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How can foreign policy be influenced?

A study to the influence of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq on

the foreign policy of Iraq

From left to right: the flag of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq and the flag of the Republic of Iraq

Bachelor’s thesis Political Science Lana Amin

10980555

First supervisor: dr. S. Rezaeiejan

Second supervisor: dr. E.A.V. Matthies-Boon 28 January 2019

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Table of contents

List of abbreviations ...5

Introduction ...7

1 Literature review ... 10

1.1 The influence of the KRI on Iraq ... 10

1.2 Conclusion ... 13 2 Theoretical framework ... 14 2.1 Theory of FPA ... 14 2.2 Resources ... 15 2.3 Domestic culture ... 15 2.4 Constitutional structure ... 16 2.5 Nationalism ... 17 2.6 Conclusion ... 17 3 Methodology ... 18 3.1 Operationalization: resources ... 18

3.2 Operationalization: domestic culture ... 18

3.3 Operationalization: constitutional structure... 18

3.4 Operationalization: nationalism ... 19

3.5 Conclusion ... 19

4 The influence of resources ... 20

4.1 First strategy of the KRG ... 20

4.2 Second strategy of the KRI ... 21

4.3 Third strategy of the KRI ... 22

4.4 Conclusion ... 23

5 The influence of domestic culture ... 24

5.1 Activities of the KDP and the PUK ... 24

5.2 Ambitions of the KRG ... 24

5.3 The influence on the KRG ... 25

5.4 Conclusion ... 25

6 The influence of constitutional structure ... 27

6.1 International policies of the KRG ... 27

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6.3 Organizational structure of the Iraqi government ... 28

6.4 Representation of the Kurds in the Iraqi government ... 31

6.5 Conclusion ... 31

7 The influence of nationalism ... 33

7.1 Attitudes towards nationalism within the KRI ... 33

7.2 Autonomy or independence? ... 34

7.3 Conclusion ... 35

Conclusion ... 36

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List of abbreviations

CFR Council on Foreign Relations DFR Department of Foreign Relations ICG International Crisis Group KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI Kurdish Region in Iraq

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

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Introduction

The Kurds are regarded as the largest nation without a state, about thirty million individuals are divided across the territory of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria (Vali 1998: 83). With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Treaty of Sèvres in which the former Ottoman Empire was partitioned into independent states was signed in 1920 (Neuberger 2014: 28). Although the Kurds were promised autonomy over their own state, the outcome for the Kurds was division across several states (ibid.). Almost a century later, the Kurdish quest for independence is still present. In 2017 a referendum for Kurdish independence in northern Iraq was held (BBC 2017). Despite a majority of the Kurds who voted “yes”, the outcome of the referendum was regarded as illegitimate by the Iraqi government (ibid.).

Each Kurdish region has developed its own definition of how a nation should be organised, whereby the Kurdish Region in Iraq (KRI) is regarded as the most progressive (Bengio 2014: 2). In 2005 Iraq got a new Constitution in which the Kurds were officially and legally recognized as an ethnic minority (McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 676-677). The KRI is characterized by having its own military force, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its own Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) (Andersen 2014). In an article by Nevzat Soguk it is mentioned that ever since President Masoud Barzani’s visit with President George W. Bush in 2006, it became an usual activity for the KRG to meet with the leaders of other states (Soguk 2015: 963-965). Another example is President Barzani’s visit with the king of Saudi Arabia which led to the development of ties between Saudi Arabia and the KRG (ibid.). In addition, the KRG established diplomatic relations with other Arab states which led to the support of the visibility of the KRG (ibid.).

This leads to the main aim of this thesis which is to study how the KRI influences the foreign policy of Iraq. Hence, this thesis tries to answer the following main question:

“How does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq in the time span from 2005 to 2018?”.

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Based on the main question, four sub-questions are used to be able to answer the main question.1 These sub-questions are as follows: “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through resources?”, “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through domestic culture?”, “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through constitutional structure?” and “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through nationalism?”.

A lot has been written about the Kurds, varying from the Kurdish national movement in each Kurdish region to the unlikeliness of a recognized state consisting of the four Kurdish regions (Jwaideh 2006; Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield 2010; Van Bruinessen 1986; Tezcür 2009; Gunter 2004). However, when focussing on the KRI, one can observe that this region already acts like an independent state whereby it could be viewed as a state within a state with regards to Iraq (Stansfield 2013: 259-262; Bengio 2014: 1; Gunter 1993: 295). On the one hand, the KRI is the only Kurdish region with autonomy. On the other hand, it is remarkable that despite Iraq letting the Kurds enjoy autonomy, there are limits to this autonomy. A common fear that is shared by both Iraq and its neighbours is full Kurdish independence (Katzman 2009: 2). This shows that the KRI indeed influences Iraq. However, it remains unclear in the existing literature how the KRI exerts this influence on the foreign policy of Iraq and what the actions of Iraq are in this regard (Boot 2017).

Besides a gap in the existing literature, the outcome of this thesis could give insights to the Middle East as a whole, Iraq and the KRI. In the article “Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds” by George Harris it is stated that both independence and recognition of the Kurds as a nation have eluded them, whereby Kurdish autonomy is a phenomenon that is not feasible. It is worth mentioning that this article dates to 1977 (Harris 1977: 113). Comparing this to the contemporary world, the opposite of this expectation is realized whereby the Kurds in Iraq succeeded in gaining autonomy (Stansfield 2013: 259-260). The Kurdish quest for independence is a phenomenon that still affects both the Kurdish population living in the Kurdish regions and the Kurdish diaspora. With regards to the latter group, in the article “Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question” by Martin van Bruinessen it is stated that nationalist attitudes are even more present among the second-generation Kurds (Van

1 The year 2005 is the starting point for this thesis because it marks an important year in which the Kurds, as mentioned earlier, were recognized in the Constitution of Iraq. The time span is defined to 2018 because of the events that have occurred in the KRI. An example is the 2017 independence referendum.

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Bruinessen 2000: 6-7). Instead of the first-generation, it is now the second-generation that continues the Kurdish quest for independence (ibid.).

To provide an answer to both the main question and the sub-questions, this thesis first gives an overview of the existing literature in which is described that the KRI is influencing Iraq due to its position and actions in the international community. Afterwards, the theory of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) by James N. Rosenau and Christopher Hill are described in the theoretical framework of this thesis. In addition, within this theoretical framework four internal factors of how foreign policy can be influenced are described. These are resources, domestic culture, constitutional structure and nationalism. The third chapter gives a description of the methodology which is a case study combined with a literature study. The case is encompassed by the KRI. The operationalization of the four internal factors and the data are described as well. Finally, in the four following chapters each of the internal factors is studied separately. Each chapter begins with a brief case description of the KRI with regards to the concerning internal factor, followed by a link between both the literature review and the theory of FPA using the data as is mentioned in chapter 3.

