Chapter 3 Shaping the era: US and Africa in the 1950s
3.2 The Soviet Union and Africa
187 Osgood, 226.
188 Osgood 226-227.
189 Osgood, 226-227.
190 J. Standifer, "The Tumultuous Life of Porgy and Bess", Humanities (Washington), Vol. 18, No. 6 (1997), 8–
53.
191 Standifer, 8-15.
The United States was not alone in this conflict. The Soviet Union also made a large effort to win over the Third World.192 1960 was the so-called The Year of Africa.193 It was an era of African independence, where seventeen countries gained sovereignty from their former colonial powers in one year. It was a tumultuous period, especially from a military and security standpoint. Eisenhower and his successors were fearful during this time, afraid o for a Domino-effect in Central and Southern Africa.194 If one country becomes independent and chooses communism, the ones around them might follow. The United States looked at the newly independent countries and their chosen leaders, to see if there was a possibility to let them join the fight against communism in Africa.195 For the Soviet Union as well as the United States, the years of chaos and decolonization in Africa were foreign-policy opportunities. Connecting with the new leaders meant a bigger chance of an advantage in their conflict. This was not uncontroversial, especially the U.S. involvement in African politics. Not only because the United States participated in forced labor of West Africans, or their Jim Crow laws but also from a diplomatic standpoint. The United States wanted help from NATO during the Cold War, but that became an issue during the years of decolonization.196 Several NATO members were colonial powers themselves. Of the fifteen members of the NATO in 1950’s and 1960’s, eight had colonies in the Third World. This gave some friction, internally but also from an outside perspective. As one African party leader said: ‘You see Americans wanting to help you decolonize while working closely together with your former oppressor’.197
The Soviet Union experienced some advantages in its quest to win over African countries.
Africa has a naturally grown preference of commune and in most places doesn’t have a bourgeoisie, not indigenous bourgeoisie at least, says professor of Political Science Daniel Kempton.198 This, in combination with the growing state apparatus, was beneficial for the Soviet Union’s socialism. It would be easier to persuade new leaders into choosing the equal
192 Colin W. Lawson, "Soviet Economic Aid to Africa", African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 349 (1988), 501–518;
Daniel R. Kempton, Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa: The National Liberation Movement Connection (New York, NY: Praeger, 1989), Parts 1 & 2; Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2013), Part I; Trends in Soviet Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, December 5, 1962, CIA, (FRUS), 1961-1963, Africa, Volume XXI, No.11.12.62 (375).
193Ebere Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960 (Harvard University Press, 2001), 27-28.
194 Latham, 173-175.
195 Latham, 173-175.
196 Thomas G. Paterson, Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 253-283; Robert D. Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy", Diplomatic History, Vol, 22, No. 1 (1998), 29–62.
197 Saleh Souleyman, "Cold War Battleground in Africa: American Foreign Policy and the Congo Crisis, January 1959 - January 1961", University of Arkansas UARK (2013), 98.
198 Kempton 40-48.
and non-colonial side of communism than capitalism. According to the influential political scientist, presidential advisor, and diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Soviets had four distinctive advantages in their relations with Africa:
“Africans agreed with the Soviets about the connection between capitalism and imperialism.
They believed that the two were linked, and both were worthy of elimination; Africans and Soviets had a common enemy. The former colonial powers were also anti-communist; no communist nation had ever been a colonial power in Africa, and Africans admired the rapid development in the Soviet Union and saw it as a model for their development.”199 The United States knew their disadvantages but weren’t always agreeing on the way to win over Africa, and not to lose other battles while doing so. The Cultural Exchange Program, together with the USIA and the tours, all continued when Eisenhower left the White House.
After Eisenhower, the pragmatic Democrat and International Relations major John F. Kennedy entered the White House.200 The Kennedy administration was for many reasons very different from its predecessor and especially on Foreign
Affairs. Kennedy had been critical of Eisenhower’s policy since the end of the 1950s.
In 1957, during the Algerian Revolutionary War of Independence Kennedy critiqued Eisenhower on his lack of involvement towards the oppressor, France.201 Kennedy promised to support decolonization in Africa and said he would recognize former colonies as sovereign states.
