its peak with 58% of all housing being social housing while social housing in the rest of the Netherlands was at 44% of all housing (Van Duijne and Ronald, 2017). The role of cities is continuously getting bigger and cities are exposed to rapid growth, and so is Amsterdam. The city has never grown so rapidly and the prognoses is that the city will continue to grow (OIS Amsterdam, 2018). Also Amsterdam has to deal with neoliberal pressures and transformations which affect the housing market (Czischke, 2014). It is important not only to know how the Netherlands are shifting from a unitary to a dualist approach but also how Amsterdam is dealing with the social housing market under these extreme political and demographic pressures and if Amsterdam is also experiencing this shift from a unitary rental market to a dualist rental market. If Amsterdam is experiencing a different rental housing model this could imply that research on countries alone is not enough. Because of Amsterdams size in comparison to the rest of the country it could be useful to research other heavily populated cities too. This research will explore how the social housing sector is dealing with the extreme political and demographic pressures and if and how the social housing sector is fitting within the unitary or dualist approach. The research will first explore which features and characteristics of the social housing sector in Amsterdam have changed and second how the geographical composition of housing tenure

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within Amsterdam is shifting. By answering the sub-questions of how the features and characteristics of the Amsterdam housing market has changed the social rented housing market in Amsterdam can be fitted within the unitary and dualist approach. The second sub-question of how the geographical and spatial composition of these changes within

Amsterdam have shifted will give the research a more specific component. So the question of this research is:

To what extent is the social housing sector in Amsterdam shifting from a unitary to dualist approach?

This question will be answered through answering the following two sub-questions How have the features and characteristics of the Amsterdam social housing sector changed?

How is the geographical and spatial composition of housing tenure in Amsterdam shifting? The following section will elaborate on the theoretical framework which first explains

Kemeny’s framework which entails the features of the unitary and dualist rental sector in which the features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam should be placed. The theoretical framework then elaborates on the difference between public

housing and social housing and the relations between the welfare state and housing systems. The theoretical framework ends with an explanation of neoliberal ideologies and the relation of neoliberalism to tenure. This is followed by the methodology which

elaborates on the research design of this study and provides a conceptual model which explains relationships between features and the type of social housing market. In the next chapter the features and characteristics of the housing system of both the Netherlands and Amsterdam are explored. After this there is an exploration of, if and how these

characteristics are shifting differently in the different districts of Amsterdam. In the last chapter the features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam and the geographical and spatial composition of this shift in the different districts of Amsterdam will be brought into relationship with and compared to Kemeny’s framework.

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Theoretical framework

Kemeny’s framework of unitary and dualist rental markets

Kemeny’s (1995) theory of rental housing systems states that certain factors lead to one of two types of rental markets. Kemeny explains:

“The interaction between economic development of rental housing stocks and their long-term policy structuring delong-termines the trajectory of development that rental housing systems follow.” (Kemeny, 1995, p.38)

Kemeny makes a differentiation between unitary and dualist rental markets in which the biggest difference is whether the rental market is segmented into a segregated market or not. These housing systems influence patterns of social change (Kemeny, 1992). Housing tenure not only impacts society’s social structure and relations, it also structures

dependency of providers and users on welfare.

To explain the difference between unitary and dualist systems further Kemeny (1995) uses a concept known as maturation. This concept states that non-profit housing

organizations can use their cost-price as a guideline for their profits since they have lower costs because their debt is a lot lower than in housing organizations which must make profit (Kemeny et al., 2005). The ratio in which a organization has these debts in proportion to market value is the criterion for how solid the organization is. Maturation therefore determines how competitive an organization can be because housing organizations with a higher level of maturation can accept lower returns and this results in lower rents. They don’t have to lower the rents, this doesn’t happen in a market with demand sensitive rent pooling, for instance. In these cases they can offer housing for a rent level comparable to the private market, yet make more profit. The role of non-profit housing organizations can be reinforced by subsidies and rent regulation with the result that over time the non-profit housing organizations can achieve higher levels of maturation and compete with other forms of rental housing organizations.

In unitary rental markets there are two types of landlords that are distinguished. Elsinga et al. (2008) describe:

“In a unitary market, non-profit and for-profit landlords compete with each other without specific government support for the former.”(Elsinga et al., 2008, p.22)

This contradicts the dualist rental system where social housing is not competing with for-profit landlords and largely functioning as a safety net. To further explain, Kemeny

distinguishes two divergent policy strategies related to the maturation process of non-profit rental housing organizations known as suppression and encouragement.

Unitary rental markets

Kemeny (1995) explains rental markets can be encouraged to perform in an unitary sector. Kemeny clarifies the term of a unitary rental market as:

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“…In a unitary market cost rental housing organizations compete with private landlords for households under increasingly deregulated conditions …. supported often on equal or nearly equal terms to cost renting” (Kemeny, 1995, p.58-59)

Non-profit housing organizations and for-profit housing organizations both receive

government support, for instance in the form of subsidies. Competition can take place either through their maturation or other factors like subsidies which can later be phased out. They are able to maintain financial health and the rental prices string along market prices. Non-profit housing organizations in the unitary market have a broad target group. In this case if the non-profit housing sector is mature, it allows competition between non-profit

organizations and the private rental sector as well as the owner occupation sector. This creates an integrated or unitary market.

The maturation of the sector is then used to put pressure on the for-profit rental market and thus limiting landlord profit extraction from rental housing. Maturation of cost renting enables housing organizations to undercut profit renting. Then, according to Kemeny “Once cost rental organizations gain a significant share of the rental market they act as market leaders, determining the maximum level of private rents by their market preponderance” (Kemeny, 1995, p.56)

The position of market leader can restrict or even eliminate profit renting. It also results in a more attractive rental sector which then can be a substitution for owner occupation.

There is a differentiation in what type of unitary market exists. Unitary rental markets can range from being cost rental to a certain level of profit. In this differentiation a unitary part-profit rental market will have rents that are somewhat higher than in a unitary cost rental market because a part-profit market has a lower level of maturation and comprises a smaller percentage of the rental housing stock. If policy allows the part-profit market to mature, this rental system moves towards a cost rental market.

