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Climate Change: A Catalyst of Security Governance? Wider Applications of Risk Theory in a Warmer Arctic

June 22nd 2018

Amaia Garces de los Fayos Alonso Student ID: 11781807

Master thesis, Political Science: International Relations Thesis Specialisation Course: European Security Politics Graduate School of Social Sciences

University of Amsterdam Roetersersstraat 1012 WX, Amsterdam The Netherlands Academic Supervisor: Dr. Rocco Bellanova [email protected] Thesis Reader: Dr. Beste İşleyen [email protected] Word count: ⁓23,140

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Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures ... 3

List of Abbreviations ... 4

Chapter One: Introduction ... 5

Chapter Two: Previous Arctic Discourses – State of the Art ... 10

2.1 Introduction ... 10

2.2 The Environment-Conflict Discourse ... 11

2.2.1 Environment-conflict discourse: Securitizing rhetoric? ... 17

2.3 The Environment-Peace Discourse ... 18

2.3.1 Environment-peace discourse: Liberalism rhetoric? ... 22

2.4 Conclusions: Filling a Gap in the Literature ... 24

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework ... 28

3.1 Introduction ... 28

3.2 A Critical Security Studies’ Approach: Differentiating securitization and risk ... 29

3.3 Critical Risk Theory ... 31

3.4 Theoretical Origins of Risk Theory: a Literature Review ... 31

3.4.1 Risk society ... 31

3.4.2 Risk governemntality: Defining the dispositif ... 34

3.5 Conclusions ... 36

Chapter Four: Research Design ... 38

4.1 Introduction ... 38

4.2 Data collection ... 38

4.2.1 Selected Primary Documents ... 40

4.3 Methodology ... 43

4.3.1 Indexing: Latent and Manifest Content Analysis ... 45

4.4 Limitations of the study ... 47

4.5 Conclusion ... 48

Chapter Five: Results – Reporting the seven Arctic themes ... 49

5.1 Introduction ... 49

5.2 The Seven Arctic Themes ... 49

5.3 Conclusions ... 63

Chapter Six: Discussion ... 65

6.1 Introduction ... 65

6.2 A conflict or peace based Arctic discourse? ... 65

6.3 Arctic security: a risk-based governance? ... 70

6.4 Conclusions ... 75

Chapter Seven: Conclusions ... 77

Bibliography ... 82

Sources ... 82

Books ... 87

Websites ... 88

Appendix ... 90

Appendix 1. Common codes and their appearance in the five coastal Arctic strategies .... 90

Appendix 2. Codebook for thematic analysis. ... 95

Word-counting ... 95

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List of Tables and Figures

1. Map of Arctic region according to Arctic Circle 8 2. Map depicting overlapping claims to the Arctic Ocean 16 3. Table of Arctic country’s national strategies and their abbreviations 40 4. Table of multilateral Arctic agreements and their abbreviations 41 5. Table of EPPR working documents and their abbreviations 42 6. Table of themes and respective codes for analysis 45 7. Illustration of Arctic cyclical climatic dispositifs 74

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation Explanation

BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation

CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

CSS Critical Security Studies

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (Arctic Council working group)

IMO International Maritime Organization

IR International Relations

MOSPA Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SAR Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic

SAO Senior Arctic Officials

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 The puzzle of increased climate change impacts in the Arctic

Global warming and climate change have fast become a topic of international discussion and a hurdle for national security. As the Earth’s climate temperature gradually rises, repercussions are felt across the globe: from rising sea levels to extreme weather conditions, causing human migration (WWFa Website; IPCC website). These relatively recent concerns have become understood as topics to be interpreted by security studies (Buzan et al., 1998:71-93; Diez et al, 2016:1-34; Peoples & Vaughan, 2010:91-104). The Arctic region experiences climate change at a faster pace and more severely than the rest of the world: warming at a rate of almost twice the global average (WWFb website; National Snow and Ice Data Centre; IPCC website). It is estimated that the sea ice extent for May 2018 was the second lowest in thirty-nine years of satellite recoding (National Snow and Ice Data Centre). Increasing water temperatures, the loss of permafrost, amplified carbon emissions and greying ice caps are central concerns among experts (National Snow and Ice Data Centre; NASA website; Norwegian Polar Institute website); as they progressively affect and devastate not only fauna and flora but also communities whose livelihoods depend on them.

The experienced significant impact of climate change, catapulted the region into the centre of political and security debates among countries within the Arctic. This is seen in the sudden increased establishment of regional Arctic Cooperative Organizations in the early 1990s. For example, the Arctic Council was established in 1996 (Arctic Council website), this institution will be further discussed in this thesis as an intergovernmental forum promoting circumpolar collaboration and governance. The focus on the High North’s melting ice drove countries and institutions to produce scientific research on new sources of hydrocarbons, transport routes, and overall economic opportunities in the early 2000s. For example, the United States Geological Survey published a report stating that the Arctic holds one of the largest undiscovered sources of conventional oil and gas (USGS, 2008).

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The melting sea ice coupled with the revelation that the region would experience new economic and human activity, spurred speculations among academics in the early 2000s. They claimed that the area would undergo a period of antagonistic relationships and disputes of overlapping territorial claims, and economic interests in the region (Borgerson, 2008; Dodds, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2011). These new developments shrouded Arctic countries’ relations in a blanket of uncertainty, creating a feeling of unease within the community of states, as politicians and academics predicted impending conflicts over resources and territory. On the other hand, as a response to these alarmist accounts of the High North1, academics proposed a rival understanding of the region based on conceptions of peace and stability (Brosnan et al., 2011; Wilson, 2015; Bailes & Heininen, 2016). Regardless of these sensationalist accounts, and increasing environmental effects, Arctic issues seldom reach mainstream politics and media, or capture the public’s eye.

1.2 Research Question and Relevance

Therefore, a nuanced understanding of the region, the relations among actors and the realities they have constructed deserves deeper analysis. It is notable to mention that this thesis will understand the international system from a social constructivist position, following Alexander Wendt’s (1992) stance. The Arctic region is interpreted as socially constructed by each state in unison, following the famous quote “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992:395). In essence, this thesis will adopt the assumption that states create their own security dilemmas and competitions by interacting in certain ways with other states (Wendt, 1992:402). Although Wendt’s social constructivist position is the starting lens of this thesis’ conceptualisation of the High North, it will not be the guiding theoretical lens. Instead, I posit that original information may be extrapolated from classical security documents, such as national strategies, and international agreements, that may shed new light on how states have organized security and governance. As a result, this thesis proposes studying the construction of Arctic security and governance in the framework of tangible changes that the region is experiencing within a risk-theory lens. Accordingly, the guiding research question of this thesis is: How has the

1 For purposes of this thesis, the High North and the Arctic are taken as equivalent. As this thesis deals

with policy frameworks, the construction of security and governance rather than scientific or legal distinctions, the terms are seen as synonymous.

