The Federal Region of Europe
Democratizing Europe with Federal Regionalism
Master Thesis in Political Science – Public Policy & Governance Word Count: 10.124
Eston David McKeague June 26th, 2020
University of Amsterdam Supervisor, Professor Dr. Afsoun Afsahi Amsterdam, Netherlands Second Reader, Professor Dr. Gordon Arlen
1 The dynamic of European unification can lead beyond this point only if Eurofederalists can design a future Europe in contrast to the status quo that the Market Europeans would like to see maintained; one that can stir the imagination and help to initiate a broad public debate over the common issues for different national arenas.
2
Abstract
This thesis examines the theoretical debate on the democratic legitimacy of European integration to operationalize a theory of a democratic Europe. It examines how two major theoretical perspectives (supranationalism and transnationalism) regard the concept of the “European demos”1 to reveal
how it has been negated and divided by EU institutions. This thesis follows Habermas’ Postnational Constellation2 to reject the theoretical perspectives
and propose an alternative consideration for the European demos. It argues that a combination of federalism and regionalism affords the ability to consider the European demos as a singular, undivided polity. With this consideration, this thesis operationalizes the federal regional perspective through an institutionalist exercise of the Federal Region of Europe.
1 Rasmussen and Lasa López, 2017: 191
3
Contents
Abstract ... 2 Contents ... 3 Introduction ... 4 I. Supranational Europe ... 6 Integration ... 7 Democratic Legitimacy ... 11II. An Alternative Perspective ... 17
Federal Regionalism ... 19
The Federal Region of Europe ... 21
Conclusion ... 24
Works Cited ... 28
4
Introduction
Who are the Europeans? European integration suffers from a well-established lack of democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy is the right to rule, which is both perceived and granted by the public, as well as to institutions and individuals (Keohane, 2011: 99). This basic political legitimacy provides the authority that is necessary for institutions and individuals to rule over a population. This thesis follows the tripartite definition of democratic legitimacy provided by Warren (2017): “empowered inclusion, collective agenda and will formation, and collective decision making” (Warren, 2017: 43). If a governance system adopts those norms, it can become democratically legitimate. When a governance system becomes democratically legitimate, it becomes a government of, by, and for the people (Thomassen, 2009: 4; Saurugger, 2014; Wolkenstein, 2018).
Defining the peoplebehind European integration – or solving the so-called problem of the demos (Abromeit, 2009; Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008; Thomassen, 2009: 4) affords this thesis with a central question: Who are the European people? This thesis assumes that the answer to this question would be revealed through the European people’s use of norms of democratic legitimacy (Warren, 2017: 43). Moreover, this thesis takes an institutionalist approach to the “collective” or “European demos” (Rasmussen and Lasa López, 2017: 191) that is necessary for European integration to be democratically legitimate. It assumes that “institutions are not ‘identity’ in themselves” (Cerutti, 2008: 5), but rather can become meaningful to people as a method of self-identification, or “relevant to the image of themselves they want to project onto external actors.” (ibid). Therefore, this thesis asks the research question: How can the European demos be treated by democratic institutions to produce European integration that benefits from democratic legitimacy? To answer this question, this thesis must ask the sub-questions: How have the major theoretical perspectives on European integration regarded the European demos and the democratic legitimacy of European integration? Additionally, how have these perspectives impacted European integration?
To answer the research sub-questions, part one of this thesis examines two major theoretical perspectives on European integration, supranational neorealism, and transnational neo-functionalism; for the sake of simplicity hitherto referred to as supranationalism and transnationalism (see Table 1). The realist perspective,
5 supranationalism, rejects the notion of a European demos in favor of multiple demoi located within the democratic institutions of EU Member States and it argues that democratic legitimacy “flows” from these institutions to the EU (Grimm, 2017: 33; see also Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 304; Gauchet, 2005 in Saurugger, 2014: 191). The neo-functional counter-perspective, transnationalism, recognizes the lack of a European demos but claims that supranationalism has “utterly failed to provide a compelling, even post hoc, explanation for the construction of the European polity” (Caporaso and Sweet, 2001: 223). Thus, transnationalism attempts to build a demos capable of providing democratic legitimacy to European integration. It argues that “building a European demos” requires the democratic institutions of the EU and the Member States to “positively simulate each other’s evolutions” (Borońska-Hryniewiecka, 2017: 80) in a “shared European space” (Thomassen, 2009: 50). Hence, transnationalism rests on vague depictions of the European demos between the Member State and EU institutions.
Table 1: Theoretical Perspectives in Part One
Theoretical Perspective European Demos Democratic Legitimacy
Supranational Member State citizens Inside the democratic institutions of Member States
Transnational Member State and EU
citizens Between Member State and EU democratic institutions
When considering the question of this thesis: how can the European demos be treated by democratic institutions so European integration is democratically legitimate? This thesis follows Habermas (2001) to reject the supranational perspective for a “faith that the nation-state alone can pursue a ‘formative politics’” (Habermas, 2001: 98), and the transnational perspective, for waiting for an “‘automatic’ development from domestic markets to a federation of states.” (ibid). Moreover, this thesis recognizes the overabundance of political theory “merely explaining or comparing” institutions and the lack of theory “evaluating and recommending” (Karmis and Norman, 2005a: 4) them to build an “inventive” theoretical perspective that is clear on “the essence and ‘why’ of democracy” in Europe (Abromeit, 2009: 23). In the second part of this thesis, an alternative theoretical perspective that treats the European demos, or People of Europe, as a federated, regional symbolic construction. This federal regional construction is argued to overcome the shortcomings of the two major
6 perspectives by providing reasoning for a singular, European demos to democratically legitimate European integration.
Table 2: Theoretical Perspective in Part Two
Theoretical Perspective European Demos Democratic Legitimacy Federal Regional Singular, undivided
European polity Inside the democratic institutions of the Federal Region of Europe
Democratic legitimacy can be conferred by the European demos when European integration adopts institutions of “empowered inclusion, collective agenda and will formation, and collective decision making” (Warren, 2017: 43). The federal regional perspective understands that although “policies and institutions are not ‘identity’ in themselves” (Cerutti, 2008: 5), they can become meaningful to citizens as a method of self-description as well as “relevant to the image of themselves they want to project onto external actors.” (ibid). Therefore, the federal regional perspective argues that to democratically legitimate European integration, the European demos must break the EU Member State’s hold on democratic institutions and actualize the collective power of the European people. The second part of this thesis elaborates on the federal regional perspective and its relationship to the European demos. To provide context to the democratic legitimacy arguments in the second part, an institutionalist exercise of the Federal Region of Europe is provided. The focus of this thesis now turns to the two major theoretical perspectives on European integration.
