The role of prudence in IR theory

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The Role of Prudence in IR Theory

Developing a comprehensive approach towards explaining extreme

policy outcomes by analysing the Iraq war of 2003

Dorien Venema

Dorien Venema (S4069846)

Master Thesis Political Science (International Relations) Supervisor: Prof. Dr. J.A. Verbeek

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Abstract

As classical realism was challenged by structural or neorealism, some of Hans J. Morgenthau’s key concepts have undergone some significant changes. In his fourth principal of political realism, Morgenthau describes that prudence, the weighing of the consequences of alternative political action, is the most important virtue of a statesman. Prudence functions as a mechanism to develop cautious policy. The mechanism of prudence applies moral action by filtering morality through time and place, and by weighing consequences of alternative political action. Morgenthau states that moral action should be focused on securing the safety of a statesman’s community. He thereby does not neglect the tension between rationality and idealism, or interests and morality. However, structural realism largely avoids this tension, by merely focussing on a cost-benefit approach. The concept of prudence thereby changed from a harm-good relationship towards a cost-benefit approach. These changes call for clarity around the concept of prudence. Therefore, we need to focus on aspects that possibly affect a statesman’s ability to apply prudence. There is a need to further analyse decision making processes in order to clarify these factors. A closer look at the players that take part during decision making will therefore clarify the pathway towards cautious, or risky policy outcomes. The Iraq war of 2003 represents imprudent policy outcome. By analysing the case of the Iraq war of 2003, the pathway towards extreme policy can be revealed.

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Tables and figures

Figure 1: The role of prudence as discussed by Morgenthau...15

Figure 2: Groupthink model...26

Figure 3: Two-stage dynamic of extreme policy outcome...39

Table 1: Involvement in decision making for each group member...49

Table 2: Risk-proneness for each group member...54

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“A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be

completely lacking in prudence” Morgenthau, 1967 p.13

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1. Introduction

Through the years, certain changes have taken place within the doctrine of realism. Due to these changes, scholars are confronted with changing concepts, once embedded in classical realism. Classical realists as Hans J. Morgenthau strongly focused on the moral side of foreign policy. He for example points out that morality plays a prudent role in state logic. Individuals do not only think in terms of interests and power determined by circumstances, but also in terms of moral values determined by abstract principles (Morgenthau, 1971 p. 23). In the international arena of power politics, acting on behalf of moral values is sometimes more important than gaining power. However, statesmen should always choose the lesser evil based on the ethic of consequences, instead of the ethic of intentions (Kaufman, 2005). Morgenthau stated that human nature is responsible for the misuse and the temptations of power (Ibid.). Therefore, Morgenthau’s realism is less suited for explaining policy choice. However, today’s scholars on (structural) realism emphasize that states overall make cost-benefit calculations. The strong emphasis on the balance of power and risk-avoidance have dominated today’s realism. The focus has shifted from the roots of human nature towards the structure of the international system. The anarchic system of international politics encourages states to look for opportunities for gaining power. However, there is still some element of restraint entailed since statesmen try to avoid risks, as they can also lose power (Mearsheimer, 2004). Due to these developments, the essence of cautious policy, as described by prudence, has undergone some changes in realist literature. As the focus shifted away from the roots of human nature, the balance of morality and rationality changed into a balance of costs and benefits within the doctrine of realism. Where morality, determined by abstract principles, once was a guideline for statesmen, gaining power is now only inhibited by rational costs of decision making and possible risks of political action.

1.1 Problem definition

As a consequence of the above explained shift from classical realism to structural realism, the essence of prudence changed significantly. Through the years, this has led to a change with regard to the definition of prudence. Whereas Morgenthau stated that there can be no political morality without prudence, structural realists merely focus on balancing costs and benefits. The concept of morality became less dominant. Prudence describes a careful calculation of costs and risks based on political stakes, and relative power (Morgenthau, 1978 p. 11-12, 519-521). Morality should not dominate decision making. Structural realism is mainly focused on a balance of power in international politics, and prudence should therefore function as a restraint to maintain the balance of power. Waltz (2000) emphasizes that states’ first concern is to maintain their position, not to maximize power. Therefore the prudent state logic is especially applicable to great powers in a balance of power system. For many realist scholars, realism is about the value-maximizing mechanism of gaining power. Therefore, the moral concept of Morgenthau’s realism is less explicit within today’s realist literature. One could argue that there has been a shift from a moral realism towards a more rational realism. Since actions of

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powerful states can have great consequences, power brings certain duties as well as certain restraints and the mechanism of prudence should balance this relationship (Mearsheimer, 2005). We therefore cannot consider great powers as mindless aggressors. Following Morgenthau, the supreme virtue in international politics should be prudence. However, prudence does not merely entail political ethics or morality, these should be judged by political consequences. The essence of prudence has evolved over years, still, it remains unclear when states act prudent and through what pathway. Prudence only highlights, as far as conceptualized by Morgenthau and structural realists, cautious policy guidelines. Furthermore, there is a lack of clarity on how states develop cautious policy. As prudence is focused on cautious policy, it thereby puts less emphasis on possible risky outcomes of decision making. Especially since the meaning of prudence has made a shift through the years, the concept should be re-evaluated. The problem definition should therefore be:

Prudence, as embedded within realism, can no longer be considered straightforward since there is a lack of clarity regarding the conditions that make a state act prudently.

If national interests are threatened and need to be protected, war is sometimes seen as a feasible option. However, military forces should only be used if national interests are being threatened, or when war advances these interests. International politics remain a self-help arena, even nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of international politics (Waltz, 2000). Morgenthau argued that "the democratic selection and responsibility of government officials destroyed international morality as an effective system of restraint”(Ibid., p. 12). Moreover, Waltz points out that intervention sometimes causes more harm than good, thereby emphasizing the moral consequences of intervention. An example of such an intervention is the case of the Iraq war of 2003. As the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq is rather hard to explain from a perspective of prudent state logic, the case of Iraq can be considered risky instead of cautious. The U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003 has raised several questions and challenges for prudence, as it can be considered a risky choice. With regard to this particular case, one might argue that the intervention did cause more harm than good. It is therefore important to research under which circumstances and conditions states act prudently or imprudently. There is a need to define the concept of prudence in order to explain the behaviour of statesmen in a more clarified and explanatory manner. Therefore actors and dynamics that possibly affect a statesman’s ability to apply prudence should be analysed.

