Twenty-First Century Politics: The Power of Populism in France and Germany

(1)

Thesis Submission to

The Faculty of Humanities of Leiden University In partial fulfilment of the requirements for

The Degree of Master of Arts In International Relations

By

Nick Berger

s1260812

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Eelco van der Maat Word count: 10739

Leiden 26.06.2017

(2)

Truth is not the first casualty of war alone: it is the first casualty of

populism

(5)

1. Introduction

The European Union saved millions of lives of asylum seekers when it allowed them to enter Europe as refugees from war-torn countries of the Middle East. This accomplishment may one day be regarded as Europe’s finest hour and could pave its way into the classrooms and history books of European generations of the future. However, the refugee crisis also revealed some repulsive sentiments of native populations in Western Europe towards the new arrivals. Old and new right-wing populist parties began to rise. Contemporary populist magniloquence utilized a narrative of fear and anxiety.

The surge of populist rhetoric became noticeable in the media at the beginning of the (Syrian) refugee crisis. This has been particularly apparent in the media of Western European countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands (Hameleers et al., 2017). The consequences became obvious when populist rhetoric turned into action on the streets. From 2015 onwards, the number of hate crimes and attacks on refugee shelters five folded in Germany alone. (ZEIT ONLINE, 2015).

To understand French and German polarization of right-wing populist parties in contemporary Europe, one must examine their impetus. The terrorist attacks of the recent years for instance stimulated feelings of anxiety. They led to the formation of mass movements against the new wave of Islamic terrorism in Europe. Right-wing parties supported the initialization of these mass demonstrations. However, they did not only march against terrorism. Right-wing movements also inflamed the situation by pointing out the cultural and religious otherness of refugees. Protests were specifically designed to radicalize the putatively neglected native population against new arrivals. At demonstrations, domestic inhabitants were frightened by the uncontrollable influx of refugees. Furthermore, cultural differentness was highlighted since refugees would presumably pose a threat to the Western way of life. As a result, demonstrations became ever more racially motivated and contagious. Protests and negative dispositions then began to slowly spill over into other regions.

(6)

Some local demonstrations in Germany quickly turned violent when arriving refugees were met by a stream of verbal abuse. Unfortunately, such hate crimes spiked throughout Germany. The situation then quickly escalated when arsons on refugee camps became recurring news in German media (Benček and Christian, 2016). In France, the temporary ban on Muslim swimsuits at public beaches eroded into a ferocious debate in politics. Pictures that circulated in French media have shown Muslimas being forced to remove their burkinis by French local Police. This sparked more controversy in France and started a debate on Muslim discrimination in Germany, expanding the discussion into other spheres of society (Ezli, 2016). Islamic terrorism and female Muslim garment were now mentioned in the same breath, indicating how bewildered the debate has become. The disputes in media that were once articulated with facts and common sense have now become depthless. This was to the benefit of populists as they refrain from the mind and speak with the heart.

Researching the popularity of populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany or National Front in France is therefore pivotal in understanding the recent successes of populism. A closer examination of their policies unveils an agenda in which cultural division and anti-globalization policies such as protectionism. However, these policies oftentimes simplify the complexity of politics and offer short-term solutions at best. They lack engagement into multilayered intricacies of issues at hand. Populists purposefully ignore the impact that their radical ideas would have on society. They infiltrate reasonable debates and cause havoc through the proposition of injudicious policies. Such policies are dangerous since they can potentially corrupt the economy on the long-term (Guiso et al. 2017).

The combination of economic protectionism and cultural resentments has been targeted at French and German Muslims as well Muslim refugees. To populists, this notion has become more favorable in recent years as it provided fertile ground for more radicalization and polarization within sections of the native population. Groups pertaining to such rhetoric have already entered regional legislation in Germany as well as general elections in France. This cannot be underestimated since populism can pose a serious threat to the functioning of the European Union. Europe would become extremely weak if France and Germany were not to work together as a combined political power. The

(7)

impulse of a united Europe in the 21st_{century is at stake. It is thus paramount to find}

new ways that can reinvigorate the European idea into the hearts of our citizens.

In the face of this new refugee crisis, German chancellor Angela Merkel was the first politician that brought actors of the European Union together. Her goal was to display steadfastness of the European Union. She articulated to the press that the challenge of refugees coming to Europe cannot be approached by just a few member states, but rather be overcome with the support of all. She highlighted to all member states of the European Union that Germany is prepared to manage the point at issue from hand to hand. She was obtained consent and respect by some member states for her great leadership Europe, which already became visible in the aftermath of the 2011 nuclear panic in Japan (Noack, 2016). At that time she took measures in her own hands by implementing progressive policies for old nuclear reactors, sparking an energy transition. During the refugee crisis, she again displayed decisive leadership by steering the course of the European Union with confidence and determination.

However, some segments of the population within France and Germany responded with negative acknowledgement or downright apathy to Merkel’s refugee policy. These groups endanger the European vision of mutual progress and further integration. Right-wing populist parties for example utilize the uncertainty in France and Germany with relentless assaults on the path Europe has taken. The concurrent causes that might expound the rise of populist popularity in Germany and France are therefore the main focus of this thesis.

1.1. Research Question

My thesis investigates the rise in popularity of right-wing populism in Germany and France. This observable phenomenon brings a challenge to established parties in contemporary politics. On the one hand, established parties defend the principles of the European idea. On the other hand, they must necessarily engage with issues that populists have put forward as they polarize society at large (Adam et al., 2016). I presume that the loss of trust into the European idea has become more substantial with the arrival of refugees in 2015, thus adding more constrains on policies proposals of

(8)

established parties. While it seems almost natural to assume the refugee crisis to be a cause of populist successes in the recent years, I rather consider it one of many possible answers. I instead suppose that the refugee influx has become the trigger mechanism that made populist sentiments more acceptable in society. If true, then this aspect can explain the outset of mass demonstrations and political debates colored by populists sentiments on current issues as they now find themselves within the political discourse. However, the rise of populism cannot be explained by the refugee crisis alone. Developing a deeper understanding on the multitude of conditions can therefore help to expound why populism has risen in the recent years. This aspect is paramount to my thesis.

