The Standard Reading

Relatively little work has attempted to combine Levinas and Foucault on the topic of subjectivity. This may be indicative of the supposed distance between their accounts. Indeed, much of the literature that puts the two authors in conversation follows a similar line in its comparative appraisal. It proceeds in one of two ways, depending on the starting author.

Regarding Levinas, the suggestion is that there is difficulty in getting from the primacy of his ethical relation to locating the subject more broadly in moral and political relations of justice.²¹³ It is claimed to be unclear how to move from the universalistic pronouncements on

212 I take this from J. Butler, GAO of Oneself, New York, Fordham University Press, 2005.

213 See for instance, E.J. Popke, ‘Poststructuralist Ethics: Subjectivity, Responsibility and the Space of Community’, Progress in Human Geography, vol. 27, no. 3, 2003, p. 305. While Popke’s work here is admittedly not putting Levinas in conversation directly with Foucault, he does seem to suggest that Levinas’ conception of politics and the state needs to be supplemented by further deconstructivist and poststructuralist accounts in order to be tenable. I take this to be in line with the kind of approach I am characterising here.

the ethical relation to the Other, to the specifics of responding to concrete others in day-to-day life. Here, the Foucauldian critique of structurally determined subjectivity is seen as an antidote to Levinas’ subordination of politics to ethics.²¹⁴

On the other hand, it is maintained that Foucault overlooks the claim of the Other on the ethical-subject. Focussing on the care of the self presents a danger of doing violence to the alterity of the Other in Foucault, even while he accounts for the presence of others in self-formation.²¹⁵ He seems to fall into the trap Levinas identifies, in reducing the Other to its relation to the subject and not respecting its radical alterity (even if he gives some space for otherness in his account). What is supposedly needed then, is Levinas’ account of the irresistible responsibility of the ethical relation to temper Foucault’s “optimistic approach of stylization of the self.”²¹⁶

According to this reading, we either need Foucault to politicise and locate Levinas in reality, or need Levinas to ethicize Foucault and make the self-forming subject responsible to alterity. Taken together, this makes up what I will term ‘the standard reading’ of the two authors in conversation. In the remainder of this section, I will expand upon this standard reading, its use for present purposes, and its shortcomings.

3.1.1. The Standard Reading - Similarities

Having just outlined the differences, it is worth pointing out the similarities that are taken between Foucault and Levinas on the standard reading. Given the kind of gap that this reading posits between the two authors, the question arises as to why attempt their combination in the first place? We can find the answer not only at the level that suggested thus far (that both provide middle-ground accounts of intersubjective ethical-subject formation), but also in several more specific points of contact.

Significantly, we see in both authors a rejection of totalizing systems of thought. In Foucault this is explicit, as his genealogical approach is designed to reveal the historical contingency of its object of inquiry. This is the case in his investigation of the subject, as we have seen how his middle-ground account depends on rejecting reification of both the pre-existing subject and the social structures that influence it. As Judith Butler has pointed out, in

214 B. Hofmeyr, Ethics and Aesthetics in Foucault and Levinas, Ph.D. diss., Nijmegen, Radboud University Nijmegen, 2005.

215 P. Lok Wing-Kai, Foucault, Levinas and the Ethical Embodied Subject, Ph.D. diss., Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit, 2011, p. 296.

216 Ibid., p. 296.

asking the questions he does about the subject, Foucault “exposes the subject as historically and variably made.”²¹⁷

Although expressed differently, we find totalization similarly rejected by Levinas. Levinas’

view of the subject sits at odds with an essentialist/humanist one. The subject is incomplete before its relation with the Other, and becomes fully realised only through this encounter. As Barry Smart puts it, Levinas, like Foucault, argues against “conceptions of the universality of reason, the unity of truth, and human beings as self-conscious subjects, and places emphasis on ‘disjunctions’, differences, gaps, dispersions in time and knowledge which are refractory to unification or totalization.”²¹⁸ We can think here of his insistence that we don’t reduce the Other to the Same, and likewise that the subject and Other remain separate in their encounter. As we’ve argued that both Levinas and Foucault propose an account whereby the subject comes to form itself in relation to something external to it, we can see that both reject systems of thought that claim to capture the essence of the subject. This ‘essence’ for them is variable, and always one that is formed in individual circumstances.

