Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations
The rise of Boko Haram
A Social Movement Theory Approach
Author: Iris Visser
Student Number: 5737508
MA Research Project Political Science: International Relations Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan
Second reader: Dr. Ursula Daxecker Date: 25 June 2014
Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations
The rise of Boko Haram
A Social Movement Theory Approach
Table of contents
Political map of Nigeria 6
I. Introduction 7
II. Theoretical framework and literature review 13
III. Methodology 34
Variables 34
Methodological issues 34
Operationalization 35
IV. Background of Nigeria 43
V. The rise and evolution of Boko Haram 51
VI. United States- Nigeria cooperation concerning counterterrorism 59
VII. A political process perspective 64
VIII. A relative deprivation perspective 75
IX. A resource mobilization perspective 91
X. A framing perspective 108
XI. Conclusion 122
Bibliography 127
Appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks 139
Number of Boko Haram attacks and resulting deaths
2010-2014 per quarter 139
I. Introduction
Like many postcolonial states, Nigeria has a turbulent history. The country is plagued by all kinds of violence. There has been civil war,1 crime rates are high,2 communal violence is common, as is sectarian
violence3 — and, often along the same lines, political violence4 — while in the south an added problem
are conflicts concerning oil.5 One of the biggest problems Nigeria faces today, is that of radical Islamic
violence in the north of the country. Whereas communal violence has long been an issue, the rise of radical Islamic groups such as Boko Haram, who function more like a terrorist organization, is relatively new (as it is in most parts of the world).
Boko Haram is formally called Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). The name Boko Haram, which means something along the lines of ‘western education is sinful’, was given to them by neighbours of their compound in the early days of the organization’s existence.6 It is used in this thesis since it is shorter and much better
known than their official name. The attacks by Boko Haram and associated violence have led to thousands of deaths since 2009.7 And although government statements sometimes suggest otherwise,8
there are no signs of Boko Haram being seriously impeded and of its violence declining. On the contrary, in the first 3 months of 2014, the radical Islamic group popularly known as Boko Haram have killed around 1500 people,9 including a large number of civilians in attacks on villages,10 and dozens of
1 ‘1970: Nigeria marks end of the Biafra civil war’, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11399157, 24
September 2010.
2 ‘Nigeria Watch: Third Report on Violence in Nigeria (2006-2011)’, Nigeria Watch, June 2011, 12-13. 3 Idem, 20-21.
4 Idem, 16-20. 5 Idem, 13-16.
6 Andrew Walker (2012) ‘Special Report 308. What Is Boko Haram?’, United States Institute for Peace, 3. 7 ‘Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Cause Humanitarian Crisis’, Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-cause-humanitarian-crisis, 14 March 2014. Also see the appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks.
8 See for example: ‘Boko Haram In Disarray, Nigerian Army Reports’, SaharaReporters,
http://saharareporters.com/news-page/boko-haram-disarray-nigerian-army-reports, 19 May 2013. Also see: Kees Broere, ‘Tientallen doden bij aanslag in Nigeria’, De Volkskrant, 15 April 2014.
9 ‘Nigeria: more than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria in early 2014’, Amnesty International. 10 ‘Boko Haram raid kills dozens in Nigeria’, AlJazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/boko-haram-raid-kills-dozens-nigeria-201421221431015516.html, last modified 12 February 2014. Also see: ‘Nigeria village attack leaves scores dead’, AlJazeera.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/nigeria-village-attack-leaves-scores-dead-2014216172549157111.html, last modified 16 February 2014.
‘Scores killed in attack in northeast Nigeria’, AlJazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/scores-killed-attack-northeast-nigeria-2014216221443992379.html, last modified 17 February 2014.
Michael Olugbode, ‘Boko Haram Kills 210 in Borno Dawn Attack, Says Senator Ahmed’, THISDAY,
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-kills-210-in-borno-dawn-attack-says-senator-ahmed/175978/, 12 April 2014.
school children.11 And famously, in April of that same year, they kidnapped over 250 schoolgirls from
Chibok, the large majority of whom were still missing at the time of writing, two months later.12
While Boko Haram is burning down villages, Nigerian police forces respond with equally harsh methods without much consideration for whether it is actual Boko Haram affiliates or random civilians that are targeted.13 The government forces are adding to the death toll in this conflict — the earlier
mentioned 1500 deaths in the first three months of 2014 included a couple of hundred people killed by government forces.14 Also when civilians are not actually targeted, the extreme measures taken to hunt
down Boko Haram still cause civilian deaths and displacement.15 The Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa states
have been in an official state of emergency for nearly a year, which puts little strain on the military forces. It would seem that Nigeria’s government forces’ methods are not effective, however, since attacks by Boko Haram have only increased in recent years. Especially attacks on civilian targets seem to have proliferated since this state of emergency.16 Next to the death toll caused by both Boko Haram’s attacks
and the government forces’ response, there are now also 300,000 to 500,000 displaced people in the three north-eastern states.17 While the February attacks all took place in Borno state, previous attacks
have happened throughout a large area of the country covering the entire north and north-eastern regions and also Abuja capital territory, adding up to 17 of Nigeria’s 36 states — although in some states there were only one or two attacks while the noth-eastern ones faced much more.18 Next to attacks on
civilians, there have been a lot of attacks on the police and the military, which was the main target
11 Anouk van Kampen, ‘43 leerlingen gedood op school Nigeria bij aanval Boko Haram’, NRC,
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/02/25/29-doden-op-school-nigeria-na-aanval-boko-haram/, last modified 25 February 2014.
Also see: Kayode Idowu and Fidelis Soriwei, Boko Haram kills Scores of UTME candidates in Borno’, The Punch, http://www.punchng.com/news/utme-students-killed-in-boko-haram-attacks/, 12 April 2014.
12 Jacob Zenn, ‘Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls’, Combating Terrorism Center,
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-and-the-kidnapping-of-the-chibok-schoolgirls, 29 May 2014.
13 ‘Nigeria police accused of victimizing Muslims’, AlJazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2014/02/nigeria-police-accused-victimising-muslims-201421516298454963.html, last modified 15 February 2014.
Also see: ‘Nigeria: Torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees by Nigerian security forces: Amnesty International’s written statement to the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (3 – 28 March 2014)’, Amnesty International, 20 February 2014.