My research attempts to provide possible explanations to the following question: What are the causes of the growth of populism in Western Europe? To fully investigate what conditions led to the growth of populism, I must narrow down my research question. I refine my question by examining only two Western European countries. Narrowing down my scope to only two members of the EU will help me identifying and potential conditions. I cross-examine France and Germany to point out differences and similarities on how the reputation of populism rose. I furthermore focus on these two countries as they are among the strongest member states of the European Union, while at the same time, neighbors. The geographic proximity of France and Germany helps me in formulating a general theory if observations are congruent. Also, both countries play similar roles as key players within the European Union, proposing significant domestic and foreign policies to member states. The specification of my research question should help me in reaching conclusions on the increasing popularity of populism. In order to identify the possible reasons in both case studies, I ask: what factors caused the rise of populist popularity in France and Germany since 2015? The focus of my research is not on how populist parties were established in the recent years. This thesis puts less focus on the supply side of populism. Instead, I examine the demand side of populism. By investigating why populations feel that supporting populism is a viable alternative to established parties, I expect to identify the causes of populist growth. The demand side is therefore of greater relevance to my thesis than the supply side. I also assume that native populations are eventually observing the overwhelming

(9)

support for refugees in the media as excessive. The astounding support of foreigners might then generate an impression of being forgotten. If my assumption is correct, then the demand side for populism has been self-created since segments of native populations felt ignored by established parties.

Predicted Explanations

I examine the rise of populist popularity on the basis of three independent variables. Albeit separate issues at first, I attempt to highlight the linkage of all three with this thesis. Firstly, I assume the competition over limited resources to be a precondition for populist sentiments to rise. I define them in my thesis as economic grievances. These grievances are critical to my assumption on populist polarization. Secondly, I predict social dissatisfactions to help populism in becoming stronger since populist parties enhance cultural resentments. For instance, the perception of foreigners migrating into a European host country is dependent on how different their languages, religions and customs are in comparison to those of the native population. If they consider Islam as a threat to their way of life, as populists claim, then I can identify cultural resentments as a possible cause. The rise of xenophobic attitudes against Muslims in Germany and France as well as against refugees from Muslim countries should provide ample evidence. Lastly, I expect the changing nature of the job market to create victims of modernization, where outsourcing and technological advancements fuel anxieties of native populations. I suspect parts of the population to perceive themselves as left behind in the competitiveness of an interconnected Europe, causing individuals to question their position within the intertwined European Union. I assume the inability of established parties to meet these segments of the population (or simply ignoring them) as a further factor that explains the rise of populism.

I assume that certain factors must be displayed in sufficient conditions for the emergence of populism. The circumstances that caused the rise of populist rhetoric might stem from the inability of established parties to reach consensus in a short time. For instance, the debates in the French and German media during the refugee crisis caused diffusion among ruling parties. Some urged their party leaders to analyze the

(10)

consequences of their choices more closely, while others insisted on opening up borders for all refugees from the Middle East. In the beginning of the discussion, the predominant narrative was on possible security risks such as the influx of Islamic terrorist among refugees or on the fragility of the economy. However, controversies within media and politics quickly spread from the political arena to the common people in which narratives of common people, media and political actors collided.

1.2. Scope of Review

A thorough analysis of right-wing populism will follow in my chapters. Currently, there are large numbers of studies conducted on Brexit, the election of Trump and right-wing populist rhetoric of politicians like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands or Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom. However, I will not examine the abovementioned people, events or countries. My focus on the rise of populism is narrowed down to the case studies on France and Germany alone. The scope is limited to contemporary politics and events that could explain the rise of populism in those two countries. The limitations of this thesis are thus the variables time and location as I focus primarily on recent developments of populism in France and Germany since 2015.

(11)

2. Characteristics of Populism

What characteristics are crucial to the rise of a populist party? While I focus predominantly on the demand side of populism, it is nevertheless crucial to understand the nature of contemporary populist parties. In this chapter I examine factors that are integral to the success of populist groups. Golder (2016) visualized the characteristics of different populist parties in four circles that explain how populism is coordinated within a framework. The figure below illustrates how these four distinctive circles intersect at two different sets.

Figure 1 Characteristics of populist parties (Golder, 2016)

Each circle represents a core ideological trait. Radicalism for instance favors extreme changes in the government since radical ideas seek to transform politics and behavior. They overlap with populism and nationalism while being disconnected from its antipode, extremism. On the opposite side to radicalism we find extremism, which overlaps with nationalism and populism, forming a ternary. This ternary of extremism, nationalism and populism is viewed as fanatic and akin to fascism. Such groups oppose the cultural

(12)

diversity in Europe while despising immigration and representative democracy (Goodwin, 2016). Fortunately, their representation is close to nonexistent in the political discourse.

However, populist parties converge successfully on an arrangement of radicalism, populism and nationalism. Rydgren (2005) refers to the combination of these characteristics as the master frame. The master frame merges anti-establishment sentiments with xenophobic tendencies. Is it thus fair to say that such traits suffice in explaining the current rise of right wing populist parties in France and Germany? I predict that it is insufficient to that claim. The following section therefore analyzes the demand side of populism to identify conditions that led to the rise of populism.

(13)

3. The Demand-Side of Populism

3.1. Introduction

This thesis investigates the demand-side of populism in order to highlight the interrelated nature of my proposed conditions. The demand-side of populism sheds light on why (native) populations mistrust establish parties and instead prefer to support right-wing populist parties. My proposed conditions analyze and point out the nature of domestic populist voters by establishing who they are. The perception of native populations with regards to these conditions in France and Germany play a crucial role in explaining the recent rise of populism. The conditions introduced on the demand-side are therefore designed to translate and break down the electoral behavior of potential voters. I define my three conditions as cultural resentments, victims of modernization and economic grievances.

3.2. Cultural resentments

The first condition discussed to describe success of right wing populist parties is cultural resentments, which is the discontent or native populations towards those that are culturally different. I analyze two theories that provide potential answers to the popularity of populism. The first theory examines the mobilization of the masses. Ivarsflaten (2008) argues that right wing parties cannot be successful unless they mobilize resentments over immigration. A closer examination of the agendas of the Front National and the Alternative For Germany support this notion. In France, Marine Le Pen has gathered more than 2.5 million web activists with messages on patriotism and anti-immigration that were shared on Facebook and Twitter. This new type of mobilization does not necessarily emerge on the streets, but rather accrue on social media. Social media groups such as the Au Nom Du Peuple (in the name of the people) have thusly brought mobilization from the streets to the internet (Fouquet, 2017).