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increased impact of climate change in the Arctic region, affected the organization of security and governance through risk measures?

1.3 Area of research: Explanation and Delineation

Before moving forward, it is noteworthy to mention that there is no precise political or scientific definition of the Arctic region. Different physical or geographical views compete with one another. There are several possible Arctic definitions based on natural features (Arctic Tree line boundary); by temperature (10°C July isotherm); or permafrost extension (Arctic Portal website a). Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the region will be defined as the area surrounding the North Pole, namely north of the Arctic Circle approximately encompassing 66° 34' N. The Arctic Circle is the Southernmost latitude in the Northern Hemisphere at which the sun can continuously remain above or below the horizon for 24 hours (Arctic Portal website a). Anything below the Arctic Circle is part of the sub-Arctic or temperate zone. This definition of the Arctic region was chosen as it has the advantage of being neutral. Please refer to Figure 1 below, for a map of the Arctic region, where the Arctic Circle is represented by a dashed line. This definition of the Arctic region comprises three continents, Asia, Europe and North America. Eight countries have territories within this region and are defined as Arctic states: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United States. Moreover, five of these countries are coastal states to the Arctic Ocean; they are Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia and the US.

1.4 Objectives, Relevance and Sociological Approach

This thesis aims to explore what type of security and governance practices are presently enacted in the High North, in order to contribute to the academic discussion in international affairs and security studies. The intention of this study is two-fold. Firstly, the research seeks to understand how the eight Arctic countries have organized their security policies through risk theory. Secondly, the study intends to prove how governments’ climate change mitigation measures have become a tool of governance (or dispositif), increasing state actions in the region. Therefore, the scientific and socio-political relevance of this project is found in the approach implemented.

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Figure 1: Map of the Arctic region according to Arctic Circle.

Source: Arctic Portal website. Maps: Arctic definitions. Last retrieved June 9th, 2018 from https://arcticportal.org/maps-arctic-definitions

Until now, a dichotomous narrative has been constructed around Arctic security; either through conflict-centred securitization rhetoric (Gorst, 2007; Borgerson, 2008; Tan and Tsai, 2010; Dodds, 2008) or within a liberal discourse of stability and peace (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009; Brosnan, 2011). However, this paper will suggest a drastic new way with which to view Arctic relations, through a content-thematic analysis of national policies of the Arctic Eight2, multilateral agreements and an Arctic Council working group, demonstrating that the region is experiencing security as ‘risk’.

2 “Arctic Eight” in this thesis refers to the eight Arctic countries, as defined by the Arctic Circle. They

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1.5 Structure of Thesis

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will proceed in six steps. First, previous academic research conducted on Arctic matters will be examined. Within the literature, two lines of reasoning are identified: one depicting the region as an area prone to conflict, and the other as a region of peace. Thus, chapter two will elaborate on the dichotomous discourses, placing these narratives within opposing theoretical strands. The chapter will argue against these divisions and instead propose to view Arctic relations through a risk-lens. This will lead to the third chapter, which explores and operationalizes the risk-theory conceptual framework. Both tenets and leading authors within critical security studies’ risk theory will be discussed and will guide the research. The fourth chapter is dedicated to establishing a research design, addressing data selection and methods based on thematic-content analysis with which to evaluate selected primary sources.

With these logistics ironed out, chapter five will report and explain the seven identified overarching themes within the primary data. The section will draw on primary sources in order to justify and analyse each theme and their component issues. This will be followed by a discussion of Arctic documents within the theoretical framework – chapter six. Thus, through the aid of the selected documents, the section will end by demonstrating how countries employed the use of diffuse dangers, caused by increased climate change, in order to produce policy strategies, multilateral agreements and thus governance tools. The thesis’s conclusions will summarise and discuss the main findings of the study so to answer the research question and show the value and limitation of the theory and methods mobilized. This project will conclude that Arctic international relations are best portrayed within a comprehensive understanding of risk theory, as countries construct their security practices by mobilizing the consequences of climate change; whereby creating governmental mitigation measures. These measures (dispositifs), in turn are here perceived, to have a double function, first the measures limit risks while secondly being governed by them. In sum, the study argues that climate change must be considered a catalyst of Arctic management, leading to an augmentation of regional governance in the coming future.

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Chapter Two: Previous Arctic Discourses – State of the Art

2.1 Introduction

The term ‘climate security’ represents a recent and fairly successful attempt to widen the security agenda. As Maria Trombetta (2008) notes, this permits to introduce environmental concerns within security understandings. Environmental issues have only recently been acknowledged within the political spotlight. They began to gain relevance in political discourse in the 1970s (Trombetta, 2008). However, it was in the 1980s that the debate about environmental security gained popularity due to the emergence of global environmental problems (idem). Environmental security was initially considered by academics as a successful manner to bring attention to salient environmental issues and increase the profile of these questions within the international arena (Buzan et al, 1998; Trombetta, 2008). However, opponents of this trend warned against the use of the term ‘security’ as it evoked a set of confrontational practices, associated with the state or the military (Trombetta, 2008).

This chapter will examine academic research conducted on Arctic environment, governance, politics, and resource allocation. Due to an increased attention on the impact of climate change and the rapid decrease of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean; new discussions on the implications of these developments on Arctic environment and security, unravelled in the early 2000s. The conversation has, so far, remained rather dichotomous. On the one side, this thesis has identified the environment-conflict discourse, which frames environmental degradation in terms of the language of security by states (Borgerson, 2008; Dodds, 2008; Tan et al, 2010). This rhetoric identifies points of future contention amongst countries as academics and politicians mobilise a narrative built around competition and territorial sovereignty. Thus, this thesis will group literature discussing such visions within the environment-conflict discourse, following a neo-realist securitization theory. On the other side, an environment-peace discourse is retraced; which frames the Arctic as a region of stability and cooperation in all fields (Borsnan et al., 2011; Wilson, 2015; Bailes & Heininen, 2016). This narrative makes a point of demonstrating how Arctic

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countries collaborate through international organizations and international law in order to establish stability and further their own interests. Thus, this thesis will group literature framing the Arctic as an area of cooperation and permanence within the environment-peace discourse, following liberalism theory.

