MA Thesis
The representation of Sŏn'gun ideology in the North Korean propaganda posters
Jelena Hoorn S1327003
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Table of Contents
Introduction ... 3
Literature Review ... 5
Methodology ... 8
Chapter 1: Sŏn'gun Policy ... 9
Sŏn'gun Ideological Characteristics ... 11
Chapter 2: Visual Analysis of Sŏn'gun Posters ... 13
Early Sŏn'gun posters: 1995-2000 ... 13
Sŏn'gun posters 2000-2011 ... 16
Sŏn'gun posters and the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign ... 19
Chapter 3: Change and Continuity in Sŏn'gun posters ... 25
Equal Emphasis and militarism starting the 1960s ... 26
Juche’s position in Sŏn'gun posters: coexistence or replacement? ... 33
Conclusion ... 40
Bibliography... 42
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Regarding Romanization
For the romanization of the Korean, the McCune-Reischauer romanization was used, except for some names of well-known figures, institutions, places, campaigns and (book) titles that are generally
known by a different romanization.
Introduction
The 1990s are perhaps one of the grimmest periods in North Korean history since the end of the Korean War in 1953. After the major socialist countries of the western hemisphere started to fall apart, two major tragedies almost simultaneously struck North Korea: the death of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung, known as the Great National Bereavement, and extreme energy and food shortages that led to nation-wide famine, referred to by the North Korean regime as the Arduous March. Both topics have been extensively covered in literature concerning the country. In the latter case, foreign observers have discussed the causes and consequences for a long time now. During the Arduous March, Kwon and Chung argue, “the most critical challenge caused by the crisis was the breakdown of the moral authority of the Workers’ Party in relation to the general population.”1 So, in an effort “to escape culpability for the economic failure”, the party shifted focus to the military in what is now known as Sŏn'gun, or Military-First politics.2 Choo-suk Suh defines Sŏn'gun as politics “operating under the principle of expanding the military’s role and privilege”3, while Dae-sook Suh provides a broader definition: “in his [Kim Jong-il’s] new ‘military first’ politics, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), in addition to playing its traditional role, directs his revolution, and leads the development of the government and the entire society.”4 The military was to lead the development of North Korea, but also set an example for the entire population.
As previous scholarship has noted, communist states have, for a variety of reasons, relied on posters to spread the government’s ideology, inspire citizens, and instruct them on what is proper and desirable behavior.5 North Korea is no exception to this and continues to produce new posters to deliver the government’s messages to the people, although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these posters. Koen de Ceuster argues in Communist
1 Heonik Kwon and Byung-ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics, (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2012): 163.
2 Kwon and Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics: 163.
3 Choo-suk Suh, "North Korea's "'Military-First" Policy and Inter-Korean Relations." in Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 14, no. 2 (2002): 172.
4 Dae-sook Suh, “Military First Politics of Kim Jong Il” in Asian Perspective 26, no. 3 (2002): 150. 5 Mary Ginsberg, “Introduction” in Communist Posters (Reaktion Books, London, 2017): 7.
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Posters, that “posters, as a graphic art form where text and image converge and mingle, not only illustrate the evolution of the ideology, but document the evolving domestic, political, economic and social agenda. […] Certainly, studying North Korean posters helps to shed light on what makes the DPRK tick.”6 In addition, the centrality of slogans in North Korean posters allow us to identify campaign goals or political agenda’s more easily, as the slogan “is handed down from the Party center.” 7 Writing about Soviet posters under Lenin and Stalin, Victoria Bonnell notes that “visual propaganda provides us with a revealing expression of the official ideology” and that it “allows us to see what was encompassed by the discursive field and what was off limits.”8 Although access to North Korean posters can be an issue at times, over the last few decades more poster collections have become available to researchers and students of North Korea. Tapping into this growing body of primary material and related secondary literature, the focus of this thesis will be the representation of the Sŏn'gun in North Korean posters produced between 1995 and 2011.
Considering that Sŏn'gun was a supposedly new ideology introduced by Kim Jong-il in the late 1990s and posters are widely used in North Korea for spreading such ideas, the appearance of Sŏn'gun in these propaganda posters is quite unsurprising. The central question for this thesis is: “How is Sŏn'gun ideology represented in the visual discourse that is North Korean propaganda posters?”. First, the methodology for this research will be discussed, followed by a brief literature review on research related to North Korean posters. In the first chapter, the appearance of Sŏn'gun politics and its ideological characteristics will be discussed. The second chapter will focus on a visual analysis of a sample of posters that contain visual or language elements related to Sŏn'gun. In the third chapter, in order to analyze change and continuity in Sŏn'gun posters, the posters from chapter 2 will be compared to a sample of posters from previous decades. Finally, in the conclusion, the results from the analysis will be summarized and some issues for future research will be discussed.
6 Koen De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“ in Communist Posters, 231 7 De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“: 238.
8 Victoria E. Bonnell, “Introduction.” in Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 14.
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Literature Review
The book North Korean Posters: The David Heather Collection was published in 2008 and contains a wide range of posters from North Korea.9 As Bryan Myers rightly points out, the book offers only a translation of the slogans in English and German and fails to provide a visual analysis.10 A more relevant issue with regards to using the book as a primary source of North Korean, is that dates, artist, and publication house are not provided either. This makes it difficult to select posters from a specific period in time for analysis, unless textual or visual elements indicate the poster was published after a certain date. The same can be said for North Korea’s Public Face: 20th Century Propaganda Posters from the Zellweger Collection. The title of the book provides us with a general timeline, but individual posters do not include data such as date and artist. Unlike North Korea Poster, however, North Korea’s Public Face does provide readers with brief descriptions of campaigns and elements found in the posters.
In “Exploring North Korean Arts”, Brian R. Myers analyzes the “Strong and Prosperous Country” campaign conducted by the North Korean state since the late 1990s. In the introduction of his chapter, Myers scathingly criticizes both Flowers for Kim Il Sung and North Korean Posters for their lack of critical moral judgement.11 His article contains some useful comments on the campaign, such as the link between the campaign and consumer goods. While discussing the recent years of the campaign through a poster from 2010, Myers concludes that “the regime seems to be heralding changes in degree and not kind” and “lives will not change”.12 The message is clear, the posters do not promise radical enough change for the North Korean citizens. But why would it? It would not benefit the regime to promise change in kind when it is probably well aware of the unlikelihood of actually realizing such promises. Analyzing another poster from the same year, Myer state that this poster “too is hardly an extravagant vision.”13 However, his remarks seems to miss the point of Socialist Realism and the general style of North Korean posters. Many elements from the 2010 posters can be found in posters from previous decades, such as a poster from the Zellweger collection
9 David Heather and Koen De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection (Munich ; London: Prestel, 2008).
10 Brian R. Myers, “Knocking on the Great Gate: The ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ Campaign in North Korean Propaganda” in Exploring North Korean Arts, ed. Rüdiger Frank (Nürnberg, Verlag Für Moderne Kunst, 2011): 72-73.