1.2 Research question

If individuals did not weigh the consequences of political action in a rational, calculated matter, there are possibly other elements that affected President Bush’s ability to apply prudence with regard to the Iraq war. Since prudence can only operate effectively if individuals act in a rational matter, we need to define which aspects affect the pathway of policy making. By speaking of “conventional rules and conventional policies such as deterrence are ineffective against ‘shadowy terrorist networks’” and

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“unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction”, the U.S. made it clear that the Iraq war was necessary, not only permissible (Shannon & Keller, 2007 p. 88). By reviewing the debate and decision making process, a clear image of the pathway of decision making can be sketched.

Thereby, we can answer the research question:

Under which conditions are states more or less prudent in playing the balance of power game? Before we can answer this question, there is a need to explain (1) what prudence is, (2) where prudence is positioned within realism and (3) how prudence is theorized nowadays.

1.3 The Iraq war and the issues that arise

The U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003 has raised a lot of unanswered questions for scholars belonging to the realist theory in International Relations. As structural realist scholars mainly focus on the cost-benefit analysis of political action, the military intervention in Iraq is hard to explain in terms of interests. The Bush administration justified the intervention by arguing that the Iraq regime had close ties with Al-Qaeda, and that they were in possession of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein was considered a murderous dictator. However, one cannot confirm his regime’s ties with Al-Qaeda, one can only assume. The CIA never confirmed the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Furthermore, several realist scholars argued that these weapons could not be used without the retaliation of the U.S. or Israel. At the time of the Iraq war, the Middle East suffered from fragile stability. By intervening, the stability of the Middle East was damaged even more. Although one might expect the U.S. to win the war easily, a valid exit strategy was lacking. As a result, the probability of becoming a viable state again was rather low. Because of the U.S. history with regard to the Middle East and interventions, there were already hostile feelings towards the U.S. With the intervention of Iraq, these feelings were again reinforced. The Iraq war has created more hatred and resentment towards the U.S. This certainly did not serve U.S. interests, it has only created more threats so far. Anti-Americanism has only increased which in turn has made Al-Qaeda gain support in the region (Leffler, 2004). Instead of recovering or securing the current balance of power, the Iraq war has unbalanced power in the region. Although all of these concerns were published in an article by realists in the New York Times, the Bush-administration decided differently. Besides the advertisement in the New York Times, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt have published several articles (Foreign policy bulletin, Belfer Center) to discuss the consequences of going to war with Iraq. Despite their public statements against Bush’s policy, it has not changed the outcome of the debate. Colin Powell (former US secretary of state) has stated that “Hans Morgenthau would have felt right at home in this new world of ours because he understood the essential partnership between morality and power, which is at the core of American foreign policy” (Mearsheimer, 2005). However, this is rather contradicting with Morgenthau’s statement of statesmen following the ethic of consequences instead of the ethic of intentions (Kaufman, 2005).

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Bush claimed that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror. The predicted consequences of the Iraq war expressed in an advertisement in the New York Times, as well in other articles by several realist scholars have become reality. We could therefore state that the Iraq war has not particularly served US interests, and that the administration made a risky decision by intervening. As described by structural realists, a prudential logic entails a careful calculation of political consequences. If the Bush administration had calculated the political consequences the same way as the realist scholars did, a war would probably have been avoided. Morgenthau’s fourth principle calls for a prudent state logic. He describes prudence as “the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions” (Morgenthau, 1948 p. 14). The prudent logic is especially important to great powers. Therefore prudence is very applicable to the U.S. foreign policy. The risks of imprudent actions can have greater consequences when great powers are involved. The concerns realists expressed with regard to the Iraq war did not affect the debate sufficiently. A prudent state logic implies both moral and rational considerations. “As the U.S. has not a strong track record successful nation building” (Schmidt & Williams, 2008 p. 204), the realist overseen possible consequences were expectable, but not taken into consideration by the Bush administration. The first Bush administration ended the Gulf War prudently since the U.S. understood the dangerous consequences of continuing the war (Ibid.). However, we cannot say the same about the second Gulf War. The expectation of realists scholars that the instability of the Middle East would increase has become reality. Therefore we might reconsider the prudent logic in international relations.

1.4 The influence of group dynamics on policy making

Realist scholars consider the state as the main actor. If we want to reveal the mechanism of prudence, there is a need to have a closer look on decision making. The consequence of an imprudent state logic is risky behaviour. Scholars like Irving Janis and Paul ‘t Hart offered new explanations for imprudent stage logic or risky behaviour. Especially the concept of groupthink has challenged realism when it comes to risky behaviour. The ability of a statesman to make rational decisions is possibly affected if the statesman operates within a policy group.

A possible alternative explanation therefore should be focused on processes around the initial decision maker (in this case George W. Bush), to find out if political actors might handle prudence differently if they are influenced by other actors who are part of the decision making process as well. Policy makers such as former Vice President Dick Cheney or former secretary of state, Colin Powell were strong influences within this particular case. Linking weapons of mass destruction to Saddam Hussein would have made the war a rational decision from the perspective of the state, but since the CIA could not confirm this, the debate was being hushed up (Badie, 2010). Instead of a prudence decision, the Bush administration made a risky decision. If individuals do not make a decision as prudence would describe, other actors could have influenced statesmen in decision making. Therefore an alternative explanation needs to be developed which takes the most important actors within the decision making

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process into account. Since there was a lot of struggle during the decision making between several political actors, Bush’s ability to apply prudence might have been affected by this conflict. Badie (2010) pointed out that the internal pressure of Cheney strongly affected decision making. Opponents of the Iraq war were put under pressure, when confronted with the Vice President. Cheney did not play the usual role of a Vice President, he considered his relationship with Bush as a partnership (Mitchel & Massoud, 2009). In a conversation with Dan Qualye Cheney said, “I have a different understanding with the President.” (Gellman & Barton, 2008). Furthermore, Mitchel and Massaud (2009, p. 273) argued that “The bureaucratic “pulling and hauling” between Powell on one side and Cheney and Rumsfeld on the other was further reflected in the relationship among deputies and undersecretaries”. The actual decision making was done by a small experienced group of politicians: U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Council Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, and CIA director George Tenet had great influence. Social interaction possibly affected decision making. The mechanism of social interaction might show us an explanation for the decision to go to war with Iraq, since these different mechanisms possibly influenced the Bush administration during the process of policy making. These mechanisms could possibly explain both cautious, as well as risky policy outcomes.