Kemeny’s model of the unitary rental market is challenged by some, for instance by Hoekstra (2010) who states:

“… so far an unregulated unitary rental market has never existed in reality, which makes it very much a hypothetical construct.” (Hoekstra, 2010, p.190)

However Kemeny’s model of unitary and dualist markets has been used for many years because it gives a extensive view on the housing systems and it explains not only the typology of housing systems but he also deepened this typology for he, as Lennartz says “sought to explain why they emerged, and has tried to relate this back to welfare state research” (Lennartz, 2010, p.6)

Dualist rental markets

Kemeny describes that on the one hand there is a concept of a ‘free market’ with profit as motive. In this free market, competition between profit seekers result in demand and

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supply. The concept of a free market assumes markets are detached from social and political institutions and social relationships such as gender, ethnicity and class.

Neoliberalism as ideology discourages state involvement, though few would argue there should be no state involvement at all. The peculiar thing here is that a profit driven market can only operate when non-profit economic activity is suppressed or discouraged via state involvement. So paradoxically the ‘free market’ becomes more profitable through state interventions to promote profits in the market and discouraging non-profit activities. According to Kemeny the consequence of such a free market, if we can call it that, is that social problems become more acute and it becomes desirable or even necessary to construct safety net provisions, these are then kept as negligible as possible to discourage their use. This construction causes a curious dualism to emerge, one where a largely unregulated profit-driven market which is sheltered from competition from non-profit activities exists yet with a strongly controlled state sector, existing of non-profit organizations.

In a profit market, part of the strategy is to suppress the non-profit rental market. Direct competition between the markets is avoided. The non-profit and private market are separated and strongly controlled by the government. The non-profit rental market is there to provide a safety net and consists of a public rental market which is strongly controlled. There are parallel public and private rental markets which are subjected to divergent forms of provision and tenure. The rental system that results from these action is known as a dualist rental system. In such a dualist system the social rental sector is not accessible to everyone because of income borders. Not everybody without access to the social housing market has enough money to rent in the private sector or is willing to do this though. Therefore the demand for housing is often directed to the owner-occupied sector. Limiting the possibility to enter the social rental sector and encouraging buying can be steered. On the supply side of social housing several actions can be taken to discourage this sector. For instance setting a low ceiling for companies and individuals on borrowing money for newbuild and renovation restricts supply and keeps housing standards low on the long-term. Behind the systematic and long-term deprivation lies a ‘poorhouse’ attitude to public renting meaning it’s for the poorest households which should be grateful for any housing offered and it shouldn’t be attractive. An example of this is state-subsidized housing in the US where the federal government failed to acquire land to build public housing, after which it handed out their tasks and responsibilities to public housing authorities (Blessing, 2014). However, limitations that fundamentally shape the path of developments were woven in public housing regulations and administrative structure (Schwartz, 2012).

The public housing was only meant for those couldn’t rent in the private rental sector and the low costs per unit combined with a design to stimulate, these features resulted in a public housing market with sub-market standards (Hays, 1995). The housing sector thereby followed patterns of racial and income segregation (Blessing, 2014).

Another way to reduce supply fast is forcible asset stripping through central

government legislated compulsory sales at discounted prices, inducing tenants to buy. This decreases the value asset value of the remaining stock and reduces the size of stock, thereby

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limiting access to the public rental sector. Not only can social housing be affected by measures like these, the degree of maturation can too by selling of low-debt properties. Unitary and dualist markets compared

According to Kemeny (1995) the main differences between unitary and dualist systems are that in a dualist system the state controls a large part of the public housing sector which is run as a command economy, keeping it completely separated from the profit market while in a unitary market there is an integrated market where non-profit and profit markets

compete under conditions which are equal or almost equal and are increasingly deregulated. The unitary market has an integrated rental market where housing is for a broad layer of the population whereas the dualist rental market has a much smaller non-profit market which is to be used only as a safety net.

Within a unitary rental market the growth of the non-profit sector isn’t oppressed nor are financial resources withdrawn yet subsidies are phased out when the rental market becomes more mature, this allows direct competition between the non-profit and for-profit market while in a dualist system the non-profit rental sector is strongly subsidized and, as Hoekstra (2010) describes it:

“In a … dualist rental system, the government normally tries to repress and counteract the maturation process in the social rental sector by, for example, forcing social rental landlords to sell off their dwellings with large discounts for the buyers.” (Hoekstra, 2010, p.86)

In terms of regulation of the rental market in a dualist system the non-profit rental sector is not only strongly subsidized but also strongly regulated while in a unitary system it’s

regulated initially but regulation is phased out just as subsidies.

Another defining difference is that in a unitary rental system the rent level is market-dependant and prices are kept lower than the market rents where in a dualist system there is no market-dependent rent level or differentiation in the rental sector. In a dualist system demand is always higher than supply.

In a unitary system social housing is for a broad layer of the population there are no stigmas on living in social housing and non-profit and profit have to compete for favors of households, also the owner-occupied sector is not dominant in a unitary system. On the other hand there is the dualist system where owner occupancy is dominant and the non-profit sector is stigmatized and only for those whom cannot buy a house.

The income of tenants in a dualist system are predominantly low-income which isn’t the case in an unitary system, here there are more medium and high income tenants. Kemeny (1995) constructed a scheme in which features of dualist and unitary markets are set out (See figure 1).

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Public housing and social housing

According to Malpass and Victory (2010) there are two different models of social housing, the public, or welfare state and the social housing, or post-welfare state model.

Modernization or change and transition occurs from the first to the latter model. This, Malpass and Victory argue:

“…is a process that has been underway since the 1970s” (Malpass and Victory, 2010, p.6) According to them the UK used to have a public housing model but shifted to the social housing model (Pearce and Vine, 2014) The public housing model and the social housing model have distinct features (Malpass and Victory, 2010).

The public housing model accommodates a broad social spectrum in the housing system, with as an example the UK housing sector before 1970 when the dominant housing sector was social rented housing. Ownership of housing overwhelmingly lies in the hands of municipalities and development of housing is also controlled by local authorities. Malpass and Victory (2010) call the type of governance municipal democratic which entails there is local autonomy. There is a bureaucratic or professional organizational culture. Housing is financed by the use of public sector loans and subsidies. The main housing tenure is renting where tenants are passive welfare recipients.