14 ‘Nigeria: more than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria in early 2014’, Amnesty International,
12. Via: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/004/2014/en/543f7ac9-6889-4f02-bf5a-d73832e04229/afr440042014en.pdf, 2014.
15 Ola’ Audu, ‘185 killed in Borno town, Baga, as soldiers, Boko Haram fight’, Premium Times,
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/130680-185-killed-in-borno-town-baga-as-soldiers-boko-haram-fight.html, last modified 22 April 2014.
16 See the appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks.
17 ‘Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Cause Humanitarian Crisis’, Human Rights Watch.
Also see: ‘UNHCR concerned as hundreds flee attacks in Nigeria’s Lake Chad region’, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=531ee2736&query=nigeria, last modified 11 March 2014.
18 See the appendix: timeline of Boko Haram attacks.
especially at the start of the violence,19 and threats are also made against Nigeria’s oil refineries in the
Niger Delta,20 against federal government and its president, Goodluck Jonathan, in particular.21 Also,
Nigeria’s borders are porous and there are fears of a spill-over into Cameroon, where Boko Haram have already kidnapped a French family in early 2013. Recently, images of Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau surfaced in which threats were made against the US and other western countries.22 Aside from
these threats and the loss of lives caused by Boko Haram, it also severely disrupts public life and harms the economy. The group’s regular attacks on schools have caused destruction and have led to the closing of over 200 schools and around 15,000 children not being able to attend school anymore in Yobe state.23
In Borno state, in March 2014 85 schools were ordered to close by officials, in fear of more Boko Haram attacks.24
As the above signals, the Nigerian government is facing a lot of difficulties in battling Boko Haram. While Boko Haram has thus far been a mostly national problem (notwithstanding some earlier mentioned spill-over into Cameroon and Niger25), other states have also voiced their concern about the violence in
the north-eastern part of the country. One of the most prominent states in this is the United States, who have designated Boko Haram and its offshoot organization Ansaru as international terrorist organizations in November 2013.26 Ansaru is officially named Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan, which means
‘Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa’.27 It was founded in January of 2012 when it split
off from Boko Haram because of ideological differences.28 To designate Ansaru as an international
terrorist organization is more understandable than it is for Boko Haram, since it is more regionally focused (as opposed to Boko Haram’s mostly national focus). Ansaru also does not support Boko Haram’s
19 Ibid.
20 Heather Murdock, ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threatens Oil Refineries, Muslim Clerics’, Voice of America,
http://www.voanews.com/content/nigerias-boko-haram-threatens-oil-refineries-muslim-clerics/1855574.html, last modified 20 February 2014.
21 ‘Boko Haram threatens Jonathan’, Vanguard,
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/boko-haram-threatens-jonathan/, last modified 13 April 2012.
22 Zachary Elkaim, ‘Boko Haram leader releases video on Maiduguru attack, threatens US’, The Long War Journal,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12/shekau_strikes_back.php, December 13, 2013.
23 Friday Olokor, ‘Boko Haram stops 15,000 pupils from schooling… destroys 200 schools’, The Punch,
http://www.punchng.com/education/boko-haram-stops-15000-pupils-from-schooling-destroys-200-schools/, 28 February 2014.
24 Associated Press in Maiduguri, ‘Nigerian state closes schools amid fears of Boko Haram attacks’, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/nigeria-state-closes-schools-fears-boko-haram, last modified 18 March 2014.
25 David Lewis, ‘Niger fears contagion from Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists’, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-niger-bokoharam-insight-idUSBREA2I16720140319, last modified 19 March 2014.
26 Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru’, U.S. Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm, last modified 13 November 2013.
27 ‘Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan’, TRAC,
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jama%E2%80%99atu-ansarul-muslimina-fi-biladis-sudan-jamusbis-ansaru, last accessed 28 March 2014.
28 ‘Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan’, TRAC.
frequent targeting of civilians. The group is rather small and far less active than Boko Haram, however, with only a handful of attacks attributed to them.29 The United States offers training and support to the
state of Nigeria in order to deal with these groups.
The ties between the United States and Nigeria go further than cooperation on counterterrorism. The two states have had strong ties for some time, but especially since the instalment of Nigeria’s fourth republic in 1999 following 16 years of military rule.30 The countries meet under the U.S.-Nigeria Binational
Commission, which organizes talks around five main themes: “good governance, transparency, and integrity; energy and investment; regional security; Niger Delta; and agriculture and food security.”31
Against the background of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the following announcement of the U.S. ‘war on terror’ quickly thereafter, United States-Nigeria relations have intensified, in particular in the field of counterterrorism. In recent years, for the United States concerns about radical Islam have been one of the most prominent points on the agenda towards Nigeria. These concerns focus on violent groups like Boko Haram and its splinter cells.32 The governments of both countries cooperate on counterterrorism, in
Nigeria as well as in the wider region — consider for example the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.33
Paradoxically, since the increased cooperation on counterterrorism there has been a rise in acts of terrorism in Nigeria. U.S. government officials and experts, when asked by Foreign Policy, expressed growing sectarian violence in Nigeria as one of their worries for 2014.34 The earlier mentioned attacks by
Boko Haram are the prime example of this. And so far, 2014 is characterized by a lot of violence by Boko Haram.
29 Ibid.
30 ‘Nigeria’, United States Africa Command, http://www.africom.mil/about-africa/west-africa/Nigeria, last accessed
9 May 2014.
31 Ibid.
32 Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru’.
33 ‘Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership’, GlobalSecurity.org, last modified January 24, 2013. 34 Micah Zenko, ‘Cloudy With a Chance of Conflict’, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/24/cloudy_with_a_chance_of_conflict, last modified 24 December 2013.
Research question
The time of Boko Haram’s arise is controversial. It is most commonly dated back to 2002, but the roots of the organization are thought to lie in the mid-nineties, in the Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) led by Abubakar Lawan.35 In 2002 Mohamed Yusuf
assumed leadership and the group slowly morphed into Boko Haram as it is known today. While the group was slightly more violent under Yusuf, they still were relatively secluded until an incident in 2009 in which Yusuf and many other members of Boko Haram were killed.36 The group had reorganized in mid-2010, this time under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, and launched its larger scale campaign of terror that lasts until today.37 It is interesting to see how this situation of increased and seemingly still increasing
terrorist activity, while the United States and Nigeria have started cooperating more strongly to combat it, can be explained.
This leads to the following research question:
How can the increase of Islamist violence in Nigeria, focusing on the case of Boko Haram, be explained in part against the background of intensified U.S.-Nigerian cooperation concerning counterterrorism?