11 Myers, “Knocking on the Great Gate”: 73. 12 Myers, “Knocking on the Great Gate”: 84. 13 Myers, “Knocking on the Great Gate”: 85.
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promoting domestic production of consumer goods.14 Part of a campaign almost three decades earlier, many of the goods portrayed in that poster, such as the electric fan, boots, umbrella and small household appliances, can also be seen in the 2010 poster “For decisive transformation of the people’s lives”. Since Myers work focuses on the “Strong and Prosperous Country” campaign, not all of his analysis will be useful for researching the representation of the Military First policy, but it does provide a clear example of how posters can be used in a broader analysis of campaigns in North Korea.
Communist Posters, a large volume edited by Mary Ginsberg, includes chapters on several communist countries, both from the past and in the present. As Ginsberg points out in the introduction, some of the chapters discuss the posters historically and thematically, while others ‘race revolutionary posters through various policy campaigns and leadership changes.’15 Koen de Ceuster wrote the contribution on North Korean posters. In the chapter, De Ceuster discusses poster from the collection of private collector Willem van der Bijl, who provided his collection to be made digitally available at Leiden University.16
De Ceuster’s chapter on North Korean posters covers several decades and themes. Some of these posters, such as Kwak Hŭngmo’s famous Chollima poster, are described and analyzed more extensively than other posters. Differently from Myer’s article mentioned above, De Ceuster’s contribution to Communist Posters contains less critical analysis or judgement of the success of the campaigns to which they belong. Instead, De Ceuster’s analysis provides useful information on continuity in posters, common elements, and the meaning of certain visual elements. Perhaps one of the few weak points of the article is that the numbers assigned to posters do not always align with discussion in the text.
English publications on North Korean posters thus far are still in their early stages, with little in depth analysis, in the Korean academic world, scholars have devoted a little more attention to this subject. For example, Yuk Yŏngsu analyses posters from 1990 to 2000 in order to ‘read’ North Korea’s political culture at that time. Yuk Yŏngsu argues that analyzing posters is important because posters are an indispensable tool for the completion and continuation
14 Katharina Zellweger and Florian Knothe, North Korea's Public Face: 20th-century Propaganda Posters from the Zellweger Collection (University of Hong Kong, 2017), 49.
15 Mary Ginsberg (ed.) Communist Posters (Reaktion Books, London, 2017), 9.
16 Koen de Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“ In Communist Posters, 231. The database of the collection is still in the developing stages, but posters from this collection could be used for this thesis.
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of the North Korean theatre state.17 The author’s research is based on posters publicized in the North Korean magazine 조선 예술 (Chosŏn yesul) and combines both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Based on this sample, the author concludes that in this period the message most common in posters from this magazine were “improving economic productivity and material self-reliance” while themes such as anti-americanism and Military First politics were less common.18 While Yuk Yŏngsu’s article provides us with very useful information, the analysis is more focused on the quantitative aspects and detailed visual analysis is only done for a few of the posters from the sample. Yuk also does not discuss what methodology he used in analyzing these posters.
While Yuk focuses on posters from a specific decade, Pak Amchong studied a larger sample of posters. Pak’s sample includes posters from the 1970s until the early 2000s, and are analyzed not for their ideological content, but for their visual design. Pak examines the posters color scheme, font and type of visual elements. Only eight posters are discussed in detail, which are described as the “representative posters”.19 Pak’s article demonstrates well the change and continuity in the design of North Korean posters.
Unlike posters, detailed analysis of Sŏn'gun elements in state media and publications can be found more frequently in Korean academia. For example, Chin Hŭikwan’s article focuses on the appearance of Sŏn'gun in state media, such as Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and its ideological meaning.20 A more in-depth research of the Rodong Sinmun was conducted by Chŏng Sŏngim, who analyzed Sŏn'gun theory through analysis of publications in the state’s newspaper. These two articles focus mostly on the ideological characteristics of Sŏn'gun and its effects on North Korean society, especially its power structures, economy and social hierarchies. Their analysis of Sŏn'gun through sources
17육영수. "이미지와 슬로건으로 읽는 북한의 정치문화." 역사와경계 ("imijiwa sŭllogŏnŭro ingnŭn puk'anŭi chŏngch'imunhwa." Yŏksawagyŏnggye) 86 (2013): 141.
18 육영수. "이미지와 슬로건으로 읽는 북한의 정치문화”: 147.
19박암종, “북한 디자인의 이론적 배경과 특성에 관한 연구: 1970-2000 년대 선전화를
중심으로” 디지털디자인학연구 (Puk'an tijainŭi ironjŏng paegyŏnggwa t'ŭksŏnge kwanhan yŏn'gur 1970-2000nyŏndae sŏnjŏnhwarŭl chungshimŭrot' Tijit'ŏltijainhakyŏn'gu) 14:1 (2014): 858.
20 진희관, “북한에서 ‘선군’의 등장과 선군사상이 갖는 함의에 관한 연구” 국제정티논총
( uk'anesŏ sŏn'gun’ŭi tŭngjanggwa sŏn'gunsasangi kannŭn hamŭie kwanhan yŏn'gut, Kukchejŏngt'inonch'ong) 48:1 (2008).
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such as printed media provides us with a basic framework for similar research and a range of conclusions that are worth exploring in the context of North Korean posters related to the Sŏn'gun era.
Methodology
This thesis will focus on analyzing the visual discourse of North Korean posters published between 1995 and 2011. In Visual Methodologies, Gillian Rose emphasizes two different forms of discourse analysis that can be conducted in visual research. The first form she describes as “discourse analysis [that] tends to pay rather more attention to the notion of discourse as articulated through various kinds of visual images and verbal texts than it does to the practices entailed by specific discourses.” This type of discourse analysis focuses on the image itself. The second form pays more attention to the practices of institutions than to the images and texts themselves.21 For this thesis, the first form of discourse analysis will be applied, although discussion of certain institution’s production and usage of propaganda posters will be conducted as well. This discourse analysis relies on other methods from Rose’s work, especially compositional interpretation. Compositional interpretation is a descriptive method of analyzing images, focuses on the content and form of images, and can be considered the basis for successfully applying the other methods.22 In addition, to provide a quantitative perspective, poster content will be coded following the principles of content analysis.23 While the sample of posters is not very large, the content analysis is especially helpful for the comparative analysis conducted in chapter three. Separately, these methods would not provide a complete analysis of the posters, but combined a clearer picture emerges.
21 Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies: An introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials (2nd ed. London, Sage, 2007): 146.
