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Conclusion

In document Empathy and Politics (pagina 38-41)

2. Circles

2.3. Conclusion

attacked by White police in South Carolina leaving him permanently blind. This response is consistent with a later statement by Truman as a response to Southern Democrats, who

disagreed with an easing policy: “But my very stomach turned over when I learned that Negro soldiers, just back from overseas, were being dumped out of army trucks in Mississippi and beaten. Whatever my inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as President I know this is bad. I shall fight to end evils like this.”127 Truman’s humanistic nature, which was highlighted in the first chapter as an important part of his decision-making process, can be found in both statements and these statements also clarify that not only Randolph of the BSCP was interested in the desegregation of the military, but the NAACP was also involved in this process. Grown exponentially during the war the NAACP had become an important voice for the Black community and, although White followed a more top-down strategy than Randolph, it resulted also effect. The combination of pressuring the top of the Truman Administration by Randolph and the growth of the NAACP and other Black activist organizations (and therefore the social pressure for change of the civil rights of Black Americans), helped the progressive thinking government officials, such as Nash, Niles, Clifford, and Forrestal, to prioritize desegregating the armed forces, but in the end it was Truman who made the decision. Of course, the question arises; did Truman make a political decision or humanistic one? This question will be further examined in the next chapter, where the popular opinion, the Presidential election of 1948, and the Cold War situation will be discussed.

remembered as a Roosevelt the 2nd. Part of building his own legacy was setting up his own team. Niles and Nash were tasked to control the information over the minority problems, Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense, and Clifford was one of the main advisors for Truman on several topics. All the aforementioned men supported a progressive policy, but to what level the progressive policy needed to be, was the discussion. Especially Forrestal and Clifford, who was backed by the Monday Night Group, had their own opinions about the extent of the changes needed, leading to some heated discussions between them.

Although the details were not clear, the inner circle group supported an integrating policy for the troops; this call was reinforced by the work of the civil rights advocates and lobbyists. Their work also had an influence on Truman’s decisions as recalled by Clifford.129 But just as in the inner circle, the members of the outer circle did not always agree with each other, although Randolph of the BSCP and White of the NAACP were both advocating to improve the position of the Black community.130 Even though some authors like Klinkner and Smith describe the establishment of EO 8802 by President Roosevelt and the issuing of EO 9982 by President Truman as Randolph’s greatest successes, these achievements were certainly not solely his merits. Randolph threatened to take direct action to persuade both Roosevelt and Truman to sway their vote. White followed a more subtle strategy, which might make White's work less noticeable to outsiders, but not less important. With his ingenious approach White knew how to appeal to Truman's humanistic character, which has been discussed in depth in the first chapter. The origin of his moral compass and the

importance of his military career upon the rest of his life were described in first part of the thesis. A moral compass can be influenced by emphatic concerns according to Hewstone, Stroebe, and Jonas.They explain how empathy is “the experience of understanding or sharing the emotional state of another person.”131

As mentioned before, each circle has influence on the leader(’s decisions) and from his professional inner and (part of) the public outer circle Truman received the message to follow through with the desegregation of the military. But a President receives multiple requests for change and it is still not clear whether Truman made a political or a humanistic decision when issuing Executive Order 9981. It is evident that Truman’s decision to issue EO 9981 was impacted in various ways. A combination of the followed strategies by the influencers seemed to achieve the desired result from the viewpoint of the activists, but was the development

129 Clifford and Holbrooke, Counsel to the President, 209.

130 Krebs, Fighting for Rights, 150.

131 Hewstone, Stroebe, and Jonas, An Introduction to Social Psychology, 340, 604.

supported by everybody? No, and, as Truman also discussed in the meeting with White, the problem with an integrating policy was: ““Everybody seems to believe that the President by himself can do anything he wishes on such matters as this,” he complained, “but the President is helpless unless he is backed by the public opinion.””132 Backing from the public and

political opposition was indeed a problem, which will be discussed in depth in the third chapter of this thesis. Not only the public opinion in the States will be discussed but also the general era and worldwide politics after the war will be examined.

132 White, A Man Called White, 331.

In document Empathy and Politics (pagina 38-41)