Looking into the increase of radical Islamic violence in Nigeria is relevant, since the campaign of terror that Boko Haram is carrying out causes a lot of suffering, as was set out above. Similarly, as discussed, the following actions by government forces and the fighting between the two parties only add to the sorrow. Assessing the case of Boko Haram helps to understand the dynamics of the arise of terror and violence. Also, it looks into how effective counterterrorism methods actually are and how they may affect existing dynamics. This is relevant since the world has seen a rise in terrorist activity not just in Nigeria, but throughout large parts of the Arab world, too, since the United States started its ‘war on terror’.38
Scientifically, the topic of this study offers insight into the dynamics of combating terrorism. It does so particularly with regard to bilateral relations between the United States and an African state concerning this matter, which is a study that may add to the more common literature about the United States’ counterterrorism cooperation with states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
35 Freedom C. Onuoha (2012) ‘(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria’, AlJazeera Center for
Studies, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/12/2012122491416595337.htm, last modified 30 December 2012.
36 Walker (2012), 4. 37 Ibid.
38 ‘War on Terrorism’, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism.html, last accessed 23
April 2014.
Layout
In order to look into the above research question and test the hypotheses, first a review of the literature available on the subject is given. Then, a theoretical framework is established with which to conduct the analysis. Chapter III sets out the research design. Chapter IV looks into the history of Nigeria since its independence, in order to provide some background and shed light on the environment and
circumstances in which the rise of Boko Haram is to be seen. Specifically its political history and the nature of the Nigerian political system are assessed. Chapter V focuses on Boko Haram. Its origins, history and ideas are set out in more detail. Chapter VI looks at United States-Nigeria relations considering counterterrorism, and specifically measures directed at Boko Haram. After these aspects are all discussed, chapter VII features looking into the increase of Islamist violence using a political process perspective. Chapter VIII does the same, but from a relative deprivation outlook. Chapter IX views the events from a resource mobilization point of view, while finally chapter X provides a look into the influence of culture and framing, especially interaction between the United States and Boko Haram. Chapter XI presents the conclusion.
II. Theoretical framework & literature review
The objective of this thesis is to look into the rise of Boko Haram and specifically its turn to and increasing use of violence. There are many factors that may play a role in the rise of insurgent groups, and different theoretical approaches choose to focus on a range of these factors. Below a wide range of factors that are looked into for understanding the rise of Boko Haram, and the accompanying literature, are discussed.
Understanding the rise of Boko Haram
A field that presents an oversight of a lot of these factors is that of social movement theory. It is appealing to look at this field of study because it is difficult to define Boko Haram. Should it be viewed primarily as a religious organization, or as a political one? This question cannot be easily answered, and an unambiguous answer does not exist. Boko Haram is an Islamist organization, which means that one of their goals is to install an Islamic state. Next to a religious group, this inherently makes them a political group as well. Because this is the case, and because it seems wise not to treat them as a very specific category based solely on their religious character — as may have been one of the pitfalls of the United States in its ‘war on terror’ — in this study Boko Haram is perceived as a type of political opposition group. This is also sensible since there are persistent rumours that Boko Haram receives part of its resources from Nigerian politicians from oppositional parties.39
A former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, asserts that Boko Haram is several things. It is a grassroots movement, it is a group seeking vengeance for their leader Yusuf’s death, and it also shows signs of an Islamic sect with a personality cult.40
Because the nature of Boko Haram is so difficult to define, and ideology and religion do play a role, they are certainly not cast aside. Literature specifically on radical Islam is also reviewed, but it is important not to pin a definition of for example ‘radical Islamic terrorist organization’ or ‘international terrorist organization’ too soon, because this is a rather narrow definition which in part determines the outcome of the research. Therefore, first and foremost, Boko Haram’s rise and dynamics are addressed by making use of social movement theory.
An overview of the evolution of social movement theory: structure versus agency
Social movement theory (SMT) does not present a single clear, ready-made theory. Therefore, some elaboration on its evolvement, the discussions within it, and how it is put to use, is necessary.
39 See for example this supposed confession of a former Boko Haram member: ‘A Confession From A Boko Haram
Member Turned Born Again’, Nairaland, http://www.nairaland.com/863111/confession-boko-haram-member-turned, 4 February 2012.
There is no telling whether there is any truth in it- especially since the source is somewhat unclear- or whether this entire transcript is politics again- however, at the least, it presents a good example of the type of rumours that exist.
40 Walker (2012), 9.
In its earlier days, SMT was rather structuralist.41 Kurzman (2003) illustrates this by giving some
quotes by leading scholars within SMT, which are all more or less structuralist. An example is Goldstone’s “continued pressure from the international system, conjoined with certain structural characteristics, precipitates revolution”42, or Skocpol’s “an adequate understanding of social revolutions requires that the
analyst take a nonvoluntarist, structural perspective on their causes and processes”.43 It seems this kind
of outlook does not explain why in cases with similar characteristics social movement action (in this case revolution) does happen in some of these cases, and does not happen in others. However, the quote of Klandermans and Tarrow almost ten years later already seems more moderate in its structuralism: “[t]hese findings suggest that it may be primarily the conditions of national politics and not factors internal to social movements that determine their careers”.44 While still not giving much credit to the
agency of social movements, at least they state that more structural factors may be primarily, responsible, so not only.
In the nineties, the above quoted authors changed their tone and gave more room for agency.45
This meant new lines of study within social movement theory came up. The trouble is that when the clear idea of structure and political environment dictating the outcome did not suffice anymore, more and more variables came up that also seemed to matter when studying social movements. This is, one could say, the time in which the word ‘theory’ in social movement theory became kind of odd. As is often the case, the more of the complicated social world is tried to be explained at once, the less clear theory actually becomes. Suddenly, everything mattered. As Kurzman phrased it, “causal factors accumulate like Occam’s stubble […]: states matter, culture matters, social structure matters, accidents of history matter — everything matters!”46 While his chapter does seem like a bit of an immodest personal account,
the point he makes is quite clear, and the trouble with the developments within SMT is obvious.
However, all the different causal factors that one can look at in explaining social movements, to some extent correspond with some of the bigger IR theories. Realists still focus on more structural factors, and where actors are considered, they are perceived as rational. Constructivists focus more on the role of culture, ideas, and framing, both as causes for the social movement to arise, as methods used by these movements in order to mobilize. Institutionalists focus on organizational structures of social
41 Structuralism is one outlook on the structure-agency debate. This is an ontological debate within social sciences,
which questions whether the structure or the agent has primacy in determining outcomes. Structuralism favours structure, leaving little room for agency.