22 Rose, Visual Methodologies: 39. 23 Rose, Visual Methodologies 60-71.
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Chapter 1: Sŏn'gun Policy
In the late 1990s, as North Korea dealt with several external and internal crises, Kim Jong-Il announced the Sŏn'gun, or Military First. The Sŏn'gun policy has received significant academic interest since its establishment from a wide range of perspectives. Jongseok Woo divides research regarding Sŏn'gun into three major categories: ideological characteristics, institutional developments, and policy effects.24
The North Korean state claims that Sŏn'gun was established 1995 when Kim Jong-il visited a military base for 현지지도 (on-sight guidance).25 While state narratives date the beginnings of Sŏn'gun to as far back as 1969, the term does not appear in public discourse until late 1997. It is at this time that Rodong Sinmun published editorials specifically mentioning Sŏn'gun.26 The first appearance of the term in North Korean publications followed in the next year. While there is debate about to what extent Sŏn'gun is a new ideology and break from Juche, scholars have reached a form of consensus on the factors that contributed to the creation of Sŏn'gun.
In terms of external factors, the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequently demise of socialism in Eastern Europe is considered one of the most important factors. Even before 1995, the annual joint new year editorials focused on the military, albeit using slightly different terms.27 The collapse of the Soviet Union challenged the idea of communism as a utopian political ideology and forced North Korean leadership to reinvent itself. Kim Jong-il believed that one of the main reasons European communist regimes had failed was that they did not have a strong army to guard the state ideologies.28 Whether or not this was true, did not matter for the purpose of the statement made by Kim Jong-il, as it was mostly meant to justify Sŏn'gun policies. Most importantly, Kim Jong-il’s Sŏn'gun was meant to divert the blame for
24 Jongseok Woo, "Kim Jong-il's Military-first Politics and Beyond: Military Control Mechanisms and the Problem of Power Succession." in Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 118. 25 진희관, “북한에서 ‘선군’의 등장과 선군사상이 갖는 함의에 관한 연구”: 378-379 and Miyeong Jeon, “The Kim Jong-il Regimes Military-first politics” in The Review of Korean Studies 12, no. 4 (2009): 181.
26 백학순 (Paek Haksun), 북한권력의역사: 사상, 정체성, 구조 (Puk'an kwŏllyŏgŭi yŏksa: Sasang, Chŏngch'esŏng, Kujo), 세종연구소 세종정책총서 파주 2010: 692 and 진희관, “북한에서 ‘선군’의 등장과 선군사상이 갖는 함의에 관한 연구”: 379,
27 진희관, “북한에서 ‘선군’의 등장과 선군사상이 갖는 함의에 관한 연구”: 380.
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the crises faced in North Korea. While facing the external challenges of political allies collapsing, North Korea also dealt with a nation-wide famine starting in the mid-1990s after the collapse of the food distribution system and the death of Kim Il-sung. Sŏn'gun was designed to
Debate exists about to what extent Sŏn'gun is a break from Kim Il-Sung’s Juche ideology. In North Korean discourse on the subject, Sŏn'gun is directly linked to Kim Il-Sung as well as the Juche ideology.29 Miyeong Jeon argues that, according to this explanation, Sŏn'gun can be seen as “practical ideology for realizing the Juche idea.”30 The introduction of Sŏn'gun does not necessarily indicate a break from previous policies, as pointed out by Kim Yŏn-ch’ol. The North Korean state has been a military state for most of its existence and Kim argues that Sŏn'gun policies can be seen as a continuation of the already existing focus on the military.31 In a similar line of thought, Brian Myers, skeptical of North Korea’s ideologies, argues the two strings of thought, Juche and Sŏn'gun, are “to be understood as parts of one unnamed whole”.32 As Adrian Buzo puts it, after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il was left with three policy options on how to handle the challenges North Korea faced: following the Albanian example of seeking an alternative form of legitimacy, following the Chinese example of party control combined with open market reforms, or uncompromisingly defend the system. 33 He chose the latter. Thus, instead of the policy changes or total collapse that foreign observers predicted following the death of Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean state ended up in a state of resolute survivalism.34
Considering the dire situation of the country’s economy and growing autonomy on part of the population in a desperate attempt to survive, it is no surprise that Kim Jong-il chose to rely on an institution that is under his direct control and is also at the direct core of the country’s history. This is in line with the argument made by Kwak Eun-Kyung in her article on
29 백학순, 북한 권력의 역사: 692-693.
30 Jeon, “The Kim Jong-il Regimes Military-first politics”: 186.
31 김연철, “북한의 선군체제와 경재개혁의 관계”: 40, and 박헌옥 (Park Hun Ok), "북한,
"강성대국 건설론"에 대한 분석과 전망.( Puk'an, “kangsŏngtaekuk kŏnsŏllon”-e taehan punsŏkkwa chŏnmang)" 군사논단 67 (2011): 28.
32 Brian R. Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth (Busan, Sthele Press, 2015): 192.
33 Adrian Buzo, Politics and Leadership in North Korea : The Guerilla Dynasty New Edition 2. ed. (Taylor and Francis, 2017): 153.
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Sŏn'gun as a symbolic political strategy. Pointing to the long history of North Korea’s leaders using the military as a force to establish and maintain power, she argues that the roots for Sŏn'gun are nested deeply in the political history of North Korea and that Sŏn'gun should be seen as a continuity of policies of previous decades.35 While the ideas of Sŏn'gun are therefore not revolutionary and new, the increased focus on the military’s role in the revolution in North Korean ideological education, through indoctrination mechanisms such as education and propaganda, demonstrate a change in leadership thinking throughout the Sŏn'gun era.
Sŏn'gun Ideological Characteristics
For the remainder of this chapter, the focus will shift to Sŏn'gun’s ideological characteristics in propaganda material. What are the core elements of Sŏn'gun that one could expect to find in posters dedicated to this thought?
The meaning of Sŏn'gun, based on North Korean publications, is ‘putting the army ahead’ of other parts of society and the army, together with the party, has to guide the people would be the main force of the revolution.36 Dae-sook Suh summarizes the meaning of the new ideology well: “in his [Kim Jong-il’s] new ‘military first’ politics, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), in addition to playing its traditional role, directs his revolution, and leads the development of the government and the entire society.”37 During this time, the status of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) decreased under Kim Jong-Il38 and that of the military at the center of development. We can expect to see images of soldiers from different branches of the military replacing the traditional image of the Party Worker in leading roles of society as they guide this revolution and lead the development of the nation. In addition to this, increasing visual elements referring to the military and its power is something else that we could expect to see in the posters produced for Sŏn'gun.
35 곽은경 (Kwak Ŭnkyŏng). "북한 사상무장 수단으로서의 상징전략: 선군정치를 중심으로." (Puk'an sasangmujang sudanŭrosŏŭi sangjingjŏllyak: sŏn'gunjŏngch'irŭl chungshimŭro),
현대정치연구 (Hyŏndaejŏngch'iyŏn'gu) 9, no. 2 (2016): 157-183.