1.4 Relevance

So far, the concept of prudence is mainly theorized by Morgenthau. Within classical realism, prudence is considered as one of the most important virtues. However, now that realism has evolved into a less moral but more rational, value-maximizing approach, prudence has changed as well. Still, the new meaning of prudence within structural realism is underexposed. Since this new concept of prudence remains unclear in some aspects, there is a need to do research on its mechanism in order to find out what possible factors affect a statesman’s ability to apply prudence. Prudence has evolved from a harm-good relation towards a cost-benefit approach, morality is no longer emphasized within this value maximising mechanism. Moreover, the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq shows that decision making is not always based on rationality, as it did not serve U.S. interests. Apparently, a statesman’s ability to apply prudence is affected by other variables as well. A statesman’s ability to create rational policy can be affected by many factors, which will make policy outcomes either cautious (or prudent), moderate, or risky. Some scholars, as for example Irving Janis, already researched risky policy. As prudence describes cautious policy, there is a need to develop a mechanism that can declare both cautious and risky policy. If actors do not always make rational decisions based on the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions, other aspects might be of great importance. If prudence is a supreme virtue in politics for realism, there is a need to define the concept more properly and find out under which circumstances prudence might be vulnerable, and under what conditions the opposite of prudent policy outcomes, risky policy outcomes, might be the result.

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2. Theory

In order to get a full understanding of the concept of prudence, the next chapter will discuss prudence by focusing on its scope, limitations, and development through the years.

2.1. Prudence: the pathway to cautious policy

Through the years, realism has been one of the leading theories in international relations. Although realism has been repeatedly challenged by scholars belonging to other disciplines, it has kept its important role within international relations. There are several pathways within the doctrine of realism, however, the core is the same: international order and the foreign policies of states are, at a fundamental level, shaped by considerations of power and interest (Brown, 2012). However, Brown also states that the consequence of the dominance of realism is that the clarity, once sought by both Morgenthau and Carr, has been lost. Today, the cost-benefit approach for gaining power can be considered as one of the central arguments of realism. However, Morgenthau did not neglect the moral aspects of politics. Both morality and interest should ensure a prudent state logic. Beside the rational focus on a prudent logic, Morgenthau extensively discussed the normative aspect of prudence. States do not only follow the prudent logic because of rational choices and unwanted consequences, morality is considered because the moral thing to do is to secure the safety of a statesman’s community. Morgenthau has widely discussed this relation between morality and politics, as well as the consequences of it. Through the years, the meaning of prudence has evolved within realism from a moral towards a more rational, risk-avoiding definition. However, prudence is principally focused on cautious policy. The possibility of risky policy outcomes is not so much discussed within literature on prudence. Therefore this chapter will point out developments within realism, and more specific, changes concerning the concept of prudence as a mechanism for cautious policy.

When it comes to the objective position of man on the political scene, Morgenthau describes that this relation is a “necessary ambivalence” (Morgenthau, 1978 p. 11). Although other individuals search for power just as himself, he will always find his own aspirations more noble and more justified. The moral dilemma for foreign policy is therefore created by blindness for our own behaviour and our coloured outlook towards the world. As all political action can be considered as an attempt to influence human behaviour, “all political action must be aware of the complexities and ambiguities of the human factor and must itself be ambiguous and complex - and in the right way” (Ibid, p. 23). Political action thus requires insight and wisdom, since human nature is complex. One cannot be ignorant on the role of power. The political actors must be aware of both “malleability and suasion and find a balance between both depending on the particular situation” (Ibid.). Therefore there is a need for an objective barrier for the human will, so that the human will will not overrule. When it comes to conflict, individuals do not think in terms of interests and power determined by circumstances, but in terms of moral values determined by abstract principles. If policy fails, this is mostly analysed as

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‘wickedness’ of the other party (Ibid.). For statesmen, moral discipline should control one’s one-sidedness. Overestimating one’s own power, and underestimating the other’s is commonly manifesting. A particular reason for this has been moral pride (Ibid; Coll, 1991.).

2.1.1 Balance of morality and interests

In order to develop cautious policy, the right balance between morality and interest needs to be established. Morgenthau describes the paradox between emotion and understanding, between wanting to win from an enemy and analysing this relationship from an objective scholarly view (Ibid; Morgenthau, 1948.). Therefore statesmen need an outstanding quality in mastering this balance and see problems in its true definition, so that they will not be overconfident and develop reckless policy instead of cautious. One might therefore argue that, next to the balance of power, there is a balance of morality and interests. If a statesman has a clear perspective, it means there is no passion or pride involved. If a state performs with only ‘good’ intentions, actions can be labelled as ‘imprudent’. Morgenthau explains that all actors should be seen as political entities that pursue their interests defined in terms of power. A state thereby can respect the interests of other states, and protect his own interests. Morgenthau thereby attempted to explain how ideological confrontation can be avoided. If we think in terms of power it will be easier to explain political action from other states.

Statesmen should have three qualities, that can be related to the practical, the moral, and the intellectual. It is of great importance for policymakers to take into account the moral picture of the people, as Morgenthau stated: “what kind of foreign or military policy will find the support of public opinion?” (Ibid. p. 113). Moreover, Morgenthau warns for possible disbalance between in what is required for in terms of good national security policy and what is required for domestic politics. By a lack of balance only a temporary political advantage is possible. Morgenthau believes that statesmen should choose the lesser evil by following the principle of the ethics of consequences instead of the perfectionist ethic of intentions (Kaufman, 2005). There can be no political morality without prudence, which means without consideration of political consequences of moral action (Morgenthau, 1967). Therefore the moral aspect in Morgenthau’s consideration of prudence is merely formed by its consequences and not by the actual meaning of moral politics. If an actor needs to judge the rightness of a given action, different aspects need to be taken into account. As Kamminga (2008, p. 2) points out, “Prudence highlights certain personal characteristics such as the capacity to deliberate; the exercise of self-control and foresight against the passions and delusions of the mind; the ability to give due regard to circumstances; an appreciation for equity and forgiveness; and the capacity to learn to live with ambiguity, incompleteness, and inconclusiveness”. These characteristics are merely intuitional guidelines rather than concrete principles, which makes it harder to predict politics. Although prudence does focus on personal aspects of decision making, it lacks concrete guiding for political actors. Prudence therefore points at the importance of the moral reasoning process. As Morgenthau has a ‘tragic view’ on international politics, prudence is considered as a necessary virtue.