42 Jack Goldstone (1980) ‘Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation’ in World Politics 32 (3) 449. 43 Theda Skocpol (1979) States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 14.
44 Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow (1988) ‘Mobilization into Social Movements’ in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter
Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (eds.) International Social Movement Research 1, 17. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI.
45 Charles Kurzman (2004) ‘The Poststructuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory’ in Rethinking Social
Movements. Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 111, 113.
46 Idem, 113.
movements to reach an understanding for their dynamics. So it is not, perhaps, the case that “everything matters”, at least not to everyone. A whole range of theories actually arose within the study of social movements, all giving primacy to something else. Below, all these different ‘categories’ of theory are discussed, and some specific, useful theories within them are assessed.
The different ‘tastes’ of social movement theory Psychology-based explanations: collective behaviour
While SMT has known a large structure-agency debate, which was mentioned above, before SMT even existed as a field of study under this name, the focus was largely on collective behaviour. These studies were characterized by socio-psychological lines of thinking, and do still exist today. In the first half of the 1900s, these kinds of studies focused mainly on individuals, and saw social movements as a sort of accumulation of personal grievances. While this idea is largely outdated, it seems likely that these kinds of emotional individual factors still matter (and among scholars this idea has become more popular again47),
but it is not feasible to research this here. Besides, this paper is not a psychological study.
In the second half of the 20th century, the field of studying social movements became more
populated by sociologists and political scientists, for whom the focus is not on the individual psyche, but more on group dynamics. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) provide a clear oversight of twelve psychological processes that lead to radicalization.48 They describe ‘common’ psychological processes,
and do not carry out the ‘Bush-style’ demonization of terrorists — which is what their study focuses on. Radicalization can be an individual process (for example a single member of Boko Haram), a group process (a Boko Haram cell) or there can be mass radicalization (in which case a bigger political group or for example Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups radicalize in conflict with the state or other groups).49 As said,
there are some obvious practical difficulties with looking into individual radicalization for this study. This is also the case for group radicalization, since studying that accurately would require group access. These objections apply less to the point of mass radicalization, which is in fact rather interesting. Did the colonial history of Nigeria, with its accompanying demographics and group grievances, help radicalize certain groups in the north, and bring more popular support to groups such as Boko Haram?
Even though these kinds of automatic radicalization processes are likely to be a part of understanding the radicalization of Boko Haram, for the outlook of this paper it is not the most relevant and at best provides a small part of the explanation. If these sort of automatic radicalization processes
47 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta (2001) ‘Introduction: Why Emotions Matter’ in Jeff
Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics. Emotions and Social Movements. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
48 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008) ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward
Terrorism’ in Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:3, 418.
49 McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), 416-418.
tend to happen when certain people are put together, they do not explain how this relates to the broader environment that the radicalizing group exists in, and at the specific characteristics of the case of Boko Haram. Plus, as Borum aptly states: “A focus on radicalization […] risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for terrorism. We know this not to be true. Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists—even those who lay claim to a "cause"—are not deeply ideological and may not "radicalize" in any traditional sense.”50
So while this is not a study that focuses on the psychology of radicalization, and while radical ideas are not a proxy for actions as taken by Boko Haram,51 it is interesting to mention some of the
twelve mechanisms for radicalization that McCauley and Moskalenko set out, because they relate to other theoretical stances and points made later on. The first is “group radicalization under isolation and threat”, which asserts that groups are more likely to radicalize when they are cut off from other parts of society (with other ideas). They are not challenged by alternative ideas anymore, and can only trust each other — a trust that is easier established if everyone is exactly on the same page.52 The second is “group
radicalization in competition with state power”, which is also very relevant here: this is something SMT, and particularly the branches of political opportunity structure or political process framework, which will be looked into more deeply below, study.53 It concerns a cycle of reaction and counterreaction between
the group and the state which leads to its radicalization — and, as is also assessed later, may enhance its legitimacy and resources. The third is “mass radicalization in conflict with an outgroup- jujitsu politics”, in which conflict with an outgroup strengthens the ingroup’s identity. Prompting a fierce reaction by the outgroup, for example the state’s security forces which mostly comprise of another ethno-religious background, or the United States, is used as a tactic for increasing legitimacy and support.54 The final
mechanism of radicalization worth mentioning is “mass radicalization in conflict with an outgroup- hate”, in which victims are dehumanized.55 This also happens in the case of Boko Haram, where the boundaries
of who could be possible victims of the group were stretched over the last years.
In the above, social movements mostly arose because of people’s irrational impulses, or because of psychological processes that happened more or less automatically, subconsciously. McCauley and Moskalenko do take a next step, however, and mention that these processes are also something that
50 Randy Borum (2011) ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review Of Social Science Theories’ in Journal of
Strategic Security, 4:4, 8.
51 Consider the earlier mentioned difficulties with defining Boko Haram. It is difficult to establish what Boko Haram’s
ideas actually are, and in how far they act out of radical beliefs and in how far they have a clear, rationalized view and plan and simply use radical beliefs to their advantage.
52 McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), 423-424. 53 Idem, 425.
54 McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), 426-427. 55 Idem, 427.
groups can consciously make use off. Also, they mention grievances that lie at the roots of some of the discussed radicalization mechanisms.
Relative deprivation
Relative deprivation (RD) is about grievances that lie at the root of mass mobilization, radicalization and insurgency. It was widely used by social movement theorists from the 1960s.56 It thus sort of followed the
psychology-based explanations but looks specifically at the role of relative deprivation in mobilization, both of social movements as leading to insurgency or civil war.
RD focuses more on the root causes of violence. It seeks to explain what sort of grievances may actually lead to social mobilization. The term relative deprivation implies that merely being deprived, so for example being poor, does not necessarily lead to movement formation. It is about people feeling they are poorer than others, or poorer than they expected to be: hence of course the word ‘relative’. Theorists within RD do not fully agree on this; what they have in common, though, is that relative deprivation is about perceived inequality.57 It also needs to be established what is meant by the perceived inequality
that RD focuses on. This is something that is not always clearly identified, but in general definitions are broad, with preconditions merely being “wanting what one does not have, and feeling that one deserves whatever it is one wants but does not have”, which can then contain all kinds of economic, social and political inequalities.58
In Nigeria, there is large income inequality between the northern and southern parts of the country,59 and large income inequality in general.60 These kinds of inequalities, especially if they also
exist along religious or ethnic lines, lead to grievances. RD may actually encompass a lot of issues, including ethno-religious strife.