36 김진환 (Kim Jin Hwan), “김일성의 선로후군과 김정일의 선군후로 – 북한 호전성 명제에
대한 비판적 평가” (Kimilsŏngŭi Sŏllohugun'gwa Kimjŏngirŭi Sŏn'gunhu-ro - Puk'an Hojŏnsŏng Myŏngjee Taehan Pip'anjŏk P'yŏng-ga), 경제와 사회 (Kyŏngjewa sahoe) 87 (September 2010): 62 and 진희관, “북한에서 ‘선군’의 등장과 선군사상이 갖는 함의에 관한 연구”: 382.
37 Dae-sook Suh, “Military First Politics of Kim Jong Il”: 150. 38 Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: 158-160.
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In addition to visual elements referencing to the military in a prominent role, slogans are also key in communicating North Korean leadership’s message to the people. Certain campaigns from the past, such as the Chollima campaign, are recycled to remind older viewers of the past campaigns and successes while simultaneously urging younger viewers to follow the examples set for them by their ancestors. Several posters from the chosen sample reference to previous campaigns through text and image. This circularity of slogans leads to blurring lines of time and space, while it also reiterates the centrality of slogans in North Korean posters.39 The slogans published by the North Korean state are central not only to posters, but to the country’s political life. While some slogans found in the posters refer to older campaigns, we can also expect newer slogans and keywords in posters to refer to the virtues of the military. After all, the main message of Sŏn'gun propaganda was to inspire the people to follow the military’s example. Slogans that contribute to that message and clarify what exactly the people ought to learn from the military
A key point to consider throughout the analysis of these posters is that, unlike what the North Korean state claim, the Sŏn'gun policies were not as defined and clear in the late 1990s as they were in the early 2000s. The policies and the final ideology that Sŏn'gun claims to be is in reality a fluid ideology and, most importantly, made to fit the needs of the state’s leadership.40 Kwak Eun-Kyung describes Sŏn'gun as a political strategy that is primarily a symbolic political strategy as a reaction to the ideological uncertainty the political system was experiencing from the mid-1990s onward.41 Much like Juche’s ideological content is actually quite weak, so it that of Sŏn'gun.42 Whilst the content of propaganda posters is highly political, it is also highly influenced by the contemporary needs of the North Korea state and is therefore better a reflection of said needs than of the ideology it claims to propagate.
39 De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“: 238-239. Other chapters from Communist Posters demonstrate that slogans play a crucial part in posters throughout the communist countries.
40 곽은경. "북한 사상무장 수단으로서의 상징전략”: 167-168. 41 곽은경. "북한 사상무장 수단으로서의 상징전략.": 159, 167. 42 Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty, 42.
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Chapter 2: Visual Analysis of Sŏn'gun Posters
For the visual analysis of Sŏn'gun posters, a selection was made from several collections. The majority of posters analyzed for this research originate from the Leiden University collection currently undergoing digitalization. The posters from this collection have yet to be studied extensively, though Koen de Ceuster has published some preliminary findings in his contribution in Communist Posters. For this study a selection of posters from the Leiden University Willem van der Bijl Collection were analyzed that were printed in the period 1995-2011. Posters were selected based on their visual and textual content with the following criteria: 1. A reference to military in visual elements 2. A slogan containing references to Sŏn'gun and/or Sŏn'gun ideology. At the right bottom corner of the posters, one can find information on where and when the poster was printed and who the artist that designed it was. Most of these posters were created at the 조선로동당출판사 (Chosŏn rodongdang ch'ulp'ansa, Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House) and printed at 평양종합인쇄공장 (P'yŏngyang jonghab inswae gongjang, P'yŏngyang Central Printing). The same small group of artists creates many of the posters and several were created by a duo of artists. Only a few of the posters are from the late 1990s, while the majority of the posters are dated between 2000 and 2010. For the analysis in chapter 3, the selection of posters was expanded to include posters from the 1960s to 1980s.
Early Sŏn'gun posters: 1995-2000
As discussed in the first chapter, the North Korean state claims that Sŏn'gun started in 1995, but the term did not appear in state media until late 1997. In the case of the sample studied here, none of the posters from the second half of the 1990s use the term or imagery of Sŏn'gun. However, a poster, depicted in picture 1, from 2000 carries a slogan that does not differ much from later Sŏn'gun slogans. In the poster, a soldier and a worker seem to be marching forward. To the left, work is already underway on a construction site, while further in the background a waterway has already taken shape between the fields. The soldier raises his arm and looks back as if he is calling for the people behind them to move together in their pace. They support the message in the slogan, which calls for the audience to “press on with the Kaechon-Lake Taesong Waterway waterway project!” Behind the worker’s right shoulders waves a red flag with the text “혁명적 군인정신”(hyŏkmyŏngchŏk kuninchŏngsin, which
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translates to mindset of the revolutionary soldier) and “자력갱생”(charyŏk kaengsaeng, which can be loosely translated to self-reliance)43. “Self-reliance” is well-known slogan in North Korea, meaning to overcome any challenges through one’s own strength, without relying on others. This is in line with the self-reliance ideas propagated in North Korea for decades as part of its Juche ideology. The slogan has been used in North Korean propaganda posters since before the Sŏn'gun era. A poster designed by Song Shi-yŏp and Ro Sŭng-hwan in 1986 titled “Let Us Forcefully Press Forward in the 1980s March in the Style of the West Sea Barrage Construction!” shows a red flag in the background with the slogan partly visible, while another poster created by Song Shi-yŏp from 1978 also shows this slogan.44
In a poster from 1999 (picture 5) titled “Forward in the Second Grand Chollima Advance”, the poster references to the Chollima campaign by copying the image from the original campaign in the background.45 While this poster carries elements that we will later see in posters from the early 2000s, it does not yet include any of the slogans or visual elements discussed at the end of the previous chapter. The absence of military projects or soldiers in the images can be partly explained by the development of Sŏn'gun policies from the mid-19990s to early 2000s. While Kim Jong-il and state media introduced Sŏn'gun through the Rodong Sinmun in the 1990s, the focus on military weaponry and national defense within economic policies at the time did not increase significantly until the early 2000s.46
43https://www.uniedu.go.kr/uniedu/home/brd/bbsatcl/nknow/view.do?id=31868&mid=SM0000053
6&limit=10&eqViewYn=true&page=11 (Accessed 30-06-2020)
44 De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“:268-269, 270 (Image 231 and 232). 45 This is another example of posters referring to and recycling slogans and images from previous campaigns, thereby blurring the lines between reality and representation. Koen de Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“: 242.
