Media and conflict in Nigeria
An analysis about the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian printed press to investigate the escalation of the religious tensions in the Nigerian media
Wendy Hoogeboom | 10003042
University of Amsterdam | 26 June 2015
Master Conflict Resolution and Governance | Thesis Number of words | 20107
Supervisor | dr. Anja van Heelsum Second Reader | dr. Ursula Daxecker
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Abstract
In Nigeria, conflicts such as the emergence of Boko Haram are often related to the religious division in the country. The country is divided between a mainly Christian south and an Islamic north. Many authors argue about the importance of the relationship between media and conflict: media can reflect conflict in society or can be an actor in the conflict. In Nigeria, the national newspapers are predominantly based in the Christian south. It is therefore
interesting to study how Muslims and Islam are portrayed in the printed press. This thesis presents an answer on the research question: “To what extent is escalation visible in the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media?” With a quantitative content analysis an overview is provided of the general tendencies of claims made about Muslims and Islam in Nigerian newspapers. The quantitative research is supplemented with a discourse analysis that operationalizes the four stages of Hamelink’s (2011) Spiral of Escalation to investigate if discourses in the Nigerian newspapers reflect escalation. The findings of this research indicate that the media only reflects escalation when related to the Boko Haram conflict, but shows no escalation in the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in general. Overall, southern-based
newspapers with a Christian background make substantively more negative claims about Muslims and Islam, while northern-based newspapers have more positive claims.
3 List of figures
Figure 2.1: Nigeria’s presidential elections, winning parties by state p. 12
Figure 3.1: Spiral of Escalation p. 22
Figure 5.1: Tone of claims in percentages p. 32
Figure 5.2: The percentage of negative, neutral and positive claims by newspaper p. 36
Figure 5.3: Average tone claims about Muslims and Islam over the year p. 38
Figure 5.4: Frequency of the different issues related to the claims p. 39
Figure 5.5: The issues extremist Islamic groups and violence, distinction Muslims
and extremists and emphasizing equality and collaboration for the
different periods p. 40
Figure 5.6: State elections and political participation for the different periods p. 41
List of tables
Table 5.1: Means and percentages of tone claims about Muslims and Islam
by group of actors p. 33
Table 5.2: Actors with their number of claims in the articles, average tone of p. 34
claims and percentages
Table 5.3 Means and percentages of tone claims about Muslims and Islam p. 35
by newspaper
Table 5.4 Means and percentages of tone claims about Muslims and Islam p. 37
by different periods
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Table of content
1. Introduction ... 6 1.1 Introduction ... 6 1.1.1 Academic relevance ... 7 1.1.2 Social relevance ... 8 1.2 Chapter outline ... 9 2. Background of Nigeria ... 102.1 Background of Nigeria’s religious tensions ... 10
2.2 The elections and the emergence of Boko Haram ... 11
2.3 Background of the printed media in Nigeria ... 13
3. Theoretical framework ... 16
3.1 Media and conflict ... 16
3.2 The Triangular relationship: media, government and the public ... 17
3.2.1 The media and the government ... 17
3.2.2 The media itself ... 18
3.2.3 The public and the media ... 18
3.3 Generalizations in the media ... 19
3.4 Discourse and the media ... 20
3.5 Escalation and the media ... 21
3.5.1 Anxiety ... 22 3.5.2 Agitation ... 23 3.5.3 Alienation ... 24 3.5.4 Accusation in a mirror ... 25 3.6 Sub questions ... 25 4. Methodology ... 27 4.1 Research strategy ... 27
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4.2 Research design and methods ... 27
4.3 Operationalization ... 28
4.4 Data ... 29
5. Claims about Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media ... 32
5.1 Tone of the debate ... 32
5.2 The different actors ... 32
5.2.1 The characterization of the newspapers ... 35
5.3 Generalizations of the claims ... 37
5.4 Differences between the tone of the claims over the year ... 37
5.5 Issues related to claims about Muslims and Islam ... 38
6. Escalation in the Nigerian media ... 43
6.1 The Spiral of Escalation in the Nigerian printed press ... 43
6.2.1 Anxiety ... 44
6.2.2 Agitation ... 45
6.2.3 Alienation ... 47
6.2.4 Accusation in a mirror ... 48
6.2 The discourses throughout the year ... 49
7. Conclusion ... 51
Bibliography ... 54
Appendixes ... 58
1. Timeline of Nigeria’s religious tensions after independence ... 58
2. Coding schedule quantitative content analysis ... 60
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1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
When speaking about religious conflict in Nigeria, Boko Haram1 is now in 2015 constantly
mentioned. The rise of this Islamic group, which claims an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria, has been worldwide news. However, the religious tensions in Nigeria are much broader and are mixed with ethnic and political tensions. Islam and Christianity are currently the two dominant religions in Nigeria, with 51 percent of the Nigerians identifying themselves as Muslim and 48 percent as Christians (Agbiboa, 2013:6). A social boundary divides the country as the Christians are living mainly in the south, while the north is the Islamic part of the country. Nigerians connect strongly with their religious identity. Onapoja (2012) argues that their attachment to being Christian and Muslim is stronger than their other identities, such as their Nigerian nationality.
The affinity of Nigerians with their religion has become politicized, and belonging to the Christian or the Muslim community is also connected to socio-economic differences (Agbiboa, 2013; Onapajo, 2012; Ibrahim, 1991). Religion, politics and social life are intertwined in Nigeria, causing: “(..) deep suspicion when it is perceived that one religious group is dominating the political affairs of the country” (Agbiboa, 2013: 9). Since Nigeria’s independence, many conflicts have taken place connected to the religious division in the country, such as violence surrounding the elections or the rise of Boko Haram. The religious tensions are interwoven into many aspects of Nigerian society.
The media are one aspect of society that often shows conflicts and are sometimes an actor in a conflict (Gibloa, 2002; Hamelink, 2011; Allen & Seaton, 1999). The media have an interesting position between the ruling elite, who attempt to use the media to influence the public, the public which they represent and shape, and the media’s own agenda (Gibloa, 2002:x). The media reflects opinions, ideas, information and norms from society and from the ruling elite to the general public. By reflecting these, the media are also reinforcing and shaping them (Gibloa, 2002:x; Hamelink, 2011). Several authors argue how the media shows the escalation of conflict, but also how the media itself reinforces or incites conflict.
Hamelink (2011) argues for example how the media have a distinctive role in his Spiral of Conflict Escalation. Analyzing the media in conflict countries could give insights in the escalation of conflict.
