• No results found

Conclusion

In document Empathy and Politics (pagina 57-64)

humanistic argument as presented by McCullough. All the answers can be substantiated with the usage of primary sources.

During World War II, the US had presented itself as the defender of freedom and democracy and thus this image would also stick after the war. As Myrdal explained in his highly influential book An American Dilemma, the war would give the US a possible means to reconsider their racial policies.204 However, Dudziak explained how even though there was international criticism from the (communist) opposition but also from allies on America’s racial understanding, this worldwide criticism did not result in major reforms due to the economic system of the US.205 According to the author “racism might be an international embarrassment. Class-based inequality, however, was a feature of capitalism, the economic system Americans were proud of.”206 The social changes made were, she argues, due to international pressure and it seems likely that international pressure has also contributed to the decision to desegregate the troops. The study of the Public Papers of the President of the United States makes clear what the priorities were for the press, but also for the Truman administration, as the documents are mainly focused on world politics and its relationship with the USSR.207 Not only by studying the relationship can the argument of Dudziak be substantiated, but also with the memo of Clark Clifford and the Negro troops in Italy memo.208 In these memos the international criticism factor became clear and thus pressure from outside the US could have contributed to the decision to issue EO 9981 to the desegregation of the troops. The image of the US as a country fighting for freedom and democracy is also

confirmed within the text of EO 9981, as it starts with the following sentence: “Whereas it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality and opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s defense.”209

Dudziak describes Truman’s civil rights policies from a worldview perspective, but Busch zooms in on the specific time period when EO 9981 was issued. Although social

204 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma.

205 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 252.

206 Dudziak, 252.

207 Harry S. Truman: 1948 : containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the president, January 1 to December 31, 1948, via http://name.umdl.umich.edu/4728453.1948.001.

208 Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 223; Memo re: Negro troops in Italy, 1945.

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/memo-re-negro-troops-italy.

209 Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces, July 26, 1948. Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Desegregation of the Armed Forces, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/executive-order-9981-desegregation-armed-forces, (consulted October 18, 2020).

reform seems unavoidable with the above presented information, the specific period needs to be taken into consideration as well. The Presidential campaign of 1948 seems to have its own influence on the decision to desegregate the troops. As Truman was down in the polls, he and his campaign team needed to focus on a more specific groups and their demands to win the election. Part of this strategy was to win the Black vote and Busch argues that that specific EO was issued because the benefits outweighed the negative impact. He explained how the South “would scream,” but Truman considered the “hardcore segregationists” already lost.210 Most authors agree with Busch that the decision to desegregate the troops pleased the civil rights advocates and therefore (a (big) part of) the Black community. As the study of the ‘A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress memo’ shows, it becomes clear that the proposal of the reforms was meant to present Truman’s stance on social equality to the public.211 However, as argued before, there was a difference in Truman’s personal and professional opinion. This dissimilarity can also be found in the document, as the text also made clear that, instead of the proposed policy changes, the public image is more crucial for Truman’s team. Due to Truman’s unique campaign strategy concentrating on specific groups, the overconfident behavior of his republican opponent Thomas Dewey, and the political base laid by FDR in the years ahead Truman was able to win the Presidential election of 1948.

Unfortunately for Truman, the Democratic party was heavily divided and, although the party had the majority in both the House and the Senate, it did not fully cooperate with Truman’s proposed policies.

The proposed civil rights reforms did not only cause trouble in the relationship between Truman and the House and Senate, but also within the Administration itself. Taking a closer look at the Administration in regard to civil rights reforms, five names seem to keep returning, namely: Eleonor Roosevelt, Clifford James Forrestal, David Niles and Philleo Nash. Even though the former First Lady was supportive of social reforms, her role diminished in time as Truman wanted to establish himself. Although the support of Mrs.

Roosevelt was useful in the early period of his presidency, Truman reorganized the Administration and appointed his own staff. Niles and Nash were tasked to control the

information about the minority problems, Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense, and Clark Clifford was one of the main advisors for Truman on several topics. Even though these

210 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 125–26.