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Picture 1: “Let us press on with the Kaechon-Lake Taesong Waterway waterway project!“ (2000)
Picture 2: “Let Us Make a Breakthrough into the New Century with the Vigour that Made Us Overcome the 'Arduous March'” (2001)
16 Sŏn'gun posters 2000-2011
Starting from the early 2000s, posters from the Leiden Collection include more pieces that are what De Ceuster describes as typical for the Sŏn'gun period, as their visual and textual content starts becoming more consistent.47 One of the elements considered indicative for the Sŏn'gun era posters, is the presence of a soldier in a leading role. A poster printed in 2001 that was created by Rim Kwang-ju, seen in picture 2, is more indicative of the Sŏn'gun style posters. Primarily, a soldier is leading on the group of people in the poster. These people represent a range of industries deemed important for the realization of a successful North Korea: steel, coal, science, agriculture and transportation.48 In the title of the poster, a reference is made to the ‘Arduous March’ of the late 1990s and a winged Chollima horse flies in the background as a worker on his back holds a red flag with the text ‘ 강성대국’ (Kangsŏngdaeguk).This layout can also be found in posters from the David Heather collection, but as the dates of the posters are not clear, they were not included for detailed analysis. Instead, they served as a reference for analysis of the posters from the Willem van de Bijl collection. They are included occasionally in the footnotes as additional examples of certain themes and designs.49 As pointed out by Koen de Ceuster, many of the elements in this specific poster can be found in a large number of other posters and is typical for the exhortative genre of North Korean posters. Especially important within this genre of posters is the movement of a group of people, often led on by one figure in the front.50
47 De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“: 229. 48 De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“: 238.
49 Heather and De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection: 150. 50 De Ceuster, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1948-“: 238.
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Picture 3 "Let Us Move Forward into the Heyday of Sŏn'gun Chosŏn” (2007)
A sense of movement is created as the people in the poster all face towards one side, in the case of the two posters above the groups both give a sense of movement to the left. In the background, stripes of white give the illusion of speed.
In some cases, this sense of speed is created not by simple strips, such as in the poster in picture 3, but by military weaponry that is drawn in slightly lighter or darker colors in the background. A poster that clearly shows this element, as shown in picture 4. In this poster designed by Pak Ch'ŏl-hyŏn and Yu Il-ho, a group of people representing some of the major economic industries is depicted moving towards the right side of the poster. While in this specific poster the party worker, not the soldier, motivates the group to march forward. Yet the soldier is not missing, as he is shown as the first of the group charging forward while a soldier depicted in red towers over the group while blowing a horn. In the yellow background, missiles are shown behind the soldiers left shoulder while to his right the barrels of tanks and a train speeding along can be seen. The depiction of military weaponry in the background not only creates a sense of movement but is also in line with the contents of that year’s joint editorial to which the slogan on the poster refers. As mentioned previously, the focus on national defense and military spending did not take a firm root in Sŏn'gun propaganda until
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the early 2000s until in 2004, when the joint editorial was more proactively promoting military spending and the national defense industry.51 This poster is therefore one of the many examples of how different forms of propaganda are woven together in the North Korean state. While the joint editorial provides readers with a set of goals and actions, the posters provides a visual reminder to the viewers of these goals as they go about their daily activities.
Picture 4 "Let's carry out the combat task presented in this year's joint editorial with the strength of Sŏn'gun." (2004)
The group of people led within this genre of exhortative posters are generally representations of specific industries. These representations of the major economic industries in North Korea have become one of the most recognizable images within propaganda posters to the point that even foreigners with little knowledge of North Korean society can interpret their meaning after seeing a few posters that include these images. Especially the scientist, farmer, miner and construction worker are easily recognizable in these posters.
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Sŏn'gun posters and the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign
In response to the range of crises North Korea faced in the 1990s, the ‘Kangsŏngdaeguk’ or ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign was launched in 1998 and the term would become a slogan of central importance that can be found throughout propaganda posters printed in the 2000s.52 Reminiscent of the Japanese “Rich Country with Strong Army” (Fukoku Kyohei) slogan from the Meiji period, the key in realizing this goal is the power and leadership of the military.53 In the case of North Korea, the campaign divided the goal into four parts: strong ideology, strong politics, strong army, and strong economy. The North Korean state claimed that the first three goals had already been achieved and therefore only the final step towards becoming a strong and prosperous country was left to be taken.54
The strong economy was defined as an independent economy that would never stop developing, was modernized in all industries and would have economic capacity that could compete with the biggest and developed nations in the world.55 It is therefore not strange that the campaign has a special connection to consumer goods and living standards, as pointed out by Myers. While the campaign itself focuses on the economy, the role of the military is a recurring element in posters from this campaign.56 The main reason for this connection is the leadership’s insistence that the military industry, ea. the national defense industry, takes priority in the economy and that all other industries are to follow it.57 From the very beginning the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign was linked to the Sŏn’gun policies. This is demonstrated by a poster from the David Heather collection that shows the
52 Myers, “Knocking on the Great Gate”: 73.
53 Ilpyong J. Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics” in North Korea the Politics of Regime Survival, ed. Young-whan Kihl, and Hong Nack Kim (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006): 66-67.
54정병화(Chung Byung Hwa), "강성대국 건설, 체제전환을 위한 체제개혁의 시도인가? 체제유지를 위한 또 다른 이데올로기인가? -선군정치를 중심으로." (kangsŏngdaeguk kŏnsŏl, ch'ejejŏnhwanŭl wihan ch'ejegaehyŏgŭi shidoin'ga? ch'ejeyujirŭl wihan tto tarŭn ideollogiin'ga? sŏn'gunjŏngch'irŭl chungshimŭro), 시민사회와 NGO 10, no. 1 (2012): 160.
55 정병화, "강성대국 건설, 체제전환을 위한 체제개혁의 시도인가? 체제유지를 위한 또 다른
이데올로기인가?”: 161.
56 Myers, “Knocking on the Great Gate”: 79.
57 정병화, "강성대국 건설, 체제전환을위한 체제개혁의 시도인가? 체제유지를 위한 또 다른
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launch of a satellite with the slogan ‘Our Strong and Prosperous Country’s first shot’.58 The ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign and Sŏn'gun posters therefore often refer to the other, blurring the lines between these two categories.
Nevertheless, the Sŏn'gun posters often display the slogan ‘Kangsŏngdaeguk’ in the background, through images of flags with certain slogans, for example in the posters in picture 2 and 3, and do not focus much on the material gains and production of consumer products that Brian Myer discusses. A poster from 2007 (see picture 3) repeats many of these same elements, with a group of people representing different industries marching towards a future in which North Korea is a strong and prosperous country. The group is led by a soldier at the front, as is the same in picture 3, and in the background two people ride the winged Chollima, while a traffic officer is carrying a flag with ‘Kangsŏngdaeguk’ on it. The slogan on the poster refers to a heyday or golden days of a “Military First”-era North Korea, which is also emphasized by the golden color of the background. Vaguely in the background, a factory and satellite dish can also be observed, but their presence is less prominent than in is common.59
North Korean posters are only one part of the entire propaganda machine. The poster (picture 3) shows how messages from other parts of the propaganda apparatus are included in the visual and textual elements of posters, therefore becoming a reminder for viewers in their daily life. On its own, the poster already has a clear message as it encourages viewers to contribute to a golden age of Sŏn'gun. The slogan “Let Us Move Forward into the Heyday of Sŏn'gun Chosŏn” refers to the joint New Year editorial published that same year in the state newspaper Rodong Sinmun titled “The Great Heyday of Sŏn'gun Chosŏn.60 While the poster picture 5 contains the same elements of movement and the Chollima horse as a prominent feature in the posters displayed in picture 2 and 3, the absence of a soldier is indicative of the early stages of Songun in which the poster was produced.