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Chapter 1 Literature review

In this literature review, an overview is given on how the influence of the KRI on Iraq is described in the existing literature. This is achieved by highlighting several scholars who have studied the KRI. Each of the studies shows that the influence of the KRI could be viewed from different perspectives which leads to a variety of insights on this subject. Before highlighting the KRI, a brief overview of Kurdistan is given to understand more of the distinctiveness of the KRI.2

1.1 The influence of the KRI on Iraq

George S. Harris states in his article “Ethnic conflict and the Kurds” that the Kurds could be regarded as a distinct nation, but that this does not need to imply unity among them (Harris 1977: 113). Certain obstacles that have resulted in a disunited Kurdish nation can be distinguished. According to Richard Falk in his article “Problems and prospects for the Kurdish struggle for self-determination after the end of the Gulf and Cold Wars”, one can notice a disunity among the Kurds due to, among other things, the absence of one leader that represents a pan-Kurdish idea. Instead of one pan-Kurdish leader, each region of Kurdistan has developed a leader who has high visibility at the regional level (Falk 1994: 592). For instance, the Kurdish region in Iran is characterized by Qazi Mohammad, the KRI by Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish region in Turkey by Sheikh Said (Harris 1977: 114). The Kurdish national movement in the KRI is regarded as the only national movement that has been both lasting and successful (Edmonds 1971: 92-93). However, one state including the four Kurdish regions is regarded as unlikely. In the article “Why Kurdish statehood is unlikely” by Michael M. Gunter reasons for this unlikeliness are given. The most obvious reason is that Kurdistan is divided across the territory of states that are already in existence (Gunter 2004: 106). The KRI is an exception with regards to the main argument by Gunter. Since 1991 northern Iraq is characterized by a de facto Kurdish state (idem: 108-109).

In the article “The case for Kurdish statehood in Iraq” by Philip S. Hadji it is stated that the KRI could be regarded as a “state”. This is because the KRI meets the four requirements of the Montevideo Convention which was established in 1933 and encompasses the qualification of a state under international law (Hadji 2009: 525-527). The four requirements are as follows: the presence of a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a capacity to

2 In this thesis the term ‘Kurdistan’ will be used for the Kurdish regions in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria (Bengio 2014: 2).

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enter relations with other states (ibid.). The KRI meets the first requirement by the notion that it has a permanent population consisting of about four million individuals. The second requirement is met by the notion that the territory which the Kurds in the KRI regard as their own, is recognized by the Constitution of Iraq. The third requirement is met by the notion that the KRI has an own government, the KRG. According to the Constitution of Iraq, the KRG is the main authority which has control over the KRI, whereby the Iraqi government is being put offside. It is worth mentioning that the KRG has several rights as well. A couple of these rights are the ability to annul federal laws, deciding the tax rates of the individuals living in the KRI, and controlling the oil and water in the KRI. Besides these rights, the KRG also has several responsibilities. It needs to ensure the security over its own region. Finally, the fourth requirement is met because the KRG has the ability to engage in relations with other states (ibid.). With regards to this requirement, the KRG acts on behalf of a foreign policy that is organised and carried out independently from the Iraqi government, despite the notion that only national governments can carry out a foreign policy (ibid.).

Both the third and fourth requirement can be highlighted. Within the KRG two main political parties can be distinguished, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (Barkey and Laipson 2005: 67-69; Gunter 1996: 226). These two political parties have been dominant in the KRI for most of the last three decades, whereby they both assure the security in the KRI by overseeing its armed forces (Barkey and Laipson 2005: 67-69). In addition, they have the authority over most of the economic activity and communication networks (ibid.). According to the article “Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s future” by Henri J. Barkey and Ellen Laipson, on the one hand, one can imply that the political organization in the KRI has its own structure due to its own government. On the other hand, there are limits to the engagement of the KRG in diplomatic relations. The political organization in the KRI remains dependent on the Iraqi government because the KRG is bound to the Constitution of Iraq (ibid.). However, KRI’s public support for federalism in Iraq has been an obstacle in the establishment of a unified, stable and peaceful Iraq (Barkey and Laipson 2005: 74).

The article “Paradiplomacy of Regional Governments in International Relations: The Foreign Relations of the Kurdistan Regional Government (2003-2010)” by Herish K. Mohammed and Francis Owtram gives insights into the organization of the KRG and the views with regards to the Iraqi government. This is achieved due to interviewing six senior officials of the KRG and the French General Consul in Erbil (Mohammed and Owtram 2014: 68-72). In contrast with what is stated in the article by Hadji, according to the senior officials, the KRG

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can not create foreign policy, despite the ability to have diplomatic relations due to the KRG’s legitimate powers (ibid.). However, one of the interviewees, Falah Mustafa Bakir who is KRG’s Head of DFR, states that the implementation of diplomatic relations is not in contrast with the interest of the Iraqi government (ibid.). It is even regarded as beneficial for both the KRG and the Iraqi government by Frederic Tissot, the French General Consul in Erbil (ibid.). According to another interviewee, Talib Rasheed Yadgar who is the General Director of the Presidential Diwan at the Kurdistan Region Presidency, the involvement in the international domain of a region within a federal state is dependent on the legal personality of the concerning region (ibid.). This legal personality could be gained due constitutional framework and the ability of the region to implement international policies (ibid.). With regards to the KRI, Yadgar mentions several articles of the Constitution of Iraq in which the above is stated. According to Article 117, the KRI is a region within federal Iraq. Thus, the KRI is allowed to be involved in international politics (ibid.). In addition, Article 121:4 states that the regions within Iraq are given the right to have diplomatic representatives in embassies in foreign governments because of the federal system in Iraq (ibid.).3

Although the senior officials of the KRG agree that the diplomatic relations of the KRG can not be regarded as acting in contrast with the Iraqi government, the field that is dominated by foreign policy is regarded as maintaining the Kurdish quest for independence (Soguk 2015: 963-965). In the article “With/Out a State, Kurds Rising: The Un/Stated Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq” by Soguk it is stated that due to the less distinct boundaries of inclusion or exclusion of the KRI in the international state system, the Kurds gained the ability to mobilize themselves both internally and externally (ibid.). The fourth requirement of the Montevideo Convention is visible in the diplomatic representations the KRG has in foreign governments, whereby exchanges between the KRG and the concerning governments are facilitated in fields such as politics, economy and culture. In addition, KRG’s DFR is responsible for the coordination of the diplomatic representations. Due to projects that the DFR in cooperation with other ministries within the KRG created, one of the aims of the KRG could be regarded as accomplished, namely gaining visibility in the international community (ibid.).