During his election period, in the Year of Africa, seventeen countries gained independence, a
moment of breakthrough for the United States – African relations, now the United Stated had open access to collaboration with the newly reestablished countries. Kennedy mentioned Africa 479 times during his entire election period.202 Before his presidency, he was a chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that focused on Africa. Because of this, he knew many African nationalist leaders personally.203
199 Brzezinski, 270-271.
200 Paterson 253-283; Dean 29-33; Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, First edition (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapter 3.
201 Souleyman, 90-101; Carole J.L. Collins, "The Cold War Comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), 243–269.
202 Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since 1960, 1st edition (New York, NY: W. Morrow, 1982), 38-39.
203 Jackson, 36-37.
His awareness of the importance of African countries and African-U.S. relations established Kennedy as an internationally progressive president that brought new life into a troubled relationship.204 These ‘winds of change’ promises were only made for international affairs.
Kennedy tried to stay away from the internal issue of segregation. During the Civil Rights Movement, many people were inspired by Kennedy’s messages of progress, but in practice never received actual support from the administration. His pragmatic point of view became clear when he only acted against segregation when federal laws were violated.205 Kennedy thought that the abolishment of the Jim Crow laws should be a state responsibility and not a federal one.206 His position on domestic segregation in combination with his efforts in improving African relations make up an odd perspective. After his inauguration in 1961, Kennedy appointed Mennan Williams to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa.
Williams was an idealistic and strong supporter of civil rights and was a progressive liberal and therefore very effective as a right-hand for Kennedy.207
To understand the playing field of the United States and the Soviet Union, it is important to look at some of the countries in Africa that had prominence in the Cold War. How the countries were supported by the hegemonies, how the decolonization went, and how their situation was before the cultural exchange programs. The horn of Africa, on the eastern side of the continent, was the first large group of countries that went through a period of decolonization during the 1950s and 1960s.208 Somalia, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Tunisia, and Algeria all fought for their independence and exemplified the domino effect, feared by the old colonial powers. After World War II especially, colonial powers knew the end was near, even though they sometimes had a hard time admitting it.209 The Algerian War (1954-1962) became an example of an awful
204 Paterson, 252-283; Dean, 50-62.
205 Bostdorff and Goldzwig, 515-518; Paterson, 260-265.
206 Dean, 30-32.
207 Dean, 29-32.
208 Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge to the Congo: A Case Study of Foreign Pressures in an Independent State (New York City, NY: International Publishers, 1967), Chapter 1; Jackson 53-60; Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa: From About 1935 to the Present, First Edition (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984), 13-17.
209 Pierre-Jean Le Foll-Luciani, ‘The Communists in Algeria (1920–93)’, in Communist Parties in the Middle East (Routledge, 2019), 199–215; Anthony Clayton, "Algeria 1954: A Case Study", The RUSI Journal, Vol, 144, No. 5 (1999), 65–68.
method of handling civil protests during the war for independence.210 The seven-year brutal war between the French and the National Liberation Front in Algeria, which got especially heated after 1957, changed the positions of colonial powers in the public eye and the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States who then used decolonization as an advantage.211 Using it to speak against colonialism. Of course, this worked better for the Soviet Union, the first to recognize independent Algeria and providing mostly military help in the Algerian War.212 By establishing a diplomatic relationship in 1962 between the Soviet Union and Algeria, the United States knew it lost Algeria. Many countries in the North-Eastern parts of Africa received military and technological support from the Soviet Union.213 So, the United Stated had to focus on the parts that were not yet influenced by the Soviet Union.
Ghana, the Gold Coast of the British Empire, gained independence in 1957.214 It became the pathfinder for the nationalist movements in West and Central Africa. New leader Kwame Nkrumah thought of himself as the African Lenin, so the Soviet Union was taking it as a blessing that Nkrumah won the first election. The countries established a diplomatic relationship in 1958 and opened embassies in 1959.215 The development of the relationship with the Soviet Union was a very slow process, even though Kwame called himself the “African Lenin”. Khrushchev was slowly losing his patience but tried to keep Nkrumah happy. When Nkrumah was outraged at the kidnapping of Congo’s Lumumba in 1960, which he blamed on the UN, Khrushchev quickly promised to sponsor and assist him in large projects worth $40 million.216 But the economic ties still were not stable, and the relationship progressed slowly between Ghana and the Soviet Union. Kennedy however, quickly persuaded Nkrumah in a meeting in Washington in 1961. Kennedy introduced him to his daughter Caroline and wife Jackie, which most certainly helped to get an advantage. Personal, non-military, diplomacy is what made the US win Ghana’s trust.217
The controversial Congo Crisis from 1960 to 1965 was a crucial moment between the Soviet Union and the United States.218 In the summer of 1960, the Congolese were free of Belgian rule. A country as large as Western Europe with over 250 ethnic groups was not