58박헌옥 (Park Hun Ok), "북한, "강성대국 건설론"에 대한 분석과 전망”: 25. See Heather and De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection: 273 for the poster.
59 A poster marking the year 2000 from the David Heather collections shares similar characteristics. Even though textual references to Sŏn'gun are missing, the soldier is clearly leading the group in a charge towards the construction of a ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’. The background of the poster shows what this strong country should look like. See Heather and De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection: 168.
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Picture 6 "Marking the 90th birthday of the Great Leader, let us add glory to this year as the year of a new leap forward in the construction of a strong and prosperous nation!" (2002)
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The posters discussed so far can mostly be categorized as exhortative posters; celebratory posters also deserve some attention in this section. These posters generally spread a message of celebration for anniversaries of party and army establishment, but also the birth of Kim Il Sung and other important events. While these posters might be less agitative, they still speak to the viewers with a political message and use familiar elements to deliver this message.61A celebratory poster for Kim Il Sung’s 90th birthday published in 2002 again implies a sense of movement through the position of the group that seems to be marching towards the left, while the soldier in the group raises his gun towards the sky. In the background, the artists have drawn the house where Kim Il Sung was born. While the poster was created for a celebratory reason, the contents itself are more exhortative than other celebratory posters.
In 2005, celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the KWP, celebratory posters were created by artists such as Hwang Myong Hyok, who created several posters for the occasion. The example shown below (picture 6), created by Hwang, celebrates the anniversary with the slogan “For the Grand Celebration of the Victors!”. The poster’s design is very similar to those already discusses, as it repeats the design of a soldier at the front raising his rifle towards the sky. Behind him, people from other sectors of the economy look in the same direction with a bright smile.
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Following the analysis of these posters, the following can be regarded characteristics of Sŏn'gun posters. First, the soldier, representing the military, in a leading position at the front of the group or encouraging them from a position further in the back is a key visual element that appears in posters from the early 2000s. The soldier is often seen with a determined expression or shouting as he leads the people onward. While the Party Worker does not disappear completely from the narrative, his appearance is less frequent and often accompanied by a soldier in a support role or seen referring to Sŏn'gun ideology. The posters clearly reflect a key thought of Sŏn'gun ideology that it is not the laborers, but the military that drives the socialist revolution towards success.
Second, the slogans in the posters combine Sŏn'gun terminology with references to goals set by the regime through editorials or other publications. While this characteristic is not limited to the Sŏn'gun period, references to the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign are frequent due to its connection with Sŏn'gun ideology and are indicative of posters from the period. The repeated appearance of the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ slogans is similar to that of previous campaigns like the Three Revolutions Movement and the Chollima campaign, which both appeared in a large number of posters in the previous decades. While the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign itself can also be considered a guiding ideology, as Chung Byung Hwa and Park Hun Ok in their respective articles, in the discourse created by the posters as the slogan appears mostly on red flags in the background, the campaign falls in the same category as the Chollima campaign.
Third, many of the posters were of exhortative nature, urging the viewer to behave in a certain way in order to accomplish the goal of a ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ set by the state. What exactly constitutes a ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ is not always clear in the textual elements of the posters, but the images of golden rice fields and steaming factory exhaust pipes in the backgrounds of the posters give an indication. The main objectives seem to be modern cities and abundance in agriculture and industry, protected and supported by a strong military. The visual discourse created in these posters support the textual discourse in other state propaganda and the ‘correct’ interpretation of these posters is guided by the viewers familiarity with publications such as articles in Rodong Sinmun, books and speeches by the leadership.
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Chapter 3: Change and Continuity in Sŏn'gun posters
This chapter explores the change and continuity in Sŏn'gun posters compared to posters from the preceding decades. To what extent did the shift to Sŏn'gun actually bring about change in the content of North Korean propaganda posters? In terms of design, continuity is key for the propaganda posters. Chapter 2 has already argued that a key element of the propaganda posters is the repeated use of key visual elements and layouts, as they are familiar to the viewer. This chapter will continue this argument from a different angle, focusing specifically on posters from previous decades produced with a specific focus on the military. How was the military portrayed in propaganda posters from the 1960s onwards compared to the posters from the heyday of Sŏn'gun?
In the second half of this chapter, the focus will shift from military images to the appearance of Juche in posters from the Sŏn'gun period. The North Korea state propagates Sŏn'gun as Kim Jong-Il’s ideological contribution, much as Juche was propagated as Kim Il Sung’s unique ideology for the state. As pointed out in the first chapter, Sŏn'gun was not to fully replace Juche, but to both ideologies were to be considered part of the greater ideology that was Kim Il Sung’s thought.62 Myers argues that in the 2000s, “the amount of lip service paid to chuch’e sasang declined steadily” and that the regime became averse to chuch’e sasang, so much so that it had disappeared from internal communications by 2007.63 Can this gradual move away from Juche ideology also be found in public images such as propaganda posters?
While the focus shifted towards Sŏn'gun from the mid-1990s onwards, Juche visuals could not disappear completely from the propaganda posters produced in the beginning of Kim Jong Il’s rule due to its status as Kim Il Sung’s ideology. This chapter examines if and how posters from the Sŏn'gun continue to display these visual elements. In the 1970s and 1980s, Juche ideology had become firmly established as the state’s officially ideology. Therefore, a selection of posters from these decades were chosen for analysis and comparison to the posters discussed in Chapter 2.
62 Myers, North Korea's Juche Myth: 191.
63 Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth: 193-194. Myers argument is mostly based on defector testimony and does not include any textual evidence of these internal communications. These statements remain difficult to verify with primary textual sources to this day.
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Picture 6 "Let's prepare for the full combat mobilization so we can crush the enemy with one blow" (1969)
Equal Emphasis and militarism starting the 1960s
Focus on the military and its power is nothing new in North Korean society. Decades before Sŏn'gun became an official ideology, the military was already a key focus within leadership.64 The army played a central role in the founding story of North Korea and, unlike many other communist states, was established before the party.65 While official ideology focused on the revolution being carried out by the workers (labor first, military after 선로후군) under Kim Il Sung’s party leadership, due to the historic role of the army in the establishment of the regime, it was never absent from North Korean propaganda.66 In 1962, the Korean Workers Party established the Equal Emphasis policy, which placed focus on the simultaneous advancement
64 Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: 46.
65 정병화, "강성대국 건설, 체제전환을위한 체제개혁의 시도인가? 체제유지를 위한 또 다른
이데올로기인가?”: 164-165. The military past of Kim Il Sung also played a huge role in his personality cult.