In the social housing model the role of social housing is predominantly residual, social housing in this model is functioning as a safety net where only households that cannot obtain a dwelling in the private market, can get social housing. Ownership lies in, as Malpass and Victory (2010) state,

“…mix of local authority and other social housing providers” (Malpass and Victory, 2010, p.7) and the development is mainly done by non-municipal providers, a shift from where

ownership was in the hands of municipalities to this mix has occurred in the UK according to Malpass and Victory (2010). The new developments are financed through a

“Mix of public and private loans; use of cross-subsidy from private developers” (Malpass and Victory, 2010, p.7)

The sector is heavily regulated by the central government. Its organizational structure is customer oriented with a focus on asset management. The dominant housing tenure is a mix of renting and shared ownership where tenants are active consumers which entails resident involvement is more important than in the public housing model.

When these models of social housing are compared to Kemeny’s framework, both in Malpass and Victory’s (2010) public model and Kemeny’s (1995) unitary model social housing is meant to accommodate a broad layer of the population and in both Malpass and Victory’s social housing model and Kemeny’s (1995) dual rental market social housing is provided as a safety net. The finance of the housing models also show similarities. In the public housing model, public sector loans and subsidies are dominant and in the dualist model, social housing is strongly subsidized. Although social housing in Malpass and Victory’s

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(2010) model is a mix of public and private loans and cross-subsidies and Kemeny’s (1995) unitary model can also be subsidized by the government, he does explain that:

“…subsidies and regulations are phased down until non-profit companies can participate on an equal footing with others on the open rental market” (Kemeny, 2006, p.3)

Kemeny (1995) also describes competition and rent levels and differentiation as features of his unitary and dualist rental housing markets, these are not mentioned in Malpass and Victory’s (2010) housing models.

Unlike in many other European countries, the Netherlands never had a dominant public housing sector (Pooley, 1992). Social housing has always been mainly provided by non-municipal providers.

Welfare states, housing systems and housing tenure

There seems to be certain linkages between welfare states, housing system and housing tenure. Therefore key concepts will be introduced and briefly explained.

In capitalist societies it was deemed as necessary to create welfare states. As Habermas (1973) explains:

“Bounty calls for a bellicose warfare state to secure the markets and investments that ‘monopolistic producers need and seek’.” (Habermas, 1973, p.412)

Through the development of these welfare states the negatives of competition in the ‘free’ market were mitigated.

Esping-Andersen (1990) classified different types of welfare capitalism. He states that the advancement of welfare states are linked to different post-war capitalist regimes.

According to Esping-Andersen, three important factors determine which policy regime emerge, these are political coalitions, labour movement mobilization and institutional legacies. Societies can then be grouped into three types of welfare systems known as de-commodified (social-democratic), conservative (corporatist) and residual (liberal).

The social democratic model is based on diminishing social division of societies and services are de-commodified (van Duijne, 2014). There are many social benefits which cause re-distribution which leads to lower (income) equality.

In the corporate welfare system the state is the active provisioner of welfare yet not so much as in a social-democratic system. States which perform in the corporate welfare system do not have a fully efficient free market. Although the state does provide welfare services, the corporate system is different, as van Duijne (2014) explains:

“The corporatist type is …. based on patronage and maintaining society’s hierarchical structure” (van Duijne, 2014, p.12)

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“The liberal type has more privatized social services and a higher level of commodification. This type relies on the benefits of a free market and thus state intervention should limit itself to facilitate the market process” (Van Duijne, 2014, p.12)

The relation of housing and welfare states remains a difficult subject for many social

scientists (Kemeny, 1981, 1992, 1995; Torgersen, 1987; Kemeny and Lowe, 1998; Bengtsson, 2001; Brandsen, 2001; Doling, 1999; Malpass, 2003, 2008; Van Duijne, 2014). Kemeny (1992) argues housing systems influence patterns of social change, he claims that social structures and relations in society are impacted by housing tenure and structures dependency of both providers and users on welfare. Kemeny (1992) further claims there is a relationship and differentiation between private of collective forms of social structure and housing policies. He explains that states where universal welfare systems are highly developed have more collectivized social structures which reflect a more collective hegemony (van Duijne, 2014). Welfare states that are residualized have more privatized social structure which reflect a individualist and privatist hegemony. Welfare states which are collectivist or privatistic have a strong effect on housing policies and the division of tenures. Privatistic societies tend to be dominated by owner-occupation, also the amount spent on welfare is lower in these states. Collectivistic systems have more social housing, predominantly renting, these states spend more on welfare.

Neoliberalism and housing tenure

Neoliberalism can be defined as:

“… a loose set of ideas of how the relationship between the state and its external environment ought to be organized” (Thorsen and Lie, 2009, p.15)

The most prominent features of which are that the state is only supposed to take on a minimal role, Thorsen and Lie (2009) describe this role as:

“to safeguard individual, especially commercial, liberty, as well as strong private property rights (cf. especially Mises 1962; Nozick 1974; Hayek 1979)” (Thorsen and Lie, 2009, p.15) There is usually a believe that the state has to be reduced and minimal in strength and size and should not intervene except for its sole legitimate purpose (Thorsen and Lie, 2009). Thereby the implementation of a free market is the optimal and only way to organize exchange goods and services (Friedman, 1962; 1980; Norberg, 2001) for it will, as Thorsen and Lie describe:

“…set free the creative potential and the entrepreneurial spirit which is built into the spontaneous order of any human society, and thereby lead to more individual liberty and well-being, and a more efficient allocation of resources (Hayek 1973; Rothbard [1962/1970] 2004)” (Thorsen and Lie, 2009, p.14-15)

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Neoliberal believes are often used to create political national policies but can also apply to an international level if for instance, the state regulates international trade to ensure the same commercial liberty and property rights which are implemented on the national level (Norberg, 2001; Friedman, 2006).

When neoliberal policies are implemented by national government this usually has implications for the housing market. When neoliberal policies became a trend in Europe in the 1980s housing policies in several European began to shift (Chizke, 2014). Where housing was provided or controlled by the state before, now a shift took place where free market principles were reinforced. Neoliberalism became the dominant political ideology (Theodore et al., 2011) and led to deregulation, privatization and welfare state withdrawal (Stonehouse et al., 2015; Venugopal, 2015; Beer et al., 2016; Chelcea and Druta, 2016). According to Rolnik (2013), housing and has an important role in neoliberal politics, as he describes: “The reform of housing policies — with all its components of homeownership, private property and binding financial commitments —has been central to the political and

ideological strategies through which the dominance of neoliberalism is maintained” (Rolnik, 2013, p.1064)

One of the countries where this neoliberal ideology became apparent to the extremes is England, where under the watchful eye of Margaret Thatcher the ‘right to buy’ policy was instituted, which entailed the large-scale sale of more than 2 million council dwellings to tenants at a discount, which not only deteriorated the social housing stock of councils but also the welfare state on physical as well as symbolic level (Forrest and Murie, 1988). Owner-occupation is the dominant tenure in England, it accounted for 69% of the total housing stock in 2005 (Whitehead, 2014). Owner-occupation and the use of social housing purely as safety net is a common feature in states which adapted neoliberal policies.

