Migrant Organisations and the Sending of Collective Remittances
A view from Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands
Author: Lida Daniëls – 10093087 Supervisor: Dr. J.M.J. (Jeroen) Doomernik
Second Reader: Dr. R.J. (Robin) Pistorius
MA Thesis Political Science: International Relations June 2015
Summary
In the past couple of decades, remittances received much attention. Governments, financial institutions, international organisations, and populations all see the potential of the large amounts of money flowing from developed to development countries. Consequently, scholars investigated to what extent those remittances contribute to the economic development of the recipient country. Can it be more than money used for consumption goods? Often, those studies define remittances as the money and goods migrants transmit to friends and family. However, it is not necessarily so that remittances have a private character that makes it difficult to monitor and influence because they “belong” to the migrant. Remittances with a private character can be referred to as “individual remittances”. Next to those individual remittances, there are also remittances that are in principal available as a tool to provide essential public goods to the places of origin. This is referred to as “collective remittances”. Collective remittances have been understudied so far. Apart from studies on the involvement of Mexican hometown associations in the U.S. in collective remittances, only few scholars investigated collective remittances and the motivations of migrants to send or not to send money or goods collectively. In order to better understand if, why, and when migrants are willing to send collective remittances for the purpose of development projects, this thesis sheds light on migrant remitting behaviour in relation to collective remittances. It does so by focusing on the crucial actor in organising collective remittances: migrant organisations. Those organisations “organise” migrant communities, and provide migrants with a dual here/there identity, which easesthe process of collecting remittances for the country of origin.
In investigating the preparedness of migrants to send remittances collectively this thesis discusses the case of Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands. Afghans in the Netherlands are a relatively new migrant group, with the result that very little research has been done on the remitting behaviour of Afghans. The situation in Afghanistan – one of long periods of conflict, and with differences along ethnic, sectarian, and regional lines – in relation to the sending of collective remittances, offers an insight into the possible impact of home-country governance in the remitting behaviour of migrants. In short, the research question of this study is as follows: What role do Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands have in the sending of collective remittances?
The conclusions of this research are made on the basis of interviews held with members of migrant organisations, with an Afghan migrant not attached to a migrant organisation, and with a policy officer from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I will
argue that the long periods of conflicts, the fragmentation of Afghanistan, and the often traumatic experiences the conflicts caused for its people, determine for a great deal the role of Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands in the sending of collective remittances. The creation of the nation Afghanistan, “homeland of the Afghans”, is still under construction. Although the members of migrant organisations often intend to send money or goods collectively, and although most migrant organisations were or are – to a greater or lesser extent – involved in development projects in Afghanistan, one can only in a few instances speak of collective remittances. Collecting money or goods among members of migrant organisations involves many obstacles. In contrast to individual remittances, which are sent to people migrants themselves know and trust, collective remittances are meant for a region or the country as a whole. Not knowing who are involved in the remitting process and who receives the money or goods, prevents Afghans to take part in the sending of collective remittances.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction 6
1.1 Introduction 6
1.2 Structure of this thesis 8
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework 10
2.1 Concepts 10
2.1.1 Remittances 10
2.1.2 Collective remittances 11
2.2 Migrant organisations and collective remittances 12
2.3 Kinds of migrant organisations 13
2.4 Collective remittances and governance 14
2.4.1 How to engage migrants: home-country government perspective 14
2.4.2 Conditions needed for cooperation 16
2.4.3 Transnational activities and host-country government perspective 17 2.4.4 Collective remittance: positive or negative? 17
2.5 Microeconomic determinants 19
2.5.1 Altruism 20
2.5.2 Self-interest 20
2.5.3 Inter-temporal contractual agreement 21
2.5.4 Other determinants 22
Chapter 3. Case 24
3.1 Case selection 24
3.2 A short history of Afghanistan 24
3.3 Afghan migrants in the Netherlands 27
3.4 General remitting behaviour 28
Chapter 4. Operationalisation 30
4.1 Research methods 30
4.2 Respondents 31
4.2.1 Respondents of migrant organisations 31
4.2.2 Respondents outside of migrant organisations 33
4.2.3 Reflections on respondents 33
4.3 Interview design 34
Chapter 5. Migrant Organisations 37
5.1 Kinds of migrant organisations 37
5.1.1 Foundation 37
5.1.2 Association 37
5.1.3 Union 38
5.1.4 Organisation 39
Chapter 6. Support for Collective Remittances 43
6.1 Determinants 43
6.1.1 Altruism 43
6.1.2 Self-interest 45
6.2 Intentions and real actions 47
6.2.1 Mistrust between Afghans in the Netherlands 47
6.2.2 Mistrust between Afghans in the Netherlands and in Afghanistan 48
6.2.3 Organisational barriers 50
6.2.4 Individual over collective remittances 51
6.3 Enhanced cooperation 53
6.3.1 Co-development 53
6.3.2 Migrant-state collaboration 57
Chapter 7. Analysis 59
7.1 Focus of migrant organisations 59
7.2 Determinants 59
7.3 Collective remittances 60
7.4 Collective remittances and governance 60
7.5 Success story 61
Chapter 8. Conclusion 63
Bibliography 66
Appendix 1: Interview Guide 72
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The remarkable increase of inflows of migrant remittances in development countries since the 1990s has made it a booming topic in the last couple of decades (Abdih et al. 2011, p. 657). Since 1998, private income transfers have been second only to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, and several times larger than remaining capital inflows and Official
Development Assistance (ODA) (ibid.). And those remittances have been rising ever since (Figure 1). In 2014, migrant remittances to developing countries are estimated to have
reached $436 billion, a 4.4 per cent increase over the 2013 level (World Bank 2015a, p. 1).
As a result, remittances have captured the attention of governments, international organisations, and
financial institutions around the world, many of which view migrant
remittances as an “unexpected ‘gold seam’, potentially able to finance development projects in lieu of scarce international assistance” (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 214). In other words, remittances are seen as having huge potential for poverty alleviation and economic development (Bilgili 2013, p. 2).
A new focus on the role of migrants in development has emerged. Given the volume of remittances sent back to family members still living in their country of origin, migrants are able to contribute to the development of their home country (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 8). Those individual remittances, defined as the money and goods migrants send back to family and friends in the country of origin, have been widely studied in the past decade because of their potential impact on development. At the same time, it is hard to rationalise individual remittances for developmental aims, since, as the terms suggests, those remittances are individual and therefore “belong” to the migrant. The private character of individual remittances makes them difficult to monitor and influence (Aparicio & Meseguer 2012, p. 206). “As a result, they are neither mediated by the recipient-country government nor directly generate resources for the government” (Abdih et al 2011, p. 657).