I. Supranational Europe
This thesis streamlines the wealth of political theory behind European integration into two overarching groups, the supranational and the transnational.3 This thesis assumes that
the democratic legitimacy of European integration benefits from a clear understanding of where the People of Europe or European demos are in relation to the institutions responsible for enforcing the norms of democratic legitimacy (Warren, 2017: 43). In part one, this thesis examines two overarching theoretical perspectives for evidence of the European demos in relation to the democratic legitimacy of European integration. This thesis follows Habermas
7 (2001) and rejects the two perspectives for negating and dividing European demos amongst the Member States of the European Union.
Integration
A major theoretical perspective responsible for a great deal of European integration is supranationalism. This neorealist perspective acts as an umbrella over a milieu of theoretical approaches including civic nationalism (Saurugger, 2014: 191), intergovernmentalism (idem: 55), and internationalism (Schuman, 2005 [1950]). The key points aligning the diverse approaches under the umbrella of supranationalism, are the treatments of the European demos and the democratic legitimacy of European integration. Supranationalism argues that either the European demos does not exist or if it does exist, it is split amongst the inclusive democratic institutions of the Member States, thus conferring democratic legitimacy onto to the EU (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 304; Grimm, 2017; Ladrech, 2005: 97; Longo and Murray, 2017: 680). A clear understanding of the two supranational treatments of the European demos is necessary before the impact of supranationalism on the democratic legitimacy of European integration can be traced.
A key indicator of the supranational perspective is an acknowledgment of the “lack of a fully developed and integrated European society and public sphere." (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 300). This lack of a European public space highlighted by the supranational perspective culminates in the argument that “the EU—as a polity—has no demos that would provide the basis for a parliamentary expression of democracy” (Borońska-Hryniewiecka, 2017: 66). The so-called ‘no-demos’ problem allows the supranational perspective to justify ignoring the European demos. Similarly, of those supranational theorists who do recognize the European demos, most consider it to be an extension of Member State demoi from which democratic legitimacy “flows” from the Member State institutions to the EU (Grimm, 2017: 33). This alignment of Member States over EU institutions is argued on “organic grounds” due to the unique ability of sovereign nation-states to build social trust, shared beliefs, and a sense of community (idem: 80; Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 304; Gauchet, 2005 in Saurugger, 2014: 191; Karlsson, 2009: 67).4
4 For a comprehensive analysis of the demos and democratic legitimacy in supranational Europe see Cerutti
8 In both the no-demos and Member State demoi approaches, the Member States and their governments are the primary institutions of supranational Europe. If European integration were to recognize the European demos with collective will formation, agenda-setting, and decision making institutions, it “would give the EU the characteristics of a state and would require [Member States] to reject it” (Grimm, 2017: 77). Without a democratically legitimate European integration, Member States occupy an “organic” position above the European demos that restricts the collective capability of the People of Europe. This restriction of the European demos in favor of Member State institutions can be corroborated throughout the European integration.
European integration was originally under the jurisdiction of the European Communities, legal predecessors to the modern European Union. The three European Communities (EC) were created by three multilateral treaties: the 1951 Treaty of Paris, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and the 1957 Euratom Treaty (European Union, 2020b). The treaty signatories were Member State governments who coordinated essential industries to prevent war in Europe and improve economic prosperity (Schuman, 2005 [1950]). The ability of the EC to both prevent war and promote economic prosperity legitimized its existence in the eyes of Member State citizens (Thomassen, 2009: 3; Longo and Murray, 2011: 677). For much of the early European integration process, no necessity to formally recognize the European demos existed. The primary tools for integration were multilateral treaties between the Member States. Multilateral treaties do not typically require popular ratification, especially from polity across nation-state boundaries. Thus, early European integration could remain democratically illegitimate in the eyes a singular, undivided European demos.
In the era of the European Communities, European integration did not require a European demos. Rather, it was made legitimate by controlling and maintaining divisions between the People of Europe by “[preventing] outbreaks of economic nationalism amongst the member states." (Rosamond, 2012: 326). Supranationalism argued that a centralized European authority would follow from the advent of free trade, a customs union, a common market, and a common currency (idem: 331 – 332). The unrecognized European demosin combination with the supranational approach to centralized governance led to the creation of undemocratic, centralized European authorities. The Council of the European Union, established in 1967, grants legislative veto powers to ministers from Member State
9 governments (Conrad, 2011: 13; General Secretariat of the Council, 2020). The European Council, established in 1974, grants the power to set the political trajectory of integration to the heads of Member State governments (ibid). Both Councils treat the European demos as if it something that either does not exist or is contained within the institutions of Member States. The collective European demosis not included in will formation, agenda-setting, or decision making in supranational Europe, Rather, Member States act on behalf of the disjointed Peoples of Europe. As European integration increased in size and scope over time, the “centralized authority” for the Peoples of Europe that was envisioned by the supranational perspective became a reality.
Supranationalism considered European integration to be “a technical matter that would yield eventually a centralized authority" (Rosamond, 2012: 332). The 1967 Merger Treaty and 1992 Treaty of Maastricht mark the evolution of a singular European authority (Levitt, Bryceson, and van Mierlo, 2017). The organizations making up the European Communities became a singular Community in 1967, and in 1992 two other treaty organizations, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and Violence Internationally (TREVI) (European Union, 2020a), merged with the singular European Community to become the three pillars of the European Union (ibid; Levitt, Bryceson, and van Mierlo, 2017): EPC, TREVI, and EC. The three pillars of the European Union had formed a “centralized authority” for European integration without including the People of Europe. Rather, this EU was for the disconnected, separate, and plural Peoples of Europe who agreed through their Member State governments to create a “centralized authority” for European integration with scant inclusion for the collective will of the singular People of Europe. The treaty-based pillarization of the EU was inspired by the supranational treatment of the European demos as accessible through Member State institutions, like multilateral treaties. From this position beholden to the benevolent Member States, access to the European demos was dependent on access to Member State demoi.
Unfortunately for the collective People of Europe, after the treaty-based pillarization of the 1990s, the EU grew into a “densely institutionalized system of interrelationships” (Caporaso and Sweet, 2001: 221). This phenomenon was exaggerated with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty when the three treaty-based pillars of the European Union were consolidated into one, contiguous “centralized authority” for Europe (ibid; European Union, 2020b). Today, the EU
10 features seven key EU institutions, more than twenty EU Directorates-General, and fifty EU agencies (ibid). Notwithstanding the observation that “there is a lack of [public] identification with any EU leader” (Longo and Murray, 2017: 672), as there are three EU presidents; the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the President of the European Parliament (European Union, 2020a). The growth of the EU has resulted in an alphabet soup of EU institutions with overlapping mandates. For example, there are six EU organizations for business, labor, and employment affairs: EMPL, GROW, ELA, EIOPA, EU-OSHA, and EASME; six EU organizations for health and food safety; six for transportation; six for space and defense; nine for law enforcement and justice; and nine for education and research.5 This bloated, supranational EU even sends a delegation to the Group
of Eight meetings alongside France and Germany – splitting the European demos for an extra seat at the table (Huigens, 2016: 103). The lack of common direction for the EU and the overexpansion of the EU bureaucracy stems from an opaque theoretical understanding of the European demos, which was taken beset by Member State institutions claiming democratic legitimate authority over Europe.