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The balance around prudence is focused on cautious policy, by avoiding a disbalance of morality and interests. Based on the above information, we could state that prudence tackles the tension between morality and rationality, and it thereby functions as a mechanism to produce thoughtful, cautious policy.

Although prudence is considered as a necessary virtue, it thus lacks adequate moral guidance. Overall, prudence implies that states should not overestimate their national power, or appeal their morality on others. As a consequence, statesmen will avoid reckless or risky policy. Realists disagree about the actual balance between morality and political action or interests. In Morgenthau’s view, the welfare and security of the statesman’s community should be secured. Still, practical consequences can overrule morality in many realist views. Whatever view on prudence, theorists agree that there can be no morality in statecraft without prudence. “The ultimate ends of statecraft is force, and force cannot be used prudently unless it is used in proportion to the values of the ends it secures” (Mapel, 1990 p. 434). In most situations statesmen will follow common morality, but in the case of absence of a general moral rule statesmen need to choose between conflicting moral and non-moral values. Also, Coll pointed out that prudence should function as a mediator between general moral principles and complex circumstances to which those principles should be applied (Coll, 1991). Statesmen sometimes need to commit morally unpalatable acts to prudent defend national interests. The balance between morality and interests is therefore not an easy balance to establish.

Morgenthau states that statesmen have certain restraints and that they will not use certain ends to certain means because of moral implications (Morgenthau, 1978). Following Morgenthau, political realism is unwilling to gloss over the tension between moral and political action. His fourth principle of political realism is focused on this particular tension, as he states that moral actions should be filtered through circumstances by time and place since moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in “their abstract universal formulation”(ibid., p. 10). Moreover, moderate policy can reflect the moderation of moral judgement. The concept of interests can function as a balance against moral excess. A counterpart to the moral principle of liberty can be the principle of national survival. Therefore prudence is of great importance to guide these principles. Prudent statesmanship is one of the main (classical) realist notions. Although Morgenthau argues that conflict is the result of failed peace diplomacy and the failed promotion of national interests, at the same time it will be imprudent to appear weak or let the other gain power over you (Leng, 1983). However, it is hard to draw a line between prudence and appeasement. From previous crises statesmen should have learned that states should act with greater caution. This entails that states should adopt a less coercive strategy and prevent a new unwanted conflict. By adopting cautious policy new conflicts should be avoided. However, one of the issues that arise here, is the fact that most statesmen think that they can bully the other state into submission to avoid higher costs. The result of this is that the losing state will try to find its solution in a tougher bargaining strategy to undue its previous lost. This means that, to

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overcome national humiliation, the result might be war. This shows that there is great tension between prudence and resolve, and that there is a lot involved when it comes to cautious decision making. Statesmen should therefore take into account the risks of prudent bargaining, since it might have unwanted consequences in the future when it comes to tougher bargaining strategies of the other party or even conflict (Ibid.).

2.1.2 The difficulties of applying morality by prudence

By following Morgenthau, prudence functions as a pathway towards cautious policy. However, statesman can miscalculate actions when there is no proper balance between both rational and moral aspects. If statesmen emphasize too much on normative aspects, states can misinterpret other states actions. Reckless action is, in most cases, the result of hubris and irrational behaviour. These two are therefore one of the biggest enemies of cautious solutions to a policy crisis. Moreover, not only consequences for one’s own state should be considered, also international and regional consequences should be taken into account. Reckless action can therefore be an enemy of prudence (Aslam, M. W., 2010). In case of reckless action, there is an imbalance between morality and interests. Statesmen will try to adjust the best calculated means and ends. Thereby statesmen should realize that means can rebound and affect the quality of humanity of its people. An important aspect is the awareness of one’s limits of power. Therefore planning should be done carefully while taking in consideration one’s own limits, otherwise, action could be considered irresponsible and consequences could be negative. Furthermore, a worst-case scenario should be included while planning political action. This is necessary to oversee political consequences, so that balanced policy will be the result. As Kirshner (2012) argues, the future is unwritten, so therefore wise policy is necessary.

Morgenthau emphasizes that an imbalance between morality and interests is due to a lack of knowledge, which derives from a lack of reason. When a statesman acts wrong, this is not because he is incapable by nature, but he lacks the knowledge that is needed. The perfect world is a world in which all commands derive from reason. A lack of knowledge from the natural laws of reason is the cause of an action that is imprudent. However, Morgenthau also explains the difficulty of performing a perfect balance between rationality and morality. The unreasonable man is both the ‘bad’ and the ‘unsuccessful’ man (Morgenthau, 1974). Morgenthau remained sceptical about men’s ability to use human reason. The only morally justified actions are those that protect national independence. He thereby again emphasizes that morality should be judged by the consequences of political action. The danger of a moralistic approach is that is can disregard prudence, with the consequence of spreading one’s own value’s on a global scale. It is therefore a struggle between the preferable and the detestable (Cozette, 2008). In order to prevent the spreading of one’s own value, morality should be applied by taking into account all circumstances (Morgenthau, 1974).

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Prudence can overrule other virtues in the sphere of action because prudence shows what human good requires regarding the particular circumstances. Prudence can help to assess technical knowledge about current circumstances and ethical knowledge about what is good for humans generally. This is possible because of “prudence knowledge of reality” (Moskop, 1996 p. 623). To do ‘good’, one must be aware of the situation and circumstances. After the understanding of what is ‘real’, foresight, which is "the capacity to estimate with a sure instinct for the future”, will help determine whether a particular action will lead to the realization of the goal (Ibid.). This capacity will reveal possible consequences of the action. Hubris can be seen as one of the biggest threats to prudence, since it is mostly the result of moralism. As the lust for power is inherent to the nature of men, hubris can be a consequence of this. However, we should take into account that morality entails a plurality of different forms and opinions. Universal morality is therefore interpreted differently by different cultural lenses. Prudence requires that statesmen will not be over-confident in their knowledge of the world. We should therefore consider this as keeping an insurance against the unpredictability of our own power and that of the other (Barkin, 2009). Moreover, Barkin describes that prudence should be reflexive, and that therefore prudence should be applied to analysis rather than to policy recommendation. If we should take questions of political morality seriously, this in turn requires reflexivity. Morality should function as a restraint, but needs to be balanced. “A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence” (Morgenthau, 1967 p.13). Without our own political morality, political action would be meaningless but morality is not universal. Especially the second aspect is important to recognize when certain political action is considered. Reflexivity helps to deal with different types of morality and therefore indirectly helps guiding towards political action.