1 The official name of Boko Haram is ‘Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad’. However, the more common used Boko Haram is applied in this thesis to prevent confusion,
7 Nigeria has an extensive press community, the biggest in the continent followed by South Africa and Kenya (Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001; Oyo, 2003; Olukoyun, 2004). There are many daily newspapers, news magazines, tabloids and evening newspapers in the country (Ojo, 2003:831). The majority of the press is based in Lagos, or in other southern areas of Nigeria. As the southern areas are mainly Christian, it is interesting to research how the news portrays Muslims and Islam. Previous research has not often examined the role of the media in religious tensions in Nigeria, and the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the media has even been less a topic of research. This study therefore focuses on how the Nigerian media portrays Muslims and Islam and if the media shows patterns of conflict escalation, leading to the central question:
“To what extent is escalation visible in the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media?”
The goal of this research will be to provide insights in how the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian press indicates escalation of the religious conflicts. This will first require an understanding of the religious tensions and the press in Nigeria. Furthermore, the conceptualization and interrelation of media, conflict and escalation will be explored in the theoretical framework. With this theoretical foundation a mixed method strategy guides this research in order to find an answer on the research question.
1.1.1 Academic relevance
Many studies have researched the role of media in conflict. The media is often researched in the context of promoting democracy and being a ‘watchdog’. Further, many studies have argued how media reflects conflicts within society, and sometimes contributes to the
escalation of a conflict (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014). The role of the media in Nigeria in promoting democracy and accountability has been a topic of academic research several times, such as Ojo's 2003 paper “The mass media and the challenges of sustainable democratic values in Nigeria: Possibilities and limitations”, and Olutokun & Seteolu's research entitled “The media and democratic rule in Nigeria” (2001).
The role of the media in Nigeria in reflecting aspects or contributing to religious conflicts is underexposed in academic research. Some authors have studied the role of the press regarding Boko Haram, such as Popoola (2012) with her article: “Press and terrorism in Nigeria: A discourse on Boko Haram”. However, these studies do not reveal how the press
8 portrays other aspects of religious conflicts, or Muslims and Islam in general. It is therefore necessary to apply theories from for example Hamelink (2011), Koopmans (2004) or Gilboa (2002) to investigate if these theories are applicable in the Nigerian context. This study has academic relevance as it applies these theories and investigates if they can be used in a different context, as well as contributing to academic understanding of the religious tensions in Nigeria.
1.1.2 Social relevance
This study attempts to reach social relevance. Analyzing the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media can indicate the role of the media in Nigeria in religious conflicts and it can provide small insights in the escalation process of the conflict. Hamelink (2008:77) argues how:
“An International Media Alert System (IMAS) is needed to monitor media contents in areas of conflict. This system would provide an ‘early warning’ where and when media set the climate for crimes against humanity and begin to
motivate people to kill others”.
He emphasizes the need to monitor escalation of a conflict in the media, as a ‘tool’ for the international community to realize when intervention is needed.
Furthermore, an analysis of the media can contribute to the awareness of Nigerian journalists about their position when reporting about conflict related topics. If research
indicates that dominant discourses are fostering (religious) conflicts in Nigeria, it is important to break this pattern and create awareness in society and among news producers. Peace journalism can be used as a concept for journalists to produce news with a de-escalating approach. This attempts to produce balanced news, look for alternative interpretations, humanize both sides, show flaws in both sides, does not anonymize enemies, and shows the horrible outcomes of a conflict such as suffering and trauma (Hamelink, 2011; Carter,
Thomas & Dente Ross, 2011). Although it is debatable if for example portraying the suffering and violence is not provoking feelings of revenge, awareness about producing balanced news could contribute to a de-escalation of a conflict.
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1.2 Chapter outline
In order to answer the foregoing research question, first a background chapter (2) will discuss the religious tensions and the press in Nigeria. This chapter is followed by a review of
theoretical insights (chapter 3) that are used to provide a framework to analyze the Nigerian media. A method chapter (4) will explain the operationalization of a content analysis, a discourse analysis and other method relevant aspects. In chapter 5 and 6 the results of the analysis will be presented. Chapter 7 offers a conclusion to the thesis.
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2. Background of Nigeria
2.1 Background of Nigeria’s religions tensions
It is argued that Nigerians are more loyal to their religion than to the Nigerian state (Onapajo, 2012:42). Moreover, scholars claim that the connection of Nigerians to their religion has become politicized, and that belonging to the Christian community or the Muslim community is also connected to socio-economic differences (Agbiboa, 2013; Onapajo, 2012; Ibrahim, 1991). This section briefly explains the historical background of these religious tensions.
In the 11th century, the northern part of Nigeria came into contact with Islam because
of trade and commerce with north Africa. Local customs from northern Nigeria were incorporated in Islam and Islam became more and more part of society. Degeneration of Islamic practices by ruling elites eventually resulted in a ‘Holy Jihad’ in the 19th century, combined with the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, which boosted the spread of Islam in the region (Onapajo, 2012).
During the 15th century, Christianity came to southern Nigeria when missionaries
entered the coast areas of the Niger-Delta region. The spread of Christian evangelization was slow in the beginning, but was boosted in the southern region through the return of liberated (Christian) slaves from Brazil and Sierra Leone, and because of the promotion of Western, Christian education. When in 1888 Nigerians established their first indigenous church as a reaction to the grievances resulting from racial discrimination, Christianity became an increasing part of southern society in Nigeria (Onapajo, 2012).
The inhabitants of Nigeria are composed of more than 250 ethnic groups. The three main groups are the Hausa/Fulani in the north with twenty-nine percent, the Yoruba in west and southwest with twenty-one percent, and the Igbo in the south-east, who constitute eighteen percent of the inhabitants (CIA, The World Factbook, 2015). These different ethnic groups have lost connection with their traditional religions. The Igbo and Yoruba are
nowadays predominantly Christian and the Hausa/Fulani Nigerians are mainly Muslim. Having said that, local customs and aspects of traditional religion have been incorporated into local Christian and Muslim practices (van Heelsum & Hessels, 2006; Onapajo, 2012).
Islam and Christianity are the two dominant religions in Nigeria nowadays. 50.5 percent of Nigerians identify themselves as Muslim and 48.2 percent as Christians, while other religious groups are only 1.3 percent (Agbiboa, 2013). The colonial ‘civilization’ agenda led to an enormous decline of traditional religions, such as the traditional Yoruba
11 religion. The British colonizers demonized the African traditional gods, and the traditional religions were castigated as 'paganism' (Onapajo, 2012; Ibrahim, 1991).The essence of their traditional religion was abolished by the civilization ideas of the colonizers (Onapajo,
2012:44). Even after Nigeria became independent, Christianity and Islam were promoted as a strategy to achieve national unity (Ibrahim, 1991:117).
Agbiboa (2013:8) states in her article that: “In Nigeria, religion is politicized and politics is ‘religionised’”. Religion is used by political leaders to gain support from citizens and religious organizations also commonly provide resources for politicians and political parties. Religion, politics and social life are intertwined in Nigeria, causing “(..) deep suspicion when it is perceived that one religious group is dominating the political affairs of the country” (ibid:9). After military rule in 1999, the division between Muslims and
Christians became even more overtly present in politics. Between 1999 and 2010 more than ten thousand people died because of violence related to religious tensions (Agbiboa, 2013).