(14)

In contrast, German groups such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) developed their representation on the streets. Mostly organized through online events on Facebook, in which location time and topics were published, their major goal has been the representation of the will of the people on the streets. They reached a record high on January 12th 2015 with more than 25.000 participants (Rucht, 2015). Participants were encouraged to either cheer or scold, depending on the topic discussed. For instance, slogans such as we are the people were met with overwhelming acclamation, while emphasis on Merkel, Europe or established parties were met with roars and derogatory language. PEGIDA and Au Nom Du Peuple both identify with homogeneity of their own people in contrast to established parties. Eventually, the cultural otherness of refugees becomes a bone of contention.

This notion is in accordance with the social identity theory presented by Tajfel (1979). The social identity theory describes individuals that naturally associate with other individuals akin to them. The association is related to the homogeneity of culture, language or political affiliation. This notion in turn creates a desire for people to become a group to boosting their self-esteem and provide further justification. This is done by perceiving their in-groupness as superior to any other group. The case studies on the Front National and the Alternative for Germany point to this in the later chapters. Populist parties exploited this perception by highlighting to native populations their prodigious cultural and behavioral norms, which are supposedly incompatible with those of immigrants. This argumentation, combined with Ivarsflaten theory on the mobilization of the masses, acts as possible explanation to the rise of populism. It furthermore shows that the social identity theory identifies the positive correlation of anti-immigrant rhetoric with the increase in right-wing populism. I assume this positive relation to lead to more support for right-wing popularity.

3.3. Victims of modernization

The second condition discussed to describe the success of right wing populist parties is victims of modernization. The European Integration is a reaction to the natural process of globalization and, at the same time, it’s most progressive expression since the Second World War (Castell, 2000). It has brought tremendous benefits to its citizens in

(15)

Europe and beyond. The divisions after the Second World War managed to heal with the help and prospect of the European Communities and, eventually, European Union. Economic opportunities grew steadily as countries in Europe began cooperating and promoting the European Single Market. For the past 60 years, Europe has also been a fortress of democracy and freedom. To this end, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 by the Norwegian Nobel Committee (Manners et.al. 2016). Europe contributed to the advancement of peace, democracy, human rights and reconciliation for over six decades in Europe (The Nobel Peace Prize 2012). It has not only evolved into a beacon of peace, but also advanced national enterprises into multinational co-operations on a European and international level. Today, transnational economies in Europe are tightly connected in the European political economy which fosters European Integration on the one hand, and globalization on the other.

Some citizens however saw globalization and modernization with incredulity. Populist parties manipulated this notion to gain votes and momentum by addressing parts of the population as the losers of modernization. These groups are (supposedly) unable to orient themselves in an ever more connected Europe (Mudde, 2011). To analyze this argument, I examine the modernization of post-cold war Europe. One scholar that supported this assertion is Betz (1994). He shed light on the adverse effects of modernization on workers and lower-level managers in postindustrial economies. Betz concluded that individuals, who once enjoyed a decent standard of living in the past, are now confronted with a modernized Europe in which they cannot compete. This resulted in resentments and frustrations alike. Mainstream parties had no proper antidote; they were either not apt to offer solutions or simply ignored this growing concern. At this point, individuals felt not only left behind but turned to those promising hasty remedy; right-wing populist parties.

Does the notion of being a victim of modernization automatically lead to the support for right-wing parties? The burden and pressure on the individual citizen due to modernization was firstly consoled by populist parties as a collective struggle (Minkenberg, 2000). These parties promised to alleviate the pressure and anxiety that the new modernization would bring. However, some authors such as Van der Brug et al. (2005) argue that this is not the case. The support for right-wing populism does not

(16)

necessarily stem from the notion of being a victim of modernization. Instead, their studies show that voters of right-wing populist parties are subserviently motivated and follow pragmatic considerations. Populist parties do not solely rely on the idea of victims of modernization. Instead, they identify segments of the population that feel left behind by the government. They promise these groups that voting for right-wing populist parties within the electorate would roll back internationalization of the EU.

The chance of winning such voters is furthermore dependent on the general proportion of potential right-wing voters. To this end, right-wing parties compete with other (traditional) parties, convincing voters that their concerns are best represented within the right-wing spectrum. It is therefore insufficient to expound the rise of right-wing populist parties just on the basis of modernization and those left behind. Modernization is tightly connected to the economy, especially in developed countries such as France and Germany.

3.4. Economic grievances

The third condition discussed to describe the success of right wing populist parties is economic grievances. Applying the realist conflict theory (Campbell 1965) should help me to explain the phenomenon of right-wing populist popularity. This theory argues that social groups encompassing conflicting interests must inevitably compete over limited resources. By doing so, the members of the in-group accuse an out-group for their economic misfortune. This translates into discriminating rhetoric and prejudices. Right-wing populist parties attempt to represent these in-groups by blaming minorities and migrants for economic misfortunes. The realist conflict theory is also supported by Golder’s (2003) argument. Support for the right populist parties is high whenever individuals perceive extreme levels of immigration. This hypothesis states that whenever voters believe that the rise of unemployment is related to an overflow of immigrants in society, right-wing populist parties will receive more electoral support.

The impact of unemployment as an aspect that expounds the success of right-wing populism has been under-researched. Few scholars investigated the relationship of unemployment, immigration and the possible support for right-wing parties as a result. I

(17)

therefore apply Dancygier’s (2010) findings since they draw from recent research on this topic. She argues that conflicts would not arise unless economic shortage prevails. Also, if immigrants receive support by the electorate during times of economic scarcity, conflicts are more likely to take place. Germany has seen the mobilization of many young people that offered spare material, shelter and food to arriving immigrants, whereas parts of the German native population that felt ignored received no attention and came away empty-handed. Their economic situation might put severe constraints their families too, however they have been left out of the discussion. The arrival of refugees led the German government to provide financial support and shelter. This financial assistance came out of the domestic budget, aggravating those that felt forgotten ever more. Right-wing populist parties then argued that immigrants get everything from state. At the same time, established parties paid little attention to this segment of population. As a result, extremist groups felt confident enough to set arsons on domestic properties that were converted into refugee shelters.