What has often been overlooked is that next to individual remittances, many migrants are also willing to remit money or goods collectively for development projects. This is called
Figure 1. World Development Indicators, OECD. Private debt includes portfolio investment bonds, commercial banks, and other lending (World Bank 2015a, p. 5)
collective remittances. In contrast to individual remittances, collective remittances “are in principal available as a tool to improve the provision of social and productive infrastructure in the backward hometowns of migrants” (Aparicio & Meseguer 2012, p. 206).
Together with the neglecting of collective remittances, the predominant emphasis on individual remittances and the families who benefit has caused an important actor to be ignored: organisations (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 191). The raising of collective remittances is an activity often fulfilled by migrant organisations (idem, p. 193). Migrant organisations in the host country amass collective remittances to provide essential public goods to their common places of origin (Duquette-Rury 2014, p. 113). An organisation can, for example, play an important role in supporting infrastructure projects and technological advancement in its country of origin. Despite a growing web of transnational organisations who increasingly interact with governments at all levels, academic theories of development only incorporate migrant communities in a very limited sense into any definitive analysis of the development prospects (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 216).
Of course, considering that the amount of collective remittances is small compared to individual remittances, it is not illogical that the literature focuses on individual remittances. Nonetheless, once migrants are settled in the host country, they often not only maintain economic contact with family and friends abroad, but also make economic contributions to their homeland through several channels, such as transnational entrepreneurship and
investment (Bilgili 2013, p. 2; World Bank 2015a, p. 15). Rather than exclusively focusing on individual remittances, researchers should focus more on collective remittances in order to know if, why, and when migrants are willing to remit money or goods collectively for a region or country. This would eventually result in a better understanding of the circumstances that migrants require before they are willing to send collective remittances. This knowledge would in turn lead to more and better cooperation among different actors involved and might increase the amount of collective remittances.
This thesis triesto find answers to the questions if, why, and when migrants are willing to send collective remittances. In order to find answers to those questions, this thesis focuses on the crucial actor in organising collective remittances: migrant organisations. What motivates members of migrant organisations to be or not to be involved in the sending of collective remittances? To be able to capture the incentives of members of migrant organisations and to link those incentives to a specific home country situation, this thesis focuses on one case: Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands.
migrants are a relatively new migrant group in the Netherlands and not much is known about this migrant population and its remitting behaviour. Moreover, the unstable situation in Afghanistan and its turbulent history is expected to affect migrant collective remitting behaviour in two directions. On the one hand, Afghanistan’s instability increases the
importance of money and goods for development projects. On the other hand, bad governance could be a hurdle preventing migrants from engaging in the sending of collective remittances, as they might question the success of project implementation. This thesis examines the impact of a country’s governance in the sending of collective remittances by investigating migrant motivations to engage in the sending of collective remittances. More specific, it focuses on members of migrant organisations, since they are the ones most likely to be involved in collective remittances.
To capture the determinants of migrant individual and/or collective remittances and to know how collective remittances are dealt with in practice, my research question is as
follows: What role do Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands have in the sending of collective remittances to Afghanistan?
I will argue that the long periods of conflicts, the fragmentation of Afghanistan, and the often traumatic experiences the conflicts caused for its people determines for a great deal the role of Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands in the sending of collective remittances. The creation of the nation Afghanistan, “homeland of the Afghans”, is still under construction. Although the members of migrant organisations often intend to send money or goods collectively, and although most migrant organisations were or are – to a greater or lesser extent – involved in development projects in Afghanistan, one can only in a few instances speak of collective remittances. Collecting money or goods among members of migrant organisations involves many obstacles. In contrast to individual remittances, which are sent to people migrants themselves know and trust, collective remittances are meant for a region or the country as a whole. Not knowing who are involved in the remitting process and who receives the money or goods, prevents Afghans to take part in the sending of collective remittances.
1.2 Structure of this thesis
Chapter 2, following this introduction, discusses the theoretical framework. In the first part the concepts remittances and collective remittances are defined, and the relation between migrant organisations and collective remittances is analysed. Furthermore, I discuss the different kinds of migrant organisations. Thereafter, I investigate the link between collective
remittances and home- and host-country governance. In the last part of this chapter, I investigate the microeconomicdeterminants of remittance-sending in order to get an understanding of why people actually send remittances.
Chapter 3 examines the case that is studied in this research. I explain why I chose Afghan migrants in the Netherlands as subject of study. Second, this chapter includes a short overview of the history of Afghanistan. Third, several general characteristics of Afghan migrants in the Netherlands are set forth, which will be followed by an explanation of the general remitting behaviour of Afghan migrants.
The next chapter, chapter 4, discusses the operationalisation. In the first part I explain the research methods applied in this research. Second, I discuss the chosen respondents and how I approached them, followed by a reflection on the respondents.
Chapter 5 investigates the migrant organisations I approached in this research. I will discuss what it explains when migrant organisations are called a foundation, association, union or organisation? Finally, I will investigate the role of migrant organisations in development projects in Afghanistan.
In chapter 6, I discuss the intended and actual behaviour of the members of migrant organisations with regard to the sending of collective remittances. In doing so, I first explore the determinants of the respondents to remit money or goods. Second, I discuss whether those determinants lead to the sending of collective remittances. Furthermore, I explore the possible results of an enhanced cooperation between migrant organisations and home- and host-county governments.
Chapter 7 analyses the qualitative data set forth in chapter 5 and 6. And this thesis will end with a final conclusion, presented in chapter 8.
Chapter 2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Concepts 2.1.1 Remittances
Remittances are most often described as household income received from abroad, mainly resulting from the international migration of workers (Yang 2011, p. 132). Remittances can be sent in the form of money or goods and may flow through a variety of formal channels (such as banks, money transfer operators and credit unions) and informal channels (such as brokers, hawala banking, and nonfinancial firms) (ibid.). Most often, remittances are voluntary
arrangements between migrant workers and family and friends left behind (Arvin & Lew 2012, p.132).
Many researchers agree that an important aspect of remittances is that, on the household level, they tend to be hedges against shocks (Combes & Ebeke 2010, p. 1076). Compared to other external flows, they are resilient and relatively less volatile, and therefore may act as a risk avoidance mechanism (Balli & Rana 2015, p. 107; Combes & Ebeke 2010, p. 1076). For example, through their contribution to ex-post risk management, it may reduce household consumption instability (Combes & Ebeke 2010, p. 1076).
