Care of the Self in The Hermeneutics of the Subject

In The Hermeneutics of the Subject (HotS), we can see Foucault applying the same genealogical methodology that he’d previously applied to the development of the prison to the emergence of ethical-subjectivity. Foucault goes against the traditional history that sees our modern view of subjectivity as knowing oneself, traceable back from the Greek imperative of self-examination, through Descartes and Husserlian phenomenology. According to Foucault, “by only considering the gnothi seauton [the Greek command to know oneself]

in and for itself alone we are in danger of establishing a false continuity and of installing a factitious history that would display a sort of continuous development of knowledge of the self.”¹⁵⁵ We need to consider the practices that subjects carries out on themselves aside from self-examination, to gain a fuller picture of the subject, especially in their relation to themself.

In doing so, we see how the subject can exercise considerable agency over their self-constitution.

It is here that the concept of the ‘care of the self’ is important. In performing the practices involved in the care of the self, the subject creates their own ethical-subjectivity.

154 This the title of chapter 1 of part four of DP (pp. 231-256).

155 M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 2005, p. 461. Emphasis added.

Foucault takes this notion of care of the self from the Greek ‘epimeleia heatou’, meaning “care of oneself, attending to oneself, being concerned about oneself”.¹⁵⁶ This attitude is more than simply a way of relating to oneself however. The epimeleia heatou is closer to a worldview, incorporating not only relations of the self to the self, but to others and surrounds. It goes beyond internal reflection and leads to the performance of practices on the self by which the subject forms their own ethical-subjectivity. As Foucault puts it, “the notion of epimeleia does not merely designate this general attitude or this form of attention turned on the self. The epimeleia also always designates a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, actions by which one takes responsibility for oneself and by which changes, purifies, transforms and transfigures oneself.”¹⁵⁷ It is in examining these practices that Foucault shows how the subject constitutes itself.

One of the most developed accounts of this centres around the ‘conversion to the self’, whereby the self changes its position to itself, altering its subjectivity. By outlining this practice and how it relates to the process of self-formation I hope to show how Foucault more broadly develops an account of ethical self-formation whereby the subject exercises agency over the constitution of their own subjectivity. Here the conversion practices that are involved in self-constitution can be compared between Christian and Hellenistic/Roman thought.

Foucault supposes that these practices (as developed in the 1^st centuries BC – AD) are distinct not only from the later Christian sense in which we usually think of conversion, but also its earlier, Platonic precedent.¹⁵⁸ This can be seen on several points. Firstly, conversion in the Hellenistic/Roman sense is not divorced from the external. In contrast to both the Platonic and Christian conceptions, that emphasise the soul’s purity in contrast to an imperfect world, the Hellenic/Roman practice of conversion takes place “in the immanence of the world”.¹⁵⁹ It does not aim at liberating the soul from earthly reality, instead attempting to establish the subject in the correct relationship with themselves. There is no ‘break’ with the self to a higher reality, rather “you must advance towards the self as you advance towards an end.”¹⁶⁰

156 Ibid., p. 2.

157 Ibid., p. 10.

158 Ibid., p. 210.

159 Ibid., p. 210.

160 Ibid., p. 213. Elsewhere Foucault notes that the metaphor of navigation, of returning from an odyssey, is a common theme in the writing on conversion to the self. Conversion here appears as a ‘journey’ towards the self (pp. 248-250).

This advancement takes place through varying techniques designed to ensure the conversion of the self throughout the diverse schools of the ancient world. For instance, meditation takes on a specific place for the Stoics. By directing one’s thoughts towards themselves, the subject can question themself, putting their subjectivity to the test.¹⁶¹ This is not meant in the sense of doubting or examining oneself. Rather, through meditation the subject changes their reflexive position in relation to themself. As Foucault points out, it is this ability of the subject to see themself a certain way that is responsible for the

“transfiguration” of the subject’s own being.¹⁶² This allows for a transformation of the subject that is not reliant on something external to it. By changing their position with regards to themself through a practice of meditation, a change over the subject begins immanent to the themself. In this way, the practice of meditation serves as an example of the subject’s self-constitution.

It is worth clarifying what is meant by ‘transfiguration’ and how this is related to subject-constitution. Firstly, although the language of immanence and connection to spiritual practices may sound somewhat mystical, the practice of the care of the self as Foucault outlines it is not a moment of spiritual transformation. Indeed, it is in opposition to this Christian image of a moment of conversion that Foucault contrasts the Greek conversion of the self as a practice or exercise.¹⁶³ Through a series of techniques, including study and bodily meditation, the subject works on themself. The position that the subject takes in relation to themself is not a Cartesian conception of subjectivity involving self-knowledge. Rather, the subject performs actions on themself, which initiate changes in their subjectivity. As Frédéric Gros puts it, “the subject of the care of the self is fundamentally a subject of sound action rather than a subject of true knowledge. The logos must actualize the soundness of action rather than the perfection of knowledge.”¹⁶⁴ It is through practical activity that the subject sets themself in a specific reflexive relation, with a view to changing their being as subject.

161 Ibid., p. 259.

162 Ibid., p. 308. Although this may sound individualistic in a worryingly liberal-humanist manner, as will become clear later, the subject’s seeing themself is not an individualistic exercise and includes also a vision of their surrounding community and world.

163 Ibid., p. 315. Foucault further terms this ‘askesis’ – an ascetic process of self-creation, but one that is without the usual associations of asceticism in the sense of self-denial.

164 F. Gros, ‘Course Context’, in M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, trans G. Burchell, New York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005, p. 528.

These practices of meditation and ‘working on yourself’ may sound somewhat New Age. Perhaps more troublingly, a self that establishes its own subjectivity sounds precariously close to the kind of self-constitution of a traditional liberal-humanist account. Some critics of Foucault have taken this turn in his later work as proof of a return to a kind of pseudo-liberalism. As C.J. Heyes has put it, “having offered one of the most trenchant and profound critiques of liberalism’s progressive view of history and its subject, other critics suggested, Foucault reverted to discussion of the obscure habits of the ancients, and seemed to resurrect the autonomous individual”.¹⁶⁵ While the link between his later and earlier work will be explored in the following section, here it is worth distinguishing the subject of care of the self from an individualistic one. Refuting the individualism concomitant in Foucault’s alleged call to self-discovery hinges on the fact that there is no pre-existent subject for Foucault. He is not advocating for a return to some pre-given subject in the process of making itself, because for him such a subject does not exist.¹⁶⁶ In ancient practices there is not the same concern with self-discovery that presupposes an independent subject examining themself. Rather, the subject is involved in a practice of self-creation, whereby it’s subjectivity is rendered in a specific way through a process of working on the self.