Challenges of Employing Nuclear Energy in the

Finally, the Management infrastructure issues in France refer to the daily operation of power plants on site.

The oversight and requirements assigned by the ASN relate to the maintenance, monitoring, and servicing of the power plants under different circumstances, like during heat waves and droughts, and ensure reactors are sufficiently cooled and air-conditioned (idem: 229). Simultaneously, the requirements for materials, repairs, skills, and qualifications of the workers are established; together with real-time checks of the reactors and management of daily activities like water intake in the reactors (ibid). Arguably, these issues are important as they construe the daily workings of the power plants, and can identify risk factors before they develop into more serious problems. They comprise the take-off and acceleration phases, as they relate to the development of the active part of the nuclear power plants' contribution to the energy transition.

Therefore, this section illustrates how supporting infrastructures allow for the full potential of nuclear energy to be used. Namely, the reviews and analyses ASN conduct on a regular basis, allow for the development of the best practices and for safe operating of the power plants, which in turn power the society and provide the bridge to RES. Although chapter 3 identified the objective value-added of nuclear energy, this section connects nuclear energy with society and illustrates the importance of supporting avenues for its success.

Since nuclear energy should arguably aid the transition process, France is a real-life example of where regulations, scientific reviews, and meticulous safety processes help it be a transition tool success.

nuclear power plant should demonstrate that a crash of a passenger plane does not lead to a nuclear catastrophe (ibid), and therefore, as mentioned in chapter 3 already, stress tests and extensive safety reviews were conducted. Nonetheless, even though the Reactor Safety Commission concluded that German power plants are not similar to the Japanese and that their overall safety is significantly higher; the fact that there is never a complete certainty that a core meltdown could not occur, was a sufficient reason to push forward the recommendation to phase-out (ibid). The Green Party demanded that more security is provided, as they believed the extension of the periodic safety reviews in paragraph 7d of the Atomic Energy Act was watering down the safety requirements (idem: 12). Eventually, even though the Reactor Safety Commission concluded that German power plants were safe enough, the population was no longer willing to bear the risks in light of Fukushima (idem: 13). Additional claims on the power deficit of the power plant’s capacity and insufficiency of financial means for research and development were presented (ibid), and the bill was voted on – with a wide majority of 513 ‘yes’ and 79 ‘no’ votes (Bowen and Fox 2011). Therefore, the security and safety of the power plants are the core challenge for employing nuclear energy in an energy transition and they were the deciding factor for the German nuclear phase-out.

Considering the Security and safety issues as the core challenge, it is curious that France was able to address these infrastructure issues and make nuclear energy a success, while Germany did not. The 2019 IAEA mission reviewed German safety practices, and in general identified that German power plants meet the international requirements, and continue to do so even during the phase-out. Nonetheless, recommendations were provided for strengthening the leadership for safety culture, establishing clear requirements for the periodic review, and updating their assessments with public inputs during the process of decommissioning license (IAEA 2019). Turning to these aspects, an analysis of the German safety reviews shows a contrast to the French ASN review. Firstly, an evident difference is in the presentation and accessibility of the safety reviews, the relevant information, and the steps taken to mitigate the risks. To illustrate, the German safety review, published both by the Nuklearesicherheit and the BMUV presents deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses which are displayed in a brief official document format. The specific safety topics are addressed in separate documents from different actors. In comparison, the French ASN review, presents an extensive report, introducing the French nuclear objectives, key stakeholders, and individual chapters for each safety issue, which are continuously supported with visual representations of the given processes. The importance of this difference lies in the accessibility and comprehensiveness of the safety reviews to the relevant stakeholders and the general public. In this way, even though Germany has clearly emphasized the safety

aspects, groups concerned about security may not be able to translate the lessons learned. As the previous section showed, stakeholder communication is one of the key infrastructure issues, that must be considered, to develop, engage, and determine the roles and responsibilities of actors throughout the life cycle stages.

Next, zooming in on nuclear waste – a key concern of anti-nuclear groups and a vital infrastructure issue, the Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal (BGE) has identified the final resting place for nuclear waste only in 2020 (BGE 2020). In general, the storing of the low- and medium-level nuclear waste, was faced with public discontent, grounded in inadequate planning and execution (Appunn 2020). Seeing that the amounts of waste will only increase in the decommissioning process, organized and careful disposal methods must be followed by Germany. The ‘Law for finding and choosing a nuclear waste repository’ passed in 2013, shows that the waste disposal facilities were only temporary and subject to change. In this way, the insecurity about the future of the nuclear waste would contribute to the public disagreement with nuclear energy, and the lack of understandable communication channels for communication of the safety strategies would have made the public perceptions of risks higher, than they actually were, as the IAEA reviews have shown.

Finally, the pro and anti-nuclear division within the government, made the framing of a clear national position, and thus supportive National Infrastructure Issues difficult. The lack of a pro-nuclear commitment and a clear nuclear strategy made the legitimization of nuclear energy as a tool for the energy transition process impossible. As shown above, the national infrastructure issues are significant in both the pre-development and stabilization phases, and without them, nuclear energy is not offered the avenue for success.

Therefore, if Germany followed the infrastructure requirements in the detail, equivalent to the French one, nuclear energy would have the space to succeed as a tool in the transition process. Particularly, with the emphasis on National Infrastructure Issues, namely the national position and stakeholder involvement issues, and the continuous updating of the Safety and Security issues, the challenges of nuclear energy would be mitigated. France similarly to Germany had to consider the lessons from Fukushima in their stress tests and safety reviews. It has hardened the safety core of its power plants and increased the water reserves, which could have helped in the German case as well. Hence, the infrastructures necessary for the use of nuclear energy go hand in hand with the main challenges as they help mitigate the obstructions to the success of nuclear energy in the transition process. A proper security and waste management strategy clearly communicated to the public, would have made a difference.