The insurance that remittances provide against domestic output shocks in the recipient economies has implications not only on the household level, but also on the macroeconomic level (Balli & Rana 2015, p. 107). This phenomenon is called “risk sharing”. It is argued that the more diverse the migration destinations of a country are, the higher the amount of shared risk (ibid.). However, because remittances compose intra-family or intra-community transfer of resources, the beneficial effects of remittances are mostly felt at the microeconomic level (Siddiqi 2011, p. 36). Moreover, although it has macroeconomic implications, in fact only a relatively small proportion of households actually benefits from remittances (Unheim & Rowlands 2011, p. 125). In the study of Amuedo-Dorantes (2006) it was shown that only 8.2 per cent of the families in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean benefited from remittances (Amuedo-Dorantes, cited in Unheim & Rowlands 2011, p. 125). In the above explanations, remittances are linked to the “domestic level”, “household income”, “household level” and “household consumption”. Although those definitions are most often used in scientific studies, this is not the only way to describe remittances.
Remittances can be divided into at least two subtypes: individual and collective. “Individual remittances” refers to the money and goods migrants send to family and friends, and
“collective remittances” means the money or goods sent collectively to the place of origin and aimed at development projects.
2.1.2 Collective remittances
Collective remittances, again, consist of the money raised and distributed (in the form of money or goods) by informal or formal groups of migrants for the benefit of their place of origin (Burgess 2012, p. 120; Lacroix 2010, p. 4). Instead of sending money individually, “migrants combine resources to achieve an impact beyond the reach of individual acting alone” (Newland et al. 2010, p. 3). Those resources are aimed at development projects, such as the donation of money for charity, disaster relief, or community projects in the country of origin (Burgess 2012, p. 120).
As the term indicates, collective remittances require collective action. Some collaboration is needed, not only among the people who collectively send the money or goods, but also on the receiving side. In the country where the migrants live, they need to work together to select the projects and collect the money or goods. In the home country – be it a national or local government or, more informally, community members – usually have to collaborate with the migrants to manage the money or goods and implement the project (ibid.).
Compared to individual remittances, collective remittances comprise significantly less money, and are far from being a universal phenomenon (Lacroix 2010, p. 4). But, as Goldring (2004) explains, because of the extra-economic dimension that characterises the bundle associated with these remittances the potentialities of collective remittances lie mainly in their feature as a “high quality resource”: “an organized force backs them, they are generally earmarked for investment and they show a clear tendency to grow in volume” (Goldring 2004, p. 822). In brief, collective remittances are not used to cover recurrent expenses but can be seen as savings (ibid.).
According to Lacroix (2010), who studied hometown associations (HTAs) and their development practices, collective remittances gained momentum during the 1990s among very diverse groups scattered around the globe (Lacroix 2010, p. 4). At that time, the
contradictions between increasing differentiation and maintaining a common village identity became more present than ever (idem, p. 7). Collective remittances could serve as a bridge between the identity fracture between emigrant and immigrant, and could thus be instrumental in integrating various spheres of migrant life (idem, p. 20, 22). As Lacroix further explains:
Collective remittances use the strength of tradition to redefine the contours of the ‘moral economy of social belonging’ that regulates the relationships with villagers and asserts a dual here/there identity (idem, p. 23).
Next to the function of collective remittances as bridge builders, migrants are also likely to achieve two things through collective remittances that eventually increase their political efficacy in the country of origin. First, they show their ability to pool resources, which gives them political leverage and opens doors to politicians who otherwise would have ignored them (Burgess 2012, p. 120). Second, through collective remittances migrants can make a visible difference back home, which brings them into the public sphere, and makes it more likely that they will interact with public officials (ibid.).
2.2 Migrant organisations and collective remittances
The bridge-building aspect of collective remittances is even more present among migrant organisations, which fulfil a crucial role in the process of sending collective remittances. Migrant organisations are located in migrant-receiving countries and are based on a shared attachment to a place of origin (Duquette-Rury 2014, p. 113). The members of the
organisations consist of migrants from the same village, municipality, state, or sending country (ibid.). In the Netherlands, there are thousands of migrant organisations, which are organisations created by migrants. The people who participate mostly do so voluntary, but some are contracted by the government.
A key purpose of those organisations is their focus on the migrant community in the Netherlands and their integration in society. They ease and orient the arrival of newcomers, for example by providing information about the Dutch health care or education system. (Lacroix 2010, p. 8; Nijenhuis 2013, p. 10). Migrant organisations also fulfil the role of preserving an immigrant identity by spreading information about the homeland and
supporting a shared sense of identity and belonging to the place of origin (Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010 p. 12; Lacroix 2010, p. 4). While easing the migration process, they preserve social linkages and allegiance toward the village of origin; a migrant organisation is in fact a “[m]ediating institution between the newcomer and the arrival society” (Lacroix 2010, p. 8-9). And since the mid-1990s, more and more migrant organisations have adopted new patterns of functioning, such as engaging in the field of development in the country of origin (Lacroix 2010, p. 13; Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 12).
In the study of Lacroix (2010) – in which he looked at three immigrant groups (the Moroccan Chleuhs and the Algerian Kabyles, and the Sikh Punjabis from India) residing in two receiving countries (France and the UK) – he observed a general trend in the pattern of collective commitment of migrants in the country of origin (Lacroix 2010, p. 2). During the last twenty years, projects in which migrants are involved shifted from mostly religious and
traditional projects to development projects (idem, p. 4). Until the 1990s, collective
remittances were mostly used for the restoration of religious buildings, or collective wells and irrigation systems (idem, p. 21). After, the projects became more focused on the creation of new infrastructure, such as electrification and the building of health centres (ibid.).
The way migrants are involved in projects and the types of projects in which migrants are involved vary greatly. In some cases, migrants combine financial contributions with local voluntary labour (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 201-202). Some migrants travel back and forth, building, for example, elaborate houses in their home villages and investing in land and businesses there (idem, p. 204).
The kinds of projects migrants are involved in also depend on how organised migrant groups are. For example, when migrants are well organised, the chances are bigger that community projects back home are co-financed by those migrants. This is often the case for Mexican and Salvadorian migrants living in the U.S. (Burgess 2012, p. 119). The funds collected by those migrants are invested primarily in health, education, disaster relief, town beautification and celebrations, and public works (idem, p.122).
More generally speaking, the largest number of migrant organisations carry out small-scale projects, mostly in the social sector. These projects might focus on infrastructure, such as building a clinic or school. Or organisations might send containers full of clothes,
discarded computers, and furniture from hospitals (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 11). Moreover, in countries where there is little trust in the government, small-scale projects are often favoured because they are often based on personal knowledge and in partnership with trusted local leaders in the origin community (Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 14).