The next sections elucidate a few conflicts in Nigeria2 to show how religious tensions are
intertwined with the life of the Nigerians.
2.2 The elections and the emergence of Boko Haram
The period around the elections of 2011 illustrate how religious tensions are involved in political and social life in Nigeria. When Goodluck Jonathan announced his candidacy for election, with strong support of Obasanja, this was seen as an insult by the northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims. Muhammad Buhari was selected as an alternative Muslim candidate from the north to confront Jonathan during the election struggle. The voting pattern clearly reflected the religious and ethnic divisions in the country. Goodluck Jonathan emerged the winner. The map below with data from the Independent National Electoral Commission shows the division between north and south in the 2011 elections. The elections were followed by an outbreak of violence. Many staff of the electoral offices were killed and Christians were targeted by the violence. In the Niger states and Kaduna alone 520 people died, and 157 churches, 46 mosques and 1,435 houses were burnt down during post-election riots (Onapojo, 2012).
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Figure 2.1: Nigeria’s presidential elections, winning parties by state
Source: OECD insights, http://oecdinsights.org/2015/04/10/nigeria-is-the-winner-west-africa-too/
In the run-up to the 2015 election, it became clear that the election would be a rematch between Jonathan and Buhari. At that time, the nation faced several problems which were hot topics during the elections and made the elections more fierce. The problems faced were the high level of corruption, the economic crisis in the impoverished, densely populated north and the ongoing violence of Boko Haram spreading from the north-east to other parts of the country. At the same time, authorities and voters faced the challenge of avoiding a repeat of the violence that occurred around the election in 2011 (Thurston, 2015). Both Nigerians and the international community and the Nigerians were concerned about developments regarding the elections. Then current president Jonathan decided to postpone the elections for six weeks
until 28th March 2015, as the National Electoral Commission argued that the military would
be unable to provide safe elections in the regions exposed to the violence of Boko Haram (Thurston, 2015). Eventually Buhari won the election and the aftermath of the elections went relatively calm.
The emergence of Boko Haram, a fundamental Islamic movement in the north-east of Nigeria, also shows the religious tensions in the country. The first period of Boko Haram in Nigeria was from 2002 to 2005, where the movement attempted to find out if there is space to have a society governed by strict Islamic law. 2005 to 2009 is seen as the second period of Boko Haram, when Mohammed Youssaf, a very charismatic man, led the movement. He desired a caliphate and many young northern Nigerians were attracted by his ideas as they had almost no identity, no future and were often displaced. In 2009, Youssaf was killed by
13 security forces after violent attacks by Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria. Then in 2010 the third phase of Boko Haram started, when they launched many violent attacks, proclaimed a caliphate in the north-east and became officially categorized by the Nigerian government and the US as a terrorist movement (Osaghae, 2015).
In the beginning, Boko Haram was not taken too seriously, as Nigerians perceive fundamental and extreme (Islamic) movements as nothing new. They thought it would fade out, just as for example the Sharia movement had (Osaghae, 2015). But Boko Haram is now committing cruel and horrifying actions in the northern part of Nigeria, such as mass killings
or kidnapping 200 ‘Chibuk girls’ from their school3. They are attempting to destabilize the
government and impose the sharia law on the whole of Nigeria, attacking almost everyone who is not facilitating them, even other Muslims who are not following them.
The emergence of Boko Haram needs to be seen in the context of a deprived northern area with chronic poverty and youth employment that is lagging behind with the rest of the country, as well as a being the victim of political corruption (Agbiboa, 2013).
2.3 Background of the printed media in Nigeria
Nigeria has a large press community, with many newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations. Moreover, Nollywood, the world’s third-largest film industry, is based in Lagos. The printed press, especially newspapers, are the topic of research in this thesis. This section therefore discusses the position of the printed press in Nigerian society, to provide a background for the results of the analysis.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Nigerian press was already a visible institution within society. By promoting political awareness and representing and directing public opinion, the press was seen as a force in the struggle of Nigerians for independence. During the period of military rule attempts were made to curtail the press, but the press did not turn away from its role in society. During these decades the press developed an activist attitude, launching campaigns against the military and their anti-democratic tendencies. Moreover, during these times the press attempted to fulfill their watchdog position within society (Adesoji, 2006). However, it should be noted that the restrictions during the military rule also slowed down the development of the press as it caused for example a lack of training institutions for journalists (Zakari Okwori & Adeyanju, 2006).
3 More details about the emergence and activities of Boko Haram in the ‘Timeline of Nigeria’s religious tensions after independence’ which is in the Appendix on page 58.
14 After the end of military rule in 1999, the position of the press in society changes, according to Adesoji (2006). During election periods, the press tends to promote specific candidates to influence the voting choice of citizens, but often fails to provide the public with the necessary information about programs and candidates for their voting decision (Adesoji, 2006). This development of the media being less critical during elections is part of a trend where the press is less critical about the government than they were during military rule. Adesoji (2006) argues that this is partly caused by corruption, because the press sometimes receives money from political leaders, and so it is difficult for them to discuss the same political leaders critically. Further, journalists are often also working in the government as advisors and assistants or are contracted as media consultants by the government (Adesjoji, 2006). During a conversation with a former Nigerian journalist (personal communication, March 2015) he described how he and many of his colleagues needed side jobs to supplement their income, often within the government. He described that these side jobs caused many journalists to be less objective in their news coverage. The journalists who are also working with the government are for example not thoroughly policing the political elite in Nigeria (Adesjoji, 2006).
The African Media Development Initiative say that there is a:
“(..) tradition in Nigeria of the media being used as a political tool, with some wealthy politicians feeling that ownership of a paper is a way of making their voices and political agendas heard” (Zakari Okwori & Adeyanju, 2006:26).
However, when looking at ownership, a positive tendency in the relationship between the government and the press is visible. Newspapers are increasingly independent from the government as they rely less on government adverts and subscriptions. Further, governments and especially the federal government, have sold many of their shares in newspapers, bringing the newspapers more often in private hands. Nonetheless, there remains a lack of transparency about ownership of newspapers (African Media Development Initative, 2005).
Ojo (2003) offers a different explanation as to why the printed press is not always systematical the watchdog within Nigerian society. The ethnic ties and the religious landscape in Nigeria sometimes guide the decision of journalists to critically discuss some public
officials or companies whilst ignoring abuses of others. He notes how an official can be devoutly defended in a newspaper because the owner or editor is from the same religion or ethnic group. During a consultation with a former journalist from Nigeria (personal
15 communication, March 2015) he described how he strongly had the follow the line of their editor, which often implied that they had to write in line with the religious background from their editor.