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Methodology

The research will be an exploratory case study. The case of the social housing markets in Amsterdam will be explored in an intensive and detailed manner. According to Yin (1994) there are a number of reasons why one should choose to use a case study, of which the most important is the following:

“The most important is to explain the presumed causal links in real-world interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental methods” (Yin, 1994, p.15)

This is exactly why this research should be a case study, it simply cannot be executed through a survey or experiment because it is about the real world and contexts. This research will be an inductive one since it tries to advance current research, rather than simply test existing theories, in the context of a rapidly shifting housing sector in

Amsterdam. It will advance current research by updating it through using the most recent statistics and current policies. It’s also a research on a different level than existing research since research of the social housing market in the Netherlands mainly focuses on the national level while this research will look at Amsterdam. By looking at Amsterdam it could be argued that the case study has an extreme case, since Amsterdam is a city much larger than the average city in the Netherlands. Also social housing comprises a larger percentage of housing tenure here. The research may be called a mixed methods approach because it is not only a qualitative case study, statistics on for instance housing stock and income are also analyzed. The mixed methods approach will allow a more complete understanding of the transformations in the social rented housing market. The gathered data will be analyzed through a thematic analysis. The research will work with a small number of data samples and the interpretation of data will be done during analysis. An important decision is how to do data gathering and analysis.

For the first sub-question the features and characteristics of the housing market are divided in policies, subsidies, rent prices, differences in types of occupation and the income of tenants. With this differentiation the features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam can be linked to Kemeny’s schedule on features of the unitary and dualist model (see conceptual model 1). Official documents such as housing policy

documents will be used to research features and characteristics of the social housing sector in Amsterdam. Thereby statistics will be used to assess the transformations in the social rental housing market. Variables such as tenure, divided in rent through housing

corporations, private rent and owner occupation but also rent levels such as social rent levels and private rent levels are used to assess changes in the housing market in

Amsterdam. The social rental housing market in Amsterdam will be compared to all of those features to research if this market is following a unitary or dualist approach.

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Conceptual model 1 (Source: Own work)

The second sub-question explores how the geographical and spatial composition of housing tenure is and has shifted in Amsterdam’s districts in the last 7 years. The reason for not doing research of a more extended time period is that the municipality of Amsterdam only provides statistics on districts since 2011. For this exploration information of the IOS and the municipality are analyzed geographically. To compare and analyze the statistics of IOS and the municipality of Amsterdam, the software Geographical Information System (GIS) is used.

By exploring the features and characteristics of the social rented housing market in Amsterdam, the social housing market can be put in context and can then be compared to the unitary and dualist approach. By doing this the main question of the research can be answered. This will be made even more specific by looking at the different districts in Amsterdam.

The outcomes of the research can be generalized in the sense that, when other big cities in the Netherlands are the subject of a similar research, the same outcomes may be expected. For this research it’s important to look not only at the outcomes of the process but also to put it in context. The replicability is high because official documents and statistics are used. The way in which the research is done is transparent, with as a result that the research can be done again. The internal validity is kept high by comparing the results out of official documents and statistics to the schedule made by Kemeny (1995). This way of researching will also keep the measurement validity high because it explores how the social rented housing market fits within the dualist or unitary approach, it is therefore easy to check whether the research explores what it says it does.

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Features and characteristics of the social housing market

To explore the features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam it is helpful to put it in to context with the national housing market. Not only do the national and local government have overlapping policies, they also have a shared historical pathway. This chapter will first explore the course of social housing in the Netherlands. Next the dominant local documents and frameworks will be shortly explained after which the course of social housing in Amsterdam with it features and characteristics are explored.

The course of social housing in the Netherlands

Between 1850 and 1860 the first housing associations were founded in the Netherlands. These were founded by workers’ associations and employers to provide housing for their workforce as well as philanthropists (Elsinga et al. 2008). Industrialists whom provided housing for their workers aimed to organize the relationship between the workforce and capital so that the workers were happier and healthier through better living, this enlarged profit for these industrialists (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008). In 1899 there already were 112 housing associations in the Netherlands, playing an important role (van der Schaar, 1987). Housing conditions were still very deplorable though, 60% of the dwellings had one or two rooms including the kitchen or storerooms (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008). The conditions of housing changed with the implementation of The Housing Act of 1901 (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2008). The act granted housing associations and municipalities government loans and subsidies for development and management of houses. The Housing Act of 1901 ensured housing associations had responsibilities and duties such as

“to house those who are not able to find an appropriate dwelling themselves” (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2008, p.35)

and

“…maintain decent-quality dwellings” (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2008, p.35)

In Amsterdam new estates were built under Wibaut, all of which had a high architectural quality and spacious layouts (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008). Between 1915 en 1921 more than 30.000 dwellings were built, in hope of improving moral conditions for the population of Amsterdam. In the 1920s housing associations and municipalities started to built on a large scale (Elsinga et al. 2008). The world economic crisis of 1929 caused the Netherlands to freeze government subsidies for housing, leaving building to the private sector (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008).

After WWII there was a large housing shortage, local councils started to play a dominant role in the construction of housing either commissioning or financing the development of housing (Elsinga et al. 2008). The housing association sector grew significantly yet became dependent on the state for financing and policies on how and where houses should be built. The social rented sector was a service which aimed at

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providing affordable and decent housing for everyone in the trend of social equality and uniformity. In the early years of the 1970s about 75.000 social rented houses were produced each year (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008). These numbers were reached through technological improvements, standardized production and uniform designs. Social housing was now broadly accessible, it ensured that a large part of the population could benefit the economic boom. The policies which related to this vast social housing market were family-orientated and for the most targeted national citizens. These policies were key to the establishment and consolidation of the welfare system.