2.3 Kinds of migrant organisations
It is not the case that all migrant organisations fulfil all the roles mentioned above; there are different kinds of organisations with different functions. Nijenhuis makes a distinction
between four types of organisations (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 11). In her study, she investigated the role of migrant organisations in development activities in order to get insight into how
migrant organisations can contribute to the development in the place of origin. She interviewed leaders of sixty migrant organisations in the Netherlands, and conducted
fieldwork in the countries of origin by interviewing local partners, the local government and the local population (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 10-11). The first type of organisations Nijenhuis mentions are charities that focus fully on the activities in the country of origin, often in an ad hoc way and small-scale. Second, there are civil organisations that, next to promoting
integration in the Netherlands, are busy with development projects in the country of origin. Third, there are HTAs, created to promote the integration of their members. Those are focused on the country of arrival, but every once in a while they also have activities directed at the country of origin. And fourth, there are more professional organisations that focus exclusively on development activities in the country of origin. Those often have paid forces and participate in the most important platform in the field of migration and development (ibid.).
Although the more professional organisations are exclusively focused on the country of origin, the most well-known organisations with links to the country of origin are HTAs. Especially, the Mexican HTAs in the U.S. have become important conduits for collective remittances, estimated to be equivalent to about 1 per cent of total remittances to Mexico. In 2009, this would mean an amount of more than $210 million (Burgess 2012, p.122). The function of HTAs engaged in development practices has been formalized and evolved to incorporate Western associational techniques, such as adopting boards of trustees and bank accounts (Lacroix 2010, p. 23).
The hypothesis in the research of Unheim and Rowlands (2012), in which they investigated the micro-level determinants of remittances from recent migrants to Canada, is that based on the expectations that the people who are joining a cultural group linked to their home community, or those who identify strongly with their ethnic origins, are expected to remit more than people who are not. This is strengthened by the fact that home-country governments have attempted to engage migrants and their organisations in the interest of national development (Unheim & Rowlands 2012, p. 127; Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 3). According to the report of the World Bank (2015), governments that have attempted to
engage migrant organisations in development through the sending of collective remittances do so because this ensures that programmes are focused on community needs, and promotes increased accountability and transparency of local and national authorities (World Bank 2015a, p. 15).
2.4 Collective remittances and governance
2.4.1 How to engage migrants: home-country government perspective
The spectacular rise in individual remittances has changed the general view of outmigration as a symptom of underdevelopment or as a net loss of talent (brain drain) to a view of outmigration as important for the national accounts of sending countries (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 192-193). It became clear that the “nationals abroad were making hard-currency
contributions that in many instances vastly exceeded what their countries received in foreign aid and that often rivalled earnings from their principal commodity exports” (ibid.). As a result, precocious sending-country governments have begun to approach expatriates proactively and interact with representatives of migrant organisations in order to sustain, encourage, and guide remittance transfers (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 193; Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 15; Burgess 2012, p. 119).
To be able to attract the resources of migrants and to control the flows of remittances, remittance-receiving states put emphasis on the quality and effectiveness of state institutions and adopt policies (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 192; Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 3). The role of a broader set of institutions in development was emphasises in the 1990s when organisations like the OECD and the World Bank deployed “concepts such as social capital and good governance in an effort to ‘get the institutions right’” (Goldring 2004, p. 804). The cases of Mexicans in the U.S. and Chinese communities abroad are good examples. Mexican migrant organisations abroad often work in conjunction with government authorities in Mexico to coproduce public works aimed at improving social welfare in their hometowns (Duquette-Rury 2014, p. 113). For example, in the early 1990s, several Mexican states created
federations of their hometown communities throughout the U.S. (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 196; Burgess 2012, p.123). Moreover, Mexico launched the well-known 3-for-1 programme, under which the local, state, and federal governments each contribute $1,- for every $1,- of remittances received through a HTA overseas (World Bank 2015a, p. 15). For Chinese emigrants, paid officials at the national, provincial, district, and city levels have as their task to maintain regular contact with migrant communities worldwide and to promote their transnational activities (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 208).
Although the programmes implemented by governments have greatly strengthened and extended the developmental impact of transnationalism in new directions, immigrants themselves have also played a significant role in transnational interactions (idem, p. 212). In the end, the initiative and efforts of those projects came from immigrants themselves. And in order for those programmes to work, migrants must be willing to take part (ibid.).
According to Portes and Zhou, the interface represents a “win-win” situation: it “stimulates the emergence of new transnational organisations and the consolidation of those already in existence” (idem, p. 213). For governmental officials, interaction is important for two reasons. First, migrants deliver important economic contributions to the country. Second, migrants are “the face of the nation” abroad; they help to define the image and relative standing of the country in the global system (ibid.). For migrants, interaction is of value
because the going abroad can give them recognition by home-country authorities, which validates the legitimacy of their organisations and their own status (ibid.).
2.4.2 Conditions needed for cooperation
Although the examples of Mexican and Chinese migrants show that interaction between governments and migrants exists and can lead to a win-win situation, Burgess in his study emphasises that collaboration with public officials remains the exception, rather than the rule (Burgess 2012, p.120). Most migrant organisations finance and coordinate projects back home without any government involvement (ibid.). Nijenhuis agrees that contact with the government is often missing, as much on the local as on the national level (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 12).
Before cooperation between migrant organisations and the government can take place, certain conditions are needed. A migrant-state collaboration is shaped by several factors. First, the extent and nature of state outreach to migrants is important (Burgess 2012, p. 136). According to Nijenhuis, an active diaspora policy in the country of origin is required for migrants to act as bridge-builders (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 12). Certainly, not all countries have an active diaspora policy, which is often the result of the historical relations between a
government and its migrant communities abroad. Those relations greatly influence the policy approach taken by a government. This is, to a large extent, related to the confidence that migrant communities have in the origin-country government. Compared to governments that have maintained positive linkages with their emigrant societies, “[m]igrant communities that have historically been suspicious of the government’s intentions will require much more reassurance from the state that its activities are promoted in the genuine interest of migrants” (Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 4). This is for a great deal in line with the argument of
institutionalist scholars, who argue that patterns of interaction between the state and civil society are path-dependent; they outlast the conditions under which they initially emerged (Burgess 2012, p.128).
Several factors can lead to the level of mistrust, which reduces migrants’ interest in becoming involved in development: low transparency and accountability, extensive
bureaucratic processes, and high levels of corruption (Lacroix & Vezzoli 2010, p. 4). Lack of policy clarity raises migrants’ suspicion and decreases their willingness to be involved in the countries’ development (idem, p. 9).
Second, the institutional capacity of a country has great importance if a government wishes to cooperate with migrant communities for development purposes. Without this
capacity, governments will not be able to design, implement, and evaluate diaspora engagement policies. The level of development of the country and its commitment to
improvement through reforms are important factors in the success of those policies (idem, p. 4). Especially for countries where there are more pressing national priorities, it is hard to create cohesive policies and to generate institutions that can coordinate their implementation (idem, p. 4, 20).