This chapter is organized around this dichotomy and aims at identifying the ‘blind-spots’ in the literature. The environment-conflict debate will be considered first, followed by environment-peace; this section will end with concluding remarks on both approaches and argue for the significance of breaking away from this division. This chapter will claim that both discourses are sensationalist and incomplete, as a result of focusing either on neo-realist or liberal ‘tunnel visions’. Instead, this chapter will claim that significance should be allocated to the time frame of the production of these discourses. The environment-conflict discourse largely emerged as reaction to not only environmental changes but also to specific events within Arctic politics, which will be further explored below. Meanwhile, the environment-peace discourse mainly responds to the environment-conflict discourse in the aim to disprove previous claims. These observations will set the groundwork for an appeal to analyse the region within a whole separate vision – risk-governance.

2.2 The Environment-Conflict Discourse

Global warming and climate change have fast become a topic of international discussion and a hurdle for national security. Scientific and political experts have assured that the Arctic is extremely vulnerable to projected climate change impacts (IPCC website; WWFb website; National Snow and Ice Data Centre). In the past decade, the Arctic has experienced a large reduction of snow and ice caps, marking 2018 with all-time low records for Arctic Ocean ice cap, reaching 1.35 million square kilometres below monthly averages (National Snow and Ice Data Centre website). The significant reduction of ice caps has moved the region into the centre of debate among countries within the Arctic, as the region ‘opens up’ to new activities and opportunities. The international focus on the High North’s melting ice drove institutions and countries to produce scientific research on new sources of hydrocarbons, transport routes, and overall economic opportunities in the early 2000s. For example, the United States Geological Survey published a report stating that the

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Arctic holds one of the largest undiscovered sources of conventional oil and gas (USGS, 2008). They estimated the occurrence of hydrocarbons in thirty-three provinces, amassing an estimated total of 90 billion barrels of oil and 44 billion barrels of natural gas (USGS, 2008). This revelation that the region would experience new economic and human activity, by the USGS and others (UNEP/GRID, 2006), created speculations that the area would undergo a period of antagonistic relationships and disputes of overlapping territorial claims, and economic interests in the region (Tan & Tsai, 2011).

Thus, the environment-conflict thesis within literature pertaining to the Arctic has been solely focused on issues such as sovereignty, territoriality and rights to the Ocean (Borgerson, 2008; Dodds, 2008, Powell, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2010). This large upsurge of Arctic interest within the academic world was most notably exasperated by two controversial acts carried out by the Russian Federation. The first event took place in august of 2007 when Russian scientists, conducting research on the underwater Lomonosov ridge, planted a rust-proof titanium flag near the North Pole (Gorst, 2007; Borgerson, 2008; Dittmer et al, 2011; Dodds, 2008; Powell, 2008). This caused tensions within the Arctic region, as Russia’s ‘subtle’ attempt to lay claim to the area was not supported by international law or other Arctic coastal countries. Canadian Foreign Minister at the time, Peter MacKay, reportedly stated “This isn’t the 15th century […] you can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say ‘we’re claiming this territory’” (BBC, 2007; CNN, 2007). These notions of ‘land grab’ and ‘territorial claims’ invoke a return to colonialist actions. This quote by the Foreign Minister clearly depicted the situation at the time, whereby the Arctic was painted as a lawless region, where such actions of defiance escalate tensions among coastal countries and are not met with repercussions.

This event created an avalanche of academic experts maintaining that the Arctic would soon experience a rise in tensions and conflict due to the Arctic Ocean melting and thus new access to sources of hydrocarbons, and transport routes (Borgerson, 2008; Dodds, 2008; Powell, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2010). For example, Charles Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis (2009) believe that the combination of the lack of legal institutions coupled with new access to resources would be the main point of contention, stating: “what is clear is that the genie of increased Arctic access cannot be put back into the proverbial bottle” (Ebinger et al. 2009:1218). Scott Borgerson

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equally contributed to this frenzy, claiming, “[the] Arctic region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources.” (Borgerson, 2008:65). By using urgent language in his paper such as “mad dash” (idem:65), “carve up the region” (idem:64), “scramble for resources” (idem:63) he constructs the issue as critical and imminent. The event had such an impact that Klaus Dodds similarly stated, “it appears that some of the intrigue and tension that characterised the Cold War has returned” (Dodds, 2008:1). These authors focus their research and predictions on the perceived violent competition over economic benefits.

The second event that increased international tensions, took place in September of 2013, when the Russian Federal Security Service seized a Greenpeace International ship (Myers, 2013; BBC, 2013; Watkins, 2013). The ship was towed to Murmansk, along with its crew due to a series of protests at an offshore Gazprom oilrig in the Arctic Ocean (idem). The seizure of the ship was carried out by Russian armed border guards, which lead to a ripple of regional strain, threatening to escalate into diplomatic confrontation (idem). The Russian Federal Security Service claimed that the ship had been seized under international laws, which govern Russia’s water and exclusive economic zone (this will be further discussed below) (idem). This event, not only rekindled protests from environmental activists, claiming that drilling will inevitably lead to an oil-spill catastrophe; but also renewed international tensions as questions of sovereignty, territoriality and access to natural resources, as mandated by the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea, once more became relevant, after the 2007 event.

The United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded in 1982 and came into force in 1994 (UNCLOS website). UNCLOS holds a large presence in the environment-conflict discourse as it sets out various legal guidelines such as navigational rights, protection of the environment and the establishment of sovereign rights over parts of the ocean (UNCLOS website; UNGA, 1982; Tan & Tsai, 2010). The Convention was designed to “regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean” (UNCLOS website3). More importantly in this case, it established regulations on country’s claims to territory through continental shelf declarations. A continental shelf is a shallow extension of the

3 Quote retrieved from UNCLOS official website: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea, a historical perspective. Last accessed April 25, 2018 from

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continent’s landmass under the ocean, restricted outwardly by the ocean floor bend (Groenning, 2017). Following UNCLOS Article 76, the default area of continental shelf all coastal states posses, is a minimum of 200 nautical miles (nm) from shore (UNGA, 1982:49; Groenning, 2017; Tan & Tsai, 2010). However, coastal states may claim an extension of this shelf beyond the allocated 200nm, if they can prove that their shelf is a prolongation of land territory (idem). Thus, if the country can prove that the submerged continental shelf naturally extends beyond the 200nm limit, an added 350nm may be awarded (UNGA, 1982:49). This delimitation of the Ocean encompasses the exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, which allows for a country’s exclusive rights within the area for purposes of “surveying, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources” (Tan & Tsai, 2010:91).