66 김진환 (Kim Jin Hwan), “김일성의 선로후군과 김정일의 선군후로 – 북한 호전성 명제에 대한
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of the economy and the military.67 In poster 13, this policy is pictured through a man and woman riding two Chollima horses as the man holds the words economy and national defense in his arms. Following behind them are several sectors of the economy and national defense.
Besides the Equal Emphasis policy, national defense frequently appears in propaganda posters. The poster above (picture 6) was published in 1969 by the North Korean People’s Army Publications (조선인민군출판사). The poster urges viewers to give their all in the preparations for combat mobilization. In the front, men from the three branches of the military march towards the right side, their faces with a stern and determined expression looking to somewhere in the distance. To their right, a battlefield with soldiers practicing their combat skills on dummies are visible, behind them the grey contours of tanks rolling towards battle. In the yellow sky, missiles point in the same direction, apparently aiming for the enemy, while in behind the air force pilot, monuments from Pyongyang are visible. It is not hard to see the resemblances with posters from the Sŏn'gun period, such as the poster in picture 4 (p. 17).
However, a key difference between the posters should be noted. The target audience for the posters seems to be different. While poster 4 is directed at all citizens, the poster discussed above is aimed more at the military. Not only the publishing house, but also the contents of the poster indicate this difference. The people displayed in poster 4 cover a wide range of industries, as discussed above, and are led on by a soldier. The poster here only depicts people from the military as they are engaged in combat. While in picture 6, the military is depicted as defenders of North Korea, but also as defenders of its ideology, represented in the far-left corner by landmarks of significance.68
A poster from 1968 is an excellent representation of the Equal Emphasis policy In poster 7, also published in the 1960s, a soldier stands in front of a factory whilst holding his gun and looking in the distance. The slogan indicates a policy towards strengthening the military, which is consistent with the policies stipulated in Kim Il Sung’s Equal Emphasis policy. For the military part of this policy, the regime focused on four main strategies to strengthen
67 Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: 46-47.
68 Especially the Chollima statue, built in Pyongyang, stands out amongst the figures in the background. 김신원(Kim Shin Won), "북한의 혁명기념비 형성에 관한 연구."
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the military power of North Korea: “arming the entire population, providing extensive additional training for existing soldiers, converting the entire country into a fortress and modernizing the armed forces.”69 Especially the first strategy indicates a policy that meant to instill into the minds of ordinary citizens a military attitude that is not very different from what Sŏn'gun would later do with its slogans calling for people to follow the example of the military.
Picture 7 "Let's strengthen the People's Army in all directions!" (1964)
69 Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: 46-47.
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An excellent example of such policies being reflected in propaganda posters is a poster from 1963 (poster 8). The poster clearly ties into the Equal Emphasis campaign and the military strategies that accompanied it. In the foreground, four people from different walks of life stand armed. Their composition is similar that of later Sŏn'gun posters. While here the soldier stands in the back, all four seems to be prepared for battle and are armed with weapons in one hand and the tools of their profession in the other.
Picture 8 "Let's arm all the people and build socialism even faster!" (1963)
In the background, an almost idyllic view of daily life is shown as people enjoy outdoor activities. Overlooking all this, almost as a sun in the sky, is Mount Baekdu, ideologically one of the most important places in North Korea. The mountain has become an easy recognizable symbol tied to the Kim dynasty and it continues to play a role in the leadership’s propaganda to this day.70
Not only visual elements, but also similar slogans from this period can be found in later posters from the Sŏn'gun period. The Equal Emphasis of the 1960s not only placed great importance on the military, but also emphasized the need for other industries to support the military. The poster in picture 7 already slightly hints at this, but this discourse is better reflected in a poster from 1966 (picture 9) and a similar poster from 1976 (picture 10).
70 Photos of Kim Jong Un’s trip to Mount Baekdu in 2019, riding a white horse at the top of the mountain became a source for memes across the internet. For domestic politics, the trip was of high ideological value and within the tradition of the Kim dynasty.
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Picture 9 (left) "Let us support the People's Army in every way possible!" (1966) and Picture 10 (right) " Let us do our utmost to help the People's Army!" (1976)
The resemblance between the two posters is quite striking, as the visual elements remain mostly the same and even the composition and layout are almost identical. Still, small additions in picture 10 create a more detailed narrative and support the message of the slogan. In both posters, a man and woman from different industries stand behind the soldier, as if they’re his backup. In the poster from 1966, these two people also seem to be armed, which is consistent with the strategy of arming all people described above. In the poster from 1976, the man and woman are no longer carrying arms, but it is clear they are there to support to soldier with their firm determination. The tools held by the man and woman, as well as the background images of industry and agriculture indicate which parts of the economy they represent. The message, even without the slogan, would be clear to a North Korean audience. The same slogan also appears in posters where a young child, often a girl, hands a bouquet of flowers to soldier while a woman stands next to them smiling. Posters with this composition also have included different slogans which include the term 군민일치 (Army and People
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Unity).71 While these posters do not have the aggressive undertone as the ones above, their message falls in the same category.
Picture 11 "Let us give full play to the traditional customs of military and civilian unity!" (1984)
Picture 12 "Let us actively support the People's Army" (2001)
71 The term appears in a poster from the 1980s urging all people to ‘speed up the construction of Kwangbok Street’ which was completed in 1989. See Heather and De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection: 157.
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The repetition of visual elements and slogans in the posters discussed so far underscore the continuity rather than change in North Korean propaganda. However, this does not mean no change can be found at all. Small details are adjusted, added or removed, as shown in the posters 9 and 10.
Picture 13 "Following the call of the Party and the Leader to continuous revolutionary surges!" (1968)
The Equal Emphasis policy would create the foundation for the following decades, as militarism ran deep in North Korean politics. Not only the policies, but also the posters from the late 1950s and 1960s are the starting point of the poster culture North Korea is now famous for. The messages created through the posters emphasize the policies set out by Kim Il Sung and party leadership and the iconic images from this period would become the mold for images created later. A simple glance at posters from the 1960s will arouse a sense of familiarity. While drawing styles might differ slightly, posters of the Sŏn'gun era clearly share elements with posters focused on the military from 1960s.72
72 Several posters from the David Heather collection contained elements that would later become common in Sŏn'gun posters. However, due to the absence of print dates, it was difficult to correctly analyze them in the context of this chapter. These poster do however underscore once more the
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Sŏn'gun ideology and its propaganda are firmly rooted in these policies and practices from the previous decades.
Juche’s position in Sŏn'gun posters: coexistence or replacement?
The second part of this chapter focuses development of the position of Juche in Sŏn'gun posters. While some scholars have argued that from the early 2000s, the ideological importance of Juche started to steadily decrease and was replaced by Sŏn'gun, at least amongst leadership, one is left to wonder if this decrease is also reflected in official propaganda material such as posters.73 Is this gradual move away from Juche as the core ideology acknowledged in the visual discourse that was created through posters? Or does the regime maintain a certain level of ‘lip-service’ to Juche at least when it concerns its communications with the people of North Korea?
