3. Race and civil rights
3.2. Civil rights, the public opinion and the Presidential race
regards to General Omar Bradley’s position on the topic (which was fake news according to Truman), the media seemed mainly interested in the political situation overseas and the economic situation at home.
As Myrdal described, racial relations in US society stood at a crossroads in the latter years of World War II. The country would probably be (one of) the new dominant force(s) in the world, because Europe was in shambles and therefore needed to be rebuilt first. How the country would take up this role needed to be determined, but its ideals were clear. Capitalism, democracy and freedom were, and still are, the cornerstones of American society and
therefore these principals needed to be shared all around the world. Setting up a post-war policy was the task Truman inherited from FDR and a difficult one, made even more challenging due to its (sometimes antagonizing) ideals. Myrdal explained that in the fight against fascism and Nazism, the US was in “favor of racial tolerance and cooperation and of racial equality,” but, as Dudziak recalls, “class-based inequality however, was a feature of capitalism, an economic system Americans were proud of.”152 According to the author, America had simply said two choices; either satisfy the international community (and the Black activists) or satisfy the South and segregationists, who (largely) saw the economic class-based inequality as part of daily life. Dudziak and Krenn argue that the social reforms made by Truman were too small and were more a token to stop the criticism. However, as the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States show, there were more reforms suggested by Truman, but the Senate “did not take action.”153 The argument of Dudziak and Krenn does not take this into consideration and therefore it is important to study the specific political situation Truman was confronted with, especially in the run-up of the Presidential election of 1948.
nominee election. Also, a part of the Southern Democrats united against Truman because of his civil rights proposals.154 The schism became clear during the Democratic Convention of 1948, when a vote was needed to unite the party in its public stance towards civil rights. In a close vote the public support for civil reforms was adopted, however the delegations of Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the Convention. Strom Thurmond, one of the
delegations who walked away, would become the leader of the Southern Democrats.155 They became known as the Dixiecrats and would also compete in the Presidential election of 1948, but the new party did only get 2,4% of the votes. However, the division in the Democratic party also had its positive outcome for Truman in the Presidential race of 1948, as it would become one of the world’s closest finishes ever in a Presidential election. Nevertheless, because of his role as president, Truman had special political tools which he could use in his favor, as opposed to his campaign opponents who didn’t have these advantages.
As the President Truman was able to issue Executive Orders and because EO 9981 was issued four months before election day on July 26, 1948, it had its effect on the Presidential Election. In this part of the thesis, the importance of new protocol will be discussed and, to give an impression of the discussion surrounding the influence of EO 9981 on the elections, McCullough will be quoted. He explains how Truman was able to win the election due to “the farm vote, the labor vote, the black vote, and the vote of the West had all counted heavily in Truman’s success and in the Democratic sweep overall.”156 According to the author, the Black vote was one of the central factors which handed Truman the victory, but the question arises whether the Black vote was part of the crucial sweep. Winning the Black vote was a slippery road for Truman’s reelection as it had a Janus-faced effect because, as historian Andrew E. Busch explains: “Several of Truman’s proposals that Congress had failed to enact, including wage and price controls, some civil rights legislation … he was using [these motions] to attract key Democratic constituencies [but they] were not popular with the public at large.”157 So, why did Truman propose and issue these kinds of reforms?
Was the Black vote a factor to win the election and did Truman actually win it? To provide an answer to these questions, the statement of Busch needs to be checked. Especially because the author seems to suggest that Truman already lost the popular vote and needed to win in an unconventional way.
154 More information on Henry Wallace can be found in the first chapter.
155 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 42-43.
156 McCullough, Truman, 1485.
157 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 165.