The situation became ever more heated as a result of remarks that were made by Germany’s vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel. He called out these extremists who set fire to refugee camps in the federal state of Saxony. To the media, he publicly said that such groups are a bunch of people that he would prefer to see incarcerated (ZEIT ONLINE, 2016). He later on pointed his middle finger at protesters swearing at him during a visit, a motion captured by the media. This attitude intensified the situation as it caused an even greater fissure in German society of the presumed us and them. Dancygier believes that such gaps between the native population and the establishment can lead to more immigrant-native conflicts. While extreme measures are undoubtedly horrific, moderate segments of the populations, who felt genuinely concerned, were excluded from the discussion. The atmosphere in Germany evolved into two camps that were either for or against refugees. The political conviction of those in favor of refugees did not allow for an opinion in between. However, concerned people existed and still exist. They were marginalized and were not able to participate in the discussion as they would be pushed into the extremist sphere. The attitude of some established parties, as shown by vice chancellor Gabriel, pushed concerned people into voting for the far right or populist parties in defiance of the establishment.

(18)

The literature shows another feature as a possible explanation to the rise in which the type of immigrant becomes crucial. For instance, noneconomic migrants who arrive on the basis of asylum put tremendous stress on the economy. The refugee crisis brought such a wave of noneconomic migrants into Europe. Hundreds of thousands of children, mothers, fathers and elderly refugees entered European countries and their respective economies in the past two years. These groups stretch the economic budget as they cannot enter the workforce immediately. If Dancygier’s assumption is correct, then the economic scarcity must translate into support for right-wing populism. The recent results of right-wing populist parties in France and Germany support this assumption.

Funke et al. (2016) offer another focal point in understanding the rise of these parties. The authors argue that policy uncertainty, which follows as a political aftershock of financial crises, can be so severe that they enable polarization in political spheres of left and right. They also demonstrate in their findings that right-wing parties can gain up to 30% more support in the aftermath of financial crises. While the increase of polarization makes crisis resolution more convoluted, they actually appear at times in which established parties must make decisive decisions enabling fast economic recovery. The authors’ main concern was to identify systematic shifts in voting behavior after a financial crisis. To this end, they examined all major financial crises in advanced economies since late 1900s. First and foremost, they identified changes in voter behavior after financial crises in general. Financial crises lead inevitably to short-term policy uncertainty. The political polarization furthermore increased after a financial crisis as well. The beneficiaries of these two interconnected changes are right-wing populist parties.

In the recent decades, populist parties have persuaded voters with their political rhetoric, xenophobia and nationalistic agenda. The rise of the current populist parties is therefore linked to observable changes in voter behavior. It becomes increasingly difficult for established parties to govern at times of financial crises as they impede the implementation of policies. Economic crises cause political fragmentation almost naturally. The population becomes anxious and seeks to find new groups that say what they want to hear. These answers are oftentimes provided by populists.

(19)

(20)

4. Methodology and Research Design

To answer my question on the rise of the popularity of populism, I will conduct an in-depth analysis of my two case studies. I wish to cover as much ground as possible in this thesis. However, there are limitations to the number of cases I can study. I purposefully choose France and Germany as they are (arguably) the two strongest members of the European Union in Western Europe. Both countries display their leadership skills in the EU, while simultaneously witnessing the rise of anti-EU sentiments in their (domestic) political arenas. I therefore want to investigate why the popularity of populism has accrued in both countries. Which factors have been crucial to this rise of populism and why has it been so in the recent years?

I suspect both cases to yield similar explanations. However, differences between the conditions that led to the rise in France and Germany are not impossible. My potential renditions, which I want to investigate in my case studies, have been discussed in my literature review. These are (in no specific order) economic grievances, cultural resentments and victims of modernization. If my assumptions were true, then I should observe the rise of populism to be dependent on a combination of these three factors. My research design applies the Explaining-Outcome process tracing proposed by Beach and Rasmus (2016). I am interested in fully explaining what caused the rise of populism in my two case studies. To that end, I work out all various factors that have potentially contributed to my outcome, yielding a minimally sufficient argument. I attempt to highlight the causal mechanism of my factors with that outcome. A causal mechanism is the theory of interdependent parts that transform causal factors from A (explanation) to B (outcome). In highlighting my outcome as the rise in popularity of populism, I investigate how my factors (economic grievances, cultural resentments and victims of modernization) have contributed to it. If they indeed are supportive to the rise of

(21)

populism, then this should help me in establishing a hypothesis that sufficiently argues in favor of my factors.

4.1.Observable implications

I predict that that some of my potential answers are more important than others. For instance, the factor victim of modernization is related to globalization and the advancement of new technologies. This rise goes hand in hand with the increase of inequality since the loss of market confidence in the Eurozone following the last financial crisis (Goda et al., 2017). In the developed markets of today, globalization always benefits the most competitive citizens, providing them with more opportunities. In contrast, more globalization leads to more competition for the least competitive citizens. Low to medium skilled workers cannot compete on a high level, thus adding stress and possible fears to their prospect of their future. Considering the situation of the social welfare system and the opportunities that might arise for them can cause anxieties, especially when thinking of one’s own children. To show that my condition victims of modernization are indeed a factor that explains the rise of populism, I should observe discussions on the new globalization in the agendas and policy proposals of the Alternative for Germany and National Front. If their political manifestations respond to this potential demand through the proposition of anti-globalization policies, then my case studies will highlight this as a factor. However, if my findings show that victims of modernization are less or not important in explaining the rise, then I can foreclose this factor and consider my other two possible explanations.