The preoccupation with economic opportunities within the High North, in the early 2000s, exacerbated by these events created a pressing problematic: neighbouring countries attempting to lay claims to the region in order to reap the benefits will most definitely cause tensions due to overlapping claims of territoriality (Borgerson, 2008; Dodds, 2008; Powell, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2010). Authors Wei-En Tan and Yu-tai Tsai stated “[by] virtue of their sovereign rights and jurisdiction, the five countries with claims to the Arctic region are presently at a critical juncture for addressing their current and future conflicts and interests.” (Tan & Tsai, 2010:92). Due to the increased coverage of scientific discoveries of natural resources within the Arctic Ocean (USGS, 2008; UNEP/GRID, 2006), each state’s maritime zones and EEZs became a pressing point of trepidation. Thus, a discussion on UNCLOS ensued with vigour after both provocative events by the Russian Federation.

It is evident that global warming has shone a spotlight on a number of pressing issues regarding Arctic sea routes and natural resource exploitation within the environment-conflict discourse. Authors highlight that not only would the increased access to oil and gas translate to economic development in the region, but also allow a prolonged navigation season, due to reduced ocean ice, decreasing shipping costs, travel time and allowing countries to tax the route (Borgerson, 2008; Powell, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2010). This discourse centres on the new opportunities that would increase state’s accumulation of wealth (Tan & Tsai, 2010). However, any state seeking to lay claim to an area and mine resources in the Arctic Ocean, would be required to follow the procedures established by UNCLOS, through the Commission

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on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) (Tan & Tsai, 2010; Groenning, 2017). The CLCS was established in order to solve the EEZ claims of extension across the world, not only in connection to the Arctic. Currently, four of the five coastal states have submitted claims to the CLCS, in order to extend their area of influence (Groenning, 2017). This excludes USA from this process, as it is the only country that has not ratified UNCLOS (idem). Canada, Denmark and Russia have submitted reports to the CLCS with overlapping claims to the ocean (idem).

Numerous academic authors claimed that the vagaries of UNCLOS terms, such as the definition of a continental shelf, create a potential for conflict (Borgerson, 2008; Powell, 2008; Dodds, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2010). Please refer to Figure 2 for a map of the overlapping continental shelf claims and EEZs; pending CLCS approval. For example, the Lomonosov Ridge, previously discussed, is under claim by the Russian Federation and Denmark (via connection to Greenland). This ridge spans an area from Russia, Greenland and Canada; many scholars believed it would become a contentious area for the Arctic, as countries would grow increasingly interested in polar resources (Holmes, 2008; Borgerson, 2008; Dodds, 2008; Gorst, 2007). The absence of an effective legal regime to achieve compulsory resolutions or a forum for resolving overlapping continental shelf disputes, was subsequently for-fronted in the discussion (idem). The lack of overarching political or legal structure, coupled with UNCLOS’s vagary on the settlement of delimitations; which stated that countries should reach an “equitable solution” amongst themselves (UNGA, 1982: 52, 56), lead some experts to claim an inevitable “coming anarchy” (Borgerson, 2008: 71). Thus, experts began to question: “who owns the Arctic?” (Millstein, 2016; McCown, 2014; Byers, 2010). All of these events and ideas combined, created a narrative that the Arctic was a “legal no-man’s land” (Borgerson, 2008: 74) at the brink of conflict at any given time.

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Figure 2: Map depicting the overlapping claims to the Arctic Ocean

Source: IBRU Centre for Borders Research website. Arctic Maps. Durham University. Last accessed June 15th 2018, from

https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/

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2.2.1 Environment-conflict discourse: Securitizing rhetoric?

Thus, the environment-conflict discourse centres its discussion on disputes over territorial claims and the management of resources. This narrative constructing the Arctic as conflict-prone is mobilised through neo-realist understandings of security (Sterling-Folker, 2013a). Authors promoting the environment-conflict discourse view the Arctic countries as competitors whose goal is to assert their sovereignty and jurisdiction over their territory and ocean. Moreover, these claims create an understanding of the Arctic as an anarchic system, which may burst into conflict at any given time due to interstate hostility. The Arctic geopolitics is thus bound to neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendency of states to gravitate towards conflict to secure resources and sovereignty (Sterling-Folker, 2013a).

This understanding of security is embodied in the securitization theory. Securitization theory, primarily associated with the so-called “Copenhagen School”, makes two important assumptions. First, it departs from a constructivist and post-structuralist approach, suggesting that threats are socially created (Trombetta, 2008). The “Copenhagen School”, established the most innovative conceptualization of the social construction of security. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998), two influential authors of this school of thought, claim there are no objective threats, instead any matter may be constructed into a security issue by following a specific reasoning (Buzan et al., 1998). According to securitization theory, the process begins with the political elite; they securitize the matter at hand by formulatting it as an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998; Peoples & Vaughan, 2010; Trombetta, 2008). A referent object, in this case, is an ideal or physical object that needs protection from a threat (idem). The labelling of a referent object as a threat is achieved through speech acts that transform the way a population perceives the problem (idem).

Once an issue is successfully defined as an existential threat, the audience, or population in this case, accepts the urgency of the threat and legitimizes the use of exceptional measures (Buzan et al., 1998; Peoples & Vaughan, 2010). These exceptional measures taken by the state allow issues to be moved out of ‘everyday’ politics and placed within elites’ decisions (idem). This leads to the second assumption of securitization theory. The theory posits that security is not considered a

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condition but a form of social practice; meaning that if an issue is successfully labelled as a security concern, it will be handled as such (Trombetta, 2008). This logic of securitization theory is rooted in an understanding of friend-enemy dichotomies, which mirrors antagonistic zero-sum rationalities of war (Trombetta, 2008; Peoples & Vaughan, 2010).

In conclusion, securitization is the reduction of politics to emergency actions in the form of extraordinary measures built upon a classical military idea of war. Authors of this school of thought focused on the construction of threat, which is legitimized through speech acts. Thus, the discourse surrounding the Arctic constructed by this literature closely falls within the bounds of securitization theory. Authors classified state territoriality and economic resources as the referent object threatened by other countries, as each government tried to extend their area of influence in order to “scramble for resources” (Borgerson, 2008:63). Through the invocation of urgent language and the importance of state sovereignty, economy and security, authors claimed emergency politics would be legitimized. Thus, instigators of this discourse promulgated that violent conflict over sovereignty was more than probable – almost eminent.

However, as the years passed and the expected securitization and inter-state conflict did not occur, many academics began to question this conceptualisation of the Arctic region. Thus, as a reaction to this securitization rhetoric of the Arctic, an opposing discourse emerged – here labelled the environment-peace discourse – which will be discussed below.

