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34 LMP’s desire to become a dominant, leftist alternative party prevented any meaningful cooperation

between them and other parties (Ripp, 2017). Since the party did not take a firm stance in the questions of media freedom and the rule of law, they could not attract most anti-government, pro-democracy voters. In 2011, LMP’s leaders became divided on the issue of cooperating with other parties. In 2012, the party decided not to join the electoral alliance of former PM Gordon Bajnai, Together 2014.

Rejecting any type of coalition for the second time in 2013, eight MPs left LMP and established a new party, Párbeszéd Magyarországért. In 2014, the party barely managed to get into parliament with 5,34%.

LMP did not learn from its mistakes, in the 2018 elections they ran alone again and secured 7,06% of the votes, led by Bernadett Szél. Their stubborn unwillingness to cooperate with other parties contributed to Viktor Orban’s third supermajority. Internal conflicts and investigations launched by the party’s ethics committee resulted in most of their leaders leaving the party. In the 2019 EP election, LMP received 2,18%, its voters presumably switched to Momentum instead (Republikon, 2020b:45-47).

DK - Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition)

Failing to achieve MSZP’s renewal, Ferenc Gyurcsany established DK in 2011. Labeling itself a progressive, center-left democratic party committed to European values, the Democratic Coalition’s main message is the rejection of the System of National Cooperation and a commitment to restoring the pre-2010 constitution. Their economic policies support a reasonably regulated, market-based competition (DK, 2017). Fidesz made continued efforts to discredit the party through their attacks on Mr Gyurcsany, who continues to be a very divisive figure in Hungarian politics. The period leading up to the 2014 national elections was characterized by fights for dominance between MSZP and DK.

Eventually, the two parties ran on a joint list and the socialists received 29 seats, while DK sent 4 MPs to parliament. Four years later, DK ran alone and received 5,38% support (valasztas.hu). The 2019 EP election was the real breakthrough for the party - Gyurcsany realized that he needed to take a step back and nominated his wife, Klara Dobrev to lead the party’s EP list, receiving 16,05%, thereby sending 4 MEPs to Brussels and becoming the biggest party of the opposition. Although already relatively well-known, Dobrev gave the impression of a fresh, new politician, and was soon elected Vice-President of the EP. Seeing its role as the biggest leftwing party, two MSZP mayors left their party after winning their districts in the 2019 local elections and joined DK (Republikon, 2020b:13-16).

Párbeszéd - Párbeszéd Magyarországért (Dialogue for Hungary)

Párbeszéd was established in 2013, after eight members of LMP’s parliamentary group decided to leave the party and start a new political community. They did not agree with LMP’s strong rejection of any kind of cooperation with other opposition parties in order to defeat Fidesz. Párbeszéd is a green, left-wing party and, as its name also suggests, open for cooperation with others. Their main policy objective is the introduction of universal basic income in Hungary. In the 2014 elections, they ran in an alliance

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with Together 2014 and sent one MP to the National Assembly (Ripp, 2017). In the 2018 elections, they had an electoral alliance with MSZP, and received 3 seats in parliament - these three MPs, together with liberal MP Anett Bősz and socialist MP Sándor Burány, were able to form Párbeszéd’s parliamentary group. Although the party itself does not have a national follower base - polling around 1-2% consistently -, its politicians are very popular. Its two co-leaders, Timea Szabo and Gergely Karacsony are the most popular opposition MPs. Mr Karacsony led the MSZP-Párbeszéd list as candidate for PM, and won the local election in 2019 to become the Mayor of Budapest. They supported two other candidates - Marta Varadine Naszalyi in District I, and Krisztina Baranyi in District IX, both of whom won mayorship. Seeing the massive popularity of their politicians, it would not be surprising if they had an important role in the 2022 opposition coordination (Republikon, 2020b:52-60).