One implication of this religious influence is the dominance of the south-west in the media. There is a “(..) locational and institutional monopoly of the south-west”, with the media mainly based in the south-west of the country and portraying a “(..) deep-rooted mindset or worldview of south-western Nigeria” (Ojo, 2003:834). Ojo describes for example an affair in which the former Minister of Mines and Power was involved, which caused a public outcry in Nigeria, though the media did not critically discuss this event. According to Ojo, the Minister was not criticized in the media as he came from the south-west of Nigeria. The African Media Development Initiative refers to this dominance of the media in the south-west as the “Lagos-Ibadan axis” (Zakari Okwori & Adeyanju, 2006:27). This concentration of newspapers based in the south contributes to a lack of different views in the news. However, it should be noted, Daily Trust, a northern-based newspaper established in 2003, is starting to break this division. Daily Trust is increasing religious coverage and is reporting about ethnic groups who were previously neglected in the national newspapers. Although Daily Trust is now among the ten most read national newspapers in Nigeria, up to now it seems that it is mainly read by Nigerians coming from the north (Zakari Okwori & Adeyanju, 2006).
This section has described developments in the national, printed media. Local and community papers probably offer a different perspective to national newspapers. Further, harassment and intimidation of journalists should also be mentioned as this obviously influences their ability to produce critical, content news. The consequences of the
developments in the national media, such as how the media sometimes fails to play the role of critical watchdog in society, or the predominance of the south-west in the Nigerian media, are used as a background to interpret the results of the Nigerian media analysis that follows.
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3. Theoretical Framework
3.1 Media and conflict
Many authors are interested in studying the role of media in conflict. In this debate, two main theoretical interests can be distinguished. First, there are theories on the role of the media in promoting democracy and good governance, in which terms such as the media as a
‘watchdog’ are commonly heard. Second, there are theories on the role of media in reflecting conflict or contributing to conflict by provoking violence or because they can be used by autocratic political actors (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014). The second debate about how media reflects or even contribute to conflict is central in this study.
Several articles have been written about the influence of the media on violent
behavior, though there is no strong empirical evidence for this relation (Hamelink, 2011:36; Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014:181). Causal relations between the role of the media and interpersonal or collective aggression are often not strong (Hamelink, 2011:36). So, the media are one factor and are not the solely responsible for causing the violence, but they have a facilitating role when contributing to conflict.
The power of the media is not in coercive power - they cannot force people to do things by for example sanctions or physical threats. Its power is more indirect, by exposing people to certain news or making accusations about certain groups (Hamelink, 2011). Claims made about a certain group in the media reflect the public discourse (Cinalli & Giugni, 2013). A claim is:
“a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy, 2005:24).
Or as Cinalli & Giugni (2013) argue: claims reflect a political position about social problems and their solutions. When claims are made in the media, the media reflects the public
discourse and expose people to this discourse.
This chapter explains the different theories of how media can reflect and facilitate conflict in society. First the relationship between the media, government and the public is explained. Second, the concepts generalization and discourse are described to explain their
17 relation to media and conflict. Third, the concept of escalation is elucidated, in particular escalation of conflict in the media.
3.2 The triangular relationship: media, government and the public
Gilboa (2002) provide an analytical perspective in his book in which he distinguishes three different areas when looking at media and conflict. He describes a triangular relationship between the media, the government and the public:
“They [the media] are manipulated and used by politicians who wish to advance their political agenda, improve their image, and shape public opinions. At the same time, the media have their own agenda and they also represent and shape public opinion. The public may also have an agenda, that may be different from the preferences of both politicians and the media.” (Gilboa, 2002:x)
The triangular relationship shows the complex role of the media, the media’s interactions with government officials and politicians, and its interactions with the public (Gibloa, 2002). To describe the role of media in conflict it is necessary to elaborate on these different areas of interaction.
3.2.1 The media and the government
The mass media often use officials from the government or politicians as a source for their news reports. Bennet (1997) provides three explanations for this relation between the media and the government and politicians. First, by creating a monopoly for public officials, the diversity of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is restricted and is therefore making the business climate more stable, because media are as a business dependent on this climate. Second, the dominance of official voices in the media are an outcome of a symbiotic relationship; both are dependent on each other and this relationship can be mutual beneficial. The last argument is that as public officials and politicians are representatives of the public, the media are acting democratically by providing them a platform to speak (Bennet, 1997).
Several arguments are available to explain why the media are providing public officials and politicians a platform to speak, but it is also important to describe how this relation can influence conflict. Politicians and public officials want to be heard in the media to influence the public opinion to their advantage. The media can help them to ‘win’ the public for their political agenda, but also to improve their image for a wider public (Gilboa, 2002).
18 Officials can have a political agenda which is fostering the conflict, and these ideas, opinions and agendas in the media can influence public opinion. Hamelink (2011:45) describes for example how Libre de Mille Collines, a big Rwandan radio and television medium, provided political leaders a platform to incite violence against Tutsis.
Further, the media do not always provide a platform for the political powerful on a
voluntarily basis. In some cases the media are used by autocratic political actors to their own advantage, and the relationship between media and the government is more one-sided. Here the media are controlled by political actors who can use them to influence the public to their own – possibly conflict-fostering – advantage (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014).
3.2.2 The media itself
It is argued that the media facilitate government officials by providing them a platform to speak and bring their ideas to a wider audience. However, the media are also an actor themselves, with their own agenda (Gilboa, 2002). Besides ‘helping’ the political leaders, many theories argue that there is a watchdog function of the media in a democratic society. These theories argue that the media contribute to democracy as they encourage transparency and accountability in the ruling system. As a watchdog they provide the public with the information needed to hold the public and private sectors to account (Schoemaker &
Stremlau, 2014). So by critically reporting about the practices of the government, politicians and private actors, the media give the public the opportunity to know what is going on by selecting this information.
A different view of the role of the media is that the media are a ‘gatekeeper’. They have a degree of agency in deciding what issues are addressed in the news and what kind of actors are cited in the mass media (Van Heelsum, 2014:2). The media influences what information, ideas or opinions flow into the public sphere. Furthermore, the media also
represent public opinion (Gilboa, 2002). The gatekeeper function of the media is two-sided, as the media control what flows from the public opinion towards the ruling elite, and vice versa.
3.2.3 The public and media
For most people, the media provides information about conflicts in the world, and so they shape what people think about a conflict (Hamelink, 2011). Moreover, the media have an ‘agenda-setting’ function as they influence what the public perceives as important issues. As they are one of the main sources of information about a conflict, editors can increase the importance of certain aspects when they filter what is in the news (Bissel, 2002). The public
19 construct a feeling, knowledge and awareness about a conflict partly based upon information from the media and they may use this information in their actions (Hamelink, 2011).
However, the public’s role is not only passive, and the interaction between the public, the media and the government is not one-sided. Social movements and citizens are also increasingly using the media to influence government officials and the public opinion (Koopmans, 2004). Interaction between different actors such as citizens, officials or
politicians is increasingly mediated by the media (Koopmans, 2004). Philo (2007) describes how media often have a commercial background, and so gaining readers and users is their primary concern. The public also has the power as the consumers, and so the media have to take the preferences of the public into consideration as the public is their source of income.
