• No results found

Chapter IV: NUCLEAR ENERGY AS PART OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS –

4.2 Adopting Nuclear Energy in a Society for its Energy Transition

4.2.1 Provision of The Appropriate Infrastructure

The systemic review of the infrastructures as provided by the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) and backed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), presents a holistic peer review aimed at the EU Member States and shows the infrastructure required for the safe, secure and sustainable nuclear power programme in the transition process. Particularly, the INIR has categorized the societal preparation for nuclear

energy into ‘Milestones’ that comprise three phases: phase 1, which includes a pre-feasibility study by the country on why nuclear energy should be included as an option in the energy strategy; phase 2, the preparatory work for the construction of a nuclear power plant, connected to the required legal and regulatory frameworks and phase 3, linked to the licensing and contracting of the first activities (ibid). The specific infrastructure issues to be addressed in each of these phases were established into 19 categories: 1. National position; 2.

Nuclear safety; 3. Management; 4. Funding and financing; 5. Legal framework; 6. Safeguards; 7. Radiation protection; 8. Regulatory framework; 9. Electrical grid; 10. Human resource development; 11. Stakeholder involvement; 12. Site and supporting facilities; 13. Environmental protection; 14. Emergency planning; 15.

Nuclear security; 16. Nuclear fuel cycle; 17. Radioactive waste management; 18. Industrial involvement; 19.

Procurement (ibid). For the purposes of this paper, the infrastructure issues were grouped together based on the topic at the highest level of generalization. The following three categories emerged: 1. National Infrastructure Issues; 2. Safety and security infrastructure issues and 3. Management infrastructure issues.

The National Infrastructure Issues, group together the national position, funding and financing, legal and regulatory frameworks, and industrial and stakeholder involvement. The Safety and security infrastructure issues include nuclear safety, radiation protection, environmental protection, safeguards, emergency planning, nuclear security, radioactive waste management, and nuclear fuel cycle. Finally, the Management infrastructure issues combine the rest – the management, electrical grid, human resource development, site, and supporting facilities, and procurement. These categories and the key documents summarizing the main objectives of each infrastructure issue are collected in Appendix 1. Therefore, turning to the French case, the infrastructure issues are positioned within the different phases of the energy transition and it is established what must a country prepare for, if it aims to take advantage of the value-added of nuclear energy in the transition process.

Firstly, France can be seen as generally complying with all of the prescribed infrastructures throughout its whole nuclear programme. To do so, France’s Nuclear Safety Authority – Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) engages in a continuous review of all of the infrastructures in cooperation with the IAEA and its Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), and publishes annual reports on their progress and challenges. The first infrastructures group, the National Infrastructure Issues - the national position, and nuclear objectives specifically, are clearly defined by both the executive and continuously promoted by the ASN. Macron’s 2022 announcement of the French Nuclear Renaissance and the ‘France 2030’ plan (France 2030), reinforce the national position on the use of nuclear energy to decarbonize the energy industry and use it for further

innovation of small nuclear reactors (ibid). Similarly, the ASN announces its principles of ‘Competence, Independence, Rigour and Transparency’ which shows its continuous commitment to responsible nuclear energy.

Secondly, regarding the legal and regulatory frameworks of the National Infrastructure Issues, which refer to the objectives and principles of nuclear law, licensing, and radiation protection, and frameworks for emergency preparedness, response and liability, the French ASN and its fundamental principles are congruent with these infrastructures. The particular principles are based on the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Environmental Code (ASN 2020: 123) and refer to the principle of licensee responsibility, precaution, public participation, or the polluter-pays principle, which stipulate rules on the costs that emerge as a fight against the pollution and the responsibility for the safety of nuclear activities (ibid). Additionally, the fundamental safety principles defined by the IAEA that France follows, shows also the interconnection between the National and Safety and Security Infrastructure issues. For example, the ASN undergoes Periodic Safety Reviews every 10 years to evaluate the conditions for the operation of the plants and controls the risks and hazards (idem: 4). Finally, the compliance with the fundamental principles joins both the national and the EU level, through the connection between the French national Convention on Nuclear Safety and the international IAEA safety principles. The national French involvement in the international frameworks is portrayed also through the ASN Deputy Directory-General chairing of the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC) since 2011 (ASN 2022). Important to note, is that these legal and regulatory frameworks would not succeed without the inclusion and collaboration of key stakeholders. In France, the Parliament which has the law-making power and the ability to make the responsible management of radioactive materials and waste formally binding, is continuously informed by the ASN on the consequences of the technological and scientific choices. These reporting activities are led by the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) which then translates them into regulatory recommendations to the parliament and the government.

Therefore, the National Infrastructure Issues, exemplified in France with the distinct pro-nuclear national position, the legal and regulatory frameworks, that follow fundamental principles on nuclear responsibility -, and the stakeholder collaboration; serve as the foundation on which French nuclear policies are built. First, the clear national position and plans for nuclear energy, are crucial especially in the pre-development phase of the energy transition, as it directs the focus of key stakeholders and provides the grounds for developing

relevant regulations. Arguably, the France 2030 plan that aims to innovate new-generation reactors and reduce the waste they create (Alderman 2022), will influence both the regulatory framework and the focus of the ASN reports. The ASN will need to review the current waste levels in French power plants and recommend ways of further reducing the amount. To achieve tangible outcomes, frameworks on the waste-less approach will need to be framed. In this way, these National Infrastructures provide the roadmap in the pre-development phase of the new cycle of the French energy transition. Nonetheless, the renewing of nuclear commitments also creates a legitimizing effect on the current nuclear endeavors in France, and in this way, evidently belongs to the stabilization phase as well.