As highlighted in my literature review, I also suspect economic grievances to become increasingly important to populists. I expect this argument to be of crucial importance as it points out the scarcity of resources to the people in their domestic markets. If my assumption is correct, we should observe the competition of resources to focus on the theory of in-groups versus out-groups as proposed by Campbell (1965). If this is true, we should also notice populist parties designing their arguments in ways that portray refugees and non-economic migrants as beneficiaries of the system. Furthermore, we should observe the proposition of short-term policies by populist parties that promise to rejuvenate the economy. If we see an increase of apathy towards established parties,

(22)

then we can assume that the populist anti-establishment rhetoric was positively absorbed by the population, rendering this factor thusly as a potential explanation to the rise. This answer will then be investigated in my case studies by the specific examination of anti-establishment rhetoric in National Front and Alternative for Germany. I furthermore assume cultural resentments to play a vital role in explaining the rise in popularity of populism. In my literature review, I stated that right-wing groups must necessarily mobilize the population against migrants or people with different cultural backgrounds. If this has been the case, we should observe anti-immigration rhetoric at demonstrations as well as in the party manifestos of the National Front and Alternative for Germany. I predict the mobilization of people to expand as a result of cultural resentments. I furthermore assume the theory of Tajfel (1979) to be of utmost importance; the formation of groups that feel superior to the other. If this is true, we should find populist parties to argue on behalf of the people that are presumably pure and exploited by their establishment who does not consider the needs of its own people. If this assumption is correct, cultural resentments should become more apparent and possibly violent. If my prediction is wrong, we should not observe a rise in anti-immigrant related violence by the native population. Furthermore, the differences on how cultural resentments might be displayed in Germany and France are to be explicitly mentioned as an aspect of consideration. Germany’s Nazi past might prohibit native populations to employ extreme languages, whereas France has a strong stance on freedom of speech, allowing even the most heinous comparisons to be uttered. Some arguments of right-wing populists in France are therefore unfathomable in the German discussion, as I will point out in my case studies.

4.2. Data Collection

The recent years have seen a stark increase in surveys conducted in the field of populism. The surveys I investigate for this thesis were either conducted in France, Germany or by the Eurobarometer and were then combined with my theoretical research and observations. This helped me in formulating my assumptions of the three factors on the recent populist rise.

(23)

4.3. Limitations

The methodology applied in this thesis to the surveys may lead to problems such as a too small sample size, which cannot be translated onto the population as a whole. However, pursuing an interpretive approach on these surveys to the methodology outweighs the risk of overgeneralization or potential errors. Subject and sample selection are thus of utmost importance to guarantee the verification and validation of methodology applied to the surveys.

(24)

5. Case Studies

The beginning of the 21st_{century has left Europe at a crossroad. The new terror of}

radical Islamism in Europe resurrected the idea of strong nation states. The established parties of the European Union as well as parties of member states failed to adequately address the new politics of fear. This fear has transformed the political landscape of Europe as the rise of right-wing parties and their nationalistic leaders have become a testimony to the success of isolationist rhetoric. With France and Germany leading the way, we must demonstrate unity towards the new challenges by highlighting our common identity as Europeans.

The rise of nationalistic parties however exhibits a crisis of identity in Europe (Smith, 2003). It is furthermore an indicator for growing anti-establishment rhetoric across our continent. Since most parties of the establishment failed to connect the population with the idea of a European identity, it is vital to investigate if anti-establishment rhetoric is the critical feature explaining the rise. For instance, if surveys and research indicate that anti-elite messaging impacts current politics in Europe on the streets, in the media and social media as well as at demonstrations, then it can be assumed that right-wing parties are likely to grow in size and scale.

To examine my claim, I interpret the findings of Polk et al. (2017). The authors modeled anti-elite as well as anti-corruption salience as a function by examining the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Date (CHES). Their findings show that anti-elite rhetoric has been critical to post-communist countries, and has also become increasingly prominent in southern European countries. While these findings do not necessarily add to my assumption on the rise of populism in France and Germany, they nevertheless reveal an overlap throughout Europe. Examining the situation in Western Europe shows that anti-elitism sentiments have indeed grown. The recent referendum on the Brexit in the UK, as well as the rise of populist demonstrations in France and Germany are a further witness to

(25)

this trend. The next two chapters examine my cases studies and my proposed explanations on why the rise of populism has occurred.

5.1. Case Study Germany - Alternative für Deutschland (AFD)

5.1.1. Introduction

The refugee crisis undoubtedly impacted the political debate in Germany. The looming conflict to Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) coincided with the growth of populism. Merkel’s ruling on accommodating Syrian refugees in Germany (and Europe), was not met with overwhelming enthusiasm by all parties. For example, the conservative wing of the CDU and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) both campaigned in favor of an upper limit to the number of refugees for the year 2015. Merkel was against such limitation at the beginning by uttering the words Wir Schaffen Das (we can do it). This sentence led to tremendous disputes in Germany and beyond, dividing the nation into two camps; those in favor and those against (Friendte, Dietrich, 2017).

The rise of the Alternative for Germany is therefore also a reaction to Merkel’s strenuous efforts to help refugees, while ignoring domestic contemplations and fears on unrestricted immigration. However, to argue that her decision alone has caused the rise of populism and Euro-skepticism would be far-fetched. It is nevertheless crucial to my thesis to consider Merkel’s stance on immigration as a vital contribution to the rise of the Alternative for Germany.

Germany’s relationship with the EU is quite unique in Europe; there is no other example of political actors being so unanimously in support of the European project, which includes integration and well as multilateralism. However, this does not suggest that all parties are in agreement. The leftist party Die Linke stands against the Lisbon treaty as well as neo-liberal economics (March, 2008). Parties such as the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and Die Grünen (Green Party) advocate reforms, while the CDU/CSU and the F.D.P. (Liberals) stand for competitiveness of Germany on a European and international stage. While disagreements exist, not one of them is

(26)

Eurosceptic. They all agree on the principal idea of a European identity and commitment towards the European idea. This commitment remained the same until the emergence of the Alternative for Germany in recent years.

5.1.2. Cultural Resentments

The first condition, cultural resentments, displays the underlying tendencies of native population in Germany. The refugee crisis has revealed that some segments of the population display some notion of racist tendencies. Today, racism is tightly related to the discourse on migration, usually from a lesser developed to a higher developed nation (Butterwegge, 2016). It is therefore of utmost importance to discuss migration and integration within the society from different angles. Christian Wulff, former German President, for instance sparked a debate in 2015 when he stated that Islam belongs to Germany. Considering the fact that the majority of refugees that entered Germany in the recent years are Muslims, it becomes ever more apparent that a discourse on Islam would arise. The rhetoric of Alternative for Germany focuses on anti-immigration policies, coupled with anti-Islam sentiments. This aspect fuels the notion of cultural resentments.