While it is not difficult to believe that a situation of (perceived) inequality provides fertile soil for a social movement or uprising to spring to life, there is also criticism on RD theory precisely because of these words ‘fertile soil’. These kinds of “socioeconomic and psychosocial theories of social movements […] mechanistically link grievances generated by economic deprivation or alienation to collective action”.61 The existence of relative deprivation alone cannot explain the rise of Boko Haram, because in
some cases with these characteristics insurgency does happen, while in others it does not. There seems to be something missing from the equation.
56 Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J. Tierney (1982) ‘Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at
Twenty Years of Theory and Research’ in The Sociological Quarterly, 23:1, 34.
57 Ibid.
58 Iain Walker and Heather J. Smith (2002) ‘Fifty Years of Relative Deprivation Research’ in Relative Deprivation.
Specification, Development and Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2.
59 United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network.
60 GINI index, World Bank. Via: Via: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=.
61 Mohammed M. Hafez (2004) ‘From Marginalization to Massacres. A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence
in Algeria’ in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.) Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach, 39.
What RD is also essentially about, as said, is the perceived inequality. This could help shed light on the above issue. Walker and Smith write that RD is actually quite good at explaining certain paradoxes, situations in which one would assume there are grievances — they name as an example the fact that women in the same jobs as men often earn a lot less, yet do not seem terribly angry about this — and thus there is no mobilization. The answer RD gives is that “people’s reactions to objective circumstances depend on their subjective comparisons”.62 Therefore, it is how people feel about the circumstances they
are in that is vital in understanding how relative deprivation can lead to mobilization of any kind, in this case of the group of Boko Haram arising.
Also, while relative deprivation may be important in the case of Boko Haram, it is difficult to measure whether this is truly one of the roots for the violence. As said, groups may also use narratives of grievances to legitimate their actions. This does not mean that they actually act because of those grievances. Furthermore, the relative deprivation approach is not the most likely candidate to shed light on the research question. The existence of grievances does not say much about why certain movements become violent, as said, and also not about when — so about the patterns of violence. However, looking into relative deprivation and related grievances is necessary for gaining an extensive understanding of the situation in northern Nigeria and the fertile soil that it has created for groups such as Boko Haram.
Within terrorism studies, very roughly, there are two main lines of thinking when considering the root causes of Islamic terrorism. The first is that the causes are to be found within ideology, the second is that the causes lie in poverty and inequality.63 That second explanation is in line with relative deprivation
theory. The first is discussed later on. The idea that the rise of groups such as Boko Haram lies in poverty and inequality mostly concerns global inequality, so not between (groups of) Nigerians but of Islamic societies feeling aggrieved versus the West.64 Thus the ‘fertile soil’ for insurgency or radical Islamism can
relate to global inequality or to inequality on a national or more local scale. Political opportunity/process
The political opportunity or political process approach partly developed as a response against the above. It insists that the existence of grievances is not enough to explain large scale insurgency: not in all societies where similar grievances exist, mass mobilization occurs. The political environment in which a movement operates shapes its behaviour. The ‘old school’ version of political opportunity would be political opportunity structure, which is the structural version of SMT that has lost popularity today. For some time now, it has been more about political processes, in which political opportunity plays a role, but may change swiftly (which is why the word ‘structure’ tends to be misleading), and in which interaction
62 Walker and Smith (2002), 1.
63 James A. Piazza (2006) ‘Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages’ in
Terrorism and Political Violence, 18, 159.
64 Piazza (2006).
within the political environment also plays a role, bringing agency into the picture. As said above: the political environment shapes a movement’s behaviour, it does not determine it. And political opportunity, as stated, is not a fixed structure, but may be altered by agents.
In 2004 a book on applying SMT to Islamic activism was published. It contains several case studies contributed by different well-known scholars in the area of social movement studies. What this book does, is very interesting for this study. Where scholars of social movement theory and of terrorism studies and Islamic activism studied much of the same matter, and faced much of the same theoretical discussions in their field, the fields largely developed separate from each other.65 This book has tried to
change that and bring the fields together:
“[T]he dynamics, process, and organization of Islamic activism can be understood as important elements of contention that transcend the specificity of “Islam” as a system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action. Though the ideational components and inspiration of Islam as an ideological worldview differentiate Islamic activism of other examples of contention, the collective action itself and concomitant mechanisms demonstrate consistency across movement-types. In other words, Islamic activism is not sui generis. Despite these similarities, the study of Islamic activism has, for the most part, remained isolated from the plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged from research on social movements and contentious politics.”66
The first couple of chapters of the book, by Hafez and Wiktorowicz, give primacy to political opportunity and political process frameworks for understanding Islamic activism.
The chapter by Hafez deals with massacres against civilians carried out by the Groupe Islamique Armé, or GIA, in 1997 and some years thereafter.67 In Algeria, at the time, there was large scale Islamist
insurgency, which targeted security forces and government officials, but also civilians, including those in “Islamist strongholds”.68 This situation shows similarities to the situation in northeast Nigeria, in which
Boko Haram attacks soldiers, policemen, other state personnel and civilians, be they Christian or Muslim. Hafez proposes an answer to the question of why such a movement radicalizes and turns to extreme violence — in his study, particularly violence directed at civilians. Grievances and ideology do matter, but to reach the stage wherein indiscriminate violence is perceived as legitimate, there needs to be a radicalization process. Hafez asserts that this is “intimately connected to the broader political process of violent contention”.69 Massacres such as those in Algeria are more likely to occur, he states, when three
conditions concerning repression exist: “(1) state repression creates a political environment of bifurcation
65 Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) ‘Introduction’ in Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1-36.