2.3 The Environment-Peace Discourse

Many scholars disagreed with the proposition that the Arctic region is conflict-prone (Brosnan et al., 2011; Young, 2011; Wilson, 2015). A second strand of research foregrounds an understanding of Artic security politics where notions of peace and stability prevail (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009; Byers, 2010; Brosnan et al, 2011, Bailes & Heininen, 2016). For example, Ian Brosnan, Thomas Leschine and Edward Miles (2011) claim that statements depicting the Arctic as a region of conflict derives from an oversimplification of complex multidimensional issues. These scholars note “where there is a possibility for conflict, there is also a possibility of cooperation”

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(Brosnan et al, 2011:173). Similarly, Oran Young (2011) states that the conflict discourse is purely misleading and claims that there are virtually no disputes regarding sovereignty over northern lands; “no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic.” (Young, 2011:189). Thus, there is no prospect of the anticipated “brutal, bitter, bloody confrontation” (Howard, 2009 as quoted in Young, 2011:193) over the increasingly scarce hydrocarbon resources.

Promulgators of this peace vision claim that military competition is side-lined by regional and intergovernmental cooperation, through the pursuit of sustainable development facilitated by circumpolar institutions (Dittmer et al, 2011). As Byers highlights “thanks to international law, there is no race for Arctic resources. Nor is there any appetite for military confrontation” (Byers, 2010: 911). Multiple voices of the environment-peace discourse base their claims on the rising importance of the Arctic Council (Wilson, 2015; Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009; Byers, 2010). The Arctic Council was established in 1996 and is an intergovernmental forum that promotes “cooperation, coordination and interaction” (Arctic Council webpage) among its members. Since its establishment, the Arctic Council’s list of participants and observers has gradually increased. Aside from its permanent member states comprising the eight countries with territories within the Arctic Circle, and six organizations representing indigenous communities, the forum allows observer status to third-party governments, including France, Italy, Japan, India or China among others (Arctic Council webpage4).

Page Wilson (2015) further maintains that the Arctic Council has multiple crucial roles as a stabilizer in the region. Not only is it seen as a security and dispute settlement mechanism, but also as a ‘society of sovereign states’ and a ‘steward’ for the region (Wilson, 2015). She claims the Council’s founding document reveals proof to consider the organization as a society of states. The Council’s common rules include the respect of each others’ sovereignty, honouring of agreements into which they enter, providing a means for promoting values of cooperation, coordination and interaction among governments and indigenous communities (Wilson, 2015; Arctic Council website). Due to the Council’s establishment through a declaration, meant it laid its foundations upon an expression of collective political will among governments

4 For further information on observer countries to the Arctic Council and their date of accession please refer to Arctic Council webpage:

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(idem). The Council’s lack of international legal standing and limited mandate therefore follows an ethical, rather than legal framework (idem). The organization’s functions are limited to adopting reports, making recommendations, setting an agenda and creating its own rules of procedure (idem). Therefore, authors such as Wilson (Wilson, 2015; Stokke, 2011; Haftendorn, 2010) see the Council as a society founded on Arctic state sovereignty and preservation of legal status quo.

Aside from the Arctic Council’s origins as a legally non-binding society where countries may pursue their common interests, Wilson additionally claims the organization is a “steward for the region” (Wilson, 2015). The Council is viewed as an essential platform for the promotion of shared knowledge, production of normative guidelines and governance based on respect. The institution’s sense of policing, respecting and caring for the natural environment and its population has warranted its label as a steward within the Arctic region (idem). A prime example of the Council’s extensive reach is its creation and management of expert working groups from which international standards, coordination and binding treaties are negotiated (Wilson, 2015; Arctic Council website). The working groups cover a wide array of topics such as contaminants, regional monitoring and assessment, conservation of flora and fauna, emergency prevention, preparedness and response, among others (Arctic Council website5). The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group will be further analysed in this thesis as an example of how the region has mobilised the impact of climate change in order to manage the High North. Bi-yearly meetings coordinate the different organs of the Arctic Council. These assemblies are called ‘Senior Arctic Officials meetings’ (SAO) and they take place within a host countries’ nation. Aside from these SAOs, or high-level representatives of each member state, indigenous groups, official observers and the six working groups discuss priorities and areas of action (Arctic Council website6). In sum, the Arctic Council is perceived by these authors as enacting peace and stability in the region through the promulgation of norms, standards and collaboration among all interested parties.

5 For further information on Arctic Council working groups, please refer to Arctic Council webpage http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-group Last retrieved June 10th 2018

6 For further information on the most recent second meeting of SAO during the Finish chairmanship,

please refer to Arctic Council webpage https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/485-sao-levi-2018-01 last retrieved June 10th 2018

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On a similar note, the adoption of Ilulissat Declaration on May 28th 2008 is widely hailed by authors as another clear example of overcoming tensions through cooperation (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009; Byers, 2010; Brosnan et al, 2011; Bailes & Heininen, 2016). The previously discussed, heated discussion about Russian scientists planting a flag on the Arctic seabed in august of 2007; and an upsurge of authors claiming that the extension of EEZs would yield strategic economic finds, fuelled the use of hyperbole like “scramble for the Arctic” (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009). As a result, the five coastal countries congregated to discuss the protection of marine environment, maritime safety and shipping routes, which culminated in the adoption of the Declaration. However, more importantly the declaration cemented two characteristics: first it reaffirmed each country’s commitment to working within an existing framework of international law to delimit their respective areas of jurisdictions, and as a result, it secondly stated that there is no need for new international legal regimes (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008; Byers, 2010; Ebinger et al., 2009). This led authors to maintain that in reality, countries were content with following an orderly existent process along international laws and norms (Ebinger et al., 2009; Byers, 2010; Young, 2011). This claim was supported by Arctic countries’ conformity to Article 76 of UNCLOS, which defines each country’s continental shelf (idem). Even Russia expressed their willingness to move forward in cooperation after the flag-planting event of 2007 (Young, 2011). Thus, new scholarship on the Arctic as marked by “a spirit of rule-based problem-solving” (Young, 2011: 190) ensued (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009; Byers, 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011).

However, authors Alyson Bailes and Lassi Heininen (2016) as well as Ian Brosnan, Thomas Leschine and Edward Miles (2011), claim the region’s stability spurs from the curious and awkward circumstance states find themselves in. They believe countries acting on their own accord, cooperate in order to attain their strategies: protecting and advancing their interests within their borders (Brosnan et al, 2011; Bailes & Hieninen, 2016). Brosnan et al., attribute this willingness to collaborate under “the dilemmas of common interest” (Brosnan et al. 2011:174). The authors claim that the dilemmas arise when actors have a common interest in securing an outcome, rather than the suboptimal alternative of unilateral action (Brosnan et al., 2011). More precisely, they state that this occurs when governments either do not

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share a preferred result or face several equally acceptable outcomes, but are unified in seeking to avoid a particular outcome (Brosnan et al, 2011: 174).