Right-wing parties are not successful unless they mobilize some type of hostility over the perceived immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2008). The German nationalist, anti-Islam and far-right movement PEGIDA founded 2014 in Dresden, not only set its goal as a resistance movement to Islam. Rather, they are calling for the enforcement of the law to curb immigration, an idea most welcomed by the Alternative for Germany. In fact, a survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2015 shows that almost 60% of Germans consider Islam to be a threat (Vopel, 2015). Pietryka (2016) even argued that xenophobic and racist sentiments have seen a stark increase in the recent years that resulted from the mass influx of refugees. Their efficiency on mobilizing supporters and building transnational cooperation with groups similar to theirs is therefore a testimony to the increase of cultural resentments. Social media has furthermore seen a rise in anti-Islam websites that advocates a range of demands. Although Dresden inhabits among lowest number of Muslims in Germany, it is nevertheless a bastion of anti-Islam

(27)

rhetoric. Considering the fact of mass demonstrations taking place in many cities in Germany, it is important to examine whether or not these groups, are supportive of the political party Alternative for Germany.

5.1.3. Victims of modernization

The second condition, victims of modernization, displays the anti-EU and anti-globalist stances in Germany. The Alternative for Germany stands critical to the EU and demands the dissolution of the European Union and the recreation of an economic community. They do not recognize the Eurozone as a complimentary system of global importance. Instead, they demand end the Experiment Euro in their political manifesto (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Applying distinction between hard and soft opposition (Szczerbiak et al., 2008), it becomes evident that the Alternative for Germany stands in hard opposition to the EU. They also objects membership of a European Union and is in favor of a formal withdrawal. This hard opposition resonates with Germans; a survey conducted by the TNS Infratest (Spengler, 2016) shows that about 62% of Germans believe that the European Union is heading in the wrong direction. Furthermore, 42% of German citizens would like to hold a referendum on Germany’s EU membership. These numbers are high and indicate that the Alternative for Germany utilizes the general discontent of the population.

Membership of the EU also illustrates for the AFD some negative effects of globalization. Such rhetoric best fits with my explanation on the victims of modernization. To the AFD, Globalization reflects the underlying conflict between the people and the corrupt elite, the good and the bad. International Institutions such as the European Central Bank are too powerful and tax collection laws harmful to national competition. This led the AFD to believe that the globalist scheme of the EU leads to unemployment in Germany. As discussed in my literature review, not everybody benefits from globalization on an equal level.

The advancement of technologies has led to scarcity of low-skilled labor, a phenomenon one cannot stop. At the same time however, established parties must address this change and seize new opportunities for parts of the native population. Ignoring this trend

(28)

caused populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany to win more electoral supports since they appear as the only party addressing the issue, however misleading their solutions might be. Rhetoric on how immigrants presumably take German jobs away from Germans have become a stereotypical nuance and best fit with my prediction on economic grievances.

The TNS Infratest also shows that smaller places in Germany (<20.000 population) are in favor of Eurosceptic parties. According to the survey, the refugee crisis is the biggest challenge to Germany in the 21st_{century. Ignoring the native population in smaller}

locations is thus dangerous. The Alternative for Germany points out that they are not against refugee in principle, however they believe that Germans must come first. Such rhetoric is powerful in places that offer less economic opportunities. My assumptions on the victims of modernization as well as economic grievances are therefore both underpinned.

The most significant quantitative finding however illustrates the readiness to participate in the next federal elections. The research shows that the percentage of demonstrators who refused to participate in elections has dropped significantly; from 32% to 11% as of January 2016. This indicates the trend from participants from a movement towards actual change-makers on a political level. This assumption is supported by the next quantitative finding; the percentage of PEGIDA followers who will vote for the Alternative for Germany in the next election has increased from 58% in 2015 to 82% in 2016. The number of biological racists (Prentice et. al. 16), which consists of those that belief in their biological superiority over others, is almost 8% of all PEGIDA followers. This number is relatively small, indicating that most protests are not necessarily racists. Instead, the majority of them consider themselves as opponents of Globalization. This finding supports my notion on the victims of modernization.

5.1.4. Economics Grievances

The third condition, economic grievances, displays an important aspect of the demand-side as it explains the rise of popularity for the Alternative for Germany. Examining populist economic policies and their potential implementations in Germany is

(29)

therefore crucial. What economic adjustments does the Alternative for Germany propose and are they popular among potential voters? To answer this question, I first and foremost identify the division of society by the Alternative for Germany. They see the common people and the elite as antagonistic elements. On the one hand, we find the elite which are seen as corrupt and evil, promoting the globalist’s agenda. On the other hand they observe the people, a (supposedly) homogenous group that suffers because of the elite. To the Alternative for Germany, the elite have put tremendous focus on the arrival of refugees, while excluding parts of the native population. Such rhetoric fits perfectly with the Campbell’s realist conflict theory (1965); the high level of immigration has therefore indeed led to the rise of right-wing populist groups.

The majority of Germans understand right-wing groups as a danger to the EU and to the democratic nature of Germany. With these facts in mind, I investigate the reasons for people to join AFD and PEGIDA. Surveys conducted by statista and YouGov (Nier, 2017) shows however that 64% of Germans consider the AFD a right-wing extremist party. 25% of those asked believe that the AFD is anti-constitutional. The findings of Patzelt and his research team (2016) should provide clear answers. They examined the attitude, perception and sociography of PEGIDA demonstrators in four survey waves, conducted in January, April and May of 2015, as well as January 2016. Their findings helped in creating a differentiated view on the phenomenon of PEGIDA, Alternative for Germany and right-wing populism in general. Firstly, the tendency towards radical ideas is evident. However, the research does not suggest that a general tendency towards right-wing radicalism can be determined. Most demonstrators and followers believe in the idea of democracy. Unfortunately, they have lost trust in the process of the federal state system in Germany. This leads to more and more support for PEGIDA and eventually, Alternative for Germany. Secondly, many demonstrators believe that Germany is socially unjust. This latter finding supports my assumption on the economic grievances.