Supranationalism upholds the principle of subsidiarity, or the localized devolution of authority (Fleming and Levy, 2014), to defend a divided European demos and democratically illegitimate European integration. Rather than including the People of Europe in democratic institutions that improve the democratic legitimacy of European integration, supranationalism considers tools to democratically legitimize European integration from within Member State institutions (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 300; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2003: 278). This shows how “the popularity of subsidiarity partly stems from its obfuscation of the central issues.” (Føllesdal, 2014: 215). The European demos is forced into twenty-seven boxes which it cannot fit. Supranationalism considers the European demos to be a formula whereas the Member State demoi are added together to achieve democratic legitimacy (Kapp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2003: 275). The mismatch between the aggregate Member State demoi and the collective European demos is calculable with the so-called EU democratic deficit.6 With the supranational incarnation of a democratically legitimate
European integration, the European demos is divided; seen as no more than the sum of its
5 It is not easy to discern a single theme from each EU organization, but a full list is provided in the Appendix. 6 For debate on the definition, causes, and solutions to the supranational democratic deficit see Gustavsson,
11 constituent parts; something that can be cultivated by strengthening the democracies of Member States.
The European demos viewed as either nonexistent or divided and the democratic legitimacy of European integration as “flowing” from the Member States to the EU, has had a profound impact on the development of a supranational Europe that considers the European demos to be little more than the product gained when adding Member State democracy. It fails to recognize democratic legitimacy as emergent beyond the sum of its parts. The supranational treatment of the European demos and the democratic legitimacy of European integration has resulted in a supranational Europe that fails to include the People of Europe in any meaningful capacity. Instead, it chooses to elevate the status of Member States over the European demos. By either negating or dividing it. The supranational perspective elevates the Member State demoito the extent that the Member States occupy a position of dominance within the EU. In other words, the Member States can rule without justification, which is an expression of injustice and illegitimate governance (Eriksen, 2014: 2). This thesis rejects the supranational perspective for the “faith that the nation-state alone can pursue a ‘formative politics’” at the European level (Habermas, 2001: 98). Likewise, a major theoretical perspective also rejects supranationalism and questions the ability of the EU to claim legitimate authority (Eriksen, 2014: 2). Since at least the 1990s, this neo-functional, counter-perspective to supranationalism has attempted to right the wrongs of the Member State-led European integration.
Democratic Legitimacy
Beginning the 1990s with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact alliance, the neorealist supranational European integration process began searching for the “more idealistic and universally oriented features of a common European culture” (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 296). A solution to fully develop and integrate European society (idem: 300) with a clear theoretical understanding of what it means to be European. In other words, supranational Europe was looking for the European demos. Political theorists responded to the shortcomings of supranationalism by inventing novel theoretical perspectives (Bohman, 2007; Conrad, 2011; Habermas, 2001; Longo and Murray, 2011; Nicolaïdis, 2013; Wolkenstein, 2018). These theorists understood the gravity of the situation they found themselves in, whereas the Member States were forced to open up “externally, in relation to
12 international regimes” (Habermas, 2001: 84) and “internally to the multiplicity of foreign, or new, forms of cultural life” (ibid; Saurugger, 2014: 19). This opening up of Member State institutions spurred a neo-functional, counter-perspective to focus on the action occurring across borders, in the transnational space separating the Member States from each other, and the Member States from the EU.7 Transnationalism regards the European demos as
something shared by Member State and EU institutions, and the democratic legitimacy of European integration reliant on the public participation in the transnational space (Conrad, 2011: 19; Patberg, 2016: 516; Wolkenstein, 2018: 295). The transnational treatment of the European demos manifests itself in several EU democratic reforms proposed by the transnational perspective.
This section examines the parliamentary, constitutional, and participatory reforms proposed by the transnational perspective. This examination concludes that the transnational perspective is unable to reverse the trajectory of supranational Europe to overcome the entrenched elevation of Member States over the European demos. Transnationalism considers Member State and EU institutions to be equal partners in the division of the European demos. While this positions EU institutions as democratically equal to the Member States, it confuses the democratic legitimacy pathway from the European demos to EU institutions. Moreover, this confuses the source of democratic legitimacy for European integration by muddying the waters between the authority of EU and Member State institutions. Notwithstanding, the EU Member States continue to hold a position of outsized influence in European integration, despite the noble democratic reform efforts suggested by the transnational perspective. Supranational Europe has thus far withstood all efforts to treat the European demos as something beyond the confines of the Member State borders, and maintains the status quo leaving the European people with no say in European affairs.
Parliament
The European Parliament (EP) first sat in an ideological formation in 1958 (European Parliament, 2020a). Prior to that time, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) sat in a formation along Member State lines (ibid.). In 1979, the EP had popular elections for the first time (European Union, 2020b). Before that, the MEPs were selected by the parliaments
7 For detailed theoretical responses to supranational Europe, see: Bohman, 2007; Pérez de las Heras, 2017;
13 of Member States (ibid.). Through this entire early period of the EPs history, it served a consultative function to the more powerful EC institutions with direct influence from Member State governments, namely the precursor to the European Commission, then identified as the High Authority (ibid.; European Parliament, 2020a).8 During the formative years of the EU, its
parliament enjoyed a second-rate status amongst the other institutions, in part due to the supranational treatment of the European demos and the democratic legitimacy of European integration. Within supranationalism, the EP is a place to bring Member State citizens together to forge common understandings. However, the democratic legitimacy of these understandings is rooted in the Member States, rather than the European demos (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 296; Grimm, 2017: 77).
The impact of supranational Europe’s treatment of the European demos can be seen in the EP party system. The EP does not have political parties, but rather “Political Groups”, which are coalitions of national political parties that coordinate activities within the EP (European Parliament, 2020b). There are pan-European political parties registered with the EP called “Europarties”. These are associations of Member State parties and function in much the same way as the “Political Groups” (Authority, 2020). In both realizations of party politics at the European level, the individual citizens of Europe are unable to participate. Within the supranational EP, the European demos is directed to split up and find a nation-state. The inability of individual citizens to be members of the “Political Groups” or “Europarties”, is enshrined in treaties written and ratified by Member State governments (European Parliament, 2020a; 2020b). Therefore, the EP political party system is dependent on Member State political parties to function. The EP functions as participatory supranationalism and has been unable to reconfigure in a fashion that enfranchises the collective European demos. Rather, it gives voice to the separate Member State demoi in the name of European democracy.