This said, it is not the case that only the government must be well-organised and establish and maintain good relations; the collaboration also demands professionalization from migrant organisations. Most of them are voluntary organisations without paid forces and mostly based on the commitment of individuals (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 12).
2.4.3 Transnational activities and host-country government perspective
Not only do home-country governments react to the remittance flows, but also host-country governments. Some of them “have reacted positively to the pro-development efforts of immigrant groups in their midst, while others have seen these activities as retarding the assimilation process or even compromising national security” (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 193).
The host countries that have supported migrant backing of development projects in the country of origin sometimes co-finance the projects. This co-financing emerged at the end of the 1990s, when the French minister of Foreign Affairs, Sami Nair, introduced the term “co-development”: the activities of migrants aimed at stimulating development in the country of origin, and co-financed by the host countries (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 8). Duquette-Rury (2014) argues that organisations in which migrants pool collective remittances resources often work in conjunction with host-country government authorities to co-produce development projects aimed at improving social welfare in their hometowns (Duquette-Rury 2014, p. 113). Among other things, small-scale development projects, temporary return migration in order for migrants to function as experts in international relations, and facilitating money transfers are important elements of co-development policy (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 9).
Within those co-development activities, the role of members of migrant organisations is crucial because they speak the language, have the same cultural background, and often have a good, wide network in the country of origin. This is particularly useful on an organisational level, they can fulfil important tasks, such as collecting money (ibid.).
2.4.4 Collective remittances: positive or negative?
outcomes for the recipient country. The projects financed and coordinated by organised migrants often compensate for the lack of public investment in basic infrastructure and welfare (Burgess 2012, p. 120). Moreover, development projects co-financed or co-managed by migrant organisations usually require some public financing, which creates “incentives and opportunities for organised migrants to demand higher standards of governance, at least with regard to their joint projects” (idem, p. 121).
With collective remittances used for development projects, civil society is also likely to be strengthened. The research of Nijenhuis shows that the activities of almost all migrant organisations are locally embedded, which means that the local population is involved. There is often additional cooperation with a local organisation that supports the practical
implementation of a project. In a number of cases, this is a local NGO, but when there is no NGO, migrant organisations often create a local organisation themselves (Nijenhuis 2013, p. 12).
On the other hand, those development projects can also pose problems, namely for governance and accountability. When migrant organisations substitute for the public provision of basic services and infrastructure, public officials are let off the hook. This weakens overall incentive for local residents to hold public officials accountable, which eventually reinforces remote and mistrustful relations between the state and society (Burgess 2012, p. 120-121). This can be amplified considering that a trustful relation is essential for collective remittances to occur in the first place. Portes and Zhou make a similar argument. They emphasise that “the volume of remittances sent by migrants provides a safety valve for domestic poverty, allowing governments and elites to avoid responsibility for alleviating it” (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 214).
Another problem concerns the impact and effectiveness of collective remittances through migrant organisations. In the World Bank report 2015, some questions and criticisms are mentioned on this matter. The report states that “[t]he scale of collective remittances or philanthropic contributions channelled through HTAs has been small” (World Bank 2015a, p. 15). Regarding effectiveness, they state the following:
It is difficult to assess whether these investments – and the matching grants – have gone to the highest-priority projects or have been diverted from other regions with a great need of assistance from fiscally constrained governments (ibid.).
More broadly, three critiques on HTAs – which can also be attributed to migrant
organisations in general – are specified in the World Bank report. First, HTAs may not have the best information on the needs of the local community, or they may have different
priorities. Also, the capacity of organisations to scale up or form partnerships is limited by the fact that their members are volunteers and their fundraising ability is finite. And third, they can become divided and weaken their own advocacy potential (ibid.).
The arguments pointing at the disadvantages of collective remittances do not seem very strong. For collective remittances to take place and to succeed, migrant organisations often work together with the local population. Moreover, home-country governments must be well organised; they must have diaspora engagement policies and generate institutions in order to attract collective remittances. Instead of weakening the incentives for home-country authorities, collective remittances are more likely to strengthen the incentives of authorities. Furthermore, when more actors involved – and in particular local governments – become aware of the role migrant organisations can fulfil in the sending of remittances, and when there is a better understanding of the prerequisites of collective remittances to take place, the scale of those remittances is likely to increase.
2.5 Microeconomic determinants
In order to find out what the role of migrant organisations is in the sending of collective remittances, it is important to know what motivates migrants to remit money or goods. Are those motivations specifically tied to individual remittances, or can they also apply to
collective remittances? The determinants of remittance-sending are discussed in the literature in two ways: one approach focuses on microeconomic factors, and the other focuses on more macroeconomic factors (Adams 2009, p. 93). In order to know the motivations of migrants, this thesis focuses on microeconomic factors.
Lucas and Stark (1985) were the first to address the motivates for remitting in terms of testable hypotheses derived from a theoretical framework (Lucas & Stark 1985, p. 902). In their study, they emphasise the variety of determining factors to remit (Adams 2009, p. 93). They explain remitting behaviour using the concepts “altruism” and “self-interest”, which are not so different from the explanations set forth by more recent studies. According to Arun and Ulku (2011), the main theories on remittances fall into three categories: altruism, self-interest, and inter-temporal contractual agreement (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896).
In addition to those three categories, more factors are mentioned in studies about determinants of remittances. Those for example include demographic characteristics (age,
education and gender), income and wealth, trust in the country, and the effectiveness of institutions involved, in particular with regard to the managerial capabilities of the migrant organisations and the project team back home (World Bank 2015a, p. 15).
2.5.1 Altruism
When thinking about the question of why migrants remain emotionally and economically connected to the country of origin, the answer may seem obvious: it is their country of birth. Indeed, personal and nostalgic connections play an important role (Burgess 2012, p. 122). Migrants have traditional loyalties to their places of origin and remittances can be seen as a continuation of their traditional duties to their places of origin (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 196). Migrants who are concerned about family still living in the home country, or who want to play a role in development projects without any expectations of reciprocity, remit money or goods out of altruism (Unheim & Rowlands 2011, p. 125; Burgess 2012, p. 122; Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896). Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) were the first to identify altruistic remittance behaviour (Johnson & Whitelaw, cited in Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896). Those behaviours are determined by a set of factors that exist irrespective of the economic situation of the migrants and that are inversely related to the recipient’s income (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896).
Arun and Ulku show how altruism relates to the culture and religion of migrants. In many cultures and religions, selfless concern for the welfare of others is paramount (ibid.). In citing Funkerhauser (1995), they explain that remittances are inversely related to the income of the recipients. The “altruistic” remittances tend to decrease as the number of other migrants from the same family increases, and with the time migrants spend in the host country (ibid.). Newland et al. in their research state that because collective remittances often include philanthropy – voluntary, organised efforts intended for socially useful purposes – it implies an element of unselfishness or altruism (Newland et al. 2010, p. 3; Philanthropy 2013).