(30)

5.1.5. Conclusion

My findings clearly indicate that populism is on the rise as a result of combining several aspects in society. Factors that facilitate the electoral gain for the Alternative for Germany have been identified as economic grievances, cultural resentments and victims of modernization, making their way into the election manifesto of AFD. Slogans such as German families first clearly indicate the cultural resentment towards the otherness of refugees. The majority of PEGIDA supporters stated that they are willing to vote for the Alternative for Germany in the next elections. The majority of them furthermore believe that the current government is ignoring the native population, thus supporting my assumption on economic grievance. Finally, the prediction on victims of modernization is especially evident in locations with small populations in Eastern Germany.

(31)

5.2. Case Study France – National Front

5.2.1. Introduction

The French government always formed coalitions between centrist and right-wing parties. For instance, France was led by right-wing centralists under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle from 1962 until 1981. Although right-wing sentiments were apparent, they seemed rather weak on a public level, leaving them to regional communities of local color. The Gaullist discourse deemphasized the loss of French sovereignty while, at the same time, pointing out the tremendous gains to France on a European level (Schmidt, 2007). Mitterrand’s socialist discourse followed the conservative Gaullist era, leading to more institutional integration of France molded into the hierarchy of the EU. He furthermore incorporated the notion of Europeanization as a counter-balance to globalization.

Today, these ideas are not compelling to the general public in France. The National Front for instance argues that France does not need Europe as it does not protect France from the problems of globalization. The 2005 no-vote on the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union added another layer of uncertainty (Ivaldi, 2006). These aspects helped Le Pen to grow, but were not sufficient conditions to explain the rise of populism in France.

The spheres of centrist and (right-wing) populist parties in France are rather fluid. Centrist parties sometimes incorporate segments of the populist policies into their own agenda, thus gaining trust of those who would have otherwise voted for National Front. A clear example of this was the 2002 election, when National Front was humiliated by centrist groups that copied some of their arguments. This clearly shows that centrist parties in France can include (attenuated) right-wing policies to gain more votes. This would be near on impossible in German politics.

(32)

France has been a vital actor in Europe even before the establishment of the European Union. Together with Germany, they have pushed the integration of Europe to the next level. According to the Eurobarometer from 1995 (2001), France and Germany were both seen as the country’s most ready to intensify the development and integration of European policies, signaling the eagerness of cooperation in the European Union. However, the Eurobarometer of Spring 2015 illustrates a rather grim outlook, as 90% of the respondents stated their distrust into political parties. This distrust was intercepted by the National Front, as they paved their way to the general elections. The following analysis should help expounding the importance of my assumptions that victims of modernization, cultural resentments and economic grievances all played a role in explaining the rise of populism in France.

5.2.2. Cultural Resentments

The first factor I investigate in this case study is the notion of cultural resentments. According to the Eurobarometer, recent years have seen a stark shift in perception of the most pressing issue the EU is facing today. For decades, French participants chose economic opportunities to be the most important aspect. The events of recent years, specifically the refugee crisis, redirected the hierarchy of concerns and helped the rise on the phenomenon of populism.

The recent Eurobarometer illustrates that the most important concern to Europeans of today is immigration. Immigration has become the most pressing issue to 20 member states of the European Union, indicating that this is not merely a phenomenon in countries with populist tendencies, but an actual and perceived threat shared among the European community. While 33% of respondents stated that the “economic situation” was the most pressing issue in 2014 with 33%, it has fallen to 27% in 2015. At the same time, immigration as an issue has skyrocketed from 24% in 2014 to 38% in 2015. Interestingly, the most pressing issue to Germans is immigration too, leading with 55%, while the French are by the numbers rather “moderate” in their concerns (34%).These numbers lead to the assumption that migration plays a subordinate role in role. However

(33)

I will highlight that immigration indeed plays a crucial role to the populist leader Marine Le Pen.

During an event on the streets of Lyon in 2010, Marine Le Pen compared Muslims that pray in public streets to a Nazi occupation. This brought nationalist policies to the center of debate (Shields, 2013). Her maneuver had the finger on the pulse on the contemporary sentiments of France. This speech (and comparison) would be impossible to utter in Germany. However, it helped her in France to gain tremendous fame and support for the party. Denouncing Muslims in such a fashion is horrendous. Nevertheless, Marine Le Pen gained more than 10 million votes in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, bringing the National Front into mainstream politics. Her comparison was so strong that it not only supports my assumption on cultural resentments but goes beyond; her statement incorporated a historical reference (however distasteful). To some segments of the French population, this statement displayed courage and strong leadership. Cultural resentments are therefore a crucial factor that explains the rise of populism in France.

Marine Le Pen focused on the promotion of the Republican ideals and secularism which France ought to pride itself for. Immigration is thus not a threat to an ethnic group or identity, but is instead a threat to the values of the French Republic as a whole. She utilizes the current debate on Islam by fighting for a ban on Muslim headscarf in public. This does not necessarily promote cultural resentments; however it exploits general anxieties of French people against Islam. To Marine Le Pen, public money should not be spent on public mosques since they undermine the integrity of the French state. Also, the notion that halal meat should not be served in schools is utilized as an argument for secularism, when in fact it supports cultural resentments. She also argues that mass immigration undermines the integrity of French people. Mass immigration is not an abstract notion to the National Front; it that is designed to destroy ethnic survival of the French. The idea of the French Republic and its social sentiment is at stake as mass immigration puts tremendous pressure on the state.

(34)

5.2.3. Victims of modernization

The second factor that I investigate in this case study is the notion of victims of modernization. In France, anti-globalist schemes and French protectionism as well as tight border controls all resonated with the population at large for decades (Hainsworth, 2004). The shift away from purely ethnic argumentation and ethnic identity towards more practical arguments on national and economic security helped National Front to gain more support over time. The phenomenon of anti-European movements is extremely apparent in France as it is the strongest anti-EU force within the European Parliament (Moreau and Wassenberg, 2016). This is highlighted in the stern rejection of the project of European integration. Also, the call for a formal withdrawal from the EU indicates how France’s National Front wishes to detach itself from global competitiveness and internationalization. Thus, the recent mobilizations in France did not only occur because of the refugee crisis; they are related to social and economic inequality caused by global competition (Vanden et al. 2017). These findings point out that victim of modernization in a plausible explanation to the rise of populism in France. Populism becomes ever more important as they grow in size and seem to opt for populist parties as their savior in uncertain times.