3.3 Generalizations in the media
When looking at the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the media, it is important to
investigate if the media, public and government refer to them as one group. This allows us to determine if claims about Muslims and Islam are perceived as applicable to all Muslims in Nigeria. This section explains how in intergroup conflicts negative generalizations of the other group in the media can cause antipathy against the others.
The perception of the ‘self’ is socially constructed as it involves the ‘other’. An identity can be divided into an interpersonal identity and an intergroup identity. Personal identity is a self-description based on interpersonal relationships and individual personalities, while social identity describes the social categories or groups someone is part of (Tajfel &Turner, 1979). When looking at others or ourselves we can shift between personal and social identities. We can see others as unique individuals, but also as members of groups, overlooking the individual differences and seeing everyone in one group as the same. When we look at members of another group – the “out-group” – than we often only see the group identity (Gray, 2011).
When looking at a group of other people, stereotypes are used. A stereotype is: “an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (Allport, 1954:191). It is a cognitive process wherein the reality is simplified, with people in the out-group being categorized according to a certain ‘picture in the head’ we have of them. Stereotypes sometimes accurately assign characteristics to a group, but often these characteristics are distorted or overblown. Stereotypes are needed as they make it easier to interpret situations, and they provide basic information about a person of a different group (Allport, 1954; Gray, 2011). But a
20 antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport, 1954:9). Others are pre-judged and generalized because of the group they belong to, and their individual
characteristics are overlooked (Gray, 2011). Such generalizations can have negative consequences, as antipathy is placed upon the other group as a whole. Hamelink (2011) argues for example that generalizations in the media and non-nuanced reporting about events can contribute to a conflict situation. In the Nigerian case, it can be harmful if all Muslims are generalized into one category, causing antipathy against them among the Christian Nigerians.
3.4 Discourse and the media
The relation between media and conflict, and how the media can reflect opinions, ideas, and information from the public and from officials, has now been considered. Further, the impact of generalizations of these opinions, ideas and information about the other in the media has been explained. This section explains the concept of discourse in relation to the media; how the media by reflecting opinions, ideas and information from society also shapes them.
According to Foucault, the meaning of a word lies in its use (Foucault, 1988:28). The way in which language is used is a reproduction of the social world. The use of language is structured, and this structure is connected to the social world. When making use of language, someone automatically refers to the prevailing manner of using language. By using this language structure, the language user reflects and shapes his or her social world (Foucault, 1988). Discourses influence the behavior of people, because they iterate ideas and knowledge. By repeating certain ideas, knowledge, social rules, judgments, etc. they become reinforced and can become common ground in a society, and therefore reflect, shape and make social reality (Tenorio, 2011).The media are rooted in society itself and when they publish content, they use the language systems, ideas, knowledge and social rules of their society. In other words, the media reflect discourses from their society. But moreover, by using these
discourses they are also actively reinforcing them and contributing to the process of making them a common ground.
Hussain argues that these media discourses are based on: “(..) shared social cognition and representation in a particular cultural, historical and sociopolitical context, characterized by shared beliefs, norms and values” (Hussain, 2000:100-101).The discourses in the media are thus not only themes and topics, but are rhetoric, specific use of words or specific
presentations with ideological connotations. An example is the discourse that emerged in the Rwandan media, especially in Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), before and during the genocide. “The media depicted the Tutsi as arrogant privileged immigrants”, as
21 cockroaches (Hamelink, 2011:49). With the use of biblical references and historical context, the media strengthened the power of their discourse (Hamelink, 2011).
The media often ‘cite’ the discourses that exist in a society, and by reflecting them they also shape a society’s discourses. Philo (2007) argues that the openness of the media to alternative discourses varies in relation to political, institutional and economic circumstances. He suggests that a strong, undisputed ‘discourse’ from the leading elite leads to less openness for different discourses in the media (Philo, 2007).
3.5 Escalation and the media
In his book ‘Media and conflict: Escalating evil’, Cees Hamelink (2011) states how conflicts are inherently part of life. Some conflicts cannot be resolved due to radical disagreements of the parties involved. As conflicts “(..) are essential to human life and its development”, we have to understand the dynamics of conflict to foresee damaging or even lethal outcomes (Hamelink, 2011:18). It is necessary to understand when conflicts escalate, “(..) when incompatible positions move from disputes to violent hostilities – even to warfare” (Hamelink, 2011:19). Escalation is in simple terms “(..) an increase in the intensity of the conflict as a whole” (Rubin, Pruit & Kim, 1994:69). A conflict moves from disagreements, from tensions and friction towards, as a last resort, mass violence and total destruction (Glasl, 1982).
Escalation has a spiraling effect, both sides are unwilling to show reconciliatory moves and often perceive that the failure to retaliate will be seen as a sign of weakness by the other. The reasons for this attitude of both parties are: not trusting the other, or blaming the other, arguing that the other is the main aggressor. Emotional factors, or subjective feelings, are essential in the escalation process. Actors want to win their claim and fear losing face. Emotions such as grief, shame, humiliation, panic, anger and fear are crucial in the process and have impact on the behavior of actors. People start to selectively inform themselves, and selectively evaluate information about a conflict, tending to seek what confirms their own point of view (Hamelink, 2011:19).
Glasl (1982) provides a detailed description of the escalation process and the different phases of this process. However, he does not specify how escalation develops in the media. Hamelink (2011) argues that the process of escalation is socially constructed and shows how it is mediated by social institutions. The media are one of those institutions that contribute to the discourses about the conflict. Hamelink claims that four drivers of what he terms the spiral of escalation can be distinguished by analyzing the mass media. Therefore, his theory about
22 escalation is central to this thesis as it is suitable for analyzing the media. The next sections will discuss the four phases in escalation according to Hamelink (2011), namely: Anxiety; agitation; alienation; and accusation in a mirror. The role of the media at each stage of escalation is explained.
Figure 3.1: Spiral of Escalation4
Violence or warfare 4. Accusation in a mirror 3. Alienation 2. Agitation 1. Anxiety Incompatible positions 3.5.1 Anxiety
Hamelink (2011:22) describes the first phase of his Spiral of Conflict Escalation as a ‘state of anxiety’. Not only a feeling of concern, or alertness, but a mixed bag of emotions such as anger, fear and humiliation. He uses the concept to “(..) denote a condition of ‘emotional strain’ that leads people to feel that they have lost not control over their lives but also a sense of meaning” (ibid: 22). Anxiety is characterized by an overall feeling that the world is a dangerous place. People feel anxious about economic, political, and environmental
circumstances, they feel threatened by epidemic diseases, terrorism or a ‘dangerous Islam’ (Hamelink, 2011).
The anxiety is collectively experienced within a group. It erodes people's independent, autonomous thoughts and choices, making them vulnerable to manipulation. Their experience of helplessness and feeling of uncertainty makes them distrust others and they start to search for a strong leader to help them out of this situation (Hamelink, 2011).