2.5.2 Self-interest
In opposition to altruism stands self-interest, which can be divided in three forms. The first is based on the desire of the migrant to secure an inheritance (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896; Carling 2008, p. 583). In this case, remittances should be positively associated with the possessions of the receiving household (Carling 2008, p. 583). Second, remitting behaviour is based on the capital equipment or income from one’s parents (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 986). In this case, migrants remit money for acquiring assets in the home area and ensure their
maintenance (Carling 2008, p. 583). Third, remittances could be sent in order to obtain social or financial services from relatives or to establish a base of physical capital, enhance social prestige, or strengthen relationships with relatives and friends (Carling 2008, p. 583; Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896). According to Arun and Ulku, the underlying reason for these kinds of remittances is often the migrants’ intention to return to the community of origin (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896).
As is especially visible in the third case, incentives of self-interest and altruism are often inextricable, and are referred to as tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896). In many instances, it is hard to know “whether the true motive is one of caring or more selfishly wishing to enhance prestige by being perceived as caring” (Lucas and Stark 1985, p. 904).
2.5.3 Inter-temporal contractual agreement
Remitting money or goods is often not a decision made by the migrant alone. The transnational connections migrants have with family and friends appear to be mutually reinforcing (Carling & Hoelscher 2013, p. 954). As once stated by Massey and Basern:
“[M]any of the decisions regarding savings and remittances are made within a social milieu of family and friends living and working abroad” (Massey & Basern, cited in Bilgili 2013, p. 4). In those instances, it can very well be the case that migrants face moral obligations to remit and to remain tied to the village community (Lacroix 2010, p. 12).
Sometimes, those moral obligations are made into a mutual agreement. When the migrant and his or her family formally agree that they will help each other in difficult times and that the migrant will at some point pay back the costs of education and migration, and costs made during initial job search and periods of unemployment incurred by his or her family, one can speak of an inter-temporal contractual agreement (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896; Carling 2008, p. 584; Loschmann & Siegel 2015, p. 39). In cases where the family, for
example, paid for migration costs or for the costs of educating the migrant, his contractual agreement can constitute repayment of those costs (Carling 2008, p. 584).
In short, inter-temporal contractual agreement includes all kinds of contractual arrangements between the migrant and the household left behind, such as insurance and risk sharing, exchange, and implicit loan agreements (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896). For example, the risks of crop failure, price fluctuations, livestock diseases, and other unforeseen
area (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 897; Carling 2008, p. 584).
2.5.4 Other determinants
Although the above explained three theories give a general idea of the remitting determinants, they are not able to provide a holistic picture. Many other factors influence the decision to transfer remittances to the home country (Unheim & Rowlands 2012, p. 126; Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 896). For example, Arun and Ulku add migrant’s profile, political volatility,
migration period and generational patterns to remittance determination (Arun & Ulku 2011, p. 897). And Unheim and Rowlands state that where income and age are factors that make total remittance value rise, the size of the migrating family, housing costs, and education make remittances likely to fall (Unheim & Rowlands 2011, p. 124).
Remittances are likely to rise with age, at least for the early period of a migrant’s participation in the labour force (Unheim & Rowlands 2012, p. 127; Carling 2008, p. 587). “Prime working age migrants have more extensive family obligations in their home
communities” (Unheim & Rowlands 2012, p. 127). Portes and Zhou (2012) make another, but related argument about age. They state that transnational activism largely is a one-generation phenomenon. According to them, the process of assimilation leads members of the second generation to turn their attention inward toward their new country (Portes & Zhou 2012, p. 215). The same is stated by Lacroix: “The children of immigrants are seldom interested in community activities. They have not internalised the village ethos and are reluctant to share the burden of its duties. … For these reasons, their role is more indirect” (Lacroix 2010, p. 15).
Among other studies, the studies of Bilgili, and that of Carling and Hoelscher show that economic integration is positively linked to remittance-sending (Bilgili 2013, p. 11; Carling & Hoelscher 2013, p. 952). The total sample showed that employed individuals are significantly more likely to remit and remit more than unemployed persons. Thus, having a secure job increases the likelihood of sending money (Bilgili 2013, p. 11-12).
Host-country expenses and responsibilities also have their impact on remitting
behaviour. As housing costs and the size of the migrating family increase, there is a reduction in remittances (Unheim & Rowlands 2012, p. 128).
The study of Adams (2009) shows that skill composition matters in remittance
determination. Countries with a larger share of highly-skilled (educated) migrants receive less per capita remittances than countries that export a larger proportion of low-skilled migrants (Adams 2009, p. 98-99; Unheim & Rowlands 2012, p. 126). A possible explanation is that
highly-skilled migrants are more likely to bring family members and to remain in their newly-adopted country. Low-skilled migrants, on the other hand, “tend to remit more because their migration is more temporary in nature and they are more concerned with returning home” (Adams 2009, p. 99).
Although the above-mentioned determinants have some explanatory power, it is important to bear in mind that the profound contextual differences in migration dynamics, the nature of families and households, and the norms and values relating to migration and
remittances vary greatly from one set of people to the next (Carling 2008, p. 584). Many researchers have found divergent outcomes of the effect of the determinants. For instance, income affects the capacity to remit, but at the same time, most migrants, including those without a high income, give remittances a high priority and are under substantial pressure to support family members in the country of origin (idem, p. 586). Those nuances and contextual circumstances should be taken into account.
Chapter 3. Case
3.1 Case selection
Afghans in the Netherlands form a relatively new migrant group with the result that the remitting behaviour of Afghans has been understudied so far (Muller 2008, p. 394; Siegel et al. 2010, p. 8). The situation of Afghanistan and the role of migrant organisations in the sending of collective remittances is especially interesting because it sheds light on the possible impact of an unstable environment in the sending of collective remittances. In a country that suffered from many conflicts, remittances can serve as vital catalysts to the post-conflict recovery and reform (Siegel et al. 2010, p. 8-9). It can boost the economy
reconstruction, that in return helps combat the institutional and structural uncertainties (idem, p. 9). The focus of collective remittances on development projects in a region or the country instead of focusing on migrants’ relatives would make it even more interesting for the Afghan government to support and increase those collective remittance flows in order to stimulate its economy.