Brosnan et al. (2011) claim that the dilemma of common interest in the Arctic context gave rise to a regime of collaboration in order to ensure an optimal outcome for all actors, through coordination within international organizations. Such areas as sovereignty, scientific research, resource development, shipping and biodiversity are topics states have an incentive to collaborate on (Brosnan et al, 2011; Bailes & Heininen, 2016). Thus, they claim that due to the nature of a collaborative regime hinged on constraining the behaviour of actors and ensuring the prevention of defections, regimes must be formalized through international organizations that service the communal needs (Brosnan et al., 2011). This notion will be important and reflected upon within the paper’s discussion, as we demonstrate how the Arctic has moved into a regime of risk prevention through: unilateral actions, such as country’s strategies; or multilateral agreements, as are the three cooperation Agreements among the eight Arctic countries; and the establishment of a working group within the Arctic Council dedicated to the harmonisation of efforts of response capabilities within the Arctic Ocean.

2.3.1 Environment-peace discourse: Liberalism rhetoric?

Thus, the environment-peace discourse centres its discussion on cooperation and collaboration through organizations in order to further a country’s interests. This narrative constructing the region as overly stable, is mobilised through liberal understandings of security (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). Just as other theories, liberalism provides a coherent set of principles and propositions that explain inter-state relations (Walker & Rousseau, 2017). This liberal school of thought posits that states do have the capacity to cooperate with each other in anarchic conditions through regimes (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b), such as the Arctic Council, or the International Maritime Organization, etc. (Brosnan et al., 2011; Byers, 2010; Wilson, 2015). Moreover, the notion that the region has not fallen into conflict due to state’s strategic decision to collaborate in order to extract benefits, further falls into neo-liberal reasoning. Following this idea, states see an opening for

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the extension of democracy, markets, freedom and membership to international organizations (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). This understanding of security is rooted in three assumptions.

The first assumption claims that democratic states are less likely to initiate and escalate conflicts with other democratic countries (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). Liberal thinkers Paine and Kant were the first to argue why democratic states may behave more peacefully towards each other (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b; Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 1969). They believed that democratic states are inherently more peaceful as they have a tendency of “negotiating their mistake” (Walker & Rousseau:22; Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 1969) rather than let their pride rupture relations with other powers. Moreover, by allowing the population to decide whether a country goes to war, Paine and Kant were confident that people would avoid the costs of war (idem). In comparison, realist securitization theorist would note that states balance their spending, defence and overall capabilities against stronger states, as any powerful agent represents a threat within the international anarchy (Wohlforth, 2017; Walker & Rousseau, 2017).

The second assumption implies that international conflict will be reduced among countries that engage in international trade (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). Paine and Kant believed that trade creates a system by which countries and individuals become useful to one another (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 1969). In essence, trade leads to peace due to shared interests of international governments, businessesmen and communities (idem). On the other hand, ‘realists’ would claim that economic interdependence increases the probability of conflict by expanding the number of issue areas under competition (Wohlforth, 2017; Walker & Rousseau, 2017). Thus, the degree of dependence is telling of tensions among countries; as for example asymmetrical relations of interdependence allows for the violent exploitation of another country (idem).

Lastly, the reduction of military conflict through the use of international institutions is the third pillar of liberal thought (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). The assumption derives from the notion that democracies are more likely to seek cooperative solutions engaging in international institutions (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). Through alliances and cooperation, international organizations are seen as promoting peace by deterring aggression

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(idem). International and regional institutions centre on mediating disputes, thus, providing arbitration within anarchy. Meanwhile, realists insist that international organizations are either generally inefficient or manipulative instruments of powerful states (Walker & Rousseau, 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013b). This explains the lack of positive mentions about the Arctic Council or other legal and political structures within the environment-conflict discourse.

Thus, the environment-peace discourse surrounding the Arctic falls within the boundaries of liberal school of thought. The authors’ rhetoric focuses on inter-state relations, constructing an understanding that each country is equal within regional organizations, this rational fits nicely within liberalism’s first assumption. Wilson’s 2015 article closely follows this reasoning, seeing the Arctic Council as a space of cooperation among sovereign states. Brosnan et al. (2011) and Bailes et al. (2016) articles support liberal theory’s second assumption. The “dilemmas of common interest” demonstrate how governments, have an incentive to cooperate in order to pursue their objectives and reap benefits. Lastly, the signature of the Ilulissat Declaration, the adherence to UNCLOS and abidance by standards created at the Arctic Council, supports the final assumption of liberal theory. Authors Byers (2010), and Wilson (2015) demonstrate how countries seek collaborative solutions through international norms. Thus, promulgators of the environment-peace discourse assert the region will only experience stability and peace as a result of overlapping beneficial outcomes.

2.4 Conclusions: Filling a Gap in the Literature

In conclusion, the environment-conflict discourse centres its discussion around disputes over territorial claims and thus the management of resources (Borgerson, 2008; Tan & Tsai, 2010; Dodds, 2008). The narrative of the Arctic as a conflict-prone region is viewed through a neo-realist lens, leading to the perceived securitization of the region. The view that scarce renewable resources are a motive for dispute, is a central theme of the eco-violence school of thought, promulgated by Malthus (1993) (Theisen & Gleditsch, 2017). Climate change, or a ‘changing’ environment, is perceived as the starting point of ‘changing’ international and state policies. Authors within this environment-conflict discourse, follow this reasoning, and see states as

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competitors whose goal is to assert and exercise their sovereignty over a space. They refer to the lack of binding institutions in order to create a view that the Arctic is an anarchic system, which will burst into conflict at the slightest interstate strain. Arctic politics and security is thus bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendency of states towards conflict over resources or sovereignty. Moreover, the Arctic is thus a space in which the foundational ‘myths’ of classical international relations are being played out. One could say, Arctic territory, resources and transport routes are identified and securitized within this narrative. The respective authors identify these three topics as referent objects that need state protection, and thus should require the mobilization of extraordinary measures.