As a further point of similarity, both Levinas and Foucault share a concern with exploring the ethical importance of alterity. While the way in which they conceptualise alterity may differ on the standard reading, many take them to share an interest in it with regards to ethics and subjectivity. Little need be said here about Levinas’. As M. L. Morgan points out, “Levinas is frequently taken to be the most distinctive voice of otherness” in philosophy.²¹⁹ When it comes to Foucault, the interest in alterity is somewhat less obvious. There is the well-documented curiosity regarding the limits of experience and new forms of subjectivity throughout Foucault’s life.²²⁰ His works also frequently deals with otherness, both in the form of external structures and networks of relations, or specified groups of outsiders. For instance, he insists that the care of the self “can only take shape by reference to the other.”²²¹ In this way, relations with alterity are fundamentally tied up with the process of self-formation

217 J. Butler, GAO of Oneself, 2005, p. 116.

218 B. Smart, ‘Foucault, Levinas and the Subject of Responsibility’, in J. Moss (ed.), The Later Foucault, London, SAGE Publications, 1998, p. 88.

219 M.L. Morgan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Levinas, p. 4.

220 For instance, James Miller draws connections between his ideas and pursuit of

extremities in The Passion of Michel Foucault, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1993. Such a link of biography and theory in Foucault has been heavily criticised however, see for instance in G. Gutting, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction, 2005, pp 1-9.

221 M. Foucault, Hermeneutics, p. 60.

in Foucault. And while this is often specified as a relation with concrete individuals, it can be extended to incorporate a more radical alterity. It is only by its location in an ethical relation with the other that care of the self can take on any ethical character. This other is also treated with a “Greek concern with the other for the other’s sake.”²²² We can thus see an exploration of alterity shared between Levinas’ and Foucault’s account of ethical-subject formation, although the specific nature of alterity is subject to contestation.

These commonalities along the lines of anti-essentialism and alterity would seem to indicate that there is ample space for a combination of Foucault and Levinas’ accounts of ethical-subject formation.²²³ In the rejection of totalizing and reifying narratives, emphasising rather locality, corporeality and alterity, we can see a shared rejection of the traditional liberal-humanist account of the self-founding subject. Both authors seem in favour of a more nuanced account that sees the subject as limited by the external, be it in the form of singular Other or structural conditions, in its process of self-creation. A connection between Foucault and Levinas’ accounts here “offers us a comprehensive understanding of one’s ethical formation after a postmodern critique of Cartesian dualism.”²²⁴ Such a connection could serve as a good basis for an account of subjectivity, preserving the ethical-subject in spite of criticisms of postmodernism as undermining this. We must then attempt to further connect these nuanced relational accounts, and interpret any differences between them.

3.1.2. The Standard Reading - Differences

While acknowledging these similarities, standard readings tend to emphasise an insurmountable difference between Foucault and Levinas. On this view, it is either Levinas that needs politicization or Foucault that needs ethicising. These divergent views of ethics and its role have an impact on the kind of subject they envisage. Before challenging the standard reading I will briefly flesh out its account of the ethical-subject in each author in turn.

222 B. Hofmeyr, Ethics and Aesthetics in Foucault and Levinas, 2005, p. 13.

223 This is of course not exhaustive of the potential similarities between Levinas and Foucault. I would suggest at least one more that while not bearing a key relevance to the present inquiry, bear mentioning as they indicate a shared method of philosophizing between Levinas and Foucault. Firstly, both authors recognise the ethical-subject as material and corporeal, against the more intellectualist image often associated with a traditional liberal-humanist picture. We see in both a shared conception of the ethical-subject as embodied and embedded in the material world (for a developed comparison here see P. Lok Wing-Kai, Foucault, Levinas and the Ethical Embodied Subject, 2011.)

224 P. Lok Wing-Kai, Foucault, Levinas and the Ethical Embodied Subject, 2011, p. 305.

The charge against Levinas is that the subject that emerges after its encounter with the Other is hard to locate in everyday ethical relations. Thus, while accounting for the existence of absolute alterity, Levinas ends up denying the real relationships between the subject and others. This is highlighted in the case of politics. While the Levinasian subject is created with an infinite and irrefutable responsibility to the Other, it seems impossible to translate this into a world made up of a multitude of Others. For one, how is the subject to balance its responsibilities? On the standard reading, Levinas’ account fails for this reason. His “ethics can respond responsibly to the Other”, however, “the political can never respond responsibly to all others”, and “if politics could do so, it would no longer be able to maintain the space necessary to prevent totalization”.²²⁵ It seems on this account that the only way for the subject to extend its ethical relation further than one singular Other, and act politically, is to fall back into reducing the alterity of the Other to the Same, undermining the foundations of Levinas’ account of ethical-subjectivity. For this reason, scholars comparing Levinas and Foucault have suggested a “Foucauldian critique of Levinas” to make a more useful ethics of alterity.²²⁶

Contrary to the passivity of the Levinasian subject, it is the activity of the Foucauldian one that is criticised. At best, it is claimed that by focussing on the activity of the subject in working on itself, Foucault overlooks the role of the Other in self-formation. Although he may pay attention to the influence of power-knowledge structures and location in social context, the point here is that alterity is always treated in relation to the subject. As such, its otherness is not respected in the Levinasian sense, seemingly undermining the possibility of an ethical relationship. The other is viewed only instrumentally as a means of achieving the subject’s own self-creative purposes. Here Levinasian thought is proposed as an easy cure.²²⁷ It is argued that for the subject in Foucault to be responsible in any meaningful sense, a relation with the other must be added as fundamental to subject formation.