66 Wiktorowicz (2004). 67 Hafez (2004), 37. 68 Ibid.
69 Idem, 38.
and brutality; (2) insurgents create exclusive organizations to shield themselves from repression; and (3) rebels promote antisystem frames to motivate violent collective action to overthrow agents of repression.”70 This falls under political process theory, but it focuses on the interplay between a variety of
variables such as the political environment, organizational structures and framing. While it is good to keep Tilly’s criticism on political process theory in mind, in starting with state repression that creates a certain environment there is considerable room for agency, since the interaction between the state agent and the insurgent group agent is central. The difference with structuralism is this: political opportunity is not perceived as a structure, but as a variable. As Kurzman aptly states, “opportunity, ultimately, is what people make of it”; therefore, it does not determine the outcome.71 This also makes it harder to study
movements in a way as to deduct certain laws that could predict the outcome. This is not an issue here, since this study is not in the business of predicting. It only seeks an understanding of what has happened so far.
An issue with the political process framework, as Hafez dubbed it, is that it focuses on the process, as the name suggests. While the argument posed by Hafez is central to explaining the increase of violence by radical Islamic groups in Nigeria, the roots of the violence cannot be traced back to it. Therefore, more historicist approaches are valuable for providing the necessary background before turning to the analysis. However, in another chapter, Hafez and Wiktorowicz make a crucial point on this matter:
“Deprivation has created a legion of disaffected recruits who seek culturally acceptable explanations that address their marginalization and social anomie. […] Although such studies point to the general conditions that give rise to Islamic movements, they do not effectively explain the emergence and proliferation of violence in repertoires of contention.”72 It is explaining Boko Harams turn to violence and
the increase in violence that is at the centre of attention in this study.
Hafez and Wiktorowicz start by stating that the turn to violence of some Islamic groups is rather interesting since these are the kind of groups that already have a lot of options for contention.73 So why
do some of these groups turn violent? Hafez and Wiktorowicz assert that two factors of the political opportunity structure are particularly important in shaping a movement’s decision whether to turn to violence. The first is access to institutionalized politics. The more exclusive a regime is, the more likely it is for movements to turn to extreme measures such as violence, because other ways of influencing the state are closed off, and because the regime is seen as “unreformable or an instrument of a narrow class
70 Ibid.
71 Kurzman (2004), 117.
72 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) ‘Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement’
in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.) Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 63.
73 Idem, 61.
or clique [which] (accordingly) needs to be overhauled”.74 Second, the nature of state repression
influences movement behaviour. Here, it is about the timing of the repression — is it preemptive or reactive — and the targeting of it – selective or indiscriminate.75 Preemptive means that the government
intervened before the group got well-organized and built a strong identity. Reactive is that the government intervenes after these factors are already established, which means that the group is better equipped to effectively evade the intervention and go underground, while their strong group cohesion and identity make chances of defection lower and the feeling of unfair treatment higher, rising motivation for battle or revenge against the state. Concerning the targeting of state repression, selective targeting means only group members are targeted. In this case only “trouble-makers” are punished and there is less of a chance that supporters and sympathizers of the group will be drawn towards the group more.76 The state does not lose any more of its legitimacy in the eyes of these supporters: selective
repression therefore limits mass support for a group such as Boko Haram, which consequently also limits its resources.77 Indiscriminate repression may lead to more of an “us versus them” feeling among the
population, in which the state is the big oppressor. So while preemptive and selective repression may hinder movement formation, reactive and indiscriminate repression may stimulate its turn to violence.78
Testing their theory on the Egyptian Islamic movement’s turn to more violent measures, Hafez and Wiktorowicz conclude that “violent contention […] became an increasingly acceptable protest repertoire in the 1990s due to three developments relating to the political opportunity structure.”79
These were the deliberalization of the political system, the reactive repression of militant Islamists, and the indiscriminatory nature of state repression.80 It is interesting to see whether these developments
have also been present in Nigeria, and whether their effects were similar there. Singerman remarks that while Islamic activist movements do show similar dynamics as other types of social movements, there is in fact something specific about them: “what is specific to Islamic movements is the political context in which they operate. Many regimes in the Middle East rely upon political exclusion and repression to maintain rule”.81 Even though Nigeria is not part of the Middle East, political exclusion and repression are
common here as well, which is why the theories by Hafez & Wiktorowicz are of importance here. Clearly, a political environment like that can have effects on the possibilities for resource mobilization of groups as Boko Haram.
74 Idem, 66. 75 Ibid. 76 Idem, 70.
77 Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004,) 70. 78 Idem, 68.
79 Idem, 80. 80 Ibid.
81 Diane Singerman (2004) ‘The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements’ in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.)
Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 143.
Resource mobilization
Just as with political opportunity, the focus is on factors that lie outside of the movement itself — more on structure — and which in part determine movement behaviour — as opposed to the first two categories within SMT (collective behaviour and relative deprivation) that focused more on factors within the psyche of the movement or movement’s individual members. Grievances certainly are important, but without any resources a group is not able to actually carry out its activities. So while grievances may explain why people wish to organize, for an understanding of the dynamic of a group turning violent looking into their possibilities for resource mobilization is vital as well. Cress and Snow (1996) phrase it as follows:
“Its central premise is that the principal antecedent task to collective action is resource aggregation and that fluctuation in the level of discretionary resources accounts, in large part, for variation in the activity levels of social movements”.82
As is hinted at above, resources need not merely be available, but movements also need to be able to put them to use to organize themselves — hence the term resource mobilization.83 Edwards and
McCarthy state that “[r]esource mobilization theory is at root aimed at better understanding how groups are able to overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in their efforts to pursue social change goals”.84 This is of course interesting in relation to Boko Haram, because they only represent a relatively
small segment of the population and one in the impoverished northeast of Nigeria, a peripheral zone, which could indicate that they do not automatically have a lot of resources at their disposal.85 More
relevant, however, is not the variation of resource availability (and accessibility) over space, but over time: has the resource availability for Boko Haram increased in recent years, and can that explain the increase in the violence it carried out? This is something to look into.
So resources are unevenly distributed over space, time and constituency. Social movements themselves can try to gain more resources, but there can also be individuals and organizations from other sectors, both state and non-state actors, that try to increase the resources of a given social movement organization.86 As Edwards and McCarthy state, “[s]uch […] actors are motivated by a number of factors,
including altruism, enlightened self-interest, compassion, religious conviction, or ideological commitment.
82 Daniel M. Cress and David A. Snow (1996) ‘Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors, and the Viability
of Homeless Social Movement Organizations’ in American Sociological Review, 61:6, 1090.
83 Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2004) ‘Resources and Social Movement Mobilization’ in David A. Snow, Sarah
A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 116.