23 Anxiety is not an objective feeling, but it is socially constructed. According to
Hamelink (2011:26), the media have a considerable role in providing a prevalent anxiety discourse, which does not correspond with the actual real life events of people. When the media warns every day of dangers, such as terrorism, or when they warn audiences/readers about what is wrong, about uncertain or alarming future, it can indicate a state of anxiety. The media are not creating this anxiety, but they reinforce the feeling by constantly reporting about dangers (Hamelink, 2011).
Hamelink (2011:40-42) provides the example of the media fostering anxiety during ‘the climate crisis’. The media are not causing the climate anxiety itself, but they portray mainly the alarmists or skeptical sides with their narratives and opinions. They do not acknowledge the fundamental uncertainty that is part of this debate, causing social anxiety and hindering sustainable solutions. In the coverage of the financial crisis, Hamelink
describes a different way the media contributed to a feeling of anxiety. There was a tendency in the media to generalize judgments, without an analysis of the situation and what society could do about it. The crisis was generalized as an uncontrollable phenomenon. More
explanations about the financial system and more nuanced reporting in the media might have decreased the feeling of anxiety (Hamelink, 2011).
3.5.2 Agitation
The next phase of the Spiral of Escalation is agitation, when the feeling of anxiety is transformed into aggressive behavior. In this phase a strong leader identifies a scapegoat responsible for the state of anxiety. This requires inflammatory language from the leader to activate the anger and aggression of his or her followers. This language is often characterized by ‘divisive, exclusionary, utopian rhetoric’, with insinuations to past events, victories or tragedy. At the same time, the followers demand their leader move forward to eliminate the cause of their anxiety. Further, when a group is targeted as a scapegoat, there is often the tendency to emphasize and legitimize cultural differences. In this phase, collective identity has to become more important than the individual identity, by creating for example collective mythical enemies (Hamelink, 2011).
In this second phase, the main role of the media is to provide a podium for the agitators. The mass media provides a public platform for political leaders to spread their inflammatory language. The media amplify the political discourses across the wider society, and though they are not creating the discourse, they are reinforcing the official one. Hamelink (2011) argues that this was clear in the period after 9/11. The media reproduced the official
24 discourse and the political discourse, for example when Bush referred to the ‘axis of evil’. Evil became part of the agitational discourse: the view was that others act in an evil manner, while we ourselves could never commit such evil (Hamelink, 2011).
Media reports can turn political leaders into celebrities. The public is interested in them and therefore they are in the news, but the media create the interest. The media represent a politician as a leader but also as an ordinary person who is like them. They create a “(..) symbolic universe that suggests responsibility and genuine concern” (ibid: 47). Furthermore, they often cover the disturbing elements of people who are exercising power when presenting them as a ‘celebrity’ (Hamelink, 2011).
3.5.3 Alienation
In the phases of anxiety and agitation, there is not enough to motivate people to actually humiliate or physically harm others. People are collectively angry and aggressive, but
something still holds them back from actually engaging in actions against the ‘others’. In most societies there are strong moral rules that prevent people from harming others. Therefore these moral rules need to disappear, or move to the background, before people are able to commit aggressive acts. The third phase of the Spiral of Escalation is the phase of alienation, where emotional distance is created between the groups and empathy is removed (Hamelink, 2011).
To create an emotional distance, there must be the idea that the other is inferior and different, and thus cannot be judged by the same moral standards. So the other must be ‘categorized’ as: “(..) outside the universe of moral obligation” (ibid: 28). The others need to be de-individualized, but also dehumanized, so they are not seen as humans anymore but as animals or demons. The perpetrator becomes disconnected from the 'other', who is no longer seen any longer as an individual with a face and a unique personality, in order to lose his or her human empathy for the victim (Hamelink, 2011).
The role of media in alienation is to contribute to this distance between the groups by intensifying the segregating language. By using and portraying dehumanizing language, the media contributes to the loss of empathy with the other group. By using dehumanizing
discourse, “(..) it constructs the opposition between us and the savages” (Hamelink, 2011:49). Hamelink gives the example of the commonly used term ‘rogue state’, when the media refer to certain countries. This is used to construct a distance between ‘our civilized state’ and ‘their non-civilized state’ outside the world community, making it more legitimate to use violence against them. Another commonly heard dehumanizing discourse is referring to
25 animals, such as cockroaches in the Rwandan case, when describing the other, or making a demon of the enemy (Hamelink, 2011).
3.5.4 Accusation in a Mirror
In the last phase of the Spiral of Escalation, the dehumanized other has to be perceived as a real danger in order to justify killing because it is ‘self-defense’. Self-defense is in many societies seen as a moral and legal justification for committing violence. In this final phase, a reversal of accusations is therefore used, with the others accused of threatening ‘us’. People argue that the other makes aggressive plans against ‘us’, so they deserve to be attacked, as it is justified as a case of defense (Hamelink, 2011).
In the media this phase is apparent when stories or discourses appear about threats from the ‘others’, accusing them of planning violence. Hamelink (2011) explains how the media in the Rwandan case accused Tutsis of planning a genocide. However, in reality, the Hutus were planning a genocide against the Tutsis. Hutu’s argued that they should attack the Tutsis because they had to defend themselves against the Tutsi threat. Similar patterns were found in Nazi Germany when Nazi propaganda argued that Jewish people were a danger for the Germans, and their extermination was needed to protect the Germans (Hamelink, 2011).
3.6 Sub-questions
The interrelation between media, conflict and escalation has been described above. This study attempts to apply these ideas into the Nigerian context, to find an answer to the research question, namely: “To what extent is escalation visible in the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media?” The following sub-questions will set out how the central question will be answered.
First, before analyzing the articles in-depth, a general overview of the tendencies of how Muslims and Islam are portrayed in the Nigerian media is needed. In the theoretical framework it was mentioned how claims about a group in the media represent partly the public debate about this group. An indication of the tone of the claims is needed, to see if the claims about Muslims and Islam are negative, neutral or positive. Further, the relation
between the media, the public and the government was described. It is therefore interesting to research who are making claims about Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media. The
theoretical chapter described how generalizations of claims can cause a negative or positive image of the whole group. The level of generalization is a third factor that needs to be studied. Last, it is interesting to reveal which issues, such as the elections or violence of Boko Haram,
26 are related to the claims about Muslims and Islam. By looking at these factors related to the claims made about Muslims and Islam in the media, this analysis attempts to provide an indication of the public debate in the printed press. This leads to the following sub-question:
How is the public debate when looking at claims made about Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian printed press?
The discourses in the media show more in-depth how the media reflects the ideas, norms and opinions in society. Further, the theory of Hamelink (2011) argues how the media features and are an active actor in his Spiral of Escalation. It is therefore interesting to research how Muslims and Islam are portrayed in the Nigerian media by investigating if the discourses in the media show Hamelink’s steps of the Spiral of Escalation. This results in the second sub-question for the thesis:
To what extent do discourses in the Nigerian media portraying Muslims and Islam show the phases of the Hamelink's Spiral of Escalation?