211 A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress, January 8, 1948.

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/minimum-civil-rights-program-eightieth-congress?documentid=NA&pagenumber=2, 2.

men seem to support civil reforms, it differed to which degree they did so. Forrestal, as Secretary of the Navy, made some reforms in the Navy, but in his later capacity as Secretary of Defense he encountered more obstructions which made him hesitant about the

desegregation of the troops. Clifford was truly passionate about defending EO 9981, but as shown in the second chapter it seems likely that it was only for a relative short time before Executive Order was established.212 In the study of the primary sources, I showed that especially Niles and Nash were active with racial issues from the start. They mostly had a supportive role as advisors for Truman and, although, Anderson claims that Niles was more focused on the future of Israel and had little interest in the civil rights of the Black community and that Nash was not in the position to make impactful changes, from the studied primary sources I got the impression that both men were supportive with the racial topic as, for example, Nash informed Niles about the Gillem board report.213 Even though the report was critical on desegregation of the troops, it still expressed there was a possibility to make this change. Instead of a decision within the Army, it should be a political decision according to the researchers of the report. Therefore, Nash mentioning this specific report to Niles, it is possible that Truman also knew about this report, due to the team structure as discussed in the second chapter.

Taking into consideration the information presented in the second chapter, I

discovered that the aforementioned advisers and government agents had, at some time during the Truman’s presidency, a progressive vision for the future of civil rights for Black

Americans. According to Burris e.a., suggestions made by this inner circle of influencers of the President can contribute to the reason why a certain decision is made by said President, a leader, as they claim: “First, inner-circle members perceive a safer environment to voice their opinions and consequently were more likely to participate in the group’s discussion. Second, leaders perceive inner-circle members as making a greater contribution [to the discussion].”214 However, the overall progressive vision did not come from out of nowhere as civil rights advocates were already trying to convince FDR to reform the military, but they did not succeed. When Truman was inducted as President, activists such as Asa Philip Randolph of the BSCP and Walter White of the NAACP tried to persuade the new President with different

212 Desegregation of the Armed Forces, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/online-collections/desegregation-of-armed-forces.

213 Philleo Nash to David Niles, with attachments, July 26, 1946.

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/philleo-nash-david-niles-attachments?documentid=NA&pagenumber=1 , 1 (consulted October 8, 2020).

214 Burris, 'Playing Favorites,' 1255.

strategies. Randolph had (just as in 1941) threatened to take direct action by organizing strikes and marches on Washington D.C. to push both FDR and Truman to sway their vote. White followed a more subtle strategy, which might make White's work less noticeable to outsiders, but nevertheless important. As described in the second chapter, White informed Truman about the shameful treatment of Isaac Woodard and other Black veterans. Telling these kinds of stories, White knew how to appeal to Truman's humanistic character and his empathy which, according to Hewstone, Stroebe, and Jonas, is “the experience of understanding or sharing the emotional state of another person.”215

The humanistic side of the argument is the next step to support my argument and to explain this opinion Truman’s background and personal development was discussed first. At the beginning of my thesis, it was described how Truman grew up in ‘old-fashioned’

Missouri, where racism and Jim Crow laws were part of daily life. Coming to age in such an environment contributed to Truman’s world vision. He described in a letter of June 1911 to his future wife Bess his ideas about race and the globe, as he explained: “I am strongly of the opinion that negroes ought to be in Africa, yellow men in Asia, and white men in Europe and America.”216 Race and identity became an important part of Truman’s life and an analysis of his time in the Army helped to understand how Truman’s leadership and political capabilities grew. When World War I started Truman saw it as his patriotic duty to rejoin the military. He became the first lieutenant of a newly formed unit and, even though he did not have the natural charisma to lead his troops, Truman grew to one of the most popular and respected officers among his men. His style of commanding was gained at a younger age, where he came to understand that by being able to put oneself in the service of another might create opportunities to achieve one's own goal through the creation of a (friendly) interaction.

Keeping his social skills in mind even during his time in the Army, Truman became friends with people like Eddie Jacobsen, Robert Danford. But especially meeting Jim Pendergast and his uncle T.J. Pendergast, were crucial for the rest of his public career.