As with all developed countries, their technological advances are taken to emerging markets. Naturally, this enrages local workers in developed countries, acting as a catalyst for the rise of populism (Baldwin, 2016). This trend is also displayed in France. The French government did not address this evolution, leaving the fears of workers to themselves. Such misconceptions are then taken up by populist groups like the National Front. The support that refugees have received in Germany was one of the aspects highlighted by the National Front. They call for a national preference of indigenous French people that must be supported at all costs (Liang, 2016). This call was met by many industrial workers from deindustrialized areas of northern France, who have decided to vote for the National Front. They have shifted from their traditional vote of (extreme) left towards the populist right (Tollefson, 2016) not only in despise of the unsuccessful year of left-oriented governance, but rather out of conviction; Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric on anti-globalization, anti-EU and national preference was what they

(35)

needed. It is therefore evident that victims of modernization also play a crucial role in explaining the rise of populism in France.

5.2.4. Economic grievances

The third factor I investigate in this case study is the notion of economic grievances. This aspect has been a vital concern to the French people for decades. For instance, in 2014 only 8% of French respondents surveyed believed the economy to be in good conditions (Eurobarometer, 2014). However, the arrival of refugees into Europe prompted the discussion to evolve more into disputes on economic globalization and redistribution of wealth.

Indiscriminately, the refugees pushed populism from anti-liberal stances towards a new brand of populism, often referred to as heritage populism (Reynié, 2016). This type of populist rhetoric focuses on population aging, coupled with the mass influx of refugees as well as economic globalization (as discussed in my section vicitms of modernization). The observation of France’s National Front shows that heritage populism features certain characteristics. These characteristics are a (presumably) European way of life with individual’s freedoms, secularism and gender equality. The National Front assembles its voters in demonstrations as the good people and hails them as protectors of French values; where the mainstream parties opt for multiculturalism, the French Populist Party points out Islamization of France by the new arrivals. This would eventually lead to the destruction of Europe and, more importantly, eradicate the French way of life. Such rhetoric fills the people not necessarily only with fear. Instead, it provides reasons for the people to go on the streets and protests together with the National Front. The French protest is thusly also a demonstration of French identity and pride. Economic policies are of less importance in support of my assumption on economic grievances as such. Rather, the National Front promotes the French identity in protection of France.

(36)

5.2.5. Conclusion

The findings presented above reveal that the otherness of refugees is a crucial factor in support of my explanation on economic grievances. As pointed out earlier, the realist conflict theory by Campbell (1965) distinguishes between a core in-group with superior features and an inferior out-group. Both groups compete over limited resources in which the in-group eventually blames the out-group for economic misfortunes. By considering the rhetoric of the National Front, it becomes apparent that this theory fits perfectly into the scheme. The National Front presents itself as the defender of secularism and individual freedom, thus representing the common people in France. By demonizing Islam and frightening the population with the prospect of Sharia Law in France, populists gain the support that we have witnessed in the recent years and are a further approval that cultural resentments, economic grievances and victims of modernization all play a crucial role in explaining the rise of populism in France.

(37)

6. Comparative analysis

The rise of populism in Germany and France in the recent years has become an issue of growing importance as it threatens the further integration of the European Union. Examining the reasons on why populism has gained such tremendous popularity has therefore been the cornerstone of this thesis. Drawing from my literature, the factors cultural resentments, victims of modernization and economic grievances all reflect upon this trend in both countries.

Cultural resentments validated my prediction as an explaining factor to the rise of populism in France and Germany. In Germany, the notion of German families suffering while refugees received tremendous attention and aid helped the Alternative for Germany to gain enormous support. Anti-immigration policies and demonstrations have therefore pushed the Alternative for Germany into the spotlight as they argued on behalf of the native population. These findings confirm my assumption on the demand-side of populism in Germany. In France, Marine Le Pen and the National Front strengthened cultural resentments with their focus on the possible Islamization of France as a result of an uncontrollable refugee influx from the Middle East. The secular nature of France, mixed with the proposed importance of French culture, resonated with great parts of the population. The demand-side on populism in France has therefore been met by the Front National. The condition on cultural resentments has therefore been established as a factor expounding the rise of populism in France.

Victims of modernization also validated my assumption as an explaining factor to the rise of populism in France and Germany. It has become apparent in my case study analysis that some regions in both countries felt threatened by modernization, supporting my notion on victims of modernization. This has been proven as a factor in Northern France, where the National Front gained significant support from de-industrialized regions that feared globalization. The average person in these regions

(38)

of France felt ignored by the government and thus opted for a populist party. There has been a strikingly similar case to France in Germany as some regions of Eastern Germany have seen a stronger increase of anti-globalization movements than others. Segments of the population joined demonstrations in Eastern Germany to displays their anger and frustration towards the established parties. Eventually, parts of the population in the region decided to vote for populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany. The condition on victims of modernization has therefore been established as a factor explaining the rise of populism in France and Germany.

Economic grievances validated my presumption as a describing factor to the rise of populism in France and Germany just the same. The National Front argued that the recession in France was caused by the European Union, thus promoting protectionist policies and nationalization of the French economy. This would prevent French people from losing their jobs and, more importantly, the French way of life as defined by secularism and individual freedoms. Germany has seen a similar rhetoric, focusing on anti-EU policies and a stronger national economy, and attacking the redistribution of wealth from Germany to Europe. This was oftentimes mixed with the attack on refugees as they received great financial support from the German government. This stoked envy and hatred towards the new arrivals and gave rise to the Populist Party Alternative for Germany. Populist parties in France and Germany again utilized the demand-side of populism for their success. The condition on economic grievances has therefore been established as another factor defining the rise of populism in France and Germany. My proposed factors cultural resentments, victims of modernization and economic grievances all validate and explain the rise of populism in France and Germany as examined from the demand-side.