Moral action Tim Place Consideration of consequences and alternative political action Prudent policy Pru den ce

“Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract Universal formulation but they must be filtered through the

concrete circumstances of time and place.” (Morgenthau, 1978 p. 10)

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Figure 1: The role of prudence as discussed by Morgenthau: Universal moral principles must be filtered through place and time (Morgenthau, 1967).

2.1.3 Balance of power and interests: avoiding risk by prudence

Current realist authors no longer emphasize Morgenthau’s moral considerations, but mainly focus on prudence as a risk-avoiding concept. Within classical realism, there was a strong focus on cautious policy. Prudence is not so much considered as a barrier to morality anymore, but as a rational concept to avoid risks in order to protect interests. We could reformulate the goal of policy making from developing cautious policy to avoiding risky policy. Both Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer argue that prudence will especially work in a world that is balanced in terms of power. Although the anarchic system of international politics does encourage states to look for opportunities for gaining power, there is still some element of restraint entailed (Mearsheimer, 2004). Mearsheimer argues that the principle of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict. States are potentially dangerous to each other. Moreover, since states are considered as rational actors, they consider the preferences of other states as well as the consequences of their actions. These general assumptions of structural realism do not dictate that great powers should act aggressively (Ibid.). Mearsheimer argues that the five assumptions of realism “create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other.” (Ibid., p. 55). He also emphasizes that possible consequences of facing or using aggression further strengthen the power of fear as a motivation force in international politics (Ibid.). Great powers cannot be considered as mindless aggressors, but not because of their ability to apply morality. Before states take action, they think carefully about the balance of power as well as how other states would react to their behaviour. These reactions possibly could affect a state’s interests. Aggression is thus tempered by calculated action instead of morality. Great powers develop a cost-benefit analysis of consequences of their political actions. Political action should benefit a state’s interests. Despite these limitations on aggressive political action, states miscalculate from time to time. This is due to the lack of information or imperfect information. However, Mearsheimer does emphasize that the best defence is a good offence, which is rather conflicting with a concept as prudence. Stephen Walt has also paid attention to the concept of prudence, by arguing that “prudent leaders will pay close attention to the forces that bring states together or drive them apart” (Walt, 1997 p. 156). Moreover, Walt speaks of a ‘prudential logic’ when it comes to alliances and their establishment or collapse. Stephen van Evera emphasized that prudence is forced by insecurity but in itself is beneficial (Van Evera, 1990). Since states need to rely on themselves (under bipolarity), as well as their leaders, there is a constant need for prudent leaders in order to protect interests. Kenneth Waltz pointed out that our view on force has changed after the Cold War, in a sense of reflecting greater prudence and thereby an increased will to control force. In the nuclear age, it thereby developed a ‘morality of prudence’ as fear for disastrous consequences increased (Waltz, 1967). This morality of prudence has to be related to a struggle between order and survival, as well as to “what men should and will fight for, a morality of

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convictions” (Ibid., 283). This does not entail that attitudes of men have undergone significant changes towards force. Moral issues are not new in this age, but have become more pressing as the consequences of political failure became more pressing. The fear for nuclear retaliation urged the need for prudence. Waltz states that the first concern of states is to maintain their position in the system, instead of maximizing power. He thereby again removes the attention from morality. Political risks should be prevented by a set of rules, pressing too hard might lead to war. “Preserving a balance is at the heart of wise statesmanship” (Waltz, 2010 p. 120). Waltz does argue that prudence is only wise in a system of balance of power, since this balance should be maintained by great powers. Jervis warns for the consequences of imprudent actions since they can lead to all-out war. The intolerably high risk of escalation is always present, this especially was the case in the nuclear age (Jervis, 1979). Hostility can provoke unwanted reactions with great consequences for national interests. Even the smallest probability of escalation can result into great infringements. Therefore the system of balance of power is sometimes transformed into a system of balance of terror. This balance of terror is focused on fear for consequences, not so much on developing good policy. A status quo state especially would focus on prudent policies, related to system-maintaining actions. Within structural realism, prudence has undergone some great changes, there is less emphasis on morality and more emphasis on avoiding risks because of fear.

Jervis specifically pays attention to history, since it provides the statesman a range of imaginable situations that might be useful when considering possible consequences of political actions (Jervis, 1976). To guide his own actions, and interpret the actions of others, one should look at history. It thereby helps to establish wise policy. However, although history offers great knowledge for the future, its lessons are not on the surface. Analogies from the past provide useful shortcuts to rationality. Dramatic events from the past can affect later decision-making, since analogies can be applied too quickly. An increase in knowledge regarding a certain subject does not entail an increase in the actor’s ability to cope with the environment (Ibid.). Dramatic events therefore can alter their perceptual thresholds too much. This in return will affect a statesman’s ability to act prudently. Processes of perception cannot be answered by a statesman’s interests, therefore we need more aspects to explain their perception on threats. When it comes to prudent states, they “may decide to strike if it feels that its fortunes are declining, thus cutting short the search for a compromise” (Jervis & Lebow, 1989 p. 166). Jervis and Lebow consider these strikes as by-products of the process of intimidation and bargaining. They thereby present how strikes can be prudent in international politics.

2.1.4 Rationality and a cost-benefit analysis

In order to come to a prudent policy, a cost-benefit analysis has to be developed. This, however, does not always imply that prudential action is the result. There are a few conditions under which state miscalculate their actions from time to time. According to Nye (1988), a balance of terror has

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developed instead of a balance of power after the Second World War. This has empowered the concept of prudence since nuclear risks have increased. Therefore, the consequences of miscalculated action increased. The consequences of waging war have changed, the cost-benefit analysis is strongly affected by this new type of balance. As the balance of terror has produced an incentive for peace, states should act more prudently these days. Peace within a balance of terror is established by fear. Prudence is not only about acting rational, but also about anticipating on potential irrational behaviour of other states. This irrational behaviour nowadays brings more risks than before, because of this new balance of terror. According to Weede (1985), prudent actors believe that the risk of escalation can never be ruled out completely. If escalation entails destruction on a greater scale, costs of waging war increase. The possibility of a nuclear war has changed the perception of prudence in such way that states pursue the control of force even more. However, Waltz does not foresee some new sort of morality since the ends for which states use force have not changed. He argues that the ‘traditional reason of state argumentations justifying the use of force still appeal to most men” (Waltz, 1967 p. 279). He reduces the possible effects of a balance of terror by focusing on the rational character of states. He does not believe that the nuclear age has changed the perception of states towards using force to acquire ends. However, one cannot deny that rational actors need to weigh the consequences of their actions and that these consequences have changed since the nuclear age. Waltz does admit that the balance of terror has created the opportunity for states to use nuclear punishment as a threat. He argues that actual force is still accomplished with conventional weapons. He also mentions that the balance of terror is considered to be more stable than traditional balance of power systems since the possibility of an all-out war or nuclear war is less likely. When it comes to a morality of prudence, Waltz describes the double meaning of the concept. On the one hand this entails the struggle of order and survival. On the other hand it entails the debate about what men are willing to and should fight for. The moral element is not new but since the nuclear age, it did become more pressing.

