Making Money as A YouTuber

productions and sameness" (Strangelove, 2020, p.168).

Self-Branding: The U.S.A. Case

Grzesiak (2018) argues that there are distinctively American elements, culturally speaking, which facilitate the production of a personal brand in ways inaccessible to other parts of the world. He specifically identifies factors in education, social conditioning and marketing practices, such as the inclusion of public speaking courses in official secondary and tertiary curricula, the social acceptance for speaking about one’s self in a self-promotional manner, and the widespread interest, on the part of a long series of professions, in establishing a personal brand (Grzesiak, 2018). As a result, Americans, from a young age already, are more aware of and inclined to use opportunities for self-promotion, a tendency which is also observable in YouTube engagement (ibid.).

Finally, other culturally specific elements, which come into play as far as the American variation of self-branding is concerned, include:

 the multicultural makeup of American society -which practically enables the discussion of more taboo issues in YouTube videos due to the de facto audience diversity-,

 the long tradition of video promotion in the American market (e.g. car rental agencies, advertising gas stations, etc.) and subsequent long existing, tested out know-how,

 the dominance of English language content globally -which guarantees international attention once American YouTubers break through nationally-, and

 the increased economic incentives of American YouTubers, who earn significantly more money from advertising revenues than other YouTubers (Grzesiak, 2018).

Entrepreneurship & Power Asymmetry on YouTube

The rising significance of online digital platforms for economic activities, has attracted scholarly attention which only recently acknowledged that the relationship between platform owners and platform contributors is atypical in the sense that it “does not fit into the classical firm-supplier relationship, Porter’s value system¹⁶ or a firm’s strategic networks; neither are they integrated hierarchies” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p.2258). This analysis challenges previous studies which have suggested that platform owners and platform contributors are codependent and their relationship is based on the common goal of providing value to customers (Adner, 2017; Nambisan & Baron, 2013), with some authors even having suggested that the said relationship is, essentially, a partnership (Gawer & Cusumano 2014; Wang & Miller, 2019; Zhu

& Liu, 2018).

Moreover, Cutolo and Kenney (2021) argue that given the current role of successful digital platforms as economic intermediaries, the reality of providing services through a platform is, in fact, so vastly different from the conditions of traditional entrepreneurship that the term

“platform-dependent entrepreneurship” should be used to describe all entrepreneurial expressions of individuals or already-existing organizations in a platform market (Cutolo &

Kenney, 2021, p.2021). By using power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) to emphasize the power imbalance between platform owners and platform contributors, Cutolo and Kenney (2021) go on to argue that power asymmetry is inherent in platforms due to their techno-economic features. Accordingly, the following characteristics of platform-dependent entrepreneurship are identified:

16 As an analytical tool, Porter’s value chain is essentially an organizational model, whereby a manufacturing/service organization is seen as a system made up of different subsystems which have their own inputs, transformation processes and outputs, involving the acquisition and consumption of resources such as land, equipment, money, etc. Primary activities include marketing and sales, among others, whereas secondary activities include human resource management and technological development, among others (Porter, 1985).

1. Because the platform acts as an intermediary for platform-dependent entrepreneurs, the latter are important to platform owners only to the extent they add value to the platform.

2. More specifically, platform owners are expected to act as ecosystem curators who regulate the ecosystem-platform on the basis that negative/opportunistic behaviors by ecosystem members/platform-dependent entrepreneurs who endanger the system’s value are disallowed (see also, Thies et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018).

3. The alternative could result in the platform’s failure, and since the platform owner’s profit is linked to the overall wellbeing and value of the platform (see also, Taüscher &

Kietzmann, 2017), there exists a strong incentive for the existence, modification and implementation of regulations (Evans, Hagyu, & Schmalensee, 2006). As a result, a variety of data-drivel tools, such as algorithmic recommendation and reputation metrics, are utilized, whereas exclusion from the platform is also a possibility (Curchod et al., 2019).

4. Ownership over digital space translates into the power to specify what type of data, or video specifications in the case of YouTube (Eaton et. al, 2015), can enter the platform, and, through the use of guidelines and codes of conduct, what kind of behavior and content is acceptable. For example, YouTube currently features a Content ID system for the protection of intellectual property and removes content deemed dangerous, such as conspiracy and anti-vaccination videos (Ørmen, J., & Gregersen, A., 2022).

5. At the same time, the platform provides lowered transaction cost, digital infrastructure and, especially in the early stage of its “life”, money-losing incentives for platform-based entrepreneurs to join it; however, exactly because it is build from software, it can be easily altered.

6. As a result of points 4 and 5, the power imbalance between platform owners and platform dependent entrepreneurs is not only apparent in the inability of the latter to negotiate the terms and conditions of their participation -a practice incompatible with the agreements in traditional entrepreneurship-, but also, and especially, in the ability of platform owners to unilaterally change the terms and conditions, website structure

and all related algorithms with no prior notice¹⁷. Therefore, ranking systems and grounds for exclusion can change overnight, with little to no transparency over the reasoning or process followed.