The major transnational attempt at reforming the EP came with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon when the EP adopted a system of degressive proportionality to allocate MEPs to Member States (Grimmett et al, 2017). Degressive proportionality is utilized to recognize the population differences between the Member States while providing the less populous states
14 more MEPs than their population might allow (idem: 9). Degressive proportionality and the complex formulas used to calculate it (idem: 27) are representative of transnationalism’s treatment of the European demos; identified as something between the EU and the Member States and accessible by calculating a truly degressive proportionality in the EP. Notwithstanding the noble effort to dislocate the European demos from Member State demoi, the EP party system and degressive proportionality all impose restrictions on the democratic pathways available to the European demos. They symbolize the outsized Member State control over the European integration project and creates a key point of contention for those who propose alternative pathways for Europe, like constitutionalists.
Constitution
In 2004, transnationalism pushed for the constitutionalization of Europe and was successful at convincing the Member States to agree on a treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Longo and Murray, 2011: 673). The location of the European demos in the Constitutional Treaty rested on the supranational concession that neither the Member States nor the citizens of Europe could be legitimately accepted as the sole subjects of the constitution (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 310). This assumption pushed transnationalism to locate the European demos between EU and Member State institutions, in the transnational space. To recognize this location of the European demos, the Constitutional Treaty was written by delegates of the Member States and ratified by the citizens of Europe, although through state-based referenda (Longo and Murray, 2011: 674). The reliance on multilateral treaties and state-based referenda as tools for European integration, even amongst transnational pushes to constitutionalize, demonstrates how transnationalism struggles to overcome the iniquities of supranationalism.
The democratic legitimacy of the Constitutional Treaty was sourced from the democratic institutions of Member States, not the European demos. While it was a monumental agreement between sovereign Member States to enter into a union in which their relationships were governed by law (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 298), the treaty drafting and ratification process illustrates the degree to which individual voters have been shut out of the debate at the European level by a Member State-elite (Wolkenstein, 2018). Throughout the process, the European demos occupied a space under the dominion of the Member States. Subsequently, the legitimation feedback loop provided by the supranational
15 peace via prosperity theory came to a crashing halt. Member State demoi rejected the Member State-led European integration when in 2005, French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty by referenda (Longo and Murray, 2011: 674). In response to the Constitutional Treaty failing to appear “’right’ in the eyes of the beholders – the members of the [European] polity” (Thomassen, 2009: 1), the dominant supranational theory argued that “a return to the old ground rules of treaty ratification seemed to be safer and less fraught" (Longo and Murray, 2011: 673). The EU abandoned the transnational efforts to constitutionalize Europe. The transnational European nowhere space would continue to remain unoccupied. By 2009, supranationalism filled the need for democratic reform with the Treaty of Lisbon, which required ratification by only Member State governments, not state-based referenda.
As with any improvised back-up plan, the Lisbon Treaty does not go as far as the Constitutional Treaty to recognize the democratic potential of the transnational space between the EU and the Member States. Although, the Lisbon Treaty did elevate the status of the EU Parliament in the legislative process, placing a democratic institution alongside the Member State-controlled councils in the EU legislative process (Conrad, 2011: 13). Notwithstanding, despite this elevation of European democracy, the EU parliament continues to occupy a position delineated by multilateral treaties which it cannot change. The institutions of Member States remain the authoritative bodies over the EU institutions and whatever transnational space has been created since 1990. Nonetheless, the transnational perspective has pushed forward to offer new and innovative methods to carve out a new location for democratic legitimacy in Europe creating a location for the citizens of Europe to participate in European affairs.
Participation
Transnational theorists recognize that for most Europeans, the EU remains in the background behind the affairs of Member States (Longo and Murray, 2011: 678). However, they claim that the so-called democratic deficit is tied to an implicit assumption of “a unified collective subject in the form of a European people” (Conrad, 2011: 16) and that the EU suffers from a “deliberative deficit about the ends of the polity” (Bohman, 2007: 135) rather than a supranational democratic deficit. They draw from centuries-old theories of European integration (Saurugger: 2014: 24, 187), to propose participatory solutions based on the
16 transnational treatment of the European demos, that occupies a space between Member State and EU institutions. Not only is participation thought to legitimize the EU, but the increase in citizen activity in European affairs is thought to improve pan-European identity by fostering “transnational solidarities” that can “transcend” the preexisting national solidarities (Wolkenstein, 2018: 284). Transnationalism argues that citizen participation in European affairs can transcend Member State democratic legitimacy. However, citizen involvement in transnational participation is still tied to Member States institutions.
Recognizing the European demos as citizens of the Member States involved in European affairs, transnational participation goes so far as to necessitate a novel conceptualization of democracy itself. Transnational theorists coin the term for this brand new version of what is essentially federalism, demoicracy. This is the theory of shared sovereignty between Member State and EU democratic institutions resulting in a plurality of equally democratic institutions (Nicolaïdis, 2013: 362; Wolkenstein, 2018: 287). This transnational space where EU citizens can engage in discussion over the boundaries between EU and Member State democracies is the same space occupied by the central and constituent authorities in federal theory (Bohman, 2007: 137). Moreover, some transnational theorists treat ‘civic deliberation’ or ‘deliberative polls’ at the European level as alternatives to a genuine European democracy notwithstanding the representative and legitimating limitations of deliberation (Olsen and Trenz, 2014: 117). Demoicracy and deliberation represent the transnational attempts to treat the European demos fairly in a supranational Europe dominated by Member State institutions. Likewise, transnationalism pushes the search for a democratically legitimate European integration into a process of reinventing the wheel.
Transnationalism considers European integration to be in uncharted territory, although the EU appears to seemingly handle it well, receiving praises for enhancing the role of the parliament with the Treaty of Lisbon and novelties like the European Citizens Initiative and the Conference on the Future of Europe (Conrad, 2011: 20; Patberg, 2014: 516). The former compounding the transnational hope for “genuine European parties” to develop and strengthen the “quest for even more transnational democracy in the EU." (Conrad, 2011: 19). The transnational reverence for the small offerings of democracy passed out by supranational Europe represents the limitations of the theory in locating the European demos through
17 Member State-led attempts at creating a participatory space from the top-down (Wolkenstein, 2018). The transnational perspective is unable to address the outsized influence of Member States in the EU which prolongs the situation in which the People of Europe have no say in European affairs. Moreover, the transnational perspective is limited in its ability to operationalize alternative pathways of European integration due to its equal inclusion of the Member States and citizens in EU affairs. In transnationalism, the source of democratic legitimacy for European integration is split between sets of institutions and is regarded as a commodity for institutions to share. The European demos cannot confer democratic legitimacy onto European integration if it is commodified by the Member States to the point of co-optation. By dividing the European demos or forcing it to fit into an awkward transnational space, the neo-functional counter-perspective to supranationalism is unable to overcome the Member State-led European integration. Therefore, this thesis rejects transnationalism for assuming the EU and the Member States would automatically include the European demos in democratic institutions (Habermas, 2001: 98). Despite these noble transnational efforts to democratize the EU, the Member States can continue to rule without justification to the European demos, which is an expression of injustice and illegitimate governance (Eriksen, 2014: 2). Supranational Europe remains democratically illegitimate and the European demos remains ignored and divided.