When brought into relationship with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) types of welfare capitalism the Dutch welfare system before 1970 was a de-commodified or social

democratic. The state provided a vast housing market and services such as healthcare for all of its citizens. According to Kemeny’s (1995) typology of welfare systems the Dutch welfare system from before the 1970s was a universal welfare system. It was highly developed and had a vast social housing sector where renting was the dominant tenure.

Mid 1970s shortages of housing were mostly solved and therefore no longer a priority in politics (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008). By the end of the 1970s the model had

reached its limits. The idea that social housing was for everyone got challenged by the labour market crisis. In line with the popular politics which idealized neoliberalism, the central government didn’t want to be directly engaged in housing, this strengthened the non-profit and private sector. Thereby the owner-occupation sector grew and social housing

organizations got more powerful.

The dominant role of local councils changed even further with the policy document on Public Housing in 1989 (Ministerie van VROM, 1989) which emphasized the role of private initiatives in the social sector and providing for households which had an income lower than a certain limit. The policy document implemented guidelines to increase financial

independence for housing associations (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 2008). With this policy document the target group of social housing changed, where before it was for a broad spectrum of population groups, this shifted towards giving households with a low income priority. A discussion was initiated about low-rent skewness; people whom had a higher income than the level set in the document could easily take advantage of the low rents that became the norm because of housing provided by housing associations. This shows that ideas which were dominant in the past, which were equality and uniformity for everyone, had changed.

In 1995 the government withdrew future financial support and cancelled all debts social housing associations had to the state (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008). This left housing associations with a vast asset base. The housing associations had a strong financial position and their role changed from providing housing to also designing local environments, the quality of neighborhoods and the social wellbeing of the tenants. They are powerful players, Lévy-Vroelant et al. (2008) describe the reason:

“…because they own most of the housing stock in renewal areas, and because their professionalism and financial means make them obvious leaders. They see themselves as

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policymakers, implementers, and social engineers: improving their housing stock, the local environment, social cohesion and tenants’ individual potential” (Lévy-Vroelant et al., 2008, p.39)

After the withdrawal of financial support from the government housing associations had to find other ways to finance the building of housing, the role of the national government changed to one between local government, housing associations and the market (Aedes, 2013). Housing associations started to sell their assets in order to finance new housing as well as building to sell. The government is supporting and even demanding the selling of rental units (van Duijne and Ronald, 2018). In the policy document called Mensen, Wensen, Wonen dating from 2000 they set out to accomplish a home ownership rate of 65% by 2010, to be reached through converting rental units to owner occupied units.

Despite of the withdrawal of financial support, the social housing sector could still benefit from some state aid (Priemus and Gruis, 2011). The European commission decided that this caused unfair competition and concluded that aid was only to be made available under, and renting had to be subjected to specific conditions (SGEC, 2009). These included that a certain number of dwellings had to be let to disadvantaged households, at the time of implementing in 2009 this encompassed households of which the annual income was below €33.000. At least 80% of dwellings but usually 90% had to be allocated to this target group. There was also a maximum rent set for social housing.

By this time the Dutch welfare regime had shifted from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) de-commodified or social-democratic regime to a conservative or corporatist welfare regime. The state did not have a free market yet didn’t provide as much welfare services as it did before. It did not shift to Kemeny’s (1990) residualized welfare system though, the dominant housing tenure remained renting and there still were welfare services. The Dutch housing model also did not shift from Malpass and Victory’s (2010) public housing to social housing model.

According to Priemus (2014) housing associations in the Netherlands also have to deal with policy instruments that are completely unknown outside of the Netherlands. In 2010 a group (Werkgroep Brede Heroverwegingen Wonen, 2010) came up with an idea that would bring yearly revenue in the treasury in the form of landlord levy. They published a report in which the landlord levy was announced. This tax was supposed to be paid by every tenure , occupied as well as rented dwellings (Priemus, 2014). Yet the

owner-occupied sector remained untouched, private landlords were also in the clear since the levy was exclusively for dwellings where rents are regulated, leaving housing associations to pay nearly 85% of the tax (Blijie et al. 2013). Rents were allowed to be raised up to 6,5%

depending on the income of the renter, with this raise it the tax would be more affordable (Priemus, 2014). Ortec finance concluded housing associations would take a hard hit (Conijn and Achterveld, 2012) and

“housing associations would no longer be able to realise new rented housing to offset the financial problems created by the landlord levy. The extra increases in rents would not be

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large enough to prevent a complete stop of investing in new rented housing” (Priemus, 2014, p.100)

Tenants can apply for individual subsidies, depending on their income and rent. One can only apply for subsidy when the rental price of the dwelling is below the liberalization line of €710,68 (Toeslagenaanvragen 2018). The amount of subsidies have been reduced however (Van Duijne and Ronald, 2018) and are facing even stronger reducing in the upcoming years. According to the Woonbond (NOS, 2017) tenants will receive an average of €94,- less in four years time. Besides the reducing of individual subsidies the tenure is also reduced to lower income households. In the housing agreement from 2014 the government stated that better-off households would be persuaded to move out of social rental housing (Van Duijne and Ronald, 2018). The persuading of better-off households is in line with the decisions of the European Commission already made in 2009 to rent to a target group of low income households.

Social housing in Amsterdam

De municipality of Amsterdam published several (policy) documents and guiding frameworks in addition to the national policies. What follows is a short summary of the most important documents, after which the features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam are explored.

Wonen in Amsterdam 2017

Wonen in Amsterdam 2017 (Berkers and Dignum, 2018) is a policy document with statistics on living and housing in Amsterdam. Different types of occupation such as the rental

corporation sector, the private rental sector and the owner-occupied sector are investigated. The difference in numbers of dwellings but also tenure and for instance prices and income are set out and compared to other years.

Woonagenda 2025

The policy document Woonagenda 2025 (Gemeenteraad Amsterdam, 2017) is a document published by the municipality of Amsterdam. The ‘woonagenda 2025’ is a guide on what the municipality of Amsterdam aims for yet doesn’t contain laws or regulation. The municipality states that it is a document with which they can start political discussions. It contains facts and statistics on the housing market in Amsterdam as well as a prognoses of the housing stock and the need for housing. It aims to make a prognoses on how the housing market can get enough payable and good quality housing as they state theirselves.