In the following chapter the theoretical concepts discussed above are operationalized in a content analysis and a discourse analysis in order to find an answer on the sub-questions and ultimately on the central question.
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4. Methods
4.1 Research strategy
This study attempts to understand and show how Muslims and Islam are portrayed in the Nigerian media. The study is based upon mixed-method data collection, combining a
qualitative research strategy with a quantitative strategy. Many theoretical discussions argue that a strategy brings epistemological commitments and that the different strategies are separate paradigms (Bryman, 2008). However, this study argues that combining the two research strategies is complementary and facilitates triangulation of the findings. With qualitative methods it is possible to carry out a more in-depth analysis, which contributes to the understanding of the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media. Nonetheless, a possible shortcoming of the qualitative methods is that it can be subjective. A quantitative method is therefore used to give a more overall overview of how Muslims and Islam are described in the Nigerian newspapers.
4.2 Research design and methods
A case study is used as a research design to guide a “(..) detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” (Bryman, 2008:52). I focused on the media coverage and how media portray
Muslims and Islam in a one-year period. Four weeks between 26th March 2014 and 14th
March 2015 are analyzed. The first week is just before Boko Haram, an Islamic terrorist organization, kidnaps more than 200 girls from a boarding school in Chibuk, a small town in north-east Nigeria. This event was extensively covered in the Nigerian media and is related to religious tension in Nigeria. The last analyzed period preceded the 2015 national elections, again a widely discussed event in the media as a Muslim and a Christian candidate were opposing each other. By researching data from four different time periods, the case study has comparative elements because it attempts to find differences in media portrayals.
The first method is a quantitative content analysis of articles from Nigerian
newspapers. This method gives an overview of the general tendencies of portraying Muslims and Islam in Nigerian media, but also of who were making which claims in the media. With a content analysis it is possible to study the articles in a systematic manner, to identify if
Muslims and Islam were shown in a positive or negative light. With predetermined categories it is possible to quantify the data, providing a first but important overview of the situation.
28 The second method applied in this study is a discourse analysis of a selection of the articles used for the content analysis. A discourse analysis offers the possibility to distinguish dominant and recursive themes and topics in daily news. This investigation was used to signal the topics and themes the media in Nigeria draw upon in their argumentative strategies when they are talking or thinking about Islam and Muslims in their country. A discourse analysis was chosen to understand how these topics and themes are constructed in “(..) shared social cognition and representation in particular cultural, historical and sociopolitical context, characterized by shared beliefs, norms and values” (Hussain, 2000:101).
4.3 Operationalization
The quantitative content analysis uses three ideas from the theoretical framework to analyze
the media5. First, the theoretical framework about media and conflicts shows a general idea:
the media can contribute to conflict if they portray the 'other' in a negative manner. I have operationalized this idea through coding whether the claims in the media about Muslims and
Islam are negative, positive or neutral6. Further, Gilboa’s (2002) triangular relation between
the state, the media and the public, as explained in the theoretical framework, is
operationalized by distinguishing between different actors. The person who makes the claim in the article is coded in the analysis as the government, public or media. Lastly, in the theoretical framework it was stated how generalizations in the media can cause antipathy when negative claims are generalized on the whole group. For this reason the generalization of claims about Muslims and Islam are coded. Other relevant aspects, such as which issue was related to the claim in the article, are coded in the analysis as well. The coding schedule partly follows the coding schema of the Eurislam Project, a European comparative research project that among others analyzed claims made about Muslims and Islam in newspapers in several European countries7.
It is recognized that using this categories for analyzing the Nigerian newspapers is a simplification of reality. But as there is not much information available about how
newspapers portray Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media, this analysis provides first insights. With a qualitative analysis I attempt to contribute to the content analysis with more attention to detail.
5 A coding schedule for the quantitative content analysis is added to the appendices, page 60.
6 Examples of negative claims are describing Boko Haram as a violent extremist Islamic group - “(..) these Muslim fundamentalists” - while a positive claim is saying that Islam is a religion of peace. Claims about Muslims and Islam which are in between positive or negative and often based upon factual information, for example “(..) noted that there was a connection between Islam and Politics”, are classified as neutral. 7 The Eurislam project, http://www.eurislam.eu/page=site.home, [last accessed on 07-06-2015]
29 Critical discourse analysis is used for a more in-depth analysis of the news articles, to understand how the media portrayed Muslims and Islam, and whether the media show the level of escalation in the conflict. For this analysis, Hamelink's 2011 Spiral of Conflict Escalation theory is leading. His four phases of escalation – 1) anxiety, 2) agitation, 3) alienation, and 4) accusation in a mirror – are operationalized to analyze the data8.
The data has been analyzed to determine whether discourses correspond with one of the Spiral of Escalation's phases. For example, when searching for discourses that show the phase of alienation, there has been attention for animal names or for discourse referring to the ‘others’ as inferior. If the discourse analysis indicated alarming feelings about an uncertain future, or the media was constantly warning for danger, than this was seen as part of the phase of anxiety. A guideline with indicators derived from Hamelink's theory was used as a first step to analyze the articles, though during discourse analysis I have been back and forth to the theory. This has led to changes or supplements to the guideline, and has been a process of constant revision.
4.4 Data
There is a large press community in Nigeria, with a wide selection of printed press, such as daily newspapers, magazine and tabloids. Furthermore, television, with the famous
Nollywood soaps and movies, has an important role in society. However, as newspapers and television are relatively expensive and not all inhabitants in Nigeria are literate, the radio is in many parts of Nigeria still the number one form of mass communication (Ojo, 2003:831). Nonetheless, as radio is less available and more difficult to study, the focus in this study was on printed press. Four newspapers were analyzed: 1) The Sun, 2) This Day, 3) The Nation, and 4) Daily Trust. The first three are big national daily newspapers and are originally based in Lagos. Lagos is in the Christian-dominated south of Nigeria, and the mega-city is the business heart of the country. The last newspaper, Daily Trust, is the only national newspaper with an Islamic background. The Sun is known as a very pro-Christian newspaper. This Day
and The Nation are described as pro-Christian but more in the middle than The Sun(Zakari
Okwori & Adeyanju, 2006). Daily Trust was selected because of its northern Nigerian and Islamic background, and the others because of their Christian background and their
availability in Lexis Nexis. All four are among the ten-most-read newspapers in Nigeria
30 (mediaReach OMD Nigeria, 2011). With this selection of newspapers this study attempts to pursue a representative sample of the mainly Christian national printed media.