This section of the thesis provided an overview of the transnational solutions to the democratically illegitimate European integration process, supranational Europe. The first part of the thesis overviews the two major theoretical perspectives on European integration, neorealist supranationalism, and neo-functional transnationalism, to examine their theoretical shortcomings and institutional impact. Each perspectives treatment of the European demos and the democratic legitimacy of European integration were examined. The next part of the thesis follows Habermas (2001) to reject the two major perspectives and present an alternative perspective to the European demos and the democratic legitimacy of European integration.
II. An Alternative Perspective
This thesis assumes that to know the People of Europe – or to solve the so-called problem of the “European demos” (Rasmussen and Lasa López, 2017: 191; see also Abromeit,
18 2009; Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008), European integration must be democratically legitimate. European integration must be of, by, and for the People, and the People must be visible in democratic institutions that follow norms of empowered inclusion and collective will formation, agenda-setting, and decision making (Thomassen, 2009: 4; Saurugger, 2014; Warren, 2017: 43; Wolkenstein, 2018). If the People of Europe are included in democratic institutions, it will be possible to know who they are. If they can vote on issues as a collective, undivided polity, then their voting record will contain their collective beliefs and values. Therefore, knowing the People of Europe is both a benefit and a requirement todemocratically legitimate European integration.
This thesis rejects supranationalism for believing the EU Member States can provide the benefits of a democratic Europe without providing democratic institutions for the People of Europe (Habermas, 2001: 98). It rejects transnationalism for assuming the EU and the Member States would automatically provide democratic institutions for the People of Europe (ibid). This thesis argues that the no-demos theory, divided demoi theory, and demoicracy theory, do not regard the People of Europe as a singular, cohesive demos. Thus, the European demos is excluded from supranational and transnational democratic institutions. Rather, supranational Europe must rely on a variety of Member State demoi to speak as a collective through separate Member State democratic institutions. European integration is not democratically legitimate because the European demos is either ignored or divided amongst the Member States. Thus, a democratically legitimate European integration process necessitates a system of democratic institutions capable of including the entire European demos. The People of Europe must be included in collective democratic institutions before they can speak as a collective. The theoretical requirements to democratically legitimize European integration must be met before the practical benefits can be observed.
This thesis recognizes a lack of inclusive, democratic institutions at the European level and considers an opportunity to invent a theoretical perspective that is clear on the essence of ‘Why European Democracy’ (Abromeit, 2009: 23). Thus, it recommends a set of inclusive democratic institutions for Europe (Karmis and Norman, 2005a: 4). This thesis recognizes that the voice of the People of Europe has been made inaudible by an unjust and illegitimate European governance (Eriksen, 2014: 2). The power of the People of Europe, their pouvoir constituent, has been co-opted by the Member States who can rule without justification (ibid;
19 Krisch, 2016; Grimm, 2017: 58 – 59). Member State-led European integration cannot fulfill the requirements to, nor benefit from, democratic legitimacy. It cannot know the People of Europe because its democratic institutions ignore and divide the European demos.
This thesis considers the lack of democratically legitimate European integration to be a problem of “confederal structures in an age when there is such strong emphasis upon democratic processes and accountability” (Watts, 2005: 241). In this undemocratic confederation of nation-states, Member State-led European integration has cast doubt of the “locus of constituent power”(Krisch, 2016: 678). The “new constitutional order” created by Member State-led European integration fails to include the power of the People of Europe, their pouvoir constituent. Consequently, supranational Europe runs the risk of becoming an undemocratic “federal superstate.” (Schmidt, 2004: 94; Eriksen, 2014: 2; Krisch, 2016). To regard the People of Europe as singular, and benefit from a democratically legitimate European integration, a novel treatment of the European demos is required. A treatment that necessitates prominent, undivided democratic institutions. As an institutionalist exercise, this thesis recommends a federal regional treatment of the European demos and the creation of federal regional democratic institutions for Europe.
Federal Regionalism
Federal regionalism borrows from two distinct fields of political theory, federalism, and regionalism. A firm understanding of federalism already exists in the public consciousness. Comparatively, regionalism is an undeveloped branch of political theory due to the ‘region’ being an “eminently ambiguous idea … used to express two conflicting processes — the supranational and infranational dimensions.” (Therét, 1999: 479). Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term ‘region’, a branch of international relations theory considers multi-state collections of activity as ‘regional’ activity (Saurugger, 2014: 226). Likewise, regionalism recognizes the increased diffusion of nation-state interests through nonconstitutional, regionalization processes (Stefanova, 2018: 164). Nation-states are increasingly opening to their close neighbors to form “regional subsets” of an emergent global order in what has been described as a “universal phenomenon” of regionalization (Saurugger,
20 2014: 227; Eriksen, 2014: 7). 9 Although, regionalization has thus far been unable to produce
a stable, region-state represented by a cohesive regional identity.
Federalism is the older, developed half of federal regionalism. It has made a profound impact on political theory and politics for centuries (Saurugger, 2014: 187). Some even declare the “Age of Federalism” in recognition of the fact that “of the ten countries of the highest GDPs in the world only two – China and France – lack any semblance of federal structure” (Calabresi and Bickford, 2014: 123). Notable federal countries include India, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Germany, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Argentina, Australia, and the United States. Theoretically, federalism can be broadly defined as two democratic bodies of equal legitimacy occupying the same political space (Karmis and Norman, 2005a: 3). The most common type of federalism is the “federation,” or a nation-state comprised of a union of partially self-governing, sub-nation-states united by a central government (Saurugger, 2014: 23). However, the principles of federalism are often customized to fit a national context that results in a variety of types all stemming from the same common theory.10
In Canada, federalism unites a diverse group of languages, ethnicities, and nationalities in which the French-speaking Québécois practice a multicultural form of citizenship alongside an English-speaking majority, and immigrants from other countries practice a multinational form of citizenship (Kymlicka, 2011: 296). Canadian federalism promotes the free exchange of ideas between citizens of different groups and never provides a static definition of what it means to be a citizen (idem: 299). Canada shows how federalism can be used to stretch the concept of the nation-state over many nations and cultures, by broadening the scope of The People to include everyone in democratic institutions. This treatment of the demos in Canada democratically legitimates Canadian institutions and provides the outside world with a clear, albeit nuanced picture of who Canadians are.