84 Idem, 118. 85 Idem, 119. 86 Idem, 120.
Others may be motivated by the desire to co-opt and thereby to control to some extent the goals and tactics of a movement.”87
There is a wide range of aspects that are covered by the resource mobilization perspective. Cress and Snow distinguish material, moral, human and informational resources.88 Or alternatively and more
simply put: “money, legitimacy, people, and occasionally expertise”.89 They inductively derived their
categories from looking at fifteen social movement organizations of homeless in the United States, which I obviously quite a different field than that of groups such as Boko Haram. While it has been said that different types of social movements all follow similar dynamics, it is also interesting to look at Edwards and McCarthy. They have synthesized previous work, including that of Cress and Snow but also that which based its typology on other types of social movements — which may therefore be more generalizable and more applicable to Boko Haram. Edwards and McCarthy provide roughly the same categories as Cress and Snow, except the fact that they divide informational resources into cultural resources and social-organizational resources, leading to a fivefold typology.90
So there are material, moral, human, cultural and social-organizational resources. Material resources encompass monetary resources, property, equipment and supplies.91 In the case of Boko
Haram one can think of money, food, hide-outs, communication devices, and of course very importantly, weapons. If Boko Haram cannot mobilize these kinds of resources, they cannot carry out their attacks. Of the moral resources the most theorized is legitimacy. Closely linked is support.92 Legitimacy can be
created by the social movement organization itself (consider successful framing), but this is difficult and more often it originates from outside the movement and can be “bestowed [upon them] by an external source known to possess [moral resources]”.93 Human resources include “labor, experience, skills, and
expertise”, plus leadership, which is a combination of these factors.94 This type of resources is about
experience and skills in individuals who can bring these to the group. The categories social-organizational and cultural resources are about resources that are present in the structure of the group.95 While these
categories relate to a movement’s “capacity to deploy personnel”, for example, individual resources concern individuals willing to cooperate.96 This is shaped in part by the legitimacy of the organization, but
also for example by other obligations or commitments an individual has.97 However, as stated, not only 87 Idem, 120-121.
88 Cress and Snow (1996), 1095. 89 Ibid.
90 Edwards and McCarthy (2004), 117. 91 Idem, 128. 92 Idem, 125-126. 93 Idem, 126. 94 Idem, 127. 95 Ibid. 96 Idem, 127-128. 97 Ibid.
labour is important, but also experience, skills, and expertise: human capital. In the case of Boko Haram, a ‘random’ angry youth that wants to join them impacts the chances of mobilization far less than if someone who can make IED’s joins them. Cultural resources link to the earlier mentioned moral resources and especially to framing. It may prove hard for a group to create legitimacy for itself, but if the group knows how to make use of a tactical repertoire of organizing protests, running meetings, surfing the web and making productions such as videos, this may “facilitate the recruitment and socialization of new adherents and help movements maintain their readiness and capacity for collective action”.98 This
resource category includes the group’s specific teachings, ideas and frames. Finally, social-organizational resources feature organizational structures and networks that can be used by the social movement organization. These can be both intentional — specifically created to further the movement’s goals — or appropriable — for example pre-existing social networks of Boko Haram members.99
These resources all have certain characteristics which influence the “use-value to social movements”.100 These are the fungibility and proprietarity of resources. Fungibility means that a resource
is context independent — the opposite is idiosyncratic, very context dependent.101 Proprietarity relates to
the degree to which access to a certain resources can be controlled.102 As an example, money is highly
fungible — it is relatively context independent, it usually keeps around the same value and can be used similarly by different actors, and it is also proprietary, since access to it can be restrained by those who have it.103
Finally, there are different mechanisms of getting access to the mentioned resource-types. Obviously, some types of resources require other measures to attain them than others, both because of the different types there are and the different degrees of fungibility and proprietarity they have. These mechanisms include aggregation, self-production, co-optation/appropriation and patronage. Aggregation is about turning individual resources into collective ones, so that they can be used for group goals.104
Self-production concerns, as the name implies, creating resources within an organization, or adding value to resources that were gained through one of the other mechanisms.105 Co-optation and appropriation both
concern using or borrowing a certain resource from another social organization. In the case of co-optation, this is with permission, and in the case of Boko Haram one could think of using networks of affiliated mosques. In the case of appropriation, the other organization did not give its permission, and
98 Idem, 126.
99 Edwards and McCarthy (2004), 127. 100 Ibid. 101 Idem, 128. 102 Idem, 130. 103 Ibid. 104 Idem, 131. 105 Idem, 134.
Boko Haram might for example go to some social organizations where many youths are gathered to recruit these youths, without the organization’s board knowledge or approval.
With looking into Boko Haram using resource mobilization theory, one needs to keep in mind that some aspects of this line of thinking as set out in the discussed articles apply more to ‘standard’ social movements. That is, ones that do not have terrorist attacks in their tactical repertoire. This is important since carrying out these kinds of attacks certainly takes resources, but still relatively little is needed to have an enormous impact on society — this is one of the characteristics of terrorism. However, organizing so many attacks for multiple years while constantly evading, and attacking, the security forces does of course require considerable resources.
Framing
The concept of framing plays a role in earlier mentioned approaches and theories. In Hafez’ theory on the occurrence of massacres, one of the conditions was that rebels promoted anti-system frames.106 Framing
also plays a role in the resource mobilization perspective: successful frames may help a group to gain more resources. There is also a large body of scholarly work that focuses solely on the concept of framing and since it is central to understanding these other approaches as well, it deserves to receive some more attention here.
Framing is an important part of the social world. Very basically, framing means “to produce (something written or spoken)”, and also to shape or construct.107 It is a way of constructing reality, giving
it meaning and shaping it, through language. That is, at least, if one considers an objective reality to exist; otherwise these different frameworks all provide different realities. Studying framing means that “social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies”, but that movement actors are “signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers”.108 Successful frames need to align with cultural
understandings present in the proposed ‘recipient’ of the frame.109 If one is able to create and spread a
successful frame, one can influence the thinking and behaviour of others. A frame, then, is defined as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” events or phenomena in the world around them.110
106 Hafez (2004), 38. 107 Merriam-Webster.
108 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment’ in Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 613.
109 Idem, 624.
110 Erving Goffman (1974) Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the Experience. New York: Harper
Colophon, 21.