In his book World War II and American Racial Politics: Public Opinion, the Presidency, and Civil Rights Advocacy, political scientist Steven White examines different polls held on racial topics during and around World War II.158 White tackles different theories surrounding the opinion on race of the US and poses the question whether there was an observable change in the public opinion on racial tensions during the war. According to the researcher there was no such thing as “liberalization” of White attitudes on race among the White population of the US.159 Liberalization is not only the backing for the advancement of the civil rights of the Black Americans but also an improvement in the general attitude towards the community. The White population, especially in the South, did not agree with most of suggested developments of the rights for Black Americans. Specifically, the
desegregation of the armed forces was unpopular with the (White) American population, but a clear reason why civil rights were unpopular is not presented in the book.160 Truman himself stated, when he reacted to the sit-in actions of the 1960’s: “The Negro should behave himself and show he’s a good citizen. Common sense and good will can solve this thing.”161 The ‘old’
way, and thus the aforementioned status quo, was the correct way forward according to Truman and his opinion seems to be shared with the rest of the country in the 1950’s. As McCullough explains: “Privately, like the country people whose votes he was courting, he [Truman] still used the word “nigger” and enjoyed the kind of racial jokes commonly
exchanged over drinks in Senate hideaways. He did not favor social equality for blacks and he said so.” 162 So, why did Truman, who privately opposed to social equality for Blacks, decide to desegregate the armed forces? McCullough continues to describe how Truman acted: “But he wanted fairness, equality before the law.” But why specifically in the military as there were other possibilities for reforms, which would also contribute to a more equal treatment before the law.
A start can be made with the following statement by White, who explains the difference in attitude among white World War II veterans:
“On the one hand, then, while far from a universal trend toward racial liberalism, there is at least some limited evidence that on attitudes toward particular civil and political rights, white veterans were distinctive from those who did not serve in the war. On the
158 Steven White, World War II and American Racial Politics.
159 White, 65–66.
160 White, 57-60.
161 White, World War II and American Racial Politics, 155.
162 McCullough, Truman, 497, 1196-98.
other hand, though it is harder to find evidence that military service was associated with less racial prejudice, and questions related to integration seem to have been especially difficult to change.”163
Even though the liberalization, as suggest by White, had not been achieved, a reason for the change in the opinion on civil rights among the White veterans is possibly because they fought together and a part of the supporting roles (logistics, laundry etc.) in the Army during World War II was done by Black Americans. Even though there were some Black units, most Black men and women participated behind the frontline at that time. In the Army the Black Americans were seen and treated as second-class citizens just as they were back home in the US. The Jim Crow laws were also applied during their service as, for example, there were White and Black canteens with different (levels of) supplies. Although there was a slight improvement observable in the general attitude among White veterans, the idea of
desegregating the military was a no-go because this would suggest that Black soldiers were on the same level as the White troopers, meaning a direct confrontation with daily class-based life. The idea to desegregate the troops was the least popular reform Truman brought forward according to White’s research, not only among the White population, but also among White veterans. Truman’s decision to issue Executive Order 9981 is therefore even more remarkable as this was a decision which was made against the will of the general public.
According to historian Andrew Busch issuing EO 9981 was a political move, as the benefits of this decision outweighed the negative impact. He explains how the South “would scream,” but Truman had already lost the “hardcore segregationists.”164 Instead, by approving the desegregating policy, he took up a clear position against the Republicans, persuaded voters from Wallace’s camp and did get the support of the civil rights advocates. Targeting the Black community in his Presidential campaign was one of the strategies used by Truman and his team, but other specific groups were also approached. The main reason for this diverse strategy was because Dewey was more popular according to the polls. So, Truman and his team travelled all over the US and convinced farmers, the Jewish community, the Black community and all the other specific groups to support him.165 By carefully selecting specific groups and make promises to handle their demands, Truman was able to win the election with the slightest margins in his favor. According to Clark Clifford, one of Truman’s team key
163 White, World War II and American Racial Politics, 93.
164 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 125–26.