The papers were studied by searching for key words in Lexis Nexis9, such as Muslim and
Islam, in four different weeks during the time period of a year. The first two weeks analyzed were 26-03-2014 up to 01-04-2014 and from 02-05-2014 up to 08-05-2014. The weeks are around April 2014, because in the middle of that month the Chibok girls were kidnapped from school in north-east Nigeria, an event which caused a lot of national and international
attention. The third week analyzed was from 31-08-2014 up to 06-09-2014, shortly after Boko Haram announced that they had established an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria, which was again a widely discussed event. The last analyzed week ran from 08-03-2015 up to 14-03-2015, just
before the national elections on 28th March 2015. From every analyzed week, ten articles were
selected for discourse analysis, by choosing every fifth article out of the sample. A total of 473 claims about Muslims or Islam were analyzed in the quantitative content analysis. These four weeks were deliberately chosen because they were all before or after a specific event related to the religious tensions in Nigeria within the one-year period of study. This means that changes in claims or discourse about Muslims and Islam might be more evident in these weeks. However, it is recognized that this selection procedure has disadvantages, as it does not representing the news of the entire year. It might be that the news not surrounding these events is a lot more positive about Muslims and Islam or show a
different escalation process. For instance, given the way the samples were selected, there is likely to be more news about Boko Haram than in other periods during the year.
In the quantitative analysis I attempted to capture the tone of the debate in Nigerian newspapers. The dependent variable in the analysis is the tone of the claim. This variable is used to measure if claims about Muslims and Islam are negative (-1), positive (+1) or neutral (0). This variable is an ordinal variable, though in the Eurislam project it is treated as an interval variable, as they assume that the distance between -1, 0 and +1 is equal10 (Cinalli & Giugni, 2013). The Eurislam approach is followed in the analysis, so the mean of the tone of the claim is often given besides the percentages, as it is an easy for readers to interpret. Because it is questionable if the data is on interval level, almost all the statistical tests are non-parametric tests to not violate the assumptions of non-parametric tests. The exception is the one test with the mean of the claim as the only variable, because the test based on an average gives the reader a less complicated result to interpret. For this test, the assumption of Cinalli
9 Lexis Nexis Academic is an online newspaper database, available via http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/ 10 The Eurislam project, http://www.eurislam.eu/page=site.home, [last accessed on 07-06-2015]
31 & Giugni (2013) is followed that there is an equal difference between the three numbers. Several independent variables mentioned in the operationalization were used to investigate differences in the tone of the debate, for example the different newspapers, the generalization of the claims, the different actors who made the claim and the issue related to the claim.
32
Claims
Negative
Neutral
Positive
5. Claims about Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian media
This chapter will have a descriptive nature in order to answer the first sub question:
How is the public debate when looking at claims made about Muslims and Islam in the Nigerian printed press?
To answer this sub question, 473 claims from four Nigerian newspapers were analyzed. This chapter will discuss the outcomes from the analysis and describe: 1) the tone of the debate; 2) the different actors and newspapers who were making the claims; 3) the generalization of the claims; and 4) the issues connected to the claims.
5.1 Tone of the debate
A general idea that emerged from the theoretical chapter is that the tone of the claims made about a certain group in the media can influence conflict. From the 473 claims about Muslims and Islam, the majority, 244 (53%) claims, were neutral. 118 (25%) of the claims were
negative and 107 (23 %) claims were positive. In the analysis a negative claim
Figure 5.1: Tone of claims in percentages was coded with -1, a positive claim with +1 and a neutral claim with 0. In a normal situation it would be expected that the media reports about Muslims and Islam are neutral. A one-sample t-test was run to determine
whether the claims were different to normal, defined as a neutral score of 0. An examination of the standardized skewness and the outliers indicated that the data was statistically normal. The mean of the type of claims about Muslims (M = -.02, SE = .032) is not significantly lower than the normal neutral score of 0, t(472) = -.73, p >.05, r = 0.03. This means that in the selection of articles the tone of the claims about Muslims and the Islam in the Nigerian media is close to neutral.
5.2 The different actors
In the theoretical framework, a triangular relationship was described between the media, the government and the public. During the analysis, the maker of the claim was coded in one of four categories: 1) state and political actors; 2) the public; 3) media; and 4) unknown or other.
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Every category was divided in several subcategories.11 For state and political actors, for
example, it was listed whether the claim was made by central government actors, local government actors or police and security agencies. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to investigate whether the groups of actors differ in the kind of claim they have made about Muslims and Islam in the media. Table 5.1 presents the means and percentages for each group of actors:
Table 5.1:Means and percentages of tone claims about Muslims and Islam by group of actors
Group of actors N Mean Negative
in % Neutral in% Positive in % The government 104 .00 28 44 28 The public 126 .17 14 56 31 The media 144 -.26 33 60 7 Other or unknown 99 .05 24 37 29 Total 473 -.02 25 52 23
A significant main effect was found: the groups of actors significantly differ in the tone of the claim they made about Muslims and Islam in the articles, H (3) = 28.94, p < .01. Mann-Whitney tests were used to examine which groups of actors differed from each other in the type of claim they made. A Bonferroni correction was applied and all effects are reported at a .02 level of significance. The media was significantly more negative in the tone of their claims than the government (U = 6063, r = -.18), the public (U = 5945, r = -.34) and the other or unknown category (U = 5463, r = -.22). We can conclude that the media was more often making negative claims about Muslims and Islam in the articles than other groups. One reason for this could be that the media was often writing in editorial news articles about Boko
Haram, which could have increased the amount of their negative claims.
11 A coding schedule is added to the appendices, which provides a more detailed overview of all the subcategories, page 60
34
Table 5.2: Actors with their number of claims in the articles, average tone of claims and percentages
Actor N Mean Negative
in %
Neutral in %
Positive in %
Government/State and political actors
104 .00 28 44 28
Central government 13 -.31 46 39 15
Local government 52 .38 6 50 44
Police and security agencies 5 -1 100 0 0
Other state executive agencies 10 -.40 50 40 10
Political parties or actors 24 -.29 42 46 13
Public 126 .17 14 56 31
Christian organizations and actors
10 -.40 40 60 0
Muslim organizations and actors 45 .51 2 44 53
Extremist groups or actors 2 1 0 0 100
Human rights organizations or activists
2 .00 50 0 50
Academics 44 .18 9 64 27
Other citizens 11 -.27 27 73 0
Other (civil) society organizations
12 -.33 33 67 0
Media 144 -.26 33 60 7
Other or unknown 99 .05 24 37 29
Table 5.2 above represents the actors that made a claim about Muslims and Islam in the articles. In the government category, most claims were put forward by local government, and the mean of local government is the only positive mean in this category. It is interesting that the other actors in this category are far more negative, such as the state executive
agencies and the police and security agencies. The claims of local government might be more often positive as they sometimes rule in the predominantly Islamic states of Nigeria and are often Muslims themselves.
For the public, most claims are made by Muslim organizations and actors, closely followed by academics. Both groups more often make claims with a positive tone. Together with the extremist groups or actors, who scarcely made claims in the articles, they shift the