Monetization & Alternative Sources of Income

Cunningham and David (2019) argue that, through monetization, YouTube is de facto forcing creators to choose similar video content and advertising strategies. At the same time, YouTube itself has taken initiatives to encourage finding one’s niche, as seen on a video currently posted on the YouTube Creators Channel, featuring YouTube’s Audience Development strategist, Ryan Nugent (YouTube Creators, 2015). Interestingly enough, thematically targeted video-sharing sites are expected to emerge as a possible response to YouTube’s domination of the industry, and further complicate its diversity (Lange, 2019). In order to further explore what strategies YouTubers develop to respond to institutional pressures for compliance to randomly changing -as analyzed in the previous section- community guidelines, I will first discuss how monetization on YouTube currently works.

In order to monetize their content on YouTube, creators must comply with YouTube’s monetization policies, which include YouTube’s Community Guidelines¹⁸, Terms of Service, Copyright and Google AdSense program policies, as well as the Advertiser-friendly content guidelines (Google, n.d. -a).

Specifically as far as Advertiser-friendly content guidelines are concerned, it is interesting to note that content pertaining to Controversial Issues and Sensitive Events is considered

17 Notable examples from the realm of YouTube include the demonetization of videos posted prior to the reinterpretation of rules, in order to prohibit certain actions which were previously acceptable (Alexander 2019), as well as the ongoing -since March 3, 2022- inability of Russian YouTubers to monetize their videos through YouTube and Google ads, or the inability of new Russian YouTubers to sign as YouTuber Partners -since March 10, 2022- (Google, n.d. -a).

18 Notable in the Community Guidelines is the subsection involving Misinformation, which pertains to Elections -interestingly enough, this policy concerns any past U.S. Presidential election, the 2021 German Federal election and the 2018 Brazilian Presidential election, with the explicit mention that other elections are included, but without mentioning which- (Google, n.d. -c), COVID-19, and Vaccine misinformation, on penalty of removing the problematic content, and, in the case of a third strike, terminating the channel (Google, n.d. -d).

advertiser-unfriendly, even if it is just commentary or contains no graphic imagery; this regulation could potentially be held against True Crime content, especially in the case of Controversial issues which are simply defined as “topics that may be unsettling for our users and are often the result of human tragedy”, whereas Sensitive Issues¹⁹ are typically related to loss of life due to terrorist attacks or organized crime (Google, n.d. -b).

Minimum eligibility requirements for the YouTube partner program include having more than 4000 valid watch hours in the last 12 months and more than 1000 subscribers (Google, n.d. -a). As aforementioned, as of March 10, 2022, creators in Russia can’t become YouTube partners, and monetization for Russian YouTubers and Russian Federation state-funded media channels has stopped (as of March 3, 2022, and as of February 25, 2022, respectively) (Google, n.d., -a). Aside from advertising revenue, YouTube partners have access to money-earning features such as Channel memberships, Merch Shelf, Super Chat & Super Stickers, and the YouTube Premium Revenue (Google, n.d. -e).

Ørmen and Gregersen (2022) argue that since the business model of YouTubers is different from that of YouTube -whose primary income is related to advertisement and transaction taxation-, YouTubers respond to institutional pressures by developing diversification strategies.

For example, external, off-YouTube monetization involves links to donation services (especially Patreon and PayPal), webshops and sponsored content (ibid. Coromina et. al, 2020).

Indeed, as far as responses to the power disadvantage are concerned, platform-dependent entrepreneurs are likely to resort to a variety of countermeasures such as offering their products through multiple platforms, or platform multihoming (Kenney & Pon, 2011), establishing their own website or physical store, and diversifying their income through typical influencer options such as in-video product placements, personal appearances, subscriptions to premium content, etc., (Cutolo & Kenney, 2021).

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19 A general problem that YouTubers are facing is that YouTube’s advertising guidelines are not applied contextually. For example, YouTubers couldn’t talk about the coronavirus outbreak without risking demonetization, because the Covid-19 outbreak was considered a sensitive topic, meaning that any and all videos about it were demonetized indiscriminately (Creator Insider, 2020).

In conclusion, YouTube constitutes a fascinating digital landscape whose inherent power asymmetry pushes creators to develop personalized business strategies that shape participatory norms and cultural meaning-making in a manner that ultimately redefines the overall “amateur” brand, as the nexus of creativity, economic incentives and platform-related stresses brings out uniquely marketable personal styles. However, the de facto emergence of business models and profit-orientation strategies is not only dictated by the medium/platform creators use, but would define their content -and subsequent treatment of ethics issues- even if the latter was purely journalistic, as the following chapter will demonstrate.