Framing has played an important role in social movement theory. As Benford and Snow state, “framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements”.111
Social movements and other actors present in the context they operate in, such as the state, local governments and the media, all participate in framing, giving meaning to reality, signifying it and sometimes ‘spinning’ it to reflect a certain reality.112
There are various types of framings that movements and movement organizations may use: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames.113 Diagnostic frames may refer to ‘injustice frames’,
which concerns how movements “identify the “victims” of a given situation and amplify their victimization”.114 Next to clarifying who the victims of the injustice are, the agent responsible for the
injustice also needs to be established and then the wrongdoings of this agent can also be amplified.115 For
example, Boko Haram often states that Nigeria is ruled by a group of false Muslims and other unbelievers and essentially all Nigerians are victims of that, especially the true believers who are now being ruled by unbelievers.116 Another aspect is something that can be called ‘boundary framing’ or ‘adversarial
framing’, with which the social movement organization is portrayed as ‘good’ and the agent that has been attributed with doing the injustice as ‘bad’.117 The fact that Boko Haram does have a religious component
gives extra rise to these kinds of frames, it can be assumed, since religious thinking usually aligns with these kinds of frames rather well. Prognostic frames involve “the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan”.118 Some research
suggests it is likely there is a connection between diagnostic and prognostic frames. In the case of Boko Haram, if they engaged in a lot of boundary and adversarial framing, prognostic frames are likely not to include ideas about talking to the government to jointly find a solution. Rather, the proposed solution would be to overthrow the government of unbelievers and create a new state.119 Counter framing, which
means that framing on the same subject is done by another actor, can affect the framings of a movement, and if it affects prognostic frames, it may also alter their modus operandi.120 A movement’s framing
activities, as said above, do not stand on its own. The third and final category of framings is motivational framing, which involves “the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive”.121 This motive is 111 Benford and Snow (2000), 613.
112 Ibid.
113 Benford and Snow (2000), 615. 114 Ibid.
115 Idem, 616. 116 Walker (2012), 2.
117 Benford and Snow (2000), 616. 118 Ibid.
119 Walker (2012), 2.
120 Benford and Snow (2000), 617. 121 Ibid.
already enclosed within the diagnostic (there is a problem and we are the victims, so we must mobilize) and prognostic (this is what we can do about it) frames. However, SMT framing scholars do add this final category of motivational framing which includes vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety.122 These are frames adding further to the motivation, one could say added vocabularies full of
‘sweeping language’ to help people over the threshold of participating and keep participating — also when perhaps, in the case of Boko Haram, participation is (increasingly) dangerous. It depends on the situation and on the other frame categories which of these four types are the most effective.123 For
example, if Boko Haram would try to motivate people stressing the urgency of the problem, that would mean that the government would have to be overthrown as soon as possible, which does not appear realistic.
Features of frames that are interesting to look into are their flexibility/rigidity and inclusivity/exclusivity, and their interpretative scope and influence. This concerns whether frames can perhaps appeal to a broader group of people and become a ‘master frame’, or whether they are only effective for the group using them.124 In the case of Boko Haram, one could hypothesize that their frames
have become more exclusive over time and becoming so radical in for example its prognostic frames that the scope and influence of the frames decreases — their frames are movement-specific.125 This relates to
the aspect of resonance — how well frames resonate within its cultural context, which is something that was mentioned earlier in this section. It relates to the effectiveness of the used frames in the sense of its potency for mobilization. Of course, with many of these characteristics, dynamics may be a bit different for Boko Haram than for a social movement in a more ‘traditional’ sense: because of the nature and ideas of Boko Haram their objective may not be to create frames that result in mass mobilization.
Next to the role of framing in some of the previous approaches, in the framing section later on the objective is to look into framing only and thoroughly assess the type of frames that Boko Haram uses. Specifically the interaction between frames by the United States and Boko Haram is looked into in that section, in order to see whether the involvement of the United States has influenced the frames used by Boko Haram and with that the dynamics of violence. Movement organizations, such as Boko Haram, generate “interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them. The question is whether U.S. involvement and counter framing has led to an increased mentioning of the United States in for example the injustice frames.
122 Ibid.
123 Benford and Snow (2000), 617. 124 Idem, 618-619.
125 Idem, 619.
In the next section, the relevant literature by scholars of Islamic activism and Islamism or political Islam is reviewed. These approaches developed alongside that of SMT and the difference is that they would not look at a group as Boko Haram through something as SMT, which focuses on all kinds of movements, but only at Islamic or Islamist movements, considering it to represent a distinct category with different dynamics. As has been argued, that is not how Boko Haram is viewed here, but there are some important points that are made by political Islam theorists as well. They are useful to keep in mind when considering the framing perspective later, especially when viewing the possible clashes between the United States and Boko Haram.
Political Islam and Islamist activism
As said, for the purpose of this study Boko Haram is perceived as a social or political opposition movement, and a mostly rational actor at that. Rather than setting groups as Boko Haram aside as a completely different category — something that has been done by many scholars when it comes to studying politics in Muslim societies — it seems more interesting, and perhaps more valuable, to normalize the political dynamics in Nigeria. However, as also became clear in the above discussion on SMT, identity does play a role in ‘general’ social movements as well — according to some strands of SMT a rather important one.126 The assertion is that this is likely to strongly be the case for an Islamic
organization like Boko Haram, because “identity is how individuals and groups define themselves and their relations to others”, and Islam, as a religion by which to lead all aspects of life, Islamic identity is a strong form of identity.127 It is a clear identity with which to define oneself, and through which to view
the world. Religion as an identity is important since “identities manifested in routine practices trump identities determined at birth” and religions tend to have a lot of traditions and daily routine practices.128
Therefore some attention is given to literature on Islamic identity and the specifics of Islamic activism (instead of more ‘general’ activism, as illustrated by SMT) as well, which can add to the understanding of the culture and framing perspective offered by SMT.
So whereas SMT focuses on opposition movements in society in general, which may include Islamic movements, there are also fields of study in which the focus is specifically on Islamic movements. Especially scholarly work looking into political Islam or Islamism are relevant here.
Islamism is politicized Islam. In the literature on the matter, there are many different definitions for political Islam and Islamism. Tibi, for example, feels that Islamism is politicized Islam, and therefore
126 See for example Alberto Melucci (1995) ‘The Process of Collective Identity’ in Hank Johnston (ed.) Social
Movements And Culture. Oxford: Routledge, 41-63.
127 Jillian Schwedler (2001) ‘Islamic Identity. Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?’ in SAIS Review, 21:2, 2. 128 Ibid.