With the support of the very influential Pendergast family, Truman was able to become a pressing judge and thereafter U.S. Senator. However, when T.J. Pendergast was convicted of tax evasion in 1939 Truman was on his own. Working as a Senator Truman supported legislation for the improvement of the civil rights (of the Black community), for example the proposed anti-lynching law of 1938. However, behind the scenes there were

215 Hewstone, Stroebe, and Jonas, An Introduction to Social Psychology, 340, 604.

216 Truman and Ferrell, Dear Bess, 39.

rumors that the Missourian Senator did not truly advocate for these reforms. McCullough explains there was a difference in Truman’s political and personal opinion of the Black community.217 With Truman’s Janus-faced base on a political and personal position on civil rights, Truman narrowly secured his second term as Senator. In his second term (1940 - 1945) Truman got the opportunity to become chairman of the Senate Special Committee to

Investigate the National Defense Program. In this capacity Truman's star was rising and he became the Vice President nominee in the 1944 Presidential campaign. After President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was reelected, Truman was installed as the new Vice President.

Only 82 days into the job, FDR died and Truman became the 33rd President. With the new post new responsibilities arose, although some expectations seemed to stay clear as Senator Burnet Maybank of South Carolina confided to a friend: “Everything’s going to be all right - the new President knows how to handle the niggers.”218

When Truman became President he was faced with several tasks, such as the end of World War II. As a result, a new world order was created which combined the experience of the war would lead to new problems and possibilities which needed to be addressed. One of these things Truman had to do was taking a stance on the civil rights policies. From outside the US voices were raised to make a change, as has been discussed by the study of the ‘Negro troops in Italy’ and Myrdal’s book.219 Even though international politics was an important topic, as can be seen in the Public Papers of the President, the international pressure was only a slight part of motivation for Truman to make the civil rights reforms. A more motivating factor was the pressure from within the Administration, even though there were discussions surrounding the topic within Truman’s team as can be seen by Clifford’s and Royall position.

However, Truman’s team was influenced by the civil rights advocates, whom already during the presidency of FDR were lobbying for change. Using different strategies, the Truman team was more and more pushed to make a change, but it still was not their priority. This changed with the Presidential election of 1948 and the struggle within the Democratic Party. During this time, Truman needed to make his political stance clear once clearer and what better way than to actually issue a reform. As shown, such a decision had a long history, but the

campaign for the elections of 1948 gave the perfect opportunity. Thus, if Truman would ever issue a reform, it would be during this specific period. However, why did he choose to

217 McCullough, Truman, 514.

218 Krebs, Fighting for Rights, 154.

219 Memo re: Negro troops in Italy, 1945. https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/memo-re-negro-troops-italy; Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma.

desegregate the military, especially as Steven White and Anderson show that there were other easier changes which could be made?

The humanistic factor comes into play here. As argued by Hewstone, Stroebe, and Jonas demonstrate that empathy is “the experience of understanding or sharing the emotional state of another person.”220 This can be strengthened by personal experiences and, as Truman served himself, he was able to understand what kind of impact time in the military can make for someone. For Truman his time in the Army did have major impact on the rest of his life, as he kept his Army friends close throughout his life/career, and most of his personal biography is focused on this specific period. Serving for your nation should therefore be a basic right for every American and because the military is based around unity, everyone should be treated equally. And even though Truman did probably know that, according to the polls and the voices raised by his opponents such as Royall his proposal was the least popular, he knew he was the leader who could make the decision to issue the reform. His time in the Army also made him a leader who was not afraid to make the (though) decision when the situation was asking for it. In conclusion, due to a humanistic factor Truman chose to issue Executive Order 9981, but the political side of this story needs to be told as well otherwise it is not clear why such a decision was needed in the first place. As Truman’s critical vision on civil rights remained the same throughout the rest of his life, it also explains why his main deed in this specific area was solely focused on the military.221

220 Hewstone, Stroebe, and Jonas, An Introduction to Social Psychology, 340, 604.

221 White, World War II and American Racial Politics, 155.

In document Empathy and Politics (pagina 57-64)