165 Busch, 200–202. See page 49 for the specific groups previously mentioned.
members, the Black vote even provided the winning margin in some states as the community rallied for the Democrats in record numbers.166 Winning the Black vote seems like a vital part of the Presidential campaign, but the essential factor was not the Black vote or the Jewish vote or etc., but it was Truman himself according to Clifford. He explains: “… it was his tenacity, his indomitable spirit, his ability to keep himself and his supporters going through the bleak seemingly hopeless campaign and his unwillingness to give up that rallied the nation.”167 However, Busch strongly disagrees with this statement; he discusses how despite Truman’s “indefatigable campaigning” was part of the reason for his victory, it was not the crucial piece.168 The author continues to explain the differences between the diverse reasons given for Truman’s triumph. Clifford can be considered one of the ‘Truman believers,’ but not only authors from the period itself describe Truman as the deciding factor. Modern researchers, such as Hamby, also consider Truman and his motivation as a vital winning aspect of the Presidential race of 1948. Even though Truman was crucial according to these writers, they also claim the win was due to Dewey’s overconfident campaign. Dewey trusted the polls and was less committed to go the distance.169 Others, such as historian Richard Stewart Kirkendall, claim that the base for the victory was already there because of FDR’s work in previous years. FDR provided the Democratic party with enough support to become the biggest party during his years as President, but it can be argued that people were more supportive of FDR than the Democratic party itself.170 A statement which can be supported by the distribution of seats in the Senate and the House at the time of the elections. In both institutions the Republicans had the majority of the seats in the Senate and especially the Congress became known as the “do-nothing.” Therefore, as claimed in the second chapter, although FDR created a foundation, Truman needed to create his own legacy. Truman did not want to be a Roosevelt the 2nd but a great president by himself. According to Busch, Truman was helped by the Democratic sweep which happened during the elections. He argues that it was not Truman’s triumph, but rather the win for the Democratic party as a whole, as they had the majority in the House and the Senate after the Elections. However, the Democratic
representatives did not have Truman’s best interests at heart as the fraction of the Democratic Convention remained in place. Truman’s progressive ideas were not supported by the
Democratic representatives and were therefore never executed.
166 Clifford and Holbrooke, Counsel to the President, 241.
167 Clifford and Holbrooke, 241.
168 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 182.
169 Alonzo L. Hamby, “The Politics of Democracy: Harry S.Truman and the American People,” 48.
170 Busch, Truman’s Triumphs, 194–95.
The suggestion of Busch becomes clearer when refocusing on the proposed civil rights reforms. As mentioned before already during the campaign for the Democratic nomination, Truman wanted to propose more civil rights adaptations for his second term, which was against Clifford’s advice.171 After he became President Truman kept pushing for change and on January 7, 1949, Truman presented in his State of the Union a new nationwide policy, which was based on his previous twenty-one point program.172 The first goal of the new scheme was “to fully secure the essential human rights of our citizens,” as Truman continues
“today, however, some of our citizens are still denied equal opportunity for education, for jobs and economic advancement, and for the expression of their views at the polls. Most serious of all, some are denied equal protection under laws. Whether discrimination is based on race, or creed, or color, or land of origin, it is utterly contrary to American ideals of democracy.”173 With this statement Truman made clear to the world that racism was a no-go and that a new social status needed to be created. The government was of vital importance in this process and Truman would lead the way. New policies were made and, as can be read, “no American problem receives more wide-spread attention, especially in dependent areas, than our treatment of racial minorities, particularly the Negro.”174 As explained in the document, this was the main issue: “The discussion of this problem cannot be evaded, and only by full publicity to improvements in this field can the United States’ position be put in fair
perspective before the bar of world opinion and communist propaganda be discredited.”175 To counter the communist opposition Truman and his team tried to establish his new civil rights ideology, but the proposed reforms were blocked by (Democratic) Southerners.
To counter the block of the 80th United States Congress, Truman and his team wanted to propose ‘a minimum Civil Rights Program.’176 Even though it seems like a strategic choice to come up with a ‘minimum’ policy plan, because it would probably get blocked by the (Democratic) Southerners, the real reason for this plan was to make “crystal clear to the
171 McCullough, Truman, 454; Clifford and Holbrooke, Counsel to the President, 217–18.
172 See page 25 for more information.
173 Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1948. Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Public Papers, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/2/annual-message-congress-state-union-1, (consulted May 22, 2021).
174 Paper Prepared by the Colonial Policy Review Sub-Committee of the Committee on Problems of Dependent Areas, April 26, 1950. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v03/d775, (consulted May 22, 2021).
175 Ibid.
176 A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress, January 8, 1948. Memorandum, Truman Library, Harry S. Truman and Civil Rights, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/minimum-civil-rights-program-eightieth-congress?documentid=NA&pagenumber=2, (consulted July 2, 2021).
public that at least as many Republicans as Southern Democrats oppose this legislation and are unwilling to take any necessary steps to get it through.”177 The program was set up to make Truman’s stance on civil rights clear to the public and was not about making reforms.