Coalitieakkoord Amsterdam 2018 ‘Een nieuwe lente en een nieuw geluid’ Recently the new political coalition agreement has been agreed upon (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018). This policy document has been presented by the municipality of Amsterdam and contains a vision of how Amsterdam should look and change by 2025. Building, living and spatial planning have a separate chapter in this document with a paragraph dedicated to goals concerning affordable housing for the lower and middle

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incomes. The coalition describes that they are actively anticipating on the challenges with which Amsterdam is faced due to its attractive force. They state an active municipality should make clear choices based upon a shared vision and open attitude.

Features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam

In 1995 Amsterdam its social housing sector comprised 58% of all housing in the city (O&S 2015). In 2017 these numbers plummeted to 39,5% of social housing offered by social housing corporations (Van Berkers and Dignum, 2018). In table 1 the information provided by the municipality of Amsterdam has been calculated to create a table with necessary information for this research. This table shows statistics on housing tenure which are used to explore how these have changed and how they are divided now. The private sector is also offering housing under the liberalization line yet renting in the private sector is much more insecure than renting from housing corporation. Private landlords can for instance end the contract for reasons such as the desire to use the dwelling themselves or to rent to another person such as a student (Rijksoverheid, 2018).

The rental market in Amsterdam is one that’s changing very fast. In the last two years the number of regulated dwellings decreased by 4,6% and since 2011 the number of

dwellings with a rent above the liberalization line has doubled (Van Berkers and Dignum, 2018). The growth of housing in the more expensive rental sector is rapid whilst dwelling with rents beneath the liberalization line rapidly reduce. Thereby liberalization (increasing rents from below the liberalization line to one that is above this line) makes the housing stock of regulated housing smaller according to the municipality of Amsterdam. This also causes the average amount of paid rent to increase.

Owner-occupancy has grown extensively in Amsterdam since 1995, when only 11% of the total housing stock was owner-occupied (Van Duijne and Ronald, 2018). In 2017 these numbers have risen to 32,5% (Van Berkers and Dignum, 2018). The private rent sector has been stable through the past 16 years, there have been some changes within the sector though. In the past 10 years this sector went from having a share of 21,5% of liberalized housing to a share of 45,8% liberalized housing.

The total housing stock provided by housing corporations is shrinking. In the past 14 years they lost almost 22000 dwellings, thereby they rent out much more dwellings in the liberalized sector. In the past 10 years the percentage of liberalized dwellings rented out by housing corporations has increased from 1,6% to 8,4%. Although it’s not a large number of the total housing stock, it is increasing very fast. Social housing has thus been in decline for the past twenty years. Even though the (social) housing stock of housing corporations is shrinking, it still covers a very large segment of the housing market. It is getting increasingly harder to acquire a dwelling via housing corporations. Woningnet, an umbrella organization of housing corporations in Amsterdam, has 212.518 people signed up who want to rent a house. The average waiting time was 8,7 years in 2014 (Kessel et al., 2016)

Kemeny (1995) concluded that the Netherlands had a unitary market system which was the same for Amsterdam. The social housing market in Amsterdam offered high-quality housing for diverse income groups according to Musterd (2014) and Boterman and Van Gent

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(2014) and restricted segregation due to an equally composition of the social housing stock over all the neighborhoods (Fainstein, 2010). The rules and regulations that apply to Amsterdam are the same ones that apply for the rest of the Netherlands. The municipality does however publish documents such as the woonagenda 2025 which is a guiding, practical framework according to themselves (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). In this document the municipality is stating its ambition to make the gap between the need for housing and the available housing stock smaller. The municipality has ‘actions’ as they call it to ensure this happens for instance that 1500 rental units for the middle-range prices have to be build and that when new housing is built, 40% of this has to be regulated rent.

Another document recently presented is the coalition agreement 2018 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018). This policy document is also a guiding, practical framework on, among other subjects, (social) housing. The municipality made the decisions in the coalition

agreement with a view towards 2025, the year that Amsterdam celebrates its 750th birthday. In the chapter of housing the municipality states they build 7500 houses a year of which 2500 are regulated dwellings in the social housing sector. Because of this it’s allowed to rent out 1300 houses in the middle-income segment. According to the coalition agreement the selling off of social housing from housing corporations is highly exceptional. The percentage of social housing (privately owned and those of housing corporations) in each neighborhood is actively monitored and is to stay on or above 45%. If not, liberalization of dwellings owned by housing corporations is not possible and any housing that becomes available is to be rented out in the social housing sector until the percentage is on 45% again. If this policy document is enforced it would mean an increase of social housing. These and other documents published by the municipality are not binding or obligatory though, so it could merely be an ideal.

To compare the housing market of Amsterdam to the Kemeny (1995) scheme (see figure 1), the topics will be compared to the current rental market.

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Table 1: Housing statistics for Amsterdam (Source: Van Berkers and Dignum, 2018)

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Geospatial analysis of housing tenure within Amsterdam

The features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam are explored not only on the urban scale but also on the level of districts. This enables an exploration of how the changes in the social housing markets are geographically and spatially developing within the city. Therefore the tenure in different districts in Amsterdam are explored and

compared.

Shifting tenure may not only indicate a shift from unitary to dualism, it can also indicate a expanding inequality or even segregation. Amsterdam always had a vast social housing sector which was distributed relatively even among districts (Fainstein, 2010). This even distribution restricted segregation to take place. However, policies such as the

20/40/40 policy, tenure mixing and state-led gentrification are enabling neighborhoods to shifts in uneven patterns. Targeted state-led gentrification is seen as a positive and gently called strengthening of neighborhoods by the municipality itself, for instance in the policy document called ‘Covenant Vernieuwing Indische buurt 2007 - 2010 (De Alliantie et al., 2008) and Herinrichtingsmodellen Javastraat (Bruursema et al., 2005). Gentrification can be defined as:

“The migration of affluent households to neighborhoods containing poorer households and generally lower-value property in both urban and rural settlements.” (Atkinson, 2012, p. 269)

While gentrification can cause positive effects such as decriminalization it also has negative effects such as putting pressure on the housing stock in and around these gentrified areas, especially lower rental units (Atkinson, 2012). Tenure mixing is one of the ways to gentrify an area but also an effect of policies such as the 20/40/40 policy, since the previous number of social rent was much higher than 20% and evenly distributed throughout Amsterdam. This tenure-mixing is described by Hochstenbach (2014) as:

“… the introduction of more expensive owner occupied dwellings and more affluent

residents to targeted neighbourhoods, frequently at the cost of affordable rental housing for lower income tenants” (Hochstenbach, 2014, p.400)

This state-led gentrification and tenure-mixing in current policies of the municipality of Amsterdam can cause shifts and changes in the even division of social housing rapidly and therefore cause inequalities and segregation in the city and between neighborhoods.