At the same time, it is not unlikely that the historical events influenced migrant-state relations, and the capacity of the government to reach out to “its population” abroad. At least three reasons can be given here. First, almost all Afghans living in the Netherlands arrived as asylum seekers who experienced traumatic events in Afghanistan. For example, in the study of Gerritsen et al. (2005) it is demonstrated that 66,3 per cent of the Afghan asylum seekers experienced forced separation from family members (Gerritsen et al. 2005, p. 20). Those experiences are likely to influence the willingness of migrants to send collective remittances. Second, the fact that Afghanistan is in a period of recovery and reform questions its abilities to establish diaspora engagement policies. And third, because of the insecure environment in Afghanistan many families establish household members at different geographic locations in order to hedge against risk to a sustainable livelihood (Loschmann & Siegel 2015, p. 38). It is very plausible that individual remittances have priority for those families.
3.2 A short history of Afghanistan
The turbulent history of Afghanistan has left deep scars in its population, which is also reflected in the Afghan migrants and migrant organisations in the Netherlands. The country’s history has influenced the behaviour of Afghan migrants in the Netherlands, which in turn has influenced their remitting behaviour, a crucial point that merits further discussion.
Afghanistan is a country with many languages, faiths, cultures, traditions and ethnic communities. Nowadays, there are four major ethnic groups in Afghanistan: Pashtun, Tajik,
Hazara and Uzbek (Haber et al. 2012, p. 1). Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in
Afghanistan (42%), with Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbeks (9%), Aimaqs (4%), Turkmen people (3%), Baluch (2%), and other groups (4%) making up the remainder (idem, p. 2). The map below shows the different ethnic groups, that can again be divided in subgroups. The location of Afghanistan has given the country a strategic position throughout history, forming “a crossroad of ancient trade routes and human migrations” (idem, p. 1). At the same time, this strategic position resulted in large-scale migrations and invasions that influenced Afghanistan’s culture and demography (idem, p. 2).
Figure 2. Ethnic groups in Afghanistan and adjacent areas (Central Intelligence Agency 2005)
The diversity present in Afghanistan is seldom celebrated. Rather, the history of Afghanistan “is replete with violence, tribal and ethnic conflicts resulting in the domination of the country’s politics by one ethno-religious community whose leadership excluded others from the decision-making process” (Emadi 2002, p. 8). In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was formally established as a state (Jazayery 2002, p. 232). Although
the word “Afghanistan” means “homeland of the Afghans” and the word Afghan has been applied to all ethnic communities that reside in the country, ethnic communities in
Afghanistan do not call themselves Afghans, but identify themselves by their ethnic names (Emadi 2002, p. 8-9). The diversity in ethnic communities has undermined Afghanistan’s attempts at nation-building (Mazhar, Khan & Goraya 2012, p. 98).
Besides the fragmentations along ethnic lines, there is also a fragmentation along sectarian lines. According to the study of Emadi, at least 75 per cent of the population
subscribes to the legal schools of the Sunni branch of Islam. 24 per cent practice the Shia faith of Islam. And less than 1 per cent are followers of other faiths, i.e. Hindus, Sikhs and Jews. (Emadi 2002, p. 10). During the Soviet occupation, from 1979 until 1989, the sectarian lines were visible; anti-Soviet insurgents remained divided along those lines (Jazayery 2002, p. 232; Emadi 2002, p. 11). Moreover, the country is also divided on the bases of tribalism and regionalism (Emadi 2002, p. 9).
With the downfall of the Russian puppet regime, people in Afghanistan expected that the theocratic regime would facilitate greater participation of diverse ethnic communities in local and state politics (idem, p. 11). However, in 1992, the resistance forces of Mujahideen marched into Kabul and deposed the government of Najibullah, who ruled from 1987 until 1992. Failure to reach agreement over the composition of a government led to the outbreak of a civil war that lasted from 1992 until 1996 (Jazayery 2002, p. 232). According to Emadi, the Islamic regime based its perception of national unity on its negation of the country’s diverse composition. But this perception proved to be fatally wrong:
The previous attempts by despotic rulers who tried to unite ethnic and religious communities by building ‘Afghan nationalism’, not realizing that national unity cannot be attained by the negation of ethnic communities but by their recognition (Emadi 2002, p. 11-12).
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1994, the fundamentalist group the Taliban emerged and became nationally and internationally recognised (Emadi 2002, p. 12-14; Jazayery 2002, p. 232). The Taliban wanted to re-establish the unity of Afghanistan using the framework of Islamic Law, Shari’a. Although they were welcomed in many areas because they established relative security, they captured Kabul and other major cities by the end of 1996 and turned into a fearsome force, creating a vicious bloodbath with its cycles of ethnic cleansing
(Jazayery 2002, p. 232-233; Emadi 2002, p. 12-14). As a result of the intensified conflicts in the 1990s, much of the industry and economic infrastructure was destroyed (Jazayery 2002, p.
235).
During many years of conflicts, many Afghans left Afghanistan as refugees. This was especially the case in the years after 1979, with the arrival of Soviet troops, after the
Mujahideen took over government in 1992, and after the large-scale massacres carried out by the Taliban in 1998-2000 (idem, p. 239).
In the post-Taliban era, the international community launched a reconstruction program, including the installation of “liberal peace”: rule of law, human rights and gender issues, liberal democratic institutions and elections, civil society, and an open economy with market-based economic growth and access to education (Houte 2014, p. 570-571). However, this program failed to take into account the complex, context-specific, and historical processes in which the Afghan conflicts are rooted (idem, p. 571).
3.3 Afghan migrants in the Netherlands
Since the late 1980s, some 43.183 Afghans have come to the Netherlands (CBS 2015a). The inflow of Afghan migrants spiked in the second half of the 1990s and in 2000 and 2001 (Dourleijn & Dagevos 2011, p. 12). Most of them fled from different regimes, since
Afghanistan has been in a more or less continuous state of civil war from the Russian invasion in 1979 onwards (Feldmann et al. 2007, p. 520). Although they form a relatively new refugee group, their numbers have risen quickly. Nowadays, they form one of the largest refugee groupsin the Netherlands (Muller 2008, p. 394; Feldmann et al. 2007, p. 515-516).
Figure 3. “Stock” number of Afghans living in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2009 by status (i.e., first generation, second generation with one parent born abroad, etc.) (Siegel et al. 2010, p. 16).
Most of the Afghans in the Netherlands have received a residence permit based on an asylum claim, and on family reunification with asylum seekers and refugees, as is shown in Figure 4 (Muller 2008, p. 394). However, the chances for Afghans to get asylum in the Netherlands dropped after 2001, with the result that Afghans increasingly get access through
marriage with a Dutch citizen (ibid.).