Even though the desegregation of the troops was already ordered by Executive Order 9981, it was still part of the program. As discussed in the introduction, there was a lot of resistance to desegregate the troops. Especially from Kenneth Royall, who had a lot of influence as
Secretary of the Army, and therefore extra attention was needed to make the Executive Order even work in the first place. However, analyzing the ‘minimum Civil Rights Program’ makes clear that it was more a political move rather than a necessity, because “only a forthright stand on all these issues [multiple civil rights reforms were proposed] will turn the trick.”178 This specific document shows that the idea to desegregate the army also needs to be seen in regard to the 1948 Presidential election and especially in how Truman wanted to present himself. As expected the President’s ideals were met with disapproval by Congress and so no reforms were made, except EO 9981.179 Even though in first instance Truman is considered by some, such as Gardner and McCullough, as a civil rights advocate, this theory can be contested.
Professor of African American Studies Carol Anderson strongly disagrees with the claim that Truman was a civil rights advocate, as she claims “… in the area of civil rights [during Truman’s presidency] … helplessness, hopelessness, and mediocrity reigned.”180 She explains how Truman and his team were actually not fully committed to make reforms. She explains how David Niles was more focused on the future of Israel and had little interest in the civil rights of the Black community.181 Philleo Nash tried his best to develop support for the improvement of the civil rights for the Black community, but he was not in the position to really make an impact. Therefore, Truman’s main government agents in regard to the topic of Black civil rights, were either focused on other cases or were not in the right position to make a difference. Anderson concludes that besides Truman’s EO for desegregating the military, the Administration was not focused on the improvement of the civil rights of Black
Americans.182 However, an argument can be presented to hail Truman as a protagonist of civil rights by means of the desegregation of the military. Truman was able to put civil rights on
177 Ibid., 2.
178 Ibid., 3.
179 Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, 224–26. What Truman truly thought about the aforementioned program is not clear, but as shown before Truman was not in favor of social equality.
180 Carol Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws: A Reappraisal of the Truman Years and the Struggle for African American Citizenship” in Kirkendall, Harry’s Farewell, 75-100, 97–98.
181 A claim which also can be traced back to the Truman Library as more documents on the future of Israel by the hand of Niles can be found than on civil rights advocacy.
182 Anderson, 99-100.
the agenda, a topic, which was barely discussable during the FDR years as FDR’s
Administration was Janus-faced.183 According to historian Lauren Rebecca Sklaroff, FDR did mention possible civil rights reforms but never took serious action to make a change. Besides Executive Order 8802 no real reforms were made.184 However, as Anderson rightfully
questions: “Why is … it easier to move to integration in the armed forces than he did within the administration itself? What was the block here? Usually, you would think that would cause less uproar if he moved within governmental agencies than within the armed forces.”185 Even though Truman decided to reform the military, his own staff was made up of almost only White members; the Justice department was critically understaffed on the hate crimes division; and no popular law changes, besides EO 9981, were made.186 Even though there would be a possibility to make some changes in the Justice department in regard to civil rights, due to ‘A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress’ proposal, Truman did not do it.187 Combined with, as shown before, Truman opposition to social
equality, questions can be raised whether or not Truman truly believed in the social reforms as proposed in the ‘A Minimum Civil Rights Program for the Eightieth Congress.’188 Although Truman is hailed by some as one the most important Presidents in the field of civil rights, his position on civil rights is still heavily debated among scholars. Some claim that Truman was blocked by several factors like the Republicans and Southern Democrats and did what he could do. However, others declare that Truman did not actually have such an interested in civil rights policy changes at all. They claim that the President was rather using reforms for political gain or due to international pressure. Several other explanations are presented to provide an argument why Truman decided to make several social adaptations, but there is not a unanimous answer.189
183 Sklaroff, Black Culture and the New Deal; William E. Leuchtenburg, "Franklin D. Roosevelt: The American Franchise," October 4, 2016. Miller Center,
https://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt/the-american-franchise, (consulted May 25, 2021).
184 The true meaning of EO 8802 can also be discussed as it was only specific for the Defense industry, which needed manpower due to participation of the United States in the World War II.
185 Anderson, 99.
186 For example, more people were in favor of the abolishment of the poll tax as the approval rate of such a measurement was above 60% in the polls since 1940 as shown in White, World War II and American Racial Politics, 54-57; Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws,” 99. This policy change had therefore support under the American people but was nevertheless never established in Truman’s presidency.
187 Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws,” 85.
188 McCullough, Truman, 514.
189 For example, theologist Richard G. Lee claims the importance of religion in the decision-making process for Truman in his book The American Patriot’s Bible: The Word of God and the Shaping of America (Nashville, Tennessee: Thomas Nelson, 2009). However, this is more or less a unique vision as it is not commonly shared among other authors.