2.1.5 Miscalculations based on risks and structure

A lack of prudent politics can be due to miscalculations. The first principle of political realism states that men only will challenge objective laws, that have their roots in human nature, at the risk of failure (Morgenthau, 2014). The possibility of calculating costs and benefits of war has been discussed by several authors. To calculate the consequences of aggressive policy is rather questionable as it requires great insight and wisdom. States miscalculate the consequences of actions every time. Miscalculations can be the consequence of states underestimating the opponent’s willingness to stand firm on issues (Mearsheimer, 1990). The danger lies in pushing the other state too far when actually the opponent state is willing to fight. Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues that multipolarity increases the likelihood of miscalculations. This is because the international system is less predictable than in other systems. Rules and rights are changing constantly because of shifting coalitions in the multipolar system. Basic norms can be shared by a large amount of states, but rights are harder to agree on (Ibid.). War also

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turns out to be more likely when states underestimate relative power regarding opposing coalitions. States can underestimate the number of states joining the coalition or overestimate the number of allies. In a multipolar system, the behaviour of many states has to be calculated. Therefore these errors are more likely in a multipolar system. This in return will affect the possibility of calculating the balance of power. Because of these risks, Mearsheimer prefers a bipolar system, “simplicity breeds certainty, certainty bolsters peace” (Mearsheimer, 1990 p. 17). Waltz especially focuses on relative gain. One of the core assumptions of realism is that states will be penalized by the international environment if they fail to protect their national interests. States are therefore sensitive for costs and they behave as unitary rational agents (Grieco, 1988).

Schelling (1970) focuses on the uncertainty that exists in international politics, and the chance of misunderstanding each other. He specifically explains the risks of this uncertainty. Furthermore he focuses on the psychological aspects of these uncertainties and risks. The result of these uncertainties is that international relations is about a competition in risk taking. It is no longer about who can use a particular amount of force, but who is willing to use the amount of force and take risks. Schelling mentions the possibility of manipulating risks. War most of the time is an unpredicted consequence of uncertain risks. The psychological harm of bargaining power is imbedded in terms of deterrence, retaliation, reprisal, and terrorism. The threat of war therefore is nowadays a common strategy to preserve peace. However, as mentioned above, there are risks involved.

Mearsheimer (1990) also warns against nationalism, since he considers nationalism as one of the main causes of war. He argues that nationalism develops best under military systems. The consequence of nationalism can be hyper nationalism, the belief that other states are threats and therefore must be treated harshly. If states rely on mass armies, the likelihood of nationalism increases. However, the costs of expansion mostly outrun the benefits of it. He also points out that states do not immediately behave irrational if their actions turn out to be unsuccessful, they simply took a rational calculated risk. Moreover, this miscalculation can be due to imperfect information in a complicated world. Although there are some significant differences between Morgenthau’s classical realism, and Mearsheimer’s structural realism, the essence remains the same. According to Morgenthau, there is a struggle for power, and according to Mearsheimer there is a struggle for security. However, both statements are based on the following assumption: humankind is not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and competitive (Ibid.). By focusing on the cost-benefit aspect of realism, we could formulate the hypothesis:

The more a state expects to benefit from political action, the riskier its foreign policy decision will be. If political actors make a risky decision, they expect to gain from it. The costs of the decision do not outweigh the benefits of it. Cautious policy is no longer made through judging moral action by

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political consequences, cautious policy is made trough a cost-benefit analysis with a focus on avoiding risks in order to protect and serve interests.

2.1.6 Rational models and its shortcomings

Besides prudence, authors have focused on the disability of statesmen to weigh consequences of foreign policy. Allison offered a rational policy model, which also contains the reflection of personality on foreign policy choices. According to Allison, one can define several variants from this ‘pure’ model. However, the core of each variant remains the same: “to place the action within a value-maximizing framework, given certain constraints” (Allison, 1969 p. 695). The first variant one can define within this rational policy model is based on the national actor and his choice. This choice depends on the situation. Allison argues: “national propensities or personality traits reflected in an ‘operational code’, concern with certain objectives, or special principles of action, narrow the goals or alternatives or consequences of the paradigm.” (ibid.). The second cluster of variants of the rational policy model is about the leader of the leadership group. The personal characteristics of the leader or the group can modify the alternative or the consequences of policy. The third cluster recognizes several actors within one government. These different variants all represent a model that is focused on a value-maximising mechanism. The rational paradigm explains outcomes by goals of the victorious actor. However, states will quit an action if its costs outweigh the benefits. Allison points out that there are, next to the rational actor model, other options to explain foreign policy. He describes two other models, which are the organisational process model and the bureaucratic politics model. The organisational process model explains foreign policy by focusing on governmental actors, and how different governmental organisations or body’s interact with each other. The difference with the rational actor model is that foreign policy is the output of organisational processes. The third model, the bureaucratic politics model, is about the bargaining process between several actors within the government that are placed hierarchical within the government (Allison, 1969). Allison already noticed that the rational actor model contains some shortcomings when it comes to the pathway of decision making. The second and third model can supplement the first model, since both models offer a way to explain the pathway of decision making.