When it comes to Juche’s appearance in North Korean posters, the ideology can be referred to in several ways. First, textual elements, such as slogans directly mention Juche ideology. These slogans can be the exhortative slogans at the top and bottom of the posters, but also slogans found more in the image itself on things like flags or banners,74 which was also discussed in chapter 2 with the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign. The ideology can also be referenced through visual clues in the posters. For example, the books characters hold often refer to speeches or publications by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as the titles of these books contain a clear message for the viewers. Another way for the creator to reference to Juche ideology is through landmarks in the background by including for example the Juche tower or Mansudae’s Grand Monument.75
consistency of North Korean posters and the repeated use of certain slogans and catchphrases throughout time. See for examples: Heather and De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection: 45-46, 52-53, 68.
73 Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth: 193-194, and Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics”: 63. 74Relevant slogans include 자립 (Charip), 자위 (Chawi), 자주 (Chaju) which are at the core of Juche ideology. See Frank Rüdiger “The Political Economy of North Korean Arts” in Frank, Rüdiger, ed. Exploring North Korean Arts: 14.
75 Benjamin Joinau, "The Arrow and the Sun: A Topo-mythanalysis of Pyongyang.", Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 14, no. 1 (2014): 79-80.
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Juche ideology first started appearing in North Korean publications at the end of the 1960s and was firmly established as the country’s leading ideology by the 1980s.76 Kim Jong Il himself, as part of the Propaganda and Agitation Department during this period, is credited with solidifying the Juche ideology on behalf of his father.77 Referring to some of the core ideas of Juche, a poster from 1968 combines the familiar composition of a group marching towards the goal of a better North Korea. The slogan urges the viewer to join them towards “implementing the 10 great platforms”.78 The poster was produced in the midst of a turning point in North Korean ideological history, as 1967 marked a point when Juche ideology would become the country’s leading ideology, replacing the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the previous decades.79 While Juche is mentioned, it is likely that it wasn’t yet referring to a fully-fledged Juche ideology, which would not be completely developed until the 1970s.
A poster from the David Heather collection, most likely from 1997 or 1998, shows four people proudly holding up a red flag with the text ‘Juche character’ and ‘National character’, while the man at the front holds a book with a text from Kim Jong Il.80 The poster does not explain what exactly this Juche character means, but is clearly meant to visually support the message in the longer text.81 In the 2000s, references to Juche ideology continue to appear in propaganda posters, such as in a poster from 2008 (picture 14) that celebrates the 60th anniversary of the North Korean state. While this poster was published more than a decade after the start of the Sŏn'gun policies, it still references elements considered at the core of Juche ideology, as it includes slogans such as ‘self-reliance’ on flags and Juche tower is in the back of the poster although the Chollima monument overshadows it.
According to Myers, the almost complete disappearance of Juche in internal communications of the North Korean state indicates the decreasing importance of the ideology within the system.82 Yet in 2006, a poster (picture 15) prominently features the Juche
76 Young Whan Kihl, “Staying power of the Socialist ‘Hermit Kingdom’” in North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival: 8.
77 Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth : 147.
78 The 10 great platforms were introduced in 1967.
http://nk.chosun.com/bbs/list.html?table=bbs_23&idxno=3744&page=10&total=247&sc_area=&sc_ word (Accessed 31-10-2020)
79 백학순, 북한 권력의 역사: 604-605.
80 Heather and De Ceuster, North Korean Posters : The David Heather Collection: 193.
81http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=crevo4&mtype=view&no=7177 (Accessed 25-10-2020)
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tower and urges the viewer to “advance vigorously along the road of Juche”. The party worker in the poster holds a large red flag with the slogan “Sŏn'gun revolution-based leadership” in yellow. Another poster from the same year shows a hand holding up a brightly burning torch with the text “Ideology, Technology, Culture” engraved on it. The burning fire is often used a symbol for Juche ideology83 and the slogan “All march forward with the banner of the 3 Great Revolutions held high!” refers to a campaign held in the early 1970s to firmly establish Juche as the country’s ideology.84
A range of posters from the David Heather collection similarly combine a dedication to Juche through visual elements and slogans, while also including an important role for Sŏn'gun ideology.85 For example, an undated poster from the David Heather collection with the slogan “Towards the Golden Age of Army First Korea!” shows a soldier and laborer riding the Chollima horse wile behind them missiles, guns and fighter jets point towards the sky and below them skyscrapers, dams and factories fill the space. The soldier is clearly leading this charge toward the golden age, but the brightly burning torch in his hand, representing Juche ideology, seems to be lighting the way for him. While this is also consistent with North Korean propaganda relying on past campaigns and slogans, such a direct reference to Juche would be unlikely if the regime was determined to move away from Juche as Myers claims.
83 Joinau, "The Arrow and the Sun: A Topo-mythanalysis of Pyongyang.”: 80. At the same time, the torch can also refer to Kim Jong Il’s on-site guidance tours. See Jae-Cheon Lim, Leader Symbols and Personality Cult in North Korea (Routledge Advances in Korean Studies, London: Routledge, 2015): 109-110.
84 백학순, 북한 권력의 역사: 636.
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Based on the posters analyzed for this research, Sŏn'gun seems to appear much more frequently than Juche did at any point. While Juche has not fully disappeared either, the visual discourse seems to suggest that Sŏn'gun is of higher ideological importance. However, whether it has fully replaced Juche remains difficult to claim based on the following considerations. First, the actual ideological content of the two ideologies should be called into question. Many scholars have argued that while the North Korean state has claimed that Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s ideologies are related but not the same, these names are merely a formality with the actual content of the ideology remaining mostly the same.86 Second, officially replacing Juche as North Korea’s ideology would be unlikely when one considers it would have put Kim Jong Il in a bad position. Not only did he spent the start of his career solidifying the ideology through the state’s propaganda apparatus, it would reflect badly on him as a son and successor to replace his father’s ideology.87
Instead of a full replacement or equal coexistence in the visual discourse of Sŏn'gun era posters, the regime maintained a certain amount of loyalty to Juche ideology in its communications toward the people while simultaneously Sŏn'gun became a more prominent feature, both in slogans and in imagery. In this sense, the posters reflect the regimes internal move away from Juche as argued by Brian Myers. However, it would not be able to completely do so, as Juche has firmly established itself in the history of the North Korean state. Slogans such as ‘자력갱생’ (charyŏkkaengsaeng) continued to appear on flags in the posters as the regime maintained the focus on the self-reliance set out in the 1960s. It has remained present as a symbol of North Korean independence in the world and supplements the ideals of the ‘Strong and Prosperous Country’ campaign as the state continued it throughout the first decade of the 21th century.
86 Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth : 192, and Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: 153.