Amsterdam is divided in 8 districts. These are: Amsterdam Centrum, Amsterdam Westpoort, Amsterdam West, Amsterdam Nieuw-west, Amsterdam Zuid, Amsterdam Oost, Amsterdam Noord and Amsterdam Zuidoost. The layout of these districts are visualized in the map on image 1. For the spatial analysis the district Westpoort is left out of the analysis since this is mainly an industrial district with only 35 houses.

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Image 2: Map of rental units per district Amsterdam 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

Image 3: Map of social rental units per district in Amsterdam 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Renting in Amsterdam

The percentage of rental units per district in Amsterdam is based on the most recent available statistics on districts in Amsterdam

(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). On the map of the percentage of rental units per districts (see image 2) the percentages of 2017 (see table 2) are visualized on a graduated map. These rental units are a combination of housing provided by housing corporations as well as private rent. The district Amsterdam Centrum has the largest percentage of rental units, yet even though Amsterdam Centrum has the most rental units, it’s ranked second when it comes to the amount of social rent in the district with 47% of social housing (see image 3 and table 3). Thereby the average rent in Amsterdam Centrum was one of the lowest in Amsterdam in 2005 with an average rent price of €367 per month, now it’s the highest of all the districts with €708 per month (See figure 2). The least percentage of rental units can be found in Amsterdam Zuid where 67,8% of all units are rented out. This district also has the lowest percentage of social housing. Amsterdam Zuidoost is the district ranked second on the amount of rent with 72,5% and has the highest percentage of social housing with 60%. It also has the cheapest average rental price with €560 per month. The district Amsterdam Noord has the second highest number of social housing while it is ranked fourth in the percentage of rental housing units.

District Percentage of rental units

Amsterdam Centrum 76,8

Amsterdam West 69,9

Amsterdam Nieuw west 69,8

Amsterdam Zuid 67,8

Amsterdam Oost 70,1

Amsterdam Noord 71,5

Amsterdam Zuidoost 72,5

Table 1: Percentage of rental units in 2017 per district (Source: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

District Percentage of social housing

Amsterdam Centrum 47

Amsterdam West 56

Amsterdam Nieuw west 52

Amsterdam Zuid 46

Amsterdam Oost 53

Amsterdam Noord 59

Amsterdam Zuidoost 60

Table 2: Percentage of social rental units in 2017 per district (Source: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

Figure 2: Average rent prices in Amsterdam per district (Source: OIS Municipality of

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Image 4: Map of tenure per district in Amsterdam 2011. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

Image 5: Map of tenure per district in Amsterdam 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Shifts in housing tenure

To explore whether or not the shifts in housing tenure are taking place at the same rate and in the same manner in all districts or not, the housing tenure of the different districts are compared. In table 4 and 5 the statistics on housing tenure per district can be found for the years 2011 and 2017. These statistics are visualized in image 4 and 5. The differences of housing tenure between 2011 and 2017 per district can be found in table 6 and are visualized in images 6 to 11.

2011 Owner-occupied Private Housing corporations

Centrum 27,8 37,7 34,9 West 23,9 31 45,2 Nieuw-west 28,4 15,3 56,3 Zuid 27,5 41,5 31 Oost 26,4 18,5 55,1 Noord 24,3 5,7 70 Zuidoost 26,4 9,1 64,5

Table 3: Housing tenure per district in Amsterdam 2011 (Source: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

2017 Owner-occupied Private Housing corporations

Centrum 32,2 36 31,8 West 30,1 29,4 40,1 Nieuw-west 30,2 18,7 51,1 Zuid 32,2 40,6 27,2 Oost 29,9 24,5 45,5 Noord 28,5 10,4 61,1 Zuidoost 27,5 16,1 56,4

Table 4: Housing tenure per district in Amsterdam 2017 (Source: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

Difference owner-occupation

Difference private rental sector

Difference rent from housing corporations Centrum +4,4 -1,1 -3,1 West +6,2 -1,6 -4,8 Nieuw-west +1,8 +3,4 -5,2 Zuid +4,8 -0,9 -3,8 Oost +3,5 +6 -9,6 Noord +4,2 +4,7 -8,9 Zuidoost +1,1 +7 -8,1

Table 5: Differences in housing tenure per district in Amsterdam from 2011-2017 (Source: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

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Owner occupancy

In the owner occupancy sector all districts experienced growth between 2011 and 2017, although not all districts experienced the same rate of growth. The maps of the difference in the percentage of owner occupied dwellings in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017 (see image 6 and 7) show this. Amsterdam Zuidoost had the least growth in the owner-occupancy sector with 1,1% in 6 years time. Amsterdam West had the fastest growth with 6,2% in the same time-span. Amsterdam Zuid had the second fastest growth of the owner-occupancy sector while this district already had the third-largest owner-owner-occupancy sector in 2011. While owner-occupancy has grown in every district, Amsterdam Zuidoost has the least growth by far with 1,1%, there is a difference of 5,1% between Amsterdam Zuidoost and Amsterdam West where the percentage of owner occupation has grown by 6,2%. What’s interesting is that there is no apparent relationship with the growth in owner occupation and the amount of decline of housing owned by housing corporations. If the top 3 of growth in owner occupancy is explored, it shows that Amsterdam West (6,2%), Amsterdam Zuid (4,8%) and Amsterdam Centrum (4,4%) have the most growth. These districts are not the districts where housing owned by housing corporations has declined the most, Amsterdam Centrum even has the least decline of housing owned by housing corporations.