The above described analysis of realism shows how realism is treated today, and what developments have taken place through the years. The rational aspect of realism has been challenged by scholars. Although Morgenthau already acknowledged that there is a limit when it comes to a cost-benefit analysis because of the existence of morality, structural realism has dropped this notion largely. Were prudence once was focused on producing cautious policy outcomes, it has changed into a risk-avoiding concept. Still, if statesmen focus on risk-avoiding risks, there is even a bigger need to investigate risky choice shifts. Within the literature on choice shifts, there has been a divide between psychological and organisational explanation of policy outcome. Nowadays, the effect of group dynamics is now acknowledged by many scholars. These developments reveal the limits of the realist

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cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, Allison has showed that theories based on the rational actor model are unable to explain how decisions are made. Prudence can be considered a mechanism for cautious policy, whether it is by the use of morality and interests or as a risk-avoiding mechanism by the use of a cost-benefit analysis. Still, it remains unclear how exactly actors make a risky decision. Janis used Allison’s critique on rational models, and thereby developed a theory based on group dynamics. 2.2 Group dynamics

Besides rational explanations and value-maximizing goals, other explanations can be offered to explain policy outcomes. If prudence explains cautious policy outcomes, there is a need to identify the pathway towards risky policy outcomes as well. Some scholars have focused on group dynamics to explain foreign policy. ‘t Hart et al (1997) clarified the dynamics of small elite groups. They argue that a lot of policy is shaped by such small elite groups, and that they can have great effects. These groups can be cabinets, committees, commissions and cliques. They furthermore argue that the outcomes of policymaking cannot explicitly be explained by Allison’s organisational process model, bureaucratic politics model or rational model. These groups function as a bridge between institutional forces and actions and decisions by political leaders. This type of analysis does not specifically focus on rational choice or avoiding escalation. ‘t Hart et al analyse variables as composition, interpersonal dynamic and leadership. These group level factors are important because they tell how power is distributed within the group, who has leadership capabilities, and if leaders want to hear other possibilities than their own ideas. Group level interaction can therefore have a great influence on the outcomes of policymaking. Although Janis (1972, 1982) focused on groupthink processes already, ‘t Hart et al tried to explain group dynamics by taking into account organisational or institutional effects as well. Moreover, they developed a mechanism that does not only focus on risky choice shifts or policy fiascos, but also cautious shifts. They defined two interrelated premises of small group perspective, namely “small group factors have a distinct, and significant, potential explanatory power in the analysis of foreign policy”, and “the purpose of small group analysis is to help us explain better the crucial, formative policy decisions that shape significant parts of a country’s foreign policy” (‘t Hart et al, 1997 p. 8). An important aspect of small group analysis is that it is able to explain how these groups can form the basis of policy recommendations that help policymakers to avoid escalation. If we want to go beyond groupthink, we should take into account that groups take a variety of shapes and forms, and they perform different functions. Furthermore, they are embedded in an institutional, as well as a political context. This context shapes and facilitates a group’s performance (Ibid.). If groups function as a think tank, they can be superior to individuals. A distinction can be made between internal and external dimensions of group behaviour. During the interaction between members of policy groups, a social construct is created by international, domestic, and organisational realities these members choose. The groups can have different meanings to members and to domestic and international stakeholders. Therefore, groups cannot have the impact described by their formal powers

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and duties. There are many other aspects that can influence the impact, for example personal values, norms, expectations and problem definitions. If we want to analyse group dynamics, we need to take into account the macro-, meso- and micro-level components of the institutional context. Allison explained three different clusters of his rational policy model. He thereby already made the distinction between the macro-, meso- and micro-level.

2.2.1 Psychological vs. Organizational paradigms

As explained in the beginning of this chapter, the analysis of policy-making has long been dominated by rational paradigms. The dominating doctrine of realism explained policy outcomes by a cost-benefit analysis, in which calculated problem-solving was the mechanism to understand these outcomes. Key norm therefore is that actors will always try to maximise their power. However, this rational choice perspective has been criticized a lot since Allison in 1971 provided evidence concerning policy-making regarding the Cuban Missile crisis. It has caused a discussion about the empirical validity of rational actor models. Some scholars have argued that the rational choice model is not suitable for the reality of politics and policy: “Rationalist assumptions of perfect information, well-ordered preferences and single-actor dominance are far removed from the reality of politics and policy” (t’ Hart, 1991 p. 248). Scholars have tried to explain a lack of rationality by using both organisational and bureaucratic models. The difference between both models lies in the level of observation. In order to understand organisational group dynamics, meso- and macro-level analysis are necessary. The effect of organisational/bureaucratic processes is the main focus. Today’s research on bureaucratic processes are most of the time stemming from the psychological school of thought. Allison’s bureaucratic model is therefore to some extent comparable to a lot of psychological models. In contrast to organisational perspectives, psychological perspectives are not focused on meso- and macro-processes, but only on micro-processes. This implies that psychological perspectives are about individual decision makers and interaction (Paul t’Hart, 1991). Psychological studies are focused on the individual actor, not so much on the bargaining process. In contrast to rational, organisational, and bureaucratic paradigms, psychological paradigms also acknowledge emotional aspects, beliefs and cognitions. Next to these factors, some scholars have focused on leadership and interpersonal style with regard to political leaders (Ibid.).

One of the most influential scholars on small decision making groups, is Janis Irving. In contrast to the above mentioned hypotheses and perspectives, Janis’ crucial linchpin is the cohesiveness of decision-making groups. It goes beyond the mechanisms of discussion, the ultimate goal of decision-decision-making groups is to obtain cohesiveness. Janis argued that, in contrast to scholars belonging to the organisational school of thought, group dynamics do not always lead to better decision-making. In fact, the desire to achieve group cohesiveness will lead to poorer decision-making.

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2.3 Groupthink

So far, we have discussed the differences between organisational and psychological paradigms when it comes to group dynamics. However, Irving Janis has tried to develop a more specific paradigm, which concerns the phenomenon of groupthink in order to explain policy fiascos. Since Irving Janis published his well appreciated book ‘Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos, many authors have tried to develop the concept of groupthink and group dynamics within decision-making. There has been an increased interest in groups and organizations in general. However, scholars tend to focus on single disciplines in order to develop evidence with regard to group dynamics. So far, Irving Janis has tried to fill the gap within political science by developing the concept of Groupthink by using aspects of psychological doctrines. The term ‘groupthink’ has entered popular vocabulary. The basic statement in the above mentioned book is that the quality of the outcome of foreign-policy decision-making strongly depends on the process of decision-making (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010). Janis showed the dynamics of groupthink by offering the example of the Bay of Pigs ‘fiasco’, where the Kennedy administration failed to offer a carefully considered solution. One of the critics Schafer and Crichlow (2010) offer is that the term ‘groupthink’ is rather limited. Moreover, scholars have argued that Janis has offered several definitions of groupthink (Ibid.). However, groupthink is focused on how policy groups sometimes create policy fiascos. Where Morgenthau’s concept of prudence was mainly focused on cautious policy, Janis’ model of groupthink model is focused on policy fiascos or risky shifts.