Momentum - Momentum Mozgalom (Momentum Movement)

Momentum was established as an association in 2015 by members of the ‘first free generation’ of Hungarians with the primary mission to resolve the systemic problems of the country. Their aim was to create a new political community that can convince the disillusioned Hungarian society that it is worth the effort to engage in politics and lead the country to the 21st century (Momentum, 2020). Whether these ambitions were fulfilled, only time will tell, but the party has undeniably energized Hungarian politics and shaken up the ‘swamp’ of the opposition side. Momentum gained widespread recognition in January 2017 with a successful campaign against Hungary’s bid for hosting the 2024 Olympic Games without consulting the citizens of Budapest. After the successful campaign, Momentum was focusing on building its national network, and ran alone in the 2018 national elections - they built a generational image and advertised themselves as a new force rejecting the entire political establishment. Obtaining 3,06%, they failed to pass the 5% threshold, but became the largest extra-parliamentary party. After the elections, they further developed their membership, which currently stands at 4.000. In the 2019 EP election, Momentum became the other surprise winner - after DK -, the party’s list obtained 9,86% and they sent two MEPs to Brussels. Campaigning on a centrist, pro-globalization, pro-European platform, using social media very actively, they rival Fidesz in their popularity among young voters (Hargitai, 2019). Their current support is roughly the same as that of DK, Jobbik and MSZP. Following the EP results, Momentum did not scrap the opposition coalition for the local elections, they only nominated a candidate for the second opposition primary in summer 2019. The party is currently focusing on their positions in local governments and building international relations (Republikon, 2020b:19-25).

5.2 Opposition agency - attempts to block the supermajority

2014 Unity

An attempt to create a wide electoral coalition of center-left parties to combat Viktor Orban’s authoritarian rule sprang up in October 2012, when former PM Gordon Bajnai announced that he intends to create a coalition of democratic parties that can prevent another Fidesz supermajority in the

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2014 elections. Merging three CSOs, Together 2014 was intended to be an umbrella organization, led by Bajnai. However, LMP’s Congress voted against joining the alliance. MSZP also did not want to accept the leadership of Bajnai and slowly took over the initiative. There was a huge divide within LMP about the cooperation, but the majority voted against it - the pro-coalition wing first formed a platform within the party, and after a second rejection of the cooperation, they left to form the Párbeszéd Magyarországért party. Ferenc Gyurcsany - seeing the election program’s decidedly liberal nature - adopted a liberal rhetoric and called for total opposition unity, resulting in more support for DK. This made it impossible to exclude his party from the alliance. Infights within the coalition and continued attacks from Fidesz compelled Bajnai to resign. MSZP leader Attila Mesterhazy stepped up as leader, supported by Gyurcsany. The coalition also included the Liberal Party, but nevertheless could not prevent another supermajority (Ripp, 2017). In 2015, Fidesz lost its supermajority in a by-election but the system - and especially the regime’s methods - did not change at all.

Hódmezővásárhely 2018 - hope and defeat

A little more than a month before the 2018 national elections, a local by-election called the power of Fidesz into question. The mayoral contest in the city of Hódmezővásárhely resulted in an unexpected defeat of the governing party’s candidate against an independent, supported by every opposition party.

The situation was even more interesting because the city was widely considered to be the stronghold of Janos Lazar, Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, who had personally campaigned for Fidesz’s candidate. When asked if it was the defeat of Lazar or his party, the current Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, Gergely Gulyas responded by saying that it was inseparable from Lazar, and a huge embarrassment (mandiner.hu, 2018). Mayor-elect Peter Marki-Zay ran as an independent, supported by Jobbik, MSZP and LMP. Analysts claimed that this event in Hódmezővásárhely had ‘sweeping psychological significance’, expecting opposition parties to quickly rethink their position (Maclean, 2018).

Opposition parties did rethink their position and were trying to reorganize the last six weeks of the campaign. It was too late in the campaign for a comprehensive reshuffle - i.e. for every party to run under a single banner and field one opposition candidate in each constituency - but they could have coordinated reciprocal withdrawals, so that as many constituencies have one opposition candidate as possible. Relations between the parties were far from simple, though. MSZP was ready to cooperate with LMP, they had made some initial plans where they would have withdrawn for the other party’s candidate already. However, Gergely Karacsony ruled out organized cooperation with Jobbik. Jobbik was also ready to cooperate with LMP. Gabor Vona, President of Jobbik had stated already that he was ready to cooperate with so-called ‘21st century parties’, meaning he was ready to work with LMP and Momentum, but not with MSZP or DK (Dull, 2018). This fundamental opposition between Jobbik and the left - MSZP and DK - did not seem to ease, even though the socialists and the rightwing party managed to conduct a coordinated campaign in Hódmezővásárhely (See Chapter 6.1).

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