This visibility is strengthened due to tension between the KRG and the Iraqi government which is present since 1961 (Rafaat 2008: 252-253). This tension is mainly because of the

3 For the Constitution of Iraq, see:

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province Kirkuk which is regarded by both the Iraqi government and the KRG as part of their territory (ibid.). In the article “Kirkuk: The Central Issue of Kurdish Politics and Iraq's Knotty Problem” by Aram Rafaat the importance of Kirkuk with regards to the Kurds is mentioned. According to President Barzani, in contrast with for instance the Iraqi government, Kirkuk is important for the Kurds due to the role it has played in the history of the Kurds (ibid.). However, including Kirkuk in the territory of the KRI would have a major influence on Iraq. In doing so, an independent Kurdistan consisting of the KRI will gain stability due to economic and political benefits (ibid.).

1.2 Conclusion

Due to the variety of insights on the influence of the KRI on Iraq, the main focus points for this thesis were obtained. The description of the existing literature about the KRI and Iraq shows that the KRI is influencing Iraq through different ways. Although the dependency of the KRI on the Iraqi government, the KRI acts similar to states that are in existence. This is because of its diplomatic relations which is, in contrast with the KRG itself, regarded as foreign policy. In addition, because of the presence of the KRG in the international domain, the KRI enabled itself to gain visibility in the international community. This visibility could be regarded as strengthened by the struggle for Kirkuk whereby inclusion of Kirkuk in the KRI will lead to economic and political stability in comparison with southern Iraq. Based on these focus points, the following chapter will describe the fundamental base of this thesis.

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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework

In this chapter the theoretical framework is given whereby the theory of FPA is used to provide an answer to the main question. One can distinguish different perspectives of how FPA can be theorized (Rose 1998: 145). With regards to this thesis, the most suitable perspective is the domestic politics of foreign policy. This is due to the notion that the KRI influences Iraq internally, as is described in the literature review. First, two perspectives of foreign policy are given. These are the perspectives by Rosenau and by Hill. Secondly, four internal factors within the domestic politics of foreign policy are further described.

2.1 Theory of FPA

According to Rosenau, foreign policy can be described as an “issue-area” (Rosenau 1967: 22-23). In this perspective, foreign policy consists of controversies within a society that are being conducted by attempts of the concerning society to maintain or change its external environment. As a result, the “issue-area” is made in which foreign policy is only regarded as an “issue” if the controversy is lasting and extending to large parts of the government (ibid.). Besides this perspective, Hill describes foreign policy as the total amount of official external relations organised and carried out by an independent actor in the international domain, whereby independent actors could be both state and non-state actors (Hill 2016: 4-6). In addition, the official external relations encompass outputs that are generated by both state and non-state actors which are present in all parts of the government (ibid.).

Although there is a difference in the context of both perspectives, Rosenau’s perspective is from the twentieth century and Hill’s perspective is from the contemporary century, the two perspectives could complement each other. As a result, a sufficient theory of FPA can be created in order to answer the main question. The perspective of Rosenau mentions the informal side of foreign policy due to the influence of the society on the official external relations. The perspective of Hill mentions the formal side of foreign policy due to the official external relations by an independent actor. However, it is a difficult task to distinguish which activities could be regarded as official external relations (Hill 2016: 4-6). Besides actions, statements and values, every official action at the international level performed by the concerning actor could be considered as foreign policy (ibid.).

In addition, foreign policy could be regarded as having a dual character (Hill 2016: 228; Kaarbo 2015: 190-191; Fearon 1998: 289-291). On the one hand, foreign policy is vulnerable to internal events and on the other hand, the consequences of foreign policy could affect these

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internal events (ibid.). This leads to the notion that both foreign and domestic politics could be regarded as distinct domains (Rosenau 1967: 24-29). However, this notion does not need to imply that these two domains are automatically separable. On the contrary, foreign and domestic politics are intertwined (Rosenau 1967: 30; Hill 2016: 233). This notion could be regarded as a two-level game as described by Robert D. Putnam (Putnam 1988: 434). In this two-level game international politics is regarded to have both a national and an international level, whereby at the national level domestic groups and politicians play a key role, and at the international level national governments meet the needs of domestic pressures where at the same time unfavourable consequences of foreign developments are being avoided (ibid.). However, because the national level does not only consist of domestic groups and politicians that can affect foreign policy, this perspective is not sufficient. According to the domestic politics of foreign policy, the internal structure of a state influences foreign policy (Rose 1998: 148). A general assumption within this perspective is that foreign policy is regarded as the product of the internal factors of a state. Certain internal factors can be distinguished (ibid.).

2.2 Resources

Questions related to resources are one of the internal factors that can influence foreign policy (Hill 2016: 233-234). Resources are linked to foreign policy due to certain fields within foreign policy, for example defence and trade promotion (ibid.). Both the national and international level put pressure on the distribution of resources. While pressure from the national level can be persistent, it is possible to ignore pressure from the international level (ibid.). The availability of resources has such an impact that it influences state authorities on making choices regarding the intensity of a certain policy, both nationally and internationally. When choosing a foreign policy with a high intensity, state authorities must be aware of higher expenditures. Examples of foreign policies with a high intensity are war or trade agreements (Clark et al. 2008: 763-764, 773). However, when a state has a high availability of resources one can imply that more foreign policies with a high intensity can be afforded compared to states with a low availability of resources (ibid.).

2.3 Domestic culture

Another internal factor that can influence foreign policy is the domestic culture of a state (Hill 2016: 235-238). This domestic culture consists of, among other things, social attitudes and political forces (ibid.). Social attitudes can be defined as behaviour patterns or conditioned

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responses to social incentives (LaPiere 1934: 230). Political forces could be actors such as political parties, political actions groups and influential personalities that are present in a state, whereby their actions could have a strong influence on both the economic and political stability of the concerning state (Hudson 2014: 144-145). This internal factor highlights the dual character of foreign policy. While certain social attitudes and political forces are likely to affect future foreign policy choices, these future foreign policy choices are likely to affect social attitudes and political forces as well (Hill 2016: 235-238). In most cases, before a foreign policy will be implemented, the concerning foreign policy will undergo a screening (Hudson 2014: 144-145). Due to this screening, the consequences for the domestic culture become clear, whereby highly intolerable foreign policy options will be dismissed, even if the option is beneficial for the state (ibid.).