210 Clayton, 65-68; Le Foll-Luciani, 199-205.
211 Clayton, 65-80.
212 Clayton, 70-80.
213 See all FRUS/CIA Archive reports in the Bibliography.
214 Nwaubani, 12-18; Thomas Zeiler, Decolonization, and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence, ed. by Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 183-250.
215 Nwaubani, 10-20; Zeiler, 183-250.
216 Cooper 1540-1545; Jackson, 29-40; Nkrumah, Chapters 2 & 3.
217 Mahoney Chapter 5; Paterson, 252-283.
218 Souleyman, 90-98.
prepared for independence, especially because it was only decided six months before. No sense of unity, national identity, but in an economically strategic place in the world.219 The instability, combined with the fact that there were no plans made by the Belgians to smooth out the bureaucratic state machine, and other countries supporting opposite leaders, led to enormous trouble. Prime minister Lumumba indirectly supported a military revolt just days after the official independence. Lumumba became the face of Congo, and being a strong advocate of socialism, the U.S. thought of him as a definite Soviet supporter.220 The CIA thought he was another Fidel Castro, even.221 President Kasavubu was outspoken pro-western, wanting to keep the contacts with the West. This was partly because of the economic gains Kasavubu knew Congo could encounter when supporting the west. The Congo Crisis also became a cruel example of miscommunication, framing, and myopia.222 Eisenhower and the CIA believed Lumumba to be a communist and were opposed to him for that. It was built upon Western misconceptions, as political scientists Henry F. Jackson, Saleh Souleyman, and Carole Collins argue; Lumumba would accept help even from the devil to fight against the Belgian troops, but the Western nations would not give him help, so he reached out to the Soviet Union. Kasavubu had Lumumba kidnapped in December 1960, with some help from the CIA.223 The legitimate leader of the Congo was assassinated in January, almost certainly by rebel authorities in Katanga. It was again Kennedy who wanted to better the relationship, but could not stop the assassination of Lumumba, also because he had been inaugurated only a few days before. He did restore the order a bit through personal diplomacy, especially in the Katanga province.224 Kennedy met everyone, ensured political leaders their independence, and showed pictures of his family to Lumumba’s successor Joseph Kasavubu. Kennedy did not make efforts to support the making of strong institutions or aid a legitimate leader. It was a weak relationship, which did not help to decrease possible Soviet influence into Congo.225
In the decolonization of African countries, there are some similarities. A lot of African countries were not set on an ideology even though the United States and the Soviet Union
219 Nigeria and the Congo: Implications for Black Africa, November 6, 1967, CIA, FRUS, 1964-1968, Congo, 1960-1968, Volume XXIII, No. 9.67; Collins 243–269.
220 Nigeria and the Congo: Implications for Black Africa, November 6, 1967, CIA, FRUS, 1964-1968, Congo, 1960-1968, Volume XXIII, No. 9.67.
221Nigeria and the Congo: Implications for Black Africa, November 6, 1967, CIA, FRUS, 1964-1968, Congo, 1960-1968, Volume XXIII, No. 9.67; Wilford, 23–34.
222 Nkrumah, Chapters 1 to 3.
223 Nkrumah, Chapters 1 to 3; Jackson, 29-40.
224 Jackson 53-70; Collins, 260–269; Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Office Files.
Countries. Congo: Security, 1961. ‘Congo: Security, 1961' | JFK Library <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/114/JFKPOF-114-012> ( Retrieved October 6, 2021).
225 Paterson, 276-283.
thought so. New leaders just wanted support against their former oppressor, to (re)build their country. In their misconceived policies, the US and the Soviet Union often failed to establish meaningful relationships. It also shows the importance of personal diplomacy, of non-military diplomacy, especially Kennedy saw this development. Eisenhower used the CIA in his administration, amongst other things, to receive news and strategies, but on a cultural level, he knew he could influence the newly sovereign countries.