It is mainly the Afghan elite, with a relatively modern lifestyle and a high level of education, who has had the opportunity to flee to Western countries, and have
succeeded in doing so (Muller 2008, p. 394-395). When comparing this migrant group with other (non-refugee) migrant groups in the Netherlands, Afghans are highly educated (idem, p. 395; Dourleijn & Dagevos 2011: 13-15). The relatively influential positions Afghans migrants had in Afghanistan and their level of education often contrasts with the positions Afghan migrants fulfil in the Netherlands. This situation is called “socio-economic deprivation”; many of the Afghan migrants are unemployed or are represented at the elementary and low levels of the labour market (Muller 2008, p. 395). In 2009, the unemployment rate for the active population of Afghan migrants was 28 per cent, which is much higher than the unemployment rate of native Dutch (4 per cent in 2009), and also high compared to the “classical” migrant groups: Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans (10-12 per cent) (Dourleijn & Dagevos 2011, p. 15; Muller 2008, p. 395; CBS 2015b).
3.4 General remitting behaviour
According to the World Bank, in 2014 Afghan migrants in the Netherlands sent back $6 million to Afghanistan (World Bank, Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2014). In total, Afghanistan received $636 million in remittances in 2014 (World Bank, Remittance Data Inflows 2015b). The book Geven in Nederland 2009 states that the giving behaviour of Afghan migrants in the Netherlands is mainly directed at the country of origin (Schuyt et al. 2009, p. 161). Of the 109
Figure 4. Number of Afghans entering the Netherlands between 1995 and 2007 by motive (Siegel et al. 2010, p. 15)
Afghan respondents, 63 remitted money or goods. In their research, they investigated who the receivers of the remittances are, shown in the scheme below:
Table 1. Receivers of remittances (Schuyt et al. 2009, p. 170)
Percentage Afghans (n=63) Family 59 Friends 17 Faith relatives 2 Villagers/city dwellers 10 Business contacts - Charities 33 Other 24
Most of the respondents, 59 per cent, sent remittances to family in Afghanistan. Also noteworthy is that one-third of the respondents sent remittances to charities. Compared to Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans in the Netherlands, of which one in ten sends remittances to charities, this is a high proportion (idem, p. 170).
How remittances sent by migrants are spent is described in Table 2. 89 per cent of remittances is spent on basic needs, such as food, shelter, education, medical care, and so forth. Furthermore, 38 per cent is spent on social needs, such as clothing, luxury goods, mobile phones, contributions to weddings, et cetera. Considering that social needs are spent on the more luxury goods, it is likely that, when linking Table 1 to Table 2, the remittances sent to charities are spent on basic needs.
Table 2. Spending of remittances (Schuyt et al. 2009, p. 171)
Percentage Afghans (n=63) Basic needs 89 Social needs 38 Business activities 2 Other 6
Chapter 4. Operationalisation
4.1 Research methods
In order to get insight into migrant remitting behaviour and into the motivations that cause people to remit money and goods individually or collectively, my methodology used is the qualitative approach through interviews. In total, I interviewed twelve people.
The steps I followed in my research were in large part based on the social research methods explained in the book Social Research Methods (2008) written by Alan Bryman. First, I set up a general research question based on the questions that arose while I was reading available literature and considering the debates and arguments presented in those studies (Bryman 2008, p. 370). Some studies described how migrant organisations –
especially Mexican HTAs in the U.S. – fulfil a role in the sending of collective remittances. They gave ideas about how such a role can be fulfilled and what the motivations are for taking on such a role. However, for many migrant groups this has not been studied yet. This was also the case for Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands. I wanted to know whether the findings applied to those organisations as well.
I next selected the relevant subjects, which were in my case organisations and people (idem, p. 372, 375). I did so mainly through the internet and through some available articles about migrant organisations in the Netherlands.
After identifying my subjects, I collected the relevant data by interviewing people and using an already available database (idem, p. 372). In this step, both qualitative and
quantitative data was used. Because I conducted the interviews myself, the focus of this research is on the qualitative data. By interviewing people, I was able to stress the understanding of the social world by examining how participants interpret that world themselves (idem, p. 366). This approach stands in contrast to the quantitative approach of adopting a natural scientific model. Rather than explaining human behaviour – called Erklären by Max Weber – my focus was on understanding it – Verstehen (idem, p. 15). A quantitative approach could be very helpful in this research as well, in order to generalise findings, discover a certain trend, and to find out more about the determinants by which Afghan migrants remit money or goods. However, since I am not part of the
community of Afghan migrants, and because I did not know any Afghans beforehand, it would have been a difficult task to get a representative sample and gather enough quantitative data in a short amount of time. However, in 2008, a Dutch research group (Bekkers et al. 2002-2008) conducted quantitative research among 109 Afghan migrants in the Netherlands an investigated, among other things, their remittance behaviour (Schuyt et al. 2009, p. 162).
Because I had access to this database and because some of this data adds value to my research, it has a small auxiliary role in my research. For the sampling method, they used quota sampling, which in this case meant that people were selected based on age, gender, level of education, and region in order to get a representative sample (ibid.). The age of the respondents was between 18-85 (ibid.). After the quota assignments were allocated to each interviewer, the interviewers themselves chose the actual sample units to fit into the framework (Moser 1952, p. 411).
The fourth step in my research was to make an interpretation of the collected data (Bryman 2008, p. 372). What were my key findings?
Finally, I analysed the findings from my data collection and interpretation to see if any new concepts and/or theories came up. Finding no new concepts or theories, I continued to the next step of writing up findings and conclusions (idem, p. 370).
4.2 Respondents
4.2.1 Respondents of migrant organisations
I interviewed ten people who are active in migrant organisations. Since I did not have any direct contact details for Afghan migrants in the Netherlands, I had to ask around and look on the internet. Most of the organisations I found through the internet. I found a database that gives names of migrant organisations (IISG n.d.). I Googled all the organisations mentioned in this database, but for many of them, no contact information could be found online. The ones for which I could find an e-mail address and a phone number, I first e-mailed, in order not to overwhelm them with my questions. If I got no response, I called them a few days later. I contacted fourteen of those organisations by e-mail. The organisations are spread all over the Netherlands. In my e-mails, messages, and conversations, I was quite open. I told them that I was a student at the University of Amsterdam and that I was writing a thesis about Afghan migrant organisations in the Netherlands. I told them that I wanted to know about their life more generally. For example, I was interested in their personal experiences of life in Afghanistan, how they arrived in the Netherlands, and what they thought about life in the Netherlands. And I told them that I wanted to know about the role of the migrant
organisations and whether and how they are connected to Afghanistan. I did not tell them my exact research question, since I wanted all members to have the feeling that they could be valuable for my research, and my research question could be too specific for that.
Next to providing information about my topic, I asked if it was possible to make an appointment with them to have a conversation, or if it was possible to join an event if there