Besides groupthink, other authors have focused on different aspects of decision-making. Traditionally, particular symptoms are classified as symptoms of groupthink (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). However, this does not entail that there is consensus on the meaning of groupthink. As Schafer and Crichlow describe: “within several disciplines groupthink is now a famous term, including psychology, sociology, and business management and administration” (Ibid., P. 7). It shows the diversity of the term itself, as it has a truly interdisciplinary impact. As a result of the rather broad definition of groupthink, previously mentioned authors try to develop a definition for groupthink as a part of a larger research program, they consider groupthink as a small part of FPDM (foreign-policy decision-making) which takes us inside the state. Scholars belonging to this research area have argued that we should get inside the so-called ‘black-box’. The particular contribution of groupthink to the doctrine of FPDM is that it emphasizes the importance of human beings as unpredictable variables. The behaviour of humans within a policy-making process strongly depends on variables as power relations, availability of information, norms and values. Therefore the outcome of policy-making processes can be rather different than expected. However, groupthink has been neglected within literature on group decision making, as the concept itself contains a variety of variables.

Humans make mistakes all the time, “to err is human” (Janis, 1973 p. 20). Janis has defined eight main symptoms of groupthink to understand why people ‘err’ during group decision making processes:

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1. “An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most of the members, which creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks;

2. Collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings which might lead to the members to reconsider their assumptions before they recommit themselves to their past policy decisions;

3. An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality, inclining the members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions;

4. Stereotyped views of rivals and enemies as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak and stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to defeat their purpose; 5. Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against any of the group’s

stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, making clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members;

6. Self-censorship of deviations from the apparent group consensus, reflecting each member’s inclination to minimize to himself the importance of his doubts and counterarguments;

7. A shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to the majority view (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent);

8. The emergence of self-appointed mind guards – members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions” (Janis, 1973 p. 21)

These eight symptoms will mostly appear during moral dilemmas. Furthermore, Janis has described a prime condition for groupthink, which is cohesiveness. Two additional conditions are insulation and authoritarian leadership. Janis admits that preventing groupthink is rather complicated: “How can policy-makers benefit from the cohesiveness of their group without suffering serious losses from groupthink?” (Ibid.). However, Janis has developed 9 prescriptive hypotheses to prevent groupthink. These hypotheses are all based on group dynamics, that is, on a group level. Influences of other groups or levels are not taken into account. Several authors conclude therefore that Irving Janis’ groupthink research program is rather limited in its scope.

2.3.1 Critics on groupthink

However, other scholars have different critics as well. Groupthink was originally developed to explain fiascos in U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, members of policy groups fell victim to this so-called groupthink syndrome, which means that they were part of a “highly cohesive group which displayed a forceful tendency toward concurrence” (‘t Hart, 1990 p. 22). Therefore, ‘t Hart argues that groupthink can be defined as “a strong tendency for quick concurrence –seeking among members of decision groups” (ibid.). Beside this definition of the groupthink theory, ‘t Hart also offers some shortcomings of the theory. He states that Janis’s groupthink theory is rather limited on the issue of causality.

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According to ‘t Hart, the direction of causality is not mentioned explicitly. Longley and Pruitt (1980) agree that there is a lack of determinacy when it comes to Janis’ groupthink mechanism. Janis describes group cohesiveness, but also focuses explicitly on concurrence-seeking tendency. Furthermore, the model is sometimes considered incomplete, since Janis does not explicitly focus on similar social phenomenon’s that strongly correlate to groupthink. Finally, ‘t Hart argues that more attention should be paid to organisational, administrative and political factors that might shape policy outcomes (Ibid.). In order to further develop groupthink theory, one should also focus on other fields of social science. ‘t Hart et al (1997) for example have presented a different model, the General Group Problem Solving Model (GGPS model), in order to offer a more value-neutral manner and it has a more political orientation.

Schafer and Chrichlow also examined that the personality of political leaders can have an effect on policy outcome. They found that ‘more distrustful leaders oversee governments that have more poorly structured decision-making groups” (Schafer and Chrichlow, 2010 p. 238). Furthermore, these type of leaders also are more likely to make decisions that increase the level of conflict. Therefore they do not specifically focus on group dynamics, but more specifically on individual characteristics. They added weight to the importance of the personality of the political leader of the group. Surprisingly, they also found that political leaders that have a considerable more in-group bias are likely to oversee decision-making processes that make less risky decisions. This is rather conflicting with Janis’ findings on group cohesiveness. Another example of personal characteristics they offer is self-confidence. If leaders have a greater self-confidence than conceptual complexity, they are less likely to commit decision-processing faults. Finally, Schafer and Chrichlow conclude that more insulated groups produce more negative results, and the presence of gatekeepers produces more negative results as well (Ibid.). So, group structure still matters, just as personal characteristics.

2.3.2 Group cohesiveness, consensus and discussion

Overall, we could state that there are three concepts that remain important in groupthink theory: group cohesiveness, consensus and discussion. In cohesive groups, members are more likely to react positively towards other members of the group (Shaw and Barret-Power 1998). However, there are several competing descriptions of cohesiveness, as the concept can be understood as very broad. Moreover, the explicit or implicit norms of a group that correlate to cohesiveness can be considered very important. The more cohesive the group, the more its members will abide its norms (Ibid.). However, this does not imply that group members will always think and act like the group does. This completely depends on the norms of the group. The content of norms can also be a cause for discussion. However, one could state that the key power of cohesiveness is that it increases the power of norms. Group cohesiveness makes members want to be part of the group as well respected participants (t’ Hart, 1991). Several scholars have argued about the positive and negative effects of cohesiveness. Of course, a group can offer more alternatives than individuals, and cohesiveness makes

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it possible for groups to create a task-oriented atmosphere in which information processing will be more effective than in groups with lesser cohesiveness. However, Janis has argued the opposite. The effects of cohesiveness cannot always be considered as positive, as it can evolve into a group goal in itself (Janis, 1982). As a consequence, criticism of group members will not always be tolerated, it will be perceived as undesirable by most members of the group. In other words: cohesiveness affects the ability of individuals to think and act critically. The lack of critical remarks and observation can be detrimental to the process of discussion. A lack of discussion can thus result into bad outcomes of policy-making. These outcomes are sometimes described as risky shifts.

The role of prudence in IR theory