Conclusion

In this chapter the theories on the decision-making progress (in regard to civil rights) have been discussed from the start of the Cold War and the Presidential Election of 1948. Coming into a war where the US battled fascism and Nazism, the country needed to take a stand against this form of oppression. During the war the US presented itself as the protagonist of democracy and freedom, but questions were raised what those ideals actually meant. Already in 1944 Myrdal explained in his book An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy the difficulties the US would face after the war was won. He argues that the US should reconsider their own racial perspectives within its society and that those perspectives need to be reformed. Although this would be a challenge, so Myrdal argues, it also creates an opportunity to present the US as the leader of a free and democratic world, as they claim to be the protector of all people in their struggle for freedom and democracy.¹⁹⁰ Even though international pressure grew, significant social changes were not made according to Dudziak.¹⁹¹ She argues that in despite of international criticism on America’s racial

relationships, the governments of FDR and Truman did not make significant racial reforms.

Her claim is supported by Anderson and Krenn, who argue that the image of freedom and democracy which the US projected was not comprehensible with its actual actions. The reforms made little impact and Krenn even states that the changes made by the Truman

Administration can thus be considered as a token.¹⁹² This argument takes on more weight with Truman's own position on civil rights, as throughout the thesis it is made clear that there was a difference between the President’s public and private stance on the topic of social equality.

Truman’s public image becomes clearer zooming in on the period when EO 9981 was issued, as the Presidential election seem to play an important role. Due to his unique strategy Truman and his team were able to win the elections. However, multiple questions can be raised about this Presidential campaign. Was it Truman’s triumph or was it a Democratic victory? Especially when taking into consideration the Democratic Convention of 1948 and what EO 9981 resulted in. Several authors have shed their light on these questions but a consensus has not been reached. Busch argues that it was the Democratic sweep which helped Truman during his own campaign, but the schism in the Democratic party resulted in an unworkable post-election situation where there was a conflict between the President and the Senate and the House. Others, such as McCullough, disagree and contribute Truman’s victory

190 Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 1021.

191 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 252.

192 Krenn, “Token Diplomacy,” 22.

to his tireless work ethic. McCullough is supported by Clifford, who claims that Truman’s indefatigable campaigning was vital for the Democratic sweep, but others such as Hamby and Kirkendall believe that it was due to other reasons, such as the overconfident campaign of Dewey or the Democratic favorable structure which base was laid in the years ahead by FDR.

Generally, it can be stated that, according to this group of scholars, Truman’s unique strategy and Dewey’s overconfidence led to the second term of the sitting President. However, there is some consensus as most of the scholars agree with the statement that EO 9981 has contributed to swinging the Black vote in Truman’s favor, but the impact of this swing on the result of the election is debated more. Multiple specific vote groups, such as the farmers, the Jews, and the other aforementioned groups, were credited for their impact as well and the combination of these vote groups seemed to bend the results of the election in favor of Truman. After the elections of 1948 were won, Truman made a statement by elaborating on his plan for the future. Truman explained that his first goal was “to fully secure the essential human rights of our citizens,” and therefore the future seemed bright.¹⁹³

Although the prospects seemed hopeful, the arguments of Dudziak and Krenn show otherwise and that real progress was not made. Anderson agrees and explains how “in the area of civil rights [during Truman’s presidency] … helplessness, hopelessness, and mediocrity reigned.”¹⁹⁴ She explains how, even though there was a blockade by Republicans and Democratic Southerners, Truman did not choose to make the required adaptations in the different areas where he actually was able to without being contested.¹⁹⁵ And even though Clifford claims the sincerity of Truman’s interest in reforming the social standards, an example a memo of August 1948 shows otherwise. In the memo Clifford urged Truman to

“stress the need for a federal Civil rights program to cover every section of the United States, to prove the world that the great benefits of American democracy are meant for all groups in the country.”¹⁹⁶ The memo shows that it was not Truman who wanted social reforms, but rather his team. Also, the public image of Truman’s presidency was one of the focus points for the team rather than the civil rights itself. It can be stated that, according to the authors, the political decision rather than the ethical decision seems more important throughout Truman’s career. In the first chapter it was discussed, that, even though Truman did vote in favor of the

193Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1948.

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/2/annual-message-congress-state-union-1.

194 Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws,” 97-98.

195 For example, as discussed before the Justice department was on the hate crimes division heavily understaffed, something which could easily be fixed according to Anderson. Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws,” 99.

196 Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 223.

improvement of the civil rights of the Black community, it was clear that he did not truly supported it. McCullough explains this as the difference between Truman’s political and personal position on racial equality.¹⁹⁷ The contrast between his personal and professional opinion seems to continue throughout his life as he strongly disagreed with the civil rights actions of the 1960’s and even claimed: “The Negro should behave himself and show he’s a good citizen. Common sense and good will can solve this thing.”¹⁹⁸ For Truman’s professional opinion the public image played an important role, which once more was made clear with the study of the ‘A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress.’ ¹⁹⁹ In the

document the support for civil rights legislation was a strategic political choice rather than an ideological principle. Issuing EO 9981 can therefore be explained as a political decision, as it pleased the international community but also helped to win the Presidential election of 1948.

However, it does not explain why Truman specifically decided to desegregate the military as this was the least popular reform as shown by the research of Steven White. An answer for this last question will be presented in the conclusion of the thesis.

197 McCullough, Truman, 514. See page 14 for more information.

198 White, World War II and American Racial Politics, 155.

199 A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress, January 8, 1948.

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/minimum-civil-rights-program-eightieth-congress?documentid=NA&pagenumber=2.