The environment-peace rhetoric centres its discussion on how the Arctic countries, although faced with uncertainty of delimiting territorial boundaries, opted for stability through international mechanisms of coordination. This narrative follows a liberal school of thought, which postulates that states do have the capacity to cooperate with each other in anarchic conditions through regimes, such as the Arctic Council (Brosnan et al., 2011; Byers, 2010; Wilson, 2015). Moreover, the notion that the region has not fallen into conflict due to state’s strategic decision to collaborate in order to extract benefits, further falls into neo-liberal reasoning. Following this idea, states see an opening for the extension of democracy, markets and freedom. One could say, Arctic territory, resources and transport routes are identified as pivotal for capitalist development and thus are not securitized, in order to continue reaping benefits.

Visions of escalating territorial disputes, a ‘New Cold War’, conflict over resources, armed clashes; or a rose-lensed view of a peaceful and unified Arctic, may catapult pressing issues into the media spotlight, yet they do not paint a comprehensive picture. The equation of resource scarcity and territorial disputes conflates struggles of different natures, involving divergent motivations. This assumption coupled with the lack of differentiation between conflict and insecurity allowed for the framing of environmental degradation within a narrative of security. This thesis claims that the unresolved territorial disputes, new findings of hydrocarbon resources and increased assertive actions by Russia in the region (as identified by conflict discourse proponents) proliferated simply due to the uncertainty and insecurity. Thus, early discussions on the future of the Arctic region was driven

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and blinded by a lack of understanding, over-dramatising research conducted in the early ‘spotlight’ that the High North experienced during 2000s.

As these violent assumptions soon proved to hold no ground, evidenced in the lack of military or political conflict in the early 2000s, an opposing narrative emerged in the early 2010s. This reactionary vision rooted in conceptualizations of cooperation and peace came as a response to previous rhetoric that has been here grouped under the environment-conflict discourse. However, it is important to note that external international events were not considered within the environment-peace narrative. For example, although not referenced in the literature, this thesis believes a large factor influencing the lack of tension over Arctic resources is due to the dramatic drop in hydrocarbon world prices as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The dip in monetary incentive to develop Arctic resources was due to the increased relative costs of researching and exploiting these resources compared to supplies from the Gulf. Energy Business specialists have predicted that Arctic resources will not be a priority until oil prices climb back to above US$80 (Nakhle, 2015). The current price of oil is US$65 (Markets Insider website), as a result these trepidations over hydrocarbon extraction were tabled in the late 2000s. Furthermore, the increase in energy efficient and renewable energy trends are discouraging large investments in development of fossil fuels. Although this environment-peace discourse aimed to demonstrate the stability of the region through exhaustive analysis of international organizations, law or even countries’ incentives, it failed to create a comprehensive understanding as it merely focused on disproving past claims; instead of objectively analysing Arctic governance, geopolitics and security. Therefore, this thesis claims that both visions orchestrated their initial narratives from flawed original assumptions, which have carried on into present-day understandings of the Arctic.

This dichotomous narrative of Arctic population, security politics, environment and resource management should not be taken lightly, as it creates a skewed understanding of the Arctic’s inherent complexity. The relationship between the recent interest in the region, increased geopolitical tensions, and governance of the Arctic has not yet been clarified, so it is not obvious how these questions overlap or which one is the driving factor. This thesis seeks to address this gap in the literature and proposes that the Arctic be considered an area governed by international norms and laws but also where governments uphold their national interests and objectives.

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Thus, scholars should see Arctic countries’ policies as risk mitigation actions, spurred by the impact of climate change; which is in turn being used as a tool of governance in order to enforce state control in areas such as: economic, social and political development. This will be further discussed in the coming chapter.

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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

Dichotomous predictions of an eminent conflict in the Arctic region in order to demarcate territory and extract resources; or visions of a peaceful and unified region are here perceived as largely skewed. Through an initial examination of classical security governance documents, this polarization of the discussion surrounding the Arctic is hereby dismissed. Thus, instead of evaluating the organization of Arctic security and governance within the mutually exclusive ‘either-or’ discourse, this paper suggests studying these topics through risk theory. More precisely, risk theory as conceptualised by Critical Security Studies (CSS). This framework will allow to better grasp how countries have “made up” (Wendt, 1992) security governance in the Arctic as a response to increasing climate change pressures. Risk theory will aid in the analysis of primary sources to demonstrate how conflict-discourses are not the everyday national or international reality of the Arctic. It will equally demonstrate how liberal theory does not permit to grasp the extent of governance dynamics at play, as it solely focuses on economics or political alignment; instead of opening the discussion to more themes (these themes will be discussed in Chapter 4). This chapter will provide guiding risk theory principles, which will be employed for the analysis of primary data.

In order to demonstrate that the Arctic countries have constructed, the region through a focus on risks, as opposed to the anticipated military ‘securitization’ or peaceful construction of ‘community of states’, this chapter will proceed in three steps. The succeeding section will first delve into a brief discussion of CSS in order to differentiate between securitization and risk theory (Peoples & Vaughan, 2010); arguing for the relevance of risk’s conceptual framework. In the second step, Critical Risk theory’s key concepts will be defined within the boundaries of this research; clarifying this thesis’s interpretation of risk. Finally, in the third section risk theory will be placed within the wider theoretical debate. In particular, the section will retrace CSS’s account of Ulrich Beck’s notion of ‘risk society’ (1996, 2006), and the key-role played by Michael Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ (2001) in Claudia

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Aradau and Rens van Munster’s proposal to think of security in terms of a ‘risk dispositif’ (2007). In doing so, the section analyses as well the work of several CSS scholars that have contributed to the emergence of CSS approach to risk theory; notably: Olaf Corry (2012), Marieke de Goede (2008), as well as Karen Petersen (2011).

3.2 A Critical Security Studies’ Approach: Differentiating securitization and risk

CSS have no singular definition, instead this ‘critical’ tool is used to recognize, understand and interrogate what is considered a ‘security’ issue (Peoples &Vaughan, 2010: 1). As such, they originated as a response to ‘traditional’ security studies. The latter developed as a sub-field of IR, with an explicit mandate of solving the problem of war and instability in world politics (Peoples & Vaughan, 2010:17-32). The object of analysis was clearly defined as the state, and aimed to explain why countries go to war (idem). This view of security studies lays its roots in neo-realist international relations theory (idem). Traditional and critical security studies differ in their way of seeing the world, understanding security practices, and in their core assumptions (Aradau & van Munster, 2007). Instead of seeking to create solutions to security problems, CSS aims to identify how they came to be constituted as a problem in the first place.