In the United States, federalism was critical to the formation and stability of the country. Federalists of the 18th century, Thirteen American Colonies were afraid that once
independence from Britain had been achieved, the free colonies would split into “an infinity
9 For a typology of regionalization, arguments why the EU is not the only case of regionalization, and a
comparative analysis of global regionalization processes, see Saurugger, 2014: 227 – 241. For a regionalist account of European integration see Stefanova, 2018.
10 The profound diversity of federalist theory is far too broad for this thesis, for a comprehensive analysis see
21 of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt.” (Hamilton, 1788: 45 – 46). Thus, the federal government recognized the states as “constituent parts of the national sovereignty,” and granted them exclusive portions of sovereign power (idem: 48). Likewise, the federal government recognized the unusual, limited situations in which the states are incapable, and the federal government should retain precedence (Calabresi and Bickford, 2014: 143). The United States shows how federalism can be used to stretch the concept of sovereignty over many states, by broadening the scope of The People to include the populations of different states. This treatment of the demos in the United States democratically legitimizes institutions and provides the outside world with a clear, although not always pretty, picture of who Americans are.
In summary, federalism is the perpetual dance between the central authority and the constituent authorities (Krisch, 2016: 664). Regionalism is the sharing of sovereignty to relieve the nation-states of pressure through the division of labor (Eriksen, 2014: 7). Together, federal regionalism is the dance between levels of governance in a region of sovereignty-sharing nation-states. Federal regionalism avoids replicating the nation-state at the regional level through federalism (ibid). Instead, it opts to source legitimacy from nation-state demoi in federated, regional institutions. Federal regionalism seeks to avoid the problems of nation-states and illegitimate regionalization with comprehensive and inclusive democratic institutions (Krisch, 2016: 664). Federal regional institutions renegotiate the unfixed domains of authority as conflicts emerge between interdependent nation-states, the regional demos, and the plethora of social groups within it. (Resnick, 2014: 363; Stefanova, 2018: 209).
The Federal Region of Europe
Europe has shown signs of federalism and regionalism for decades. Interpretations of European federalism have existed for centuries and the topic has enjoyed renewed interest since the 1990 Maastricht Treaty (Saurugger, 2014: 25). Political theorists today have no qualm classifying the EU as a “confederal government” (Calabresi and Bickford, 2014: 124); even supranational theorists recognize the relevance of federalist theory, if only to further their attacks on European federalism for “undermining popular sovereignty” (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2005: 295 - 299). European regionalism largely takes the form of ‘European integration’ or ‘Europeanization’. However, regionalist scholars have often considered this
22 process to be one of regionalization (Stefanova, 2018: 52). As argued above, European regionalization is controlled by the Member States rather than the People of Europe. This delegitimatizes the regionalization process and lacks the expression of a clear, or nuanced picture of who they are. Europe suffers from regionalization without representation.
The sheer size of Europe is reason enough to adopt federal regionalism (Weinstock, 2001: 80). Beyond regarding the People of Europe to be a cohesive demos, federal regionalism could provide them with a say in European affairs which could confer a sense of belonging and pride (Abromeit, 2009: 34). Canada transitioned from a centralized state into a federation of provinces (Therét, 1999). Canadian identity, while nuanced, was historically handed down from London. The United States transitioned from autonomous states into a federal nation-state (ibid). The growth of federal identity in the US parallels the growth of the supranational, confederal European identity. Federal regionalism rejects the supranational for its negation of the European demos and transnationalism for expecting its automatic recognition. Neither theoretical perspective offers democratic institutions to the European demos to democratically legitimatize European integration. Federal regionalism recognizes the present situation as one in which full democratic legitimacy has yet to be achieved and considers the European demos to be a source of legitimacy unconfined by nation-state borders and indivisible between higher and lower levels of government. Democratically legitimate European integration requires stretching the concepts of the state and the People of Europe to include the populations of different languages, religions, cultures, ethnicities, nations, and nation-states; it requires the institutionalized dance between groups of people and their levels of governance inherent to federal regionalism.
Federal regionalism considers the European demosto occupy a federated, regional position in Europe. Democratic institutions with the capacity to include the full, undivided European demoswill make it possible to know The People of Europe through democracy. With this treatment, the European demos can perceive and grant the right to rule to a just and legitimate European integration (Keohane, 2011: 99; Eriksen, 2014: 2). Thus, a theoretical Federal Region of Europe (FRE) would consider the European demos to be its agent-focused, normative foundation to self-government (Warren, 2017: 43). Habermas (2001) saw no obstacle expanding certain functions of the state onto a post-national federation (Habermas, 2001: 75), and Kucera (2017) continues the tradition when operationalizing the concept of
23 European armed forces. The FRE is meant to operationalize the undivided European demos within the trappings of a post-national, region of Europe. It aims to include the European demos within the European political process by empowering representatives to form a collective agenda and will through communication, deliberation, negotiation, and bargaining (Warren, 2017: 43). Member States would become federalized by the FRE, so they would remain but in a less dominant capacity. Their authority would be limited to their demos, and their ministers and heads of state must be left at home. The FRE parliament would abolish degressive proportionality in favor of the highest-average proportion method, allow individual voters to get involved in the FRE party system, and allow political parties to run pan-European election campaigns with pan-European party-lists (Habermas, 2017). The FRE would embody a clear, but nuanced picture of the European demos.
The FRE would reflexively constitute the People of Europe into collective agents capable of thinking and acting for themselves on behalf of the People (Warren, 2017: 43), by reinvigorating the pillarized structure of EU governance from 1992 to 2009. In the FRE, the EU would be repillarized into legislative, judicial, and executive pillars. Democratic accountability in the pillared FRE would be derived from a series of checks-and-balances between the pillars, as well as, between the People of Europe and their elected representatives. As Alexander Hamilton notes, the checks-and-balances between the pillars “are powerful means by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained, and its imperfections lessened or avoided.” (Hamilton, 1788: 45). The executive functions of the FRE would be carried out by a consolidated group of EU agencies, directorates-general, and bureaus (see Appendix). The average number of Member State ministries or departments was calculated by the author to be fifteen. As such, the FRE would have fifteen ministries. Symbolic measures would be taken to ensure the transition away from Member State-led European integration and towards democratic European regionalization would be salient in the public consciousness. Geographically locating the pillars of the FRE in separate cities around Europe or together in a federal region along the border of two Member States (e.g. France and Germany) would promote the repillarization of the EU and the democratization of European regionalization.