2.4 Constitutional structure

Foreign policy can also be influenced by the constitutional structure of a state (Hill 2016: 238-241). This implies elements within a constitutional structure such as the relationship between the executive and the legislative branch of a state. A form of this relationship could result in a federal system, whereby individuals of a certain state are committed to the federal government and the government of the constituent state (Hill 2016: 238-241; Gunter and Yavuz 2005: 124). The fundament of federalism is the notion that self-rule and shared rule are combined whereby communal purposes can be accomplished (Elazar 1987: 5-6; Brancati 2004: 7-8). One of the characteristics of federal systems is that in many cases it is possible for constituents to create policies of their own (Hill 2016: 238-241). On the one hand, common policy-making is shared by both the federal government and the constituents. On the other hand, the respective integrities of the constituents are maintained because the activities of the federal government are organised and carried out in such a way they do not contradict with the self-rule of the constituents (Elazar 1987: 5-6). Another characteristic is that federal systems can function based on a separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branch. The separation of powers could be regarded as the prevention of concentration of power within foreign policy actions of the executive branch (Hill 2016: 238-241; Gunter and Yavuz 2005: 124).

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2.5 Nationalism

A fourth internal factor that can influence foreign policy, is nationalism (Hill 2016: 251). Nationalism is regarded as a suitable instrument for actors who are part of the authority of a state to strengthen their legitimacy and stabilize their rule (ibid.). The link between nationalism and foreign policy can be found in the notion that the way in which a state manages its international relations can possibly validate or contradict nationalism (Tuminez 2000: 4-17). The choice for a certain action in foreign policy can have two outcomes. On the one hand, it can undermine the rule of state authorities and on the other hand, it can support the rule of state authorities (ibid.). The first outcome is likely to be influenced by certain groups within a state who might seek to become part of the state’s authority, to change the formulation or implementation of foreign policy, or to bring their own state into being. As a result, state authorities might be forced to continue with other foreign policy options (ibid.).

2.6 Conclusion

Due to describing the theory of FPA and the four internal factors that can influence foreign policy, the fundamental base for this thesis has been created. However, to apply this fundamental base on the KRI, the following chapter describes how this is achieved due to describing the method, the indicators and the data that are used.

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Chapter 3 Methodology

To provide an answer to the main question, a case study in combination with a literature study is used. The case is encompassed by the KRI. Within this case study the focus is put on the four internal factors of the domestic politics of foreign policy. In the following, both the operationalization and data for each internal factor are described.

3.1 Operationalization: resources

To measure the first internal factor, the indicator ‘energy policy’ is used. The choice for this indicator is made with regards to the importance hydrocarbons have on Iraq (Stansfield 2010: 1400-1401). A successful management of this sector is important for the economic well-being of Iraq (ibid.). However, no clear data on which policies the Iraqi government had implemented or rejected and whether there were higher expenditures or not, were accessible. Despite this, the data for this indicator is diverse. The data sources of this internal factor consist of primary data from the KRG and the World Bank. In addition, existing literature, reports from the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), news articles, and previously taken interviews are used.

3.2 Operationalization: domestic culture

The indicator for the second internal factor is encompassed by ‘political parties’. Due to the restricted time frame for this thesis, the choice is made to put the focus on the two main political parties in the KRI which are the KDP and the PUK (Gunter 1996: 226-231). In contrast with the indicator for the first internal factor, there was not much primary data available for the indicator ‘political parties’. Mainly with regards to the activities of both the KDP and the PUK. Certain obstacles such as the language of the official KDP website and the limited access to the official website of the PUK made it difficult. However, the official website of the KRG did provide data for this thesis. The data for this indicator is encompassed by primary data from the KRG, existing literature, a news article, a report from Foreign Policy, and previously taken interviews.

3.3 Operationalization: constitutional structure

With regards to the third internal factor, the focus is put on federal systems. The first indicator is encompassed by ‘international policies’ and the second indicator is encompassed by ‘organizational structure’. The choice for these indicators is made with regards to the

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characteristics of federal systems. Similar to the indicator for the first and the second internal factor, the data for both of these indicators is encompassed by several sources. The data consists of primary data from the KRG and the Iraqi government, existing literature, a report from National Interest and a previously taken interview.

3.4 Operationalization: nationalism

The indicator for the fourth internal factor is encompassed by ‘attitudes towards nationalism’. As mentioned earlier, the choice for a certain action in foreign policy can have two outcomes, undermining the rule of state authorities or supporting the rule of state authorities (Tuminez 2000: 4-17). For instance, when attitudes of the Kurds in the KRI towards their own nationalism aren’t strong, then it is more likely that the rule of state authorities is supported. However, in the case of strong attitudes, the first outcome is more likely. To study this, the data for this indicator mainly consists of previously taken interviews with influential individuals within the KRG. In addition, primary data from the Iraqi government, a report from the CFR and existing literature are used.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the four internal factors of the domestic politics of foreign policy have been operationalized, whereby the necessary tools for answering both the sub-questions and the main question have been obtained. In the following four chapters, each internal factor is studied separately.

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Chapter 4 The influence of resources

This chapter provides an answer to the first sub-question: “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through resources?”. The indicator that is chosen to measure this internal factor is ‘energy policy’. In the course of this chapter, it becomes clear that the Iraqi government and the KRG show differences in their activities in the hydrocarbon sector of Iraq. The main difference is that the KRG is using the available resources in a more efficient way. In the case description, the focus is put on the strategies of KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources through which it aspires to achieve its energy policies.4

4.1 First strategy of the KRG

The first strategy is to make the KRG a dependable, stable and secure provider of hydrocarbons to international markets (Ministry of Natural Resources KRG 2013). As in the literature review is stated by Hadji, the KRI and its authorities are recognized by the Iraqi government (Hadji 2009: 525-527). Despite this recognition, the KRG remains dependent because its budget consists mainly of oil revenues from the Iraqi government (Mansurbeg and Paasche 2014: 114-115). According to the Deputy Prime Minister of the KRG, Qubad Talabani, 90 per cent of KRG’s budget consists of the oil revenues (Glasser 2017). However, this budget experiences major fiscal shortages because of halting payments from the Iraqi government (ibid.). Deputy Prime Minister Talabani mentions that although the KRG and the Iraqi government have a prosperous relationship in the security domain, this is not present in the economic domain (ibid.). Because on the one hand the KRI is enclosed by the Iraqi government and on the other hand it is longing for economic independence, a potential market for KRG’s oil is Turkey (ICG 2012). By creating routes through Turkey in order to export hydrocarbons independently from the Iraqi government, the KRG is assuring itself that it receives revenues even if the Iraqi government is halting payments (Mansurbeg and Paasche 2014: 114-115). An example is the pipeline from the KRI to Turkey through which the KRG can export oil (The Spectator 2017: 3).

As is described in the theoretical framework, the distribution of resources is dependent on both the national and international level. At the national level, the consequences of Saddam

4 Due to the restricted time frame for this thesis, only the first three strategies are further described. For the other strategies of KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources, see: http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/the-ministry/legal-framework/our-policies. Accessed 9 January 2019.