Next, regarding the Safety and Security Infrastructure issues, they are a critical component of the fuel cycle, waste management, and emergency situations, and so they are extensively monitored and regulated. A comprehensive long-term strategy for radioactive waste management and knowledge of safety requirements are necessary already before the decision to launch a nuclear energy power programme (IAEA 2012). The ASN monitors and regulates the compliance of licensee responsibilities, to ensure that radioactive substances are properly handled, transported and that the health of the people and the environment is kept (ASN 2020:

148). For example, only in 2020, transporters of radioactive substances transmitted 12 infringement reports, to which ASN enforced sanctions. In this way, the ASN continuously ensures compliance with the regulations and best standards, and through unannounced inspections of the power plants and transport activities identifies areas for improvement (idem: 154). Furthermore, two vital safety considerations are identified in the full scope of ASN security control – the radiological emergency and post-accident situation management;

and the radioactive waste handling. Firstly, the emergency planning concerns frameworks that prevent accidents in the first place, guidelines for determining the degree of danger, and the regular testing of emergency situation plans (idem: 172). Specifically, France has produced Off-site (PPI) and On-site emergency plans, and in 2014 the French government published the Major Nuclear or Radiological Accident National Response Plan, which has incorporated the lessons from the Fukushima accident (idem: 175). The plans include the appropriate steps to be taken by the stakeholders and guide citizens in each phase – ‘Reflex phase’

(shelter and await instructions over 2km), ‘Immediate phase’ (shelter and await instructions over 2km and evacuate over 5km), and ‘Joint response’ (population protection measures based on dose forecast) (idem: 180).

In case of an emergency, the role of communication and information is also heightened, and thus a collaboration between the media, stakeholders, and the international assistance (like the IAEA-EU and the ASN), is outlined (ibid). Secondly, turning to the radioactive waste handling, it is managed by the ASN, by the

overseeing compliance with guidelines on one hand, and the classification of steps and procedures for different levels of waste on the other. Article L542-1-1 of the Environment Code qualifies the requirements needed for the reuse of radioactive substances and aims to minimize the volume and harmfulness of the waste through sorting, treatment, packaging, and disposal guidelines (idem: 354). Due to the importance of waste handling, France is continuously developing its guidelines, and thus in 2019 the new 5th French Radioactive Material and Waste Management Plan (PNGMDR) was introduced (ibid). The particular disposal procedures are determined by two parameters: the activity which contributes to the toxicity of the substance and the half-life of the radionuclides. Namely, the levels of the radioactive waste range from very low level, which is simply left to decay on the production site and then disposed of together with conventional waste; all the way up to high level, which is disposed of in reversible deep geological facilities, 550 meters underground (idem: 367).

The high-level nuclear waste is first separated and transmuted to minimize its impacts and then stored according to the Act of 28 June 2006 and under the oversight of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) (ibid.) Finally, the security and safety infrastructure reviews the fuel cycle installations, and France has already hardened the safety core and increased the water reserves, as a lesson learned from Fukushima (idem: 328).

Therefore, the security and safety infrastructures, are given extensive attention in France and are supported with frameworks that are continuously being updated. Clearly, addressing these considerations before a nuclear program is launched positions the topic in the pre-development phase, but also ensures that the safety practices are embedded in the very structure of the power plants and that the safest practices are upheld at every stage. Reflecting on nuclear waste in particular, it is important to also consider how will France deal with the storage of the high-level nuclear waste in the decades to come, and whether regulations have been designed to ensure the safety of future generations as well. Nonetheless, for the time being, the extensive documentation, publicly accessible plans, and communication avenues not only aided this analysis but also simultaneously provide resources for the education of the public and fears that may be connected to nuclear energy. As seen in chapter 3, France’s approach to mitigating anti-nuclear sentiments grounded in security fears are addressed through education, and this is evident also here. Finally, the cooperation between the various levels and the national and international spheres in addressing nuclear waste aid in the robustness of the security infrastructures in France. Ultimately, this shows that proper management helps nuclear energy be a success for the energy transition. The security and safety issues are therefore key in the pre-development phase, but also throughout the whole transition, cycle to ensure its ongoing ability to power the society.

Finally, the Management infrastructure issues in France refer to the daily operation of power plants on site.

The oversight and requirements assigned by the ASN relate to the maintenance, monitoring, and servicing of the power plants under different circumstances, like during heat waves and droughts, and ensure reactors are sufficiently cooled and air-conditioned (idem: 229). Simultaneously, the requirements for materials, repairs, skills, and qualifications of the workers are established; together with real-time checks of the reactors and management of daily activities like water intake in the reactors (ibid). Arguably, these issues are important as they construe the daily workings of the power plants, and can identify risk factors before they develop into more serious problems. They comprise the take-off and acceleration phases, as they relate to the development of the active part of the nuclear power plants' contribution to the energy transition.

Therefore, this section illustrates how supporting infrastructures allow for the full potential of nuclear energy to be used. Namely, the reviews and analyses ASN conduct on a regular basis, allow for the development of the best practices and for safe operating of the power plants, which in turn power the society and provide the bridge to RES. Although chapter 3 identified the objective value-added of nuclear energy, this section connects nuclear energy with society and illustrates the importance of supporting avenues for its success.

Since nuclear energy should arguably aid the transition process, France is a real-life example of where regulations, scientific reviews, and meticulous safety processes help it be a transition tool success.