225 A. Topolski, Arendt, Levinas and a Politics of Relationality, 2015, p. 170.

226 B. Hofmeyr, Ethics and Aesthetics in Foucault and Levinas, 2005, p. 21. Hofmeyr goes even further and suggests that such a critique also highlights that the lack of emphasis on the freedom of the subject in Levinas contra Foucault results in the Levinasian subject being a subjected one (see p. 255).

227 See for instance J. Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, p. 204, or B. Smart, ‘Foucault, Levinas and the Subject of Responsibility’, p. 87. Both authors suggest that the process of self-creativity of the subject in Foucault must first be founded on a fundamental relation with alterity.

We can now see that, although differently, both authors on the standard reading are accused of missing key parts of ethical-subjectivity in their accounts of subject formation. We can frame this around the notion of responsibility. Levinas struggles to get from the infinite responsibility created in the subject’s pre-existing relation with absolute alterity to a subject that can act ethically in the real world. Although Foucault thoroughly locates ethical-subjectivity in the world, he however seems to stumble in accounting for this more direct responsibility for the individual other. There is something to be said for this reading, although it is not the full picture. There are short-comings, which motivate the need for a different reading combining Levinas and Foucault.

3.1.3. The Standard Reading - Problems

The main drawback of the standard reading is that it often argues on a selective reading of the two authors, and thus misses nuances across their thought that suggest greater compatibility. By focussing on certain parts of their work, the gap between Levinas and Foucault appears greater than it is. For instance, in the above presentation of Foucault under the standard reading, we see that his account of ethical-subjectivity is usually expressed in the language of his later work on care of the self and self-creation.²²⁸ This makes sense given that this is perhaps his most explicitly ‘ethical’ work. However, as I’ve suggested in the previous chapter, we gain a fuller picture of subject formation if we look at Foucault’s account across his work, including the sometimes more structural mid-works focussing on processes of subjection. These works immediately suggest greater importance of the external in the process of subject formation, and act as a necessary counter-balance to the later Foucault’s (apparent) emphasis on the work of the subject on themself.

We can also identify problems with the standard reading’s interpretation of Levinas.

Again, we see that the reading takes a narrow view of Levinas’ work. This may be in the form of a tight focus only on particular texts, or through a focus only on certain of Levinas’ ideas.²²⁹ Whilst it is not necessarily wrong to focus on specific works for methodological purposes,

228 For instance, Barry Smart argues (in a manner reminiscent of the return of the subject narrative that I have tried to assuage in the previous chapter), that a free subject is introduced in the later work of Foucault (p.79-81).

229 For example, in her Foucauldian critique of Levinas, Brenda Hofmeyr decides to focus only on the early Levinas, up to and including Totality and Infinity. This may miss the developments of OtB where Levinas clarifies the passibity of the subject that is often critiqued.(B. Hofmeyr, Ethics and Aesthetics in Foucault and Levinas, 2005, p. 20.)

what such a limitation can do is miss out developments of Levinasian concepts that resist the standard reading.²³⁰.

While I have problematized the reconstructions of Levinas and Foucault on the standard reading that compares their work, some of the underlying challenges may remain. They approach the question of subjectivity distinctly, using different language and concepts. While we can see structural similarities in their account of an ethical-subject formed intersubjectively, these differences make it seem an almost insurmountable task to construct an account that can do justice to both their projects, whilst remaining true to them.

Importantly, this is not just a textual question of difference. The differing levels of analysis that Levinas and Foucault address represent different aspects of being an agent, and thus come with differen strengths and weaknesses for our thinking about ethical subjectivity.

Levinas’ account of an infinitely responsible subject does run into problems (though the standard reading may overblow them) in the real world, particularly in applying this model of subjectivity to ethical and political actions. If it is unable to address these things, this would lend creedance to the critics of postmodernism that a theory of subjectivity that is critical of essentialising is unable to perform the role needed of such a concept. The same is true in an opposite way with Foucault. In his historical and structural account, he arguably does end up reducing alterity somewhat in the way Levinas criticises of philosophy. This may lead us to question how ethical the Foucauldian subject can ultimately be. Furthermore, there is also the question of where Foucault can draw his normativity from if he consistently highlights contingency. We may need a sense of alterity to at as ethical foundation. We therefore need to go beyond this direct comparison of their thought, and see how they can be combined in a different framework. Doing so allows us to construct a broader theory that addresses these challenges.