This thesis will not make use of the ‘traditional security studies’ due to its narrow problem-solving approach and its core assumptions. Traditional security studies assumes that the state is the only referent object, it accepts the ‘anarchic’ nature of the international system and hence, that wars between states is an inherent feature (Peoples & Vaughan, 2010:20). Critical security studies (CSS), on the other hand, argue that accepting war, as the basis of international relations, is incorrect. Instead of partaking within the problem-solving approach within the status quo, CSS engages with the problem of the status-quo (Peoples &Vaughan, 2010:20) Thus CSS, leaves behind the focus on security as military capacity and instead: broadens, deepens, focuses and extends security studies (idem). Firstly, by broadening security studies, it includes a range of issues beyond military force. Secondly, deepening implies a theoretical approach that connects security with general assumptions of

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political life. Thirdly, CSS focuses on a grounded normative goal, that of human emancipation. Lastly, the ‘extension’ of security allows a multiplicity of issues and actors to be included in security agendas (Peoples &Vaughan, 2010: 20; Buzan et al., 1996; Christou et al., 2010).

Both securitization theory and (critical) risk theory can be subsumed within CSS. Risk theory and securitization theory have long been perceived as two separate academic debates; security studies falling under international relations and risk studies being a matter of sociology or economics (Petersen, 2011). Nevertheless, the proliferation of transnational threats such as terrorism, or climate change has brought the fields closer together (Petersen, 2011; Aradau & van Munster, 2007). Risk theorist Mikkel Rasmussen claims, “the standards by which we measure our security have changed and risk-thinking is shaping the strategies by which Western governments seek to achieve security.” (Rasmussen, 2006: 2-3). Some authors such as Thomas Diez, Franziskus von Lucke and Zehra Wellmann (2016) see risk as a continuation of security theory, while others such as Olaf Corry (2012) state that risk politics is not an instance of securitization but something completely distinctive.

In this study, the distinctions between riskification and securitization are acknowledged, however they are not seen as two completely separate spheres. Instead, risk and securitization are conceptualised as following a similar but distinct ‘logic’ – or set of practices with which to deal with a problem. While securitization is rooted in rationalities of war in order to overcome a threat (Trombetta, 2008; Peoples & Vaughan, 2010); riskification is fixed in prevention in order to overcome a danger (Aradau & van Munster, 2007; Diez et al, 2016). As previously discussed in Chapter two, there is little evidence to demonstrate that securitization of the Arctic actually occurred. Securitization’s focus on political elite, using the audience as the filter determining between a speech act and emergency actions, discards securitization theory as a viable framework for this thesis. This thesis will not focus on how each individual political elite discussed and created a threat; but rather on how national lines of reasoning within security strategies highlighted risks posed by climate change, in turn creating tools of governance in order to minimise these dangers. In sum, securitization’s focus on elites’ speech acts and audience, overlooks certain ways of ‘doing’ security (security practices) that are crucial in risk theory, and in the organization of Arctic security; as will be soon demonstrated.

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3.3 Critical Risk Theory

This thesis will examine the importance of placing risk at the centre of inquiry when examining the construction of Arctic security governance. Petersen (2011) identifies three main schools of thought within risk theory: 1) Financial and economic risk; 2) Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ (1996, 2006); and 3) Michael Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ (2001) coupled with Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster’s risk ‘dispositif’ (2007). This thesis will utilise the last two understandings of risk theory, as the research focuses on security and governance rather than economics.

The notion of ‘risk’ is characterised by connotations of long-term potential dangers, categorised by uncertainty and diffuse sense of unease (Diez et al., 2016; de Goede, 2008; Corry, 2012). Risk as a security practice is understood as being grounded in prevention, probabilities, possible future scenarios and managing diffuse dangers (Corry, 2012; Diez et al., 2016; Petersen, 2017; de Goede, 2008). A main characteristic of risk lies in the lack of immediacy, or diffuse time frame, as “a risk is a scenario located in the future which is connected to a policy offering a way of preventing that risk from materializing” (Corry, 2012:244). Risk posits that the issue at hand is manageable and involves a diffuse referent object (i.e. an object that is being threatened and needs to be protected) that no state military can identify and physically fight (Diez et al., 2016). Therefore, this thesis will interpret the management of security risk, through specialised tools, as trying to identify and prevent the ‘unknowns’ (Petersen, 2011; Corry 2012; Kassler & Daase, 2008). Moreover, following this notion of risk, ‘riskification’ is here understood as the social process of constructing something “politically in terms of potential danger” (Corry, 2012:238). This understanding of ‘riskification’ therefore may be understood as a tool of governing society via dispositifs within ‘global risk management’.

3.4 Theoretical Origins of Risk Theory: a Literature Review 3.4.1

Risk society

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Ulrich Beck is widely hailed as the most influential promulgator of risk theory, identifying risk as a modus for governance. Beck claims that risk is a modern concept, which requires decisions and “attempts to render the unpredictable consequences of civil decisions predictable and controllable,” (Beck, 1996:2). This means, that risks are inherently avoidable and may be predicted through an analysis of the likelihood of an event (idem). As a result, Beck moves on to theorise the coming into being of a ‘world risk society’ (Beck, 1996, 2006). From this perspective, we would be living in an era in which our political, social and economic decisions have global consequences that in turn, trigger catastrophes that contradict the “institutionalised language and promises of the authorities” (Beck, 1996:3). Beck’s main argument of a ‘risk society’ is that modern society constructs its own risks in the world, while being increasingly preoccupied with preventing and managing these risks, and ultimately creating even more risks (Beck, 1996). Consequently, Beck conceptualises this production and mitigation of risks as a vicious cycle creating feedback loops. In Beck’s risk society the “logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by the principle of precaution through prevention” (Beck, 2006:344). This notion of forestalling is a main tenet within risk theory, and will be further developed below. Beck identifies three dangers within risk society: ecological crises, economic crises and terrorism (Beck, 1996). In this thesis, the focus will be on ecological crises, or more precisely on the impact of climate change in the Arctic.

Beck moves away from security understandings such as Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. His contribution rests on two pillars: firstly, he disagrees with antagonistic understandings of security (Beck, 2006; Trombetta, 2008). Secondly, Beck challenges the neoliberal discourse surrounding risk (idem). He advocates that contemporary risks affect everybody and it is impossible to create barriers from them (idem). This global nature of risks, presupposes two characteristics: first, it creates new forms of political risk society and equally creates inconsistencies and inequalities within regions as to who is affected by these dangers (Beck, 1996). These understandings differ widely from securitization, as the Copenhagen School is rooted in ally-enemy distinctions that identify external threats to which a country’s armed forces can defend (Buzan et al., 1996). Instead, Beck suggests that these contemporary threats are uninsurable and instead governments should work towards the prevention of catastrophes and not only their control (idem). Thus, risk society

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