The FRE would have institutions capable of constantly regulating between European unity and national diversity by ensuring the peaceful coexistence between the various language, religious, cultural, ethnic, and national groups in Europe (Therét, 1999: 481;
24 Habermas, 2001: 74; Krisch, 2016: 678). 11 In the FRE, the European demos would not be
divided or shared with any other authority, as this would blur the distinction between the European demosand the demoi of the EU Member States (Eriksen, 2014: 3). In the FRE, the European demos would be a singular, symbolic construction of the People of Europe which can upgrade the normative institutions of the EU and the Member States without being mentally rooted in the nation-state as a “pre-political community of shared destiny” (Habermas, 2001: 76, 64; Eriksen, 2014: 7). To overcome the unjust and illegitimate Member State-led European integration, the European demos would break the Member State hold on democratic institutions by differentiating Member State functions, like the right to rule, from the ability to perceive and grant that right (Keohane, 2011: 99; Schmidt: 2004: 976; Eriksen, 2014: 7). The European demos, through the FRE, would actualize the power of the People of Europe, their pouvoir constituent, to democratically legitimate European regionalization (Krisch, 2016: 661; 678). The European demos would use the democratic institutions of the Federal Region of Europe, to legitimate European regionalization and show the world who the People of Europe are.
Conclusion
This thesis assumes that the democratic legitimacy of European integration benefits from a clear understanding of where the People of Europe, or European demos, are in relation to the institutions responsible for enforcing the norms of democratic legitimacy – “empowered inclusion, collective agenda and will formation, and collective decision making” (Warren, 2017: 43). To answer the research question: How can the European demos be treated by democratic institutions to produce European integration that benefits from democratic legitimacy? This thesis examines two major theoretical perspectives and develops a third as an alternative. This thesis follows Habermas (2001) to reject the two major theoretical perspectives. It rejects supranationalism for either negating or dividing the European demos amongst the EU Member States. It rejects transnationalism for attempting to squeeze the European demos into an ill-defined political space between the EU and Member State institutions. Afterward, this thesis develops an alternative theoretical
11 This is not to suggest that the citizens of non-EU countries in Europe are not members of the European demos
25 perspective on the European demos in response to the shortcomings and institutional impacts supranationalism and transnationalism. Through a combination of federalism and regionalism, this thesis provides a consideration of the European demos as a singular, undivided polity. This consideration of the European demos is argued to necessitate federal and regional democratic institutions to be fully included in European governance. This thesis argues that a federal regional treatment of the European demos can democratically legitimate European integration by allowing it to break the EU Member State hold on democratic institutions and actualize the collective power of the People of Europe. This thesis argues that federal regional institutions in Europe would democratize European integration through the enfranchisement of the European demos. It operationalizes the federal regional perspective to imagine such institutions. These institutions are meant to empower the voice of the collective People of Europe. They are meant to foster a democratically legitimate European integration process by reframing it as a democratic regionalization of Europe. Thus, making integration truly of, by, and for the People of Europe.
This thesis aimed to provide a concise yet comprehensive argument for the federal regional perspective. Nonetheless, key ideas relevant to the arguments contained in this thesis were excluded due to lack of space or shortsightedness on the part of the author. In general, decisions were made to keep the arguments flowing and connected. Digression down every theoretical rabbit-hole, while entertaining for the author, does nothing to serve the overall agenda of rejecting major theoretical perspectives and offering a combination of federalism and regionalism in return. Because of this, this thesis forgoes discussion on several key points. Namely, theories on European integration, European federalism, regionalism outside of Europe, and a comprehensive discussion of the hypothetical transition from European Union to Federal Region of Europe.
Firstly, the breadth and depth of theoretical perspectives on European integration proved daunting for this thesis to encapsulate. There are many branches of supranationalism and transnationalism that contradict the conclusions herein. The construction of these perspectives in this thesis is meant to provide a theoretical context to the arguments of federal regionalism. This thesis is not meant to be considered in any way an overview of theoretical perspectives on Europe and European integration. Neorealist supranationalism and neo-functional transnationalism are but two perspectives sitting atop of a mountain of
26 EU scholarship. Civic nationalism, republican federalism, liberal post-nationalism, and Kantian cosmopolitanism are just a smattering of the theoretical perspectives outlined extensively by Saurugger (2014). Critically, European federalism and its variations are not given the credit they deserve throughout this thesis. This theoretical perspective is perhaps one of the oldest in Europe and partially responsible for the development of both supranationalism and transnationalism. Euro-federalism enjoys a diversity of opinions amongst its adherents which has resulted in a collection of political parties.12 Consequently, the author acknowledges
shortness of breath in dealing with European federalist thought and encourages all to invest thoughtful consideration of their positions.
Secondly, this thesis avoids an in-depth discussion of regionalism in a global governance sense. Regionalization processes around the world are taking up the interest of globalization scholars and political theorists alike. This thesis could provide a better picture of how federal regionalism in Europe compares to other instances of regionalization around the world such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the East African Community, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the Caribbean Community. A comparison of these instances of regionalization concerning the principles of democracy and federalism, and the degree of nation-state interdependence may aide the regionalism arguments contained in this thesis. Regionalization processes are not unique to Europe and those taking place outside of Europe deserve an increase of scholarly attention and debate. Is regionalization a natural process of globalization? What does regionalization look like for illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes? What is Europe’s role, if any, in supporting regionalization processes around the world?
Lastly, the operationalization of federal regionalism through an institutionalist exercise of the Federal Region of Europe (FRE) could be more comprehensive. The concept of the FRE is meant to show how an undivided, European demos could be recognized by European institutions. The discussion was kept towards the democratic, federal, and regional functions of the FRE while avoiding topics of economics, sociology, monetary and fiscal policy, nationalism, pan-European identity, and the like. The FRE could be a state-building exercise, but in this thesis, it was meant to advance the idea that the European demos is left out of
27 European governance. However, questions remain as to how exactly the EU could make the transition to a Federal Region of Europe, the division of Member State and EU institutional labor within it, and if the transition to a federal regional would necessarily be democratic.
In conclusion, this thesis provides an inventive treatment of the European demosto stir the imagination. All of the policies recommended in the second part can be adopted by treaty or through the EU legislative process, that is to say, this thesis recognizes the unfeasibility of the Federal Region of Europe but not the EU democratic reforms recommended by a federal regional perspective. Rather, EU democratic reform is a hot topic of debate amongst some of the registered, European political parties and amongst every unregistered, Euro-federalist party. There is political momentum to democratize the EU, and this thesis encapsulates many of the arguments put forth by EU reformers into a single theory of change. It is critical to note that this thesis is only one person’s perspective, with all the limitations and biases inherent to that. The author understands that the grand story of Europe and integration, as well as every perspective on it, cannot possibly fit into these pages. Europe is larger than any single academic work can capture. The theory presented in this thesis is hoped to initiate a public debate on the federal regionalization of Europe. The institutionalist exercise of the Federal Region of Europe is a digestible aggregate of ideas designed to stir the imagination.
28
Works Cited
Abromeit, H. (2009) “Accountability and Democracy”, chapter 3 in The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union by Gustavsson, S., Karlsson, C., Persson, T., London Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-48099-4.
Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations. (2020). “List of registered European Political Parties,” Retrieved May 15th, 2020 from
http://www.appf.europa.eu/appf/en/parties-and-foundations/registered-parties.html. Bellamy, R., and Castiglione, D. (2005). “Building the Union: The Nature of
Sovereignty in the Political Architecture of Europe”, chapter twenty-five in Karmis, D., and Norman, W. (ed.) (2005) Theories of Federalism: A Reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-137-05549-1.
Bohman, J. (2007). Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi. Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN: 978-0-262-02612-3.
Borońska-Hryniewiecka, K. (2017). “From Legislative Controllers to Policy Proponents: The Evolving Role of National Parliaments in EU Multi-Level Governance” chapter four in Pérez de las Heras, B. (ed.) (2017). Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union and Global Governance. Switzerland: Springer Nature. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-41381-5-4.
Calabresi, S. G., and Bickford, L. D. (2014). “Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law” chapter five in Fleming, J. E. and Levy, J. T. (ed.) (2014)
Federalism and Subsidiarity. New York: New York University Press. ISBN: 978-1-4798-6885-8. Caporaso, J. A., and Sweet, A. S. (2001). “Conclusion: Institutional Logics of European Integration” in Sweet, A. S., Sandholtz, W. Fligstein, N. (ed.) (2001) The Institutionalization of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 0–19–924795–1.
Cerutti, F. (2008) “Why political identity and legitimacy matter in the European Union”, in Cerutti, F, and Lucarelli, S. (ed.) (2008) The Search for a European Identity: Values, policies, and legitimacy of the European Union by New York: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-44687-7
Cerutti, F, and Lucarelli, S. (ed.) (2008). The Search for a European Identity: Values, policies and legitimacy of the European Union. New York: Routledge. ISBN:978-0-415-44687-7.
Conrad, M. (2011). "The European Citizens' Initiative. Transnational Democracy in the EU at Last?", Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration, 1(7): 5-22. DOI:
10.13177/irpa.a.2011.7.1.1.
Eriksen, E. O. (2014). “Regional cosmopolitanism: the EU in search of its
legitimation”, European Journal of Futures Research, 2(51). DOI: 10.1007/s40309-014-0051-8.
European Parliament (2020a). “The Parliament and the Treaties”, European Parliament Website. Retrieved on May 15th, 2020 from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
29 European Parliament. (2020b). “The Political groups of the European Parliament”, European Parliament Website. Retrieved on May 15th, 2020 from https://www.europarl
.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups. European Union (2020a). “EU Presidents – who does what?”, European Union Website. Retrieved on May 15th, 2020 from
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/presidents_en.
European Union (2020b). “The history of European Union”, European Union Website. Retrieved on May 15th, 2020 from
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.
Fleming, J. E., and Levy, J. T. (ed.) (2014). Federalism and Subsidiarity. New York: New York University Press. ISBN: 978-1-4798-6885-8.
Føllesdal, A. (2014). “Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity” chapter seven in Fleming, J. E., and Levy, J. T. (ed.) (2014) Federalism and Subsidiarity. New York: New York University Press.
Gauchet, M. (2005). La condition politique. Paris: Gallimard, in Saurugger, S. (2014). Theoretical Approaches to European Integration, p. 191-193. Palgrave MacMillan: London. DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-36724-2.
General Secretariat of the Council (2020). “History”, Consilium Europa Website. Retrieved on May 15th, 2020 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/history/.
Grimm, D. (2017). The Constitution of European Democracy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805120.001.0001.
Grimmett, G., Pukelsheim, F., González, R., Słomczyński, W., Życzkowski, K. (2017). “The Composition of the European Parliament”, EU Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Retrieved May 15th, 2020
from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/583117 /IPOL_IDA%282017%29583117_EN.pdf.
Gustavsson, S., Karlsson, C., Persson, T. (2009). The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union, London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-48099-4.
Habermas, J. (2001). The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN: 9780745623511.
Habermas, J. (2017) Citizen and State Equality in a Supranational Political Community: Degressive Proportionality and the Pouvoir Constituant Mixte. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55: 171– 182. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12517.
Hamilton, A. (1788). The Federalist Papers, 9 (pg. 44 – 48). Oxford, UK: Oxford World Classics. ISBN: 978-0-19-280592-8.
Huigens, J. C. (2016). Becoming in-Crowd: Constructing EU Power in Informal Governance a Study of the Role of the European Union in the G8 Summit. [s.n.] Retrieved May 15th from lib.uva.nl/permalink/31UKB_UAM1_INST/gq32c0/
30 Karlsson, C. (2009). “EU Treaty Reform and Accountability”, chapter 6 in The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union by Gustavsson, S., Karlsson, C., Persson, T., London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-48099-4.
Karmis, D., and Norman, W. (2005a). “The Revival of Federalism in Normative Political Theory”, chapter one in Karmis, D. and Norman, W. (ed.) (2005) Theories of Federalism: A Reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-137-05549-1.
Karmis, D. and Norman, W. (ed.) (2005b). Theories of Federalism: A Reader. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-137-05549-1.
Keohane, R. O. (2011). “Global Governance and Legitimacy.” Review of International Political Economy: Legitimacy and Global Governance 18(1): 99–109. DOI:
10.1080/09692290.2011.545222.
Krisch, N. (2016). “Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational orderI”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 14(3): 657 – 679, DOI:
10.1093/icon/mow039.
Kucera, T. (2017) “What European army? Alliance, security community or postnational federation”, International Politics, 56: 321–338. DOI: 10.1057/s41311-017-0129-6.
Kymlicka, W. (2011). “Multicultural citizenship within multination states”, Ethnicities, 11(3): 281 – 302. DOI: 10.1177/1468796811407813.
Levitt, S., Bryceson, S., and van Mierlo, F. (2017). “The EU Institutions”, chapter three in Bitonti, A. and Harris, P. (eds.) (2017). Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying Industry in 28 EU Countries. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 31–44. DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-55256-3_3
Longo, M., and Murray, P. (2011). "No ode to joy? Reflections on the European Union’s legitimacy", International Politics, 48: 667–690. DOI: 10.1057/ip.2011.29.
Nicolaïdis, K. (2013). “European demoicracy and its crisis”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51: 51-369. DOI:10.1111/jcms.12006.
Olsen, E., and Trenz, H-J. (2014). “From Citizens’ Deliberation to Popular Will Formation? Generating Democratic Legitimacy in Transnational Deliberative Polling” in Political Studies, 62(S1): 117–133. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12021.
Patberg, M. (2014). “Supranational Constitutional Politics and the Method of Rational Reconstruction”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 40(6), 501-521.
Phnniemore, D. and Warleigh-Lack, A. (ed.) (2009). Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rasmussen, S.B., and Lasa López, A. I. (2017) “Supranational Options to Reinforce the Political Legitimacy of the EU”, introduction to part three of Pérez de las Heras, B. (ed.) (2017). Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union and Global Governance. Switzerland: Springer Nature. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-41381-5-4.