Housing owned by housing corporations

Most of the social housing is owned by housing corporations. As can be seen in table 4 the composition of the percentage of housing stock owned by housing corporations varies per district. This variation is unambiguously apparent with a difference of 39% between the smallest and the largest percentage of housing stock owned by housing corporations in 2011. The lowest amount of dwellings owned by housing corporations in 2011 is in Amsterdam Zuid (31%) while Amsterdam Noord had a housing stock owned by housing corporations which entail 70% of the total housing stock in Amsterdam Noord. In 2017 Amsterdam Zuid still has the lowest percentage of rental units owned by housing corporations with 27,1% and Amsterdam Noord still has the highest, although the

percentage has shrunk from 70% to 61,1%. The housing stock of housing corporations has shrunk in all the districts between 2011 and 2017. The largest difference took place in Amsterdam Oost with 9,6%, the lowest in Amsterdam Centrum. The maps of the difference in the percentage of rental dwellings owned by housing corporations in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017 (see image 10 and 11) show these changes. What is

apparent in tables 4 to 6 is that Amsterdam Noord and Amsterdam Zuidoost had the largest percentage of housing owned by housing corporations in 2011, when the statistics of 2017 are explored it becomes apparent that in those districts the decline of housing owned by housing corporation are very high with a decline of respectively 8,9% and 8,1%. Only Amsterdam Oost has more decline of housing owned by housing corporations. These changes in the percentage of housing owned by housing corporations per district are visualized in image 10 and 11.

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Private rental housing

The difference of private rental housing has stayed relatively even for Amsterdam as a whole, however, a shift has taken place between the different districts in Amsterdam, which is also apparent in the maps of the difference in the percentage of owner occupied dwellings in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017 (see image 8 and 9). While the sector grew significantly in Amsterdam Zuidoost (7%), Amsterdam Oost (6%) and Amsterdam Noord (4,7%) the sector shrunk in the other districts with rates between 1,6% and 0,9%. While the number of private rental housing stayed even for Amsterdam the difference in districts where the most growth and the most decline are found, is a difference of 7,9% between Amsterdam Zuid (-0,9%) and Amsterdam Zuidoost (+7%). The differences per district are thus varied but do seem to have a relation with the percentage of housing owned by housing corporations. The top 3 districts where the sector had the most growth (as

mentioned, Amsterdam Zuidoost, Amsterdam Oost and Amsterdam Noord) are also in the top 3 where the percentage of housing owned by housing corporations had the largest decline. The differences in the private rental housing sector are visualized in the maps that can be found in image 8 and 9.

Social housing

While the social housing market used to be equally composed over the different districts and neighborhoods in Amsterdam, this had already changed in 2011. In 2017 Amsterdam

Zuidoost had the most social housing with 60% (see table 3). Amsterdam Zuid relatively had the least amount of social housing with 46%. This means there is a difference of 14%

between the district with the most and the least amount of social housing. There doesn’t seem to be a relation with how many rental units a district has and the percentage of social housing in the districts. For the top 3 of districts with the largest percentage of rental units, only one is also in the top 3 of the largest percentage of social housing.

It is hard to reveal relationships between the increase en decrease of the housing sectors among the districts. The housing corporations do however seem to have sold off most housing in the districts where they had the most housing previously. Thereby there seems to be a relation between the districts where the growth of private rental housing is the largest and the districts where housing owned by housing corporations has declined the most.

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Image 6: Graduated map of the difference in the percentage of owner occupied dwellings in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Image 7: Map of the difference in the percentage of owner occupied dwellings in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Image 8: Graduated map of the difference in the percentage of rented dwellings in the private sector in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Image 9: Map of the difference in the percentage of rented dwellings in the private sector in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Image 10: Graduated map of the difference in the percentage of rental dwellings owned by housing corporations in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Image 11: Map of the difference in the percentage of rental dwellings owned by housing corporations in Amsterdam per district between 2011 and 2017. Source: Information: OIS Municipality of Amsterdam (2017). Map by Enya Schots (2018)

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Conclusions

Features and characteristics of the social housing market in Amsterdam

Policies

Since 2011 the share of housing provided by housing corporations has declined. Not only did their total housing stock decline, the share of social housing on the housing market declined from 49, 8% to 39,5% in the past 10 years. In the same timeframe the private housing sector has been stable. Their social housing supply has declined though. At this point in time the private sector provides 24,4% of all housing in Amsterdam while housing corporations provide 43,1% of all housing. There are waiting lists for social housing via housing corporations though, however, it is not known if and how long people have to wait for (social) housing on the private market or liberalized housing via housing corporations. The housing corporations have direct competition with the private sector in the sense that they are able to maintain financial health and prices string along market prices or, in many cases, lower prices.

The non-profit housing organizations are providing housing for a broad target group rather than having a function as safety net since their share of the total housing market is 43,1% of all housing. This is a large share of the total housing market, certainly in

comparison to the UK which does have a safety net function, housing associations there provide 10% of the rental housing stock and local authorities another 8% (Whitehead, 2014). This country is considered to have a dualist rental system. There is no stigma on social housing or housing provided by housing organizations, this is also reflected in the amount of people renting in these sectors (respectively 52,6% and 43,1%) and the amount of people who are listed on the waiting list. The rental market in Amsterdam is not regulated in the sense that housing associations can control their rent prices. This is reflected in the fact that they provide social housing as well as liberalized housing.

Subsidies

Amsterdam has a mature social housing market. The non-profit sector doesn’t receive subsidies, the government withdrew financial support in 1995 and housing corporations are now financial independent. Individuals can receive a housing allowance.

Price

There is differentiation in the rent levels of non-profit organizations, housing corporations can decide their rent prices, however, most of their housing is provided in the social housing sector. It can be argued whether or not this level is lower than the market price because the private sector does offer a higher percentage of their housing stock for liberalized rents but the private market is significantly smaller.

Differentiation occupation

The owner occupation sector is gaining ground in Amsterdam. However, the total owner-occupied housing stock is now at 32,5% which means the non-profit organizations provide a larger share of housing with 43,1%. For now owner-occupancy is not the dominant housing tenure, certainly not in comparison with a dualist country such as the UK where the owner-occupancy sector comprised of 64% of the total housing stock in 2011 (Whitehead, 2014).

Shifting social housing market in Amsterdam : unitary or dualist?

Shifting social housing market in Amsterdam.

Unitary or dualist?

Bachelor thesis 2018

Table of contents

Shifting social housing market in Amsterdam.

Unitary or dualist?

Theoretical framework

Methodology

Features and characteristics of the social housing market

Geospatial analysis of housing tenure within Amsterdam

Conclusions