For the energy policies of KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources, see: http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/the-ministry/legal-framework/our-policies. Accessed 9 January 2019.

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Hussein’s regime caused the Iraqi government to fall behind in comparison with the KRG. In order to develop and maintain a prosperous economy, the Iraqi government has a high reliance on the hydrocarbon sector (Stansfield 2010: 1400-1401). Only after Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Iraqi government gained the ability to start the export of hydrocarbons and in doing so, recover its hydrocarbon sector (ibid.). However, the existence of KRG’s energy policies and KRG’s engagement in international markets intensifies the existing situation in the rest of Iraq (ibid.). Despite the high availability of resources, the Iraqi government can not afford foreign policies with a high intensity due to less efficient use of resources. Due to the prosperous start of the KRG in post-Saddam Iraq, the KRG has been able to make better use of the available resources in Iraq. This influences the Iraqi government at the international level. Economic relations with the KRG are preferred by other states, such as Turkey, to relations with the Iraqi government.

4.2 Second strategy of the KRI

The second strategy is that the KRG needs to attract skilful international companies to invest in the KRI by offering production sharing contracts (Ministry of Natural Resources KRG 2013). As is stated as well by Hadji, according to the Constitution of Iraq, the KRG has the ability to control its own hydrocarbon sector and in doing so, establishing its own energy policies (Hadji 2009: 525-527). Despite the draft of an oil law in 2007 by the KRG and the dozens of signed contracts with international oil companies, independently from the Iraqi government, the KRG is actually not able to export its own oil without both the permission and assistance of the Iraqi government (ICG 2012).

However, President Barzani states that the agreements and contracts that the KRG makes with international companies are legitimate (Asharq Al-Awsat 2009). When focussing on President Barzani, one can notice that he is dedicated that the agreements and contracts of the KRG with international companies are not going to be annulled, even if the Iraqi government has not given permission or assistance (ibid.). According to President Barzani, the aspirations of the KRG are not only relevant for the KRI but also for Iraq as a whole (ibid.). The steadiness of President Barzani that can be drawn from his statements, emphasizes that pressure from the national level is not easy to be ignored. As a result, due to the continuation of the activities of the KRG, the difference in the efficient use of resources between the Iraqi government and the KRG remains maintained.

In addition, the lasting effects of the Saddam Hussein regime did not only influence the use of the available resources by the Iraqi government. It was also made difficult for

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international companies to operate in Iraq due to the instability in the region (Otterman 2005; Mansurbeg and Paasche 2014: 117). This implies that Iraq’s high availability of resources because of its geographical location, does not guarantee that it also leads to higher revenues. Instead, the wealth in hydrocarbons, due to the location of the KRI, combined with the stability in the region has attracted international companies to explore and make use of the KRI (ICG 2012). This influences the Iraqi government because due to the low revenues, foreign policies with a high intensity can not be afforded.

4.3 Third strategy of the KRI

The third strategy is that the KRG works with the Iraqi government to ensure the establishment of fair and transparent oil and gas and revenue-sharing laws for Iraq (Ministry of National Resources KRG 2013). According to the Iraqi government, the KRG is acting in contrast with this strategy (ICG 2012). Instead of working together with the Iraqi government, the KRG is not taking any attempt to create one federal hydrocarbons law (ibid.). According to President Barzani, the Iraqi government is acting in contrast with the third strategy (Asharq Al-Awsat 2009). He states that the Iraqi government received many opportunities to develop its hydrocarbon sector. However, the opposite was achieved whereby support from the KRG was rejected (ibid.). As described earlier in this chapter with regards to the first strategy, the KRG created a pipeline from the KRI to Turkey. President Barzani adds that the revenues gained by this export of oil could go to the Iraqi government, whereby the KRG takes its own share as is stated in the Constitution of Iraq (ibid.). In addition, in a speech by the Prime Minister of the KRG, Nechirvan Barzani, at the CWC oil and gas conference in 2012, he stated that in order to develop a modern and sustainable hydrocarbon sector, every action of the KRG with regards to oil and gas is created to develop the hydrocarbon sector of Iraq (Barzani 2012).

Today, there is still little political trust between the KRG and the Iraqi government (World Bank 2018). After the independence referendum in the KRI, the Iraqi government started to regain control of all areas which were the centre of discussions between the KRG and the Iraqi government. One of these areas was Kirkuk (ibid.). As described in the literature review by Rafaat, Kirkuk is important for both the Iraqis and the Kurds (Rafaat 2008: 252-253). Including Kirkuk in the KRI will make the KRI for instance more economically stable. The retake of Kirkuk led to the loss of half of KRG’s income due to oil export (World bank 2018). In contrast with the first and the second strategy, the implications of this strategy show that national pressure can be ignored. Although the KRG intents on continuing with its activities in the hydrocarbon sector, the KRG remains in the first place dependent on the Iraqi

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government. This shows that the Iraqi government has a central position in Iraq. The response of the Iraqi government after the independence referendum implies that the economic relationship between the KRG and Turkey is regarded as a threat by the Iraqi government. It could be considered as Kurdish independence being encouraged indirectly, mainly because of the notion that Turkey has not closed its border with the KRI despite the establishment of the independence referendum (Mansurbeg and Paasche 2014: 117; The Spectator 2017: 3). In addition, the Iraqi government might consider the KRG as its competition due to KRG’s activities in the economic domain. It is remarkable that although the KRG has mentioned multiple times that every action in the hydrocarbon sector is beneficial for the Iraqi government because of the share of revenues, the Iraqi government seems to take any actions in order to prevent the support of the KRG.

4.4 Conclusion

The answer to the first sub-question is multifaceted. The descriptions of the first three strategies with regards to the achievement of KRG’s energy policies, showed different ways through which the KRG is influencing the foreign policy of Iraq. Despite the high availability of resources, the Iraqi government is not able to implement foreign policies with a high intensity. On the one hand, the lasting effects of Saddam Hussein’s regime led to low revenues due to the inefficient use of the available resources in Iraq. On the other hand, it has become less attractive for international companies to invest in Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector due to the instability in southern Iraq. This emphasizes the weak position of the Iraqi government in the international community, both economically and politically. The KRI has a high availability of resources as well, but through efficient use in combination with stability in the region, it has become more attractive for other states to have economic relations with the KRG. However, the third strategy showed the perspective of the Iraqi government of its position towards the KRG. Its response to the independence referendum emphasized that national pressure like international pressure can be ignored.

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Chapter 5 The influence of domestic culture

This chapter provides an answer to the second sub-question: “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through domestic culture?”. The indicator that is chosen to measure this internal factor is ‘political parties’. The answer to this question is two-sided. On the one hand, the activities of both the KDP and the PUK, independently from the Iraqi government, emphasize that Iraq has two foreign policies. On the other hand, the KRG is influenced by the activities of the Iraqi government as well.

5.1 Activities of the KDP and the PUK

The KDP and the PUK are the two main political parties that have characterized the KRI till today (Beck 2014: 14; Fantappie and Hiltermann 2018). Prime Minister Barzani, who is a member of the KDP, undertakes several activities for example meetings with influential foreign individuals. Recent activities of Prime Minister Barzani are meetings with Cardinal Pietro Parolin who is the Secretary of State of the Vatican, Heiko Maas who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Hashimoto who is an ambassador of Japan and Stef Blok who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (KRG 2018a). In addition, Deputy Prime Minister Talabani, who is a member of the PUK, also has meetings with influential foreign individuals. Recent activities of Deputy Prime Minister Talabani are a meeting with Robert Karem who is an Assistant Secretary of Defence of the United States (US) and the attendance of a seminar consisting of Iranian representatives (KRG 2018b).

5.2 Ambitions of the KRG

As is described in the literature review by Barkey and Laipson, the political organization in the KRI is structured independently from the rest of Iraq (Barkey and Laipson 2005: 67-69). Despite that the political organization of the KRI remains dependent on the Iraqi government, the activities of both the KDP and the PUK show the ambitions of the two political parties. Besides, the engagement of the KRG in diplomatic relations are not onetime actions. The repeating activities of Prime Minister Barzani and Deputy Prime Minister Talabani show that there is persistence in these actions. In addition, this persistence is also visible in the diplomatic representations of the KRG in other states. The most visible example is that the KRG has its own DFR (Soguk 2015: 963-965). Besides these activities of both the KDP and the PUK, the independence referendum made the Iraqi government also aware again of the ambitions of the KRG. This influenced the Iraqi government because it cancelled all international flights to the

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KRI. The retake of Kirkuk by Iraqi forces was a step towards the reconstruction of an unified Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi government might have recruited the help of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Abdullah 2018: 115-116; The Spectator 2017: 3).

As is mentioned earlier in the theoretical framework, within domestic politics one can distinguish political forces which consist of actors such as political parties. The actions of these actors have the possibility to influence both the economic and political stability of a state. With regards to the political stability, the activities of both the KDP and the PUK emphasize the central position of the Iraqi government compared to the KRG. It also ensured that the Iraqi government could create stronger official external relations with its neighbouring states with Kurdish populations. Iraq’s neighbours are anxious that the ambitions of the KRG will lead as an example and make the aspirations for autonomy or even independence of their own Kurdish populations become reality (Katzman 2009: 2).

5.3 The influence on the KRG

Foreign policy choices will also have an impact on these political forces. When establishing the independence referendum, it is likely that President Barzani expected another response from the Iraqi government, the international community and the KRG (Fantappie and Hiltermann 2018). Due to President Barzani making it possible for citizens from the so-called disputed areas, which both the KRG and the Iraqi government claim as their own, to vote in the independence referendum as well, the Iraqi government retook these disputed areas by sending security forces (ibid.). Neighbouring state Iran positioned its trained and equipped Shiite groups against the Kurdish forces and neighbouring state Turkey took measures such as threats to close the border with the KRI (ibid.). The US also backed the Iraqi government because of two main reasons: to prevent any changes in the borders within the Middle East and to prevent possible threats to the rule of the Iraqi government (ibid.). As is described in the theoretical framework, it is common to have a screening before implementing a foreign policy. Due to the creation of stronger ties between the Iraqi government and other states as a result of the activities of the KDP and the PUK on behalf of the KRG, intolerable foreign policy options with regards to the KRI might still be implemented to halt the ambitions of the KRG.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided an answer to the second sub-question which is two-sided. Due to the activities of both the KDP and the PUK the Iraqi government became aware of the ambitions

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of the KRG. This was visible in the persistent diplomatic relations of the two political parties and the independence referendum of the KRG. An independent KRI implies changes in Iraq's relations with other states, changes in the borders within the Middle East and changes in the unity of Iraq. As a result of this awareness, the Iraqi government has been able to strengthen its official external relations with other states. However, choices in foreign policy also influence the political parties in the KRI. With regards to the KRI, the Iraqi government would implement intolerable foreign policies to halt the ambitions of the KRG and to hamper the KRG by creating obstacles in maintaining its prosperous economic relations. In addition, the response from the Iraqi government to the independence referendum passed over a clear message to the KRG that in the end only the Iraqi government has the right to rule over the territory of Iraq.

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Chapter 6 The influence of constitutional structure

In this chapter, the third sub-question is answered: “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through constitutional structure?”. The first indicator that is used to measure this internal factor is ‘international policies’ and the second indicator is ‘organizational structure’. Due to these two indicators, it becomes clear that the Iraqi government is able to strengthen its own position nationally and internationally because of how the composition of the Iraqi government is organised.

6.1 International policies of the KRG

KRG’s DFR states that according to the Constitution of Iraq, it is permitted for the KRG to have representative offices in other states (DFR of the KRG 2018). Due to this, the KRG is able to maintain the promotion of certain interests related to fields such as economy, culture and education (ibid.). The representative offices of the KRG in other states have as primary responsibilities to preserve and promote international awareness and interest in politics, culture, economy, education, and business and investment opportunities of the KRG (ibid.). The KRG does make a distinction between states which are of more interest to the KRG. This distinction is based on for instance deep-rooted relations or the number of Kurdish diaspora living in one of those states (ibid.). Furthermore, international business is something that is valued among the KRG. According to the KRG, its “liberal investment law” promotes the general openness of the KRG towards the international community (ibid.).

6.2 Effectiveness of the Iraqi government

As is described by Soguk in the literature review, the Kurds from the KRI have succeeded in gaining visibility due to the engagement of the KRG in the international domain (Soguk 2015: 963-965). The first indicator emphasizes that the KRG is indeed able to locate itself as the government of the KRI in the international domain independently from the Iraqi government. However, despite that the KRG acts in accordance with the Constitution of Iraq, the views towards how federalism is interpreted by both the Iraqi government and the KRG are different (Alkadiri 2010: 1318). According to Deputy Prime Minister Talabani, the Iraqi government has always been a proponent of centralization (Glasser 2017). Several political parties within the Iraqi government have tried to modify articles in the Constitution of Iraq regarding decentralization (Alkadiri 2010: 1318). The KRG has always been a proponent of

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decentralization, but with the side note that in the first place they are bound to the foreign policy of Iraq (ibid.).

As is described in the theoretical framework, foreign policy consists of official external relations whereby every official action by an independent actor at the international level can be considered as foreign policy. The KRG is influencing the Iraqi government due to their official external relations which emphasizes the formal side of foreign policy. This implies that Iraq has two different foreign policies, whereby the foreign policy of Iraq is not only focused outside of Iraq but also within Iraq itself. In addition, the KRI is influencing the Iraqi government as part of the Iraqi society which emphasizes the informal side of foreign policy. The different views about how the constitutional structure in Iraq should be organised and the contradicting actions of both the Iraqi government and the KRG, indicate lasting controversies within the society of Iraq which contribute to the “issue area”. As a result, the foreign policy of Iraq is more focused on hampering the KRG instead of focusing on recovering its own position in the international community.

6.3 Organizational structure of the Iraqi government

Since 2005 Iraq is regarded as a sovereign, independent and federal state. Within this state, one can distinguish a republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic system in which the government is structured.5 In addition, in Article 3 of the Constitution of Iraq, it is stated that Iraq has diverse nationalities, religions, and sects whereby in Article 4 it is stated that both the Arabic and the Kurdish language are regarded as Iraq’s official languages.6 The Constitution of

Iraq was established with the Iraqi’s themselves as well as with the participation of the Kurds (Barkey and Laipson 2005: 66-67). Mainly the quest of the Kurds for federalism and other issues related to their status in Iraq had a high influence in the establishment of the Constitution of Iraq (ibid.). In Figure 1 and in Figure 2 the compositions of the KRG and the Iraqi government in 2018 are shown.

5 Article 1 of the Constitution of Iraq, see:

http://www.iraqiembassy.us/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution_of_Iraq_0.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2019.

6 Article 3 and Article 4 of the Constitution of Iraq, see:

http://www.iraqiembassy.us/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution_of_Iraq_0.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2019.

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Figure 17

The composition of the KRG in 2018 Executive branch8

Legislative branch9 Parliament

New Generation Movement Coalition toward Reform Age

Turkmen Development Party Nation

Turkmen Front

Coalition of National Union

Goran Movement

Al-Rafidain

The Peoples’ Council of the Chaldeans, Syriac and Assyrians The Turkman Reform

Armenian KDP PUK Freedom

Kurdistan Islamic Group

7 With regards to the theoretical framework of this thesis, only the executive and the legislative branch have been shown in Figure 1.

8 The executive branch of the KRG is made up of the President, Deputy President and Ministers. For the President and Deputy President of the KRG, see KRG a:

http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=316&p=226. Accessed 12 January 2019.

For the Ministers of the KRG, see KRG b: http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=318&p=228. Accessed 12 January 2019.

9 For the Parliament of the KRG, see KRG c:

http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/Default.aspx?page=members&c=Presidency-Member2018. Accessed 12 January 2019.

President Masoud Barzani

Deputy President Kosrat Rasul Ali

Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani

Cabinet Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani

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Figure 210

The composition of the Iraqi government in 2018

Executive branch11

Cabinet

Min. of Agriculture - Salih Al-Husni Min. Communications - Naim Al-Rubai

Min. of Construction, Housing, & Public Municipalities - Bengin Rekani Min. of Electricity - Luay Al-Khatib

Min. of Finance - Fuad Husayn

Min. of Foreign Affairs - Muhammad Ali Al-Hakim Min. of Health & Environment - Ala Al-Alwan Min. of Industry & Minerals - Salih Al-Jaburi Min. of Labor & Social Affairs - Basim Al-Rubai Min. of Oil - Thamir Ghadban

Min. of Trade - Muhammad Hashim Min. of Transportation - Abdallah Luaybi Min. of Water Resources - Jamal Al-Adali Min. of Youth & Sports - Ahmad Al-Ubaydi Governor, Central Bank of Iraq - Ali Al-Allaq Ambassador to the US - Farid Yasin

Permanent Representative to the UN - Muhammad Bahr Al-Ulum Legislative branch12

10 With regards to the theoretical framework of this thesis, only the executive and the legislative branch have been shown in Figure 2.

11 The executive branch of the Iraqi government consists of three Kurdish politicians: President Barham Salih, Min. of Construction, Housing and Public Municipalities Bengin Rekani, and Min. of Finance Fuad Husayn. For the executive branch, see CIA a: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/IZ.html. Accessed 12 January 2019.

12 Within the legislative branch of the Iraqi government four Kurdish political parties are represented: KDP, PUK, Goran Movement and New Generation Movement. For the legislative branch, see CIA b:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. Accessed 12 January 2019. President Barham Salih Deputy President Nouri Al-Maliki Osama Al-Nujaifi Ayad Alawi Aya Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi Council of Representatives Al Sa’irun Alliance Al Fatah Alliance Al Nasir Alliance KDP

State of Law Coalition Wataniyah

National Wisdom Trend PUK

Iraqi Decision Alliance Anbar Our Identity Goran Movement

New Generation Movement Other

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6.4 Representation of the Kurds in the Iraqi government

Since 2005 Kurdish politicians have been represented in the governments in post-Saddam Iraq (Barkey and Laipson 2005: 68-69). In 2018 four Kurdish political parties, as is shown in Figure 2, were represented within the legislative branch of the Iraqi government. In Figure 1 is shown that these political parties were also members of the KRG’s Parliament. Furthermore, in Figure 2 is shown that in 2018 three positions within the executive branch of the Iraqi government were held by Kurdish politicians.

Despite that the current President of Iraq, Barham Salih, implies to be the head of the Iraqi government, he has mainly a symbolic position.13 Instead, the head of the Iraqi

government is encompassed by the Prime Minister of Iraq, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who has the decisive role in the government with regards to rejecting or implementing foreign policies.14 Although one of the tasks of President Salih is to ensure that the Iraqi government acts in accordance with the Constitution of Iraq, in reality the Iraqi government could be considered as acting in a centralized Iraq instead of a decentralized Iraq, according to Deputy Prime Minister Talabani (Glasser 2017). The second indicator emphasizes that the federal structure in Iraq does not make it possible for the KRG to really participate in both the shaping and implementation of the foreign policy of Iraq. Because of the limited power of the Kurdish politicians in the Iraqi government, the KRG can not directly influence the foreign policy of Iraq. Power within the Iraqi government is most concentrated in the executive branch which negates the representation of the KRI in the legislative branch of the Iraqi government. This implies that the second characteristic of federal systems, the separation of power between the executive and the legislative branch, is actually not relatable with regards to the Iraqi government.

6.5 Conclusion

The first indicator emphasized the formal side of foreign policy due to KRG’s official external relations. Iraq could be considered as having two foreign policies, whereby it is remarkable that this implies that the foreign policy of Iraq is also focused within Iraq itself. The first indicator also emphasized the informal side of foreign policy. Iraq’s foreign policy is influenced by the

13 Article 67 of the Constitution of Iraq, see:

http://www.iraqiembassy.us/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution_of_Iraq_0.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2019.

14 Article 78 of the Constitution of Iraq, see:

http://www.iraqiembassy.us/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution_of_Iraq_0.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2019.

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different perspectives within the Iraqi society on how the constitutional structure in Iraq should be organised. On the one hand, Iraqis see Iraq as a centralized state. On the other hand, Kurds see Iraq as a decentralized state. The actions taken by both the Iraqis and the Kurds lead to controversies. The persistent view of a decentralized Iraq among the Kurdish part of the Iraqi society maintains the implementation of official external relations by the KRG. As a result, an obstacle in establishing an effective government in Iraq has been created. However, the second indicator emphasized that as a result of these controversies, the executive branch within the Iraqi government, where Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi is the head of, can implement foreign policies that could be detrimental to the KRI but beneficial for the rest of Iraq by how the concentration of power is structured in the Iraqi government.

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Chapter 7 The influence of nationalism

This chapter provides an answer to the fourth sub-question: “Does the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq influence the foreign policy of Iraq through nationalism?”. The indicator that is used to measure this internal factor is ‘attitudes towards nationalism’. Although Kurdish politicians are content with autonomy only, the aspirations towards independence are present as well. These aspirations are visible in the actions of the KRG which undermine the rule of the Iraqi government.

7.1 Attitudes towards nationalism within the KRI

In post-Saddam Iraq, the Kurds became the second-largest group in the Council of Representatives within the Iraqi government (Van Wilgenburg 2012: 48-50). During the establishment of the Constitution of Iraq in 2005, the Kurds were able to put Article 140 in this Constitution which consists of three important points regarding the Kurds’ position in Iraq and in the international community. These points are normalization, a national census, and a referendum among the citizens of the KRI to decide about the future of the KRI (ibid.). However, the Iraqi government was not coerced by the international community to implement Article 140 (ibid.).15 Implementation of Article 140 will make the KRI a strong constituent within Iraq. That is one of the reasons why the KRG is determined to protect and implement the Constitution of Iraq (O’Leary 2007: 37-39; Barkey and Laipson 2005: 68-69; Alkadiri et al. 2012).

In addition, the KRI is showing to both Iraq and the international community that it can function independently from the Iraqi government (Van Wilgenburg 2012: 48-50; Cook 2013). Besides the establishment of its own oil and gas laws, and its signed contracts with international oil companies, Iraqis who want to cross the border from southern Iraq to northern Iraq, have to register with security services or undergo checks at Kurdish checkpoints. Furthermore, instead of Arabic, English is the other main language that has the preference in the KRI, despite the fact that both Kurdish and Arabic are the official languages of Iraq according to the Constitution of Iraq (Van Wilgenburg 2012: 48-50; Cook 2013).

15 Article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq, see:

http://www.iraqiembassy.us/sites/default/files/documents/Constitution_of_Iraq_0.pdf. Accessed 24 January 2019.

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7.2 Autonomy or independence?

As is mentioned in the theoretical framework, nationalism and foreign policy can be linked due to the way a state manages its foreign relations. The management of its foreign relations can either validate or contradict nationalism because of choices in foreign policy options. One outcome is that the rule of state authorities is undermined and another outcome is that the rule of state authorities is supported. With regards to this thesis, the first outcome is interesting to study further.

According to President Barzani, the ambition of establishing a Kurdish state is present (Asharq Al-Awsat 2009). In saying so, President Barzani is contradicting himself. He has also stated that even though all the requirements of an independent state are being met by the KRI, it is not the main motive of the KRG to actually become independent on condition that the Iraqi government is working in accordance with the Constitution of Iraq (Asharq Al-Awsat 2011). According to Deputy Prime Minister Talabani, there will be an independent Kurdish state (Glasser 2017). In an interview with Susan B. Glasser in The Global Politico, he states: “No, I—it’s my personal belief that Kurdistan will be independent one day. I think that’s—there’s an irresistible movement towards independence. Whether that’s now, whether that’s two years from now, whether that’s five 10 years from now, that train has left the station. It’s just a matter of whether it speeds up or slows down” (ibid.). He adds that independence can be considered as a process whereby the starting point is to put the focus within the KRI to create consensus about the views towards independence. After this, the focus can be put towards the Iraqi government (ibid.).

Although the Constitution of Iraq recognizes the KRI, the Iraqi government is not acting in line with what is stated in this Constitution, according to President Barzani (Asharq Al-Awsat 2009). He believes that the Iraqi government actually wants the KRI not to have an own government (ibid.). In addition, according to President Barzani, the Kurds are not demanding more than what is stated in the Constitution of Iraq. Remarkable is that he states that the demands of the Kurds can not be labelled as “Kurdish” but as “Iraqi-Kurdish” (ibid.). The partnership they want in Iraq is not a partnership between Kurds and Iraqis, but between the citizens of Iraq. In other words, the demands of the Kurds are beneficial for Iraq as a whole (ibid.). This is not only according to President Barzani but also regarded as such by the views of other members within the KRG as is mentioned in the literature review by Mohammed and Owtram. An example is KRG’s Head of DFR who mentions that the interests of the KRG and the Iraqi government are not contradicting (Mohammed and Owtram 2014: 68-72).

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The way the Iraqi government manages its foreign relations validates the attitudes towards Iraqi nationalism but contradicts the attitudes towards Kurdish nationalism. The attitudes towards Kurdish nationalism are strengthened which is reflected in both the continuation of the activities of the KRG in the international domain and the present aspirations towards the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Although the KRG states that it is not acting in contrast with the Iraqi government, its response to the Iraqi government implies an undermining of the rule of state authorities.

7.3 Conclusion

The indicator ‘attitudes towards nationalism’ emphasized that the Kurdish quest for independence remains maintained because it keeps being mentioned by Kurdish politicians. Although Kurdish politicians agree on improving the relationship between the Iraqi government and the KRG, the persistence in the activities of the Kurdish politicians shows the contradiction in their words and actions. In addition, the foreign policy choices of the Iraqi government contradict the attitudes towards Kurdish nationalism. As a result, the attitudes towards Kurdish nationalism are being strengthened. This is reflected in the attitude that the KRI draws towards the rest of Iraq, such as the official border crossing from the south to the north. Also because Arabic is not considered a main language within the KRI. This implies that there is an undermining of the rule of the Iraqi government by the KRG. Despite the negligence of the Iraqi government with regards to the implementation of articles of the Constitution of Iraq, the KRG continues with the "rights